Fundamentals of Corporate Finance Chapter 21 Mergers Acquisitions

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Fundamentals of Corporate Finance Chapter 21 Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Control Fifth Edition Slides

Fundamentals of Corporate Finance Chapter 21 Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Control Fifth Edition Slides by Matthew Will Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 2 Topics Covered ÜThe Market for Corporate Control ÜSensible Motives for Mergers

21 - 2 Topics Covered ÜThe Market for Corporate Control ÜSensible Motives for Mergers ÜDubious Reasons for Mergers ÜEvaluating Mergers ÜMerger Tactics ÜLeveraged Buy-Outs ÜThe Benefits and Costs of Mergers Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 3 The Merger Market Methods to Change Management èProxy battle for control

21 - 3 The Merger Market Methods to Change Management èProxy battle for control of the board of directors èFirm purchased by another firm èLeveraged buyout by a group of investors èDivestiture of all or part of the firm’s business units Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 4 Recent Mergers Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill

21 - 4 Recent Mergers Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 5 The Merger Market Tools Used To Acquire Companies Proxy Contest Tender

21 - 5 The Merger Market Tools Used To Acquire Companies Proxy Contest Tender Offer Acquisition Merger Leveraged Buy-Out Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Management Buy-Out Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 6 Sensible Reasons for Mergers Economies of Scale A larger firm may

21 - 6 Sensible Reasons for Mergers Economies of Scale A larger firm may be able to reduce its per unit cost by using excess capacity or spreading fixed costs across more units. $ Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Reduces costs $ $ Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 7 Sensible Reasons for Mergers Economies of Vertical Integration èControl over suppliers

21 - 7 Sensible Reasons for Mergers Economies of Vertical Integration èControl over suppliers “may” reduce costs. èOver integration cause the opposite effect. Pre-integration (less efficient) Post-integration (more efficient) Company S Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin S S Company S S S Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 8 Sensible Reasons for Mergers Combining Complementary Resources Merging may results in

21 - 8 Sensible Reasons for Mergers Combining Complementary Resources Merging may results in each firm filling in the “missing pieces” of their firm with pieces from the other firm. Firm A Firm B Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 9 Sensible Reasons for Mergers as a Use for Surplus Funds If

21 - 9 Sensible Reasons for Mergers as a Use for Surplus Funds If your firm is in a mature industry with few, if any, positive NPV projects available, acquisition may be the best use of your funds. Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 10 Dubious Reasons for Mergers ÜDiversification èInvestors should not pay a premium

21 - 10 Dubious Reasons for Mergers ÜDiversification èInvestors should not pay a premium for diversification since they can do it themselves. Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 11 Dubious Reasons for Mergers The Bootstrap Game Acquiring Firm has high

21 - 11 Dubious Reasons for Mergers The Bootstrap Game Acquiring Firm has high P/E ratio Selling firm has low P/E ratio (due to low number of shares) After merger, acquiring firm has short term EPS rise Long term, acquirer will have slower than normal EPS growth due to share dilution. Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 12 Dubious Reasons for Mergers The Bootstrap Game Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright ©

21 - 12 Dubious Reasons for Mergers The Bootstrap Game Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 13 Evaluating Mergers ÜQuestions èIs there an overall economic gain to the

21 - 13 Evaluating Mergers ÜQuestions èIs there an overall economic gain to the merger? èDo the terms of the merger make the company and its shareholders better off? ? ? Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 14 Evaluating Mergers ÜEconomic Gain Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The

21 - 14 Evaluating Mergers ÜEconomic Gain Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 15 Evaluating Mergers Example - Given a 20% cost of funds, what

21 - 15 Evaluating Mergers Example - Given a 20% cost of funds, what is the economic gain, if any, of the merger listed below? Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 16 Evaluating Mergers ÜEstimated net gain Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by

21 - 16 Evaluating Mergers ÜEstimated net gain Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 17 Merger Tactics White Knight - Friendly potential acquirer sought by a

21 - 17 Merger Tactics White Knight - Friendly potential acquirer sought by a target company threatened by an unwelcome suitor. Shark Repellent - Amendments to a company charter made to forestall takeover attempts. Poison Pill - Measure taken by a target firm to avoid acquisition; for example, the right for existing shareholders to buy additional shares at an attractive price if a bidder acquires a large holding. Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 18 Leveraged Buy-Outs Unique Features of LBOs Large portion of buy-out financed

21 - 18 Leveraged Buy-Outs Unique Features of LBOs Large portion of buy-out financed by debt Shares of the LBO no longer trade on the open market Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved

21 - 19 Leveraged Buy-Outs Potential Sources of Value in LBOs èJunk bond market

21 - 19 Leveraged Buy-Outs Potential Sources of Value in LBOs èJunk bond market èLeverage and taxes èOther stakeholders èLeverage and incentives èFree cash flow Mc. Graw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 by The Mc. Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved