File Protection Mechanisms u AllNone Protection Lack of

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File Protection Mechanisms u All-None Protection • Lack of trust • All or nothing

File Protection Mechanisms u All-None Protection • Lack of trust • All or nothing • Timesharing issues • Complexity • File listings

File Protection Mechanisms u Group Protection • User cannot belong to two groups •

File Protection Mechanisms u Group Protection • User cannot belong to two groups • Forces one person to be multiple users • Forces user to be put into all groups • Files can only be shared within groups

File Protection Mechanisms u Single Permissions • Password/Token for each file Can be lost

File Protection Mechanisms u Single Permissions • Password/Token for each file Can be lost u Inconvenient u Must be protected (if changed, must notify all users) u • Temporary Acquired Permission u UNIX’s set userid (suid)

User Authentication u Something the user knows (password, PIN, passphrase, mother’s maiden name) u

User Authentication u Something the user knows (password, PIN, passphrase, mother’s maiden name) u Something the user has (ID, key, driver’s license, uniform) u Something the user is (biometrics)

Use of Passwords Mutually agreed-upon code words, assumed known only to user and system

Use of Passwords Mutually agreed-upon code words, assumed known only to user and system u First line of defense u Loose-Lipped Systems u • WELCOME TO XYZ COMPUTING • ENTER USER ID: summers • INVALID USER NAME • ENTER USER ID:

Attack on Passwords u u Ask the user Search for the system list of

Attack on Passwords u u Ask the user Search for the system list of passwords • • • Find a valid user ID Create a list of possible passwords (encrypt if needed) Rank the passwords from high to low probability Try each password If attempt fails, try again (don't exceed password lockout)

Attack on Passwords u Exhaustive Attack (brute-force) • • u 18, 278 passwords of

Attack on Passwords u Exhaustive Attack (brute-force) • • u 18, 278 passwords of 3 letters or less 1 password / millisecond would take 18 seconds (8 minutes for 4 letters, 3. 5 hours for 5 letters) Probable passwords (dictionary attack) • • 80, 000 word dictionary would take 80 seconds Expanded “dictionary”

Attack on Passwords u UK Study (http: //www. cnn. com/2002/TECH/ptech/03/13/dangerous. pass words/? related) •

Attack on Passwords u UK Study (http: //www. cnn. com/2002/TECH/ptech/03/13/dangerous. pass words/? related) • • • 50% passwords were family names Celebrities/soccer stars – 9% each Pets – 8% 10% reflect a fantasy Only 10% use cryptic combinations

Attack on Passwords u u u Look on desk… Try no password Try user

Attack on Passwords u u u Look on desk… Try no password Try user ID Try user’s name Common words (password, private, secret) Short dictionary Complete English word list Common non-English dictionaries Dictionary with capitalization and substitutions (0 for o and 1 for i) Brute force (lowercase alphabet) Brute force (full character set)

Attack on Passwords u u Plaintext System Password List (MS Windows) Encrypted Password List

Attack on Passwords u u Plaintext System Password List (MS Windows) Encrypted Password List – 1 -way (/etc/passwd) Shadow Password List (/etc/shadow) Salt – 12 -bit number formed from system time and process id; concatenated to password

Password Selection Criteria u u u u u Use characters other than A-Z Choose

Password Selection Criteria u u u u u Use characters other than A-Z Choose long passwords Avoid names and words Choose unlikely password Change password regularly (don’t reuse) Don’t write it down Don’t tell anyone http: //www. mit. edu/afs/sipb/project/doc/passwor ds/passwords. html One-time passwords

Authentication Should be slow (5 -10 seconds) u Should only allow a limited #

Authentication Should be slow (5 -10 seconds) u Should only allow a limited # of failures (e. g. 3) u Challenge-Response Systems u Impersonation of Login u Authentication Other than Passwords u