Exploration 07 Airborne Surveys Planning Logistics and Safety

Exploration 07 Airborne Surveys Planning, Logistics and Safety Toronto, Canada September 2007 1 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Presenters 2 q John Issenman, IAGSA Chief Operating Officer q Stan Medved, Manager Aviation Safety - BHP Billiton, IAGSA Technical Committee Chair and Executive Committee Member www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Airborne Surveys – Planning Logistics & Safety Introduction and Accident Rate Review of Typical Business Process & Logistics Geophysical Goals Versus Aviation Constraints Fixed Wing Safety Considerations Helicopter Safety Considerations Introduction to IAGSA Standards Sample Survey Flight Specifications & Risk Analysis Accident Case Studies 3 09: 00 -09: 10 -09: 30 -10: 20 Break 10: 40 -11: 30 -12: 00 Lunch 13: 00 -14: 00 Accident Case Studies (cont) 14: 00 -14: 30 Break 14: 50 -15: 30 Conclusions 15: 30 -16: 00 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Part 1: Introduction and Accident Rate Review John Issenman 4 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Why form IAGSA? q q 5 After a particularly bad year in 1995 (5 aircraft lost; 10 fatalities) several survey companies decided to form the International Airborne Geophysics Safety Association (IAGSA) Mandate: Ø To develop promote and enhance safety in the industry Ø Develop standards and recommended safety practices for survey operations Ø To serve as a repository of safety information relevant to the industry Ø To educate clients on the relevant safety topics to assist in writing appropriate contract specifications www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

What has IAGSA done so far? 6 q Developed “Standards” and “Recommended Practices” for the industry; published in a Safety Policy Manual q Developed a “Recommended Contract Annex” based on the Safety Policy Manual for clients to add to their requirements (more on this later) q Gathered accident and activity data q Gathered safety advisories for sharing among members www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

What has IAGSA done so far? 7 q Implemented an accreditation program to review Active Member compliance with IAGSA policies q Funded a special project to develop risk analysis tools for high elevation helicopter autorotations q Established website where much of the above information may be obtained www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

How are we doing? q IAGSA gathers accident and activity data to develop meaningful accident rates q Each Active Member provides annual activity data (i. e. flying hours) for each category of aircraft q In addition, the number of fatal and non-fatal accidents is compiled q These data are used to calculation accident rates normalized to 100, 000 flying hours – (convention aviation accident statistics throughout the world) 8 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Accident Rate Review 9 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Accident Rate Review q Airborne Geophysics Survey Industry overall accident rate (fixed and rotary wing) has come down from 11 in 1998 to 2 in 2005 q Fatal rate over same time has come down from 6 to 1 per 100, 000 hours q North American/European/Australian non-scheduled commercial air services (fixed and rotary) rates are approximately 10 (total) and 1 (fatal) per 100 K hours, respectively 10 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Accident Rate Observations q Since IAGSA inception, the accident rates have trended in the right direction q One in two survey accidents result in a fatality compared with one in ten for non airline commercial aviation q Analysis of survey accidents has shown: 11 Ø the inability to clear high terrain while flying lines is a factor Ø high proportion of piston engine fixed wing aircraft www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

End of Part 1: Introduction and Accident Rate Review QUESTIONS? 12 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Part 2: Review of Typical Business Process John Issenman 13 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Step 1 – Tender Issue q A request for proposals or a tender document is issued to eligible bidders q The RFP specifies, among other things, how the client expects the survey to be flown q It is important that the client know what is “reasonable” to expect 14 Ø from various aircraft Ø over differing terrain Ø with the desired survey equipment www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Step 2 – Bid Preparation & Acceptance q A bid is prepared during which the bidder considers: Ø Suitable types of aircraft for the requested survey data and equipment Ø Terrain over which the survey it to be done Ø Specs for flying height, speed and data resolution Ø Costs q A risk assessment is completed to determine whether the survey can be completed safely as requested or with mitigations applied q If the answer is NO, it will be difficult to submit a conforming bid! (so will someone else bid on it? ) 15 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Step 3 – Crew Assembly Field crew is assembled and mobilized: 16 Ø One or two geophysicists or logisticians Ø One or two pilots Ø Possibly one onboard technician Ø Probably one Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (AME) Ø Risk analysis updated based on any amendments to contract and subject to crew input upon arrival on site www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Step 4 – Logistics Support 17 Ø Aircraft availability – Foreign registration of aircraft, aircraft modifications Ø Air Operator Certificate Ø Permits Ø Flight crew licensing Ø Fuel availability – pre-positioning may be required Ø Spare parts (aircraft and survey equipment) Ø Hangar access Ø Office and personnel accommodation Ø Security www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Step 4 – Data Acquisition q First flights to assess validity of assumptions used in risk analysis (e. g. . determine suitability of digital terrain elevation model used and drape surface generated) q Geophysicists process data gathered daily for quality control. q Pilots fly grid lines and may monitor onboard survey equipment. q Technician or operator may monitor onboard survey equipment. q AME ensures aircraft can fly. q Geophysicist performs quality assurance and preliminary field processing 18 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Step 5 – Data Processing Most final data processing, cartography, and production of other final products are done at the operator’s main offices; some done in field for QC and to provide preliminary data to client. 19 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

20 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

End of Part 2: Review of Typical Business Process QUESTIONS? 21 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Part 3 a: Fixed-wing Safety Considerations In Airborne Geophysics Stan Medved 22 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations q General factors – What are the goals? What Types of aircraft? q Speed – What does it mean for the geophysicist & the pilot? q Climbing and Descending – which is more demanding? q Multi-engine is always safer – isn’t it? 23 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - General q q 24 Geophysicist’s goal: Ø To obtain the best possible data with available resources How? Ø Fly low and slow Ø Increase number / size of sensors Ø Increase sampling rate Ø Improve sensor resolution www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - General q Pilot’s goal: Ø q 25 To safely fly the task within survey specifications How? Ø Operate the aircraft within manufacturers’ and regulatory limits Ø Use a risk management based approach Ø Regulatory requirements relating to survey flying are minimal compared with other commercial operations www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - General q Aircraft types: Ø Typical aircraft are smaller single and twin engine piston and turboprop Ø A few larger aircraft such as the Fugro Dash 7 and CASA 212 Ø With a few exceptions aircraft have not been designed for continuous low level operations • • • Ø 26 Performance implications Affect on structural integrity Inappropriate limitations Aircraft need to be modified www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Aircraft Types - Cessna 210 27 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Aircraft Types - Cessna Caravan 28 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Aircraft Types - Cessna 404 29 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Aircraft Types – Air Tractor 402 30 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Aircraft Types q Smaller aircraft designed to FAR Part 23 standards or equivalent q Airline type aircraft designed to the more rigorous FAR Part 25 Ø q 31 This has a significant impact on required and achievable climb performance and system redundancy Larger aircraft essentially used to provide big EM loop; they are generally too big for other applications www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Aircraft Types - DHC-7 32 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Aircraft Types – CASA 212 33 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Aircraft Types – Turbine DC-3 34 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 35 q Will become more common q Potential of better performance and safety q Currently payload limited q Large UAVs are more complex than existing manned survey aircraft q Introduces new safety issues www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed q The speed of an aircraft does not have the same meaning or implications for different people q Geophysicists are concerned with ground speed (GS) q Pilots are primarily concerned with Indicated Airspeed (IAS) followed by True Airspeed (TAS) Ø 36 What’s the difference? www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed q Indicated Airspeed (IAS) is what the pilot sees on the q Calculated by subtracting static air pressure from the total pressure of the airflow (pitot pressure) and dividing by air density q All aircraft reference speeds are quoted in Indicated Air Speed airspeed indicator. Ø Ø q 37 Stall (Vs) Take-off Landing approach (typically 1. 3 Vs) Best rate of climb (Vy, Vyse), etc IAS reference speeds remain unchanged regardless of altitude and temperature www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed q IAS is easy to measure and display to pilot. q IAS only equals true air speed under standard atmospheric conditions i. e. sea level (1013 h. Pa) & 15 C. q As altitude and temperature increase, so does true airspeed for a given IAS. q For example 120 Knots IAS equals a TAS of: 38 Air Temperature 15 C 35 C Sea Level 5000 ft 10, 000 ft 15, 000 ft 120 129 139 152 125 134 144 156 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed q Ground Speed is simply True Airspeed plus the wind effect. q A practical IAS – TAS – GS example: q 39 Ø Cessna 404 minimum safe/practical airspeed is 130 KIAS Ø New Mexico survey elevation 6000 ft, air temperature 20 C Ø 130 KIAS = 147 KTAS Ø 15 knot tailwind will give a ground speed of 162 knots Either accept the higher ground speed or choose a different aircraft which can fly safely at a lower IAS. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed q 40 Some definitions: Ø Stall speed (Vs) – is the minimum Indicated Airspeed at which the aircraft can generate sufficient lift to continue flying; not related to the function of the engine(s)! Ø Minimum single engine control speed (Vmc) – is the minimum Indicated Airspeed at which a multi-engine aircraft can be controlled with one engine failed and the other producing maximum thrust www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed Ø 41 Best single-engine rate of climb speed (Vyse) – is the Indicated Airspeed at which the aircraft will achieve the maximum climb rate with one engine operating at maximum thrust www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed 42 q For higher data resolution, it is often desirable to fly at low speed q Turbulence, high nose up attitude, and turns make consistent flying at minimum flight manual speeds impractical and unsafe q IAGSA has developed a minimum speed standard for fixed wing aircraft which is the greater of: Ø 130% of the clean stall speed (Vs) Ø 110% of the recommended single engine climb speed (Vyse - multi-engine aircraft only) www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed q q 43 IAGSA minimum safe speed examples: Ø C 404 120 knots (KIAS) Ø C 208 B 82 knots (KIAS) These are not intended to be used as target survey speeds but are the lowest Indicated Airspeeds that a pilot should ever see while surveying and manoeuvring. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations - Speed q 44 Reasons for not flying slower: Ø You can fly right down to stall speed, but safety margins are eroded to the point where turbulence or a turn will cause the aircraft to stall. At survey heights recovery is unlikely. Ø You can fly below single engine control speed as long as both engines are operating – lose one and the aircraft will rapidly depart controlled flight. Ø You can fly below best single engine climb speed – but in the event of an engine failure, the only way to accelerate to this speed is to descend – in most cases not an option at survey heights. Ø Aircraft are more difficult to control at low speeds. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending q Pilots generally think in terms of climb and descent rates (metres per minute) whilst geophysicists refer to climb or descent gradients (metres per km). q Aircraft performance charts provide climb rates which vary with density altitude. q Typical survey aircraft can achieve a maximum cruise climb rate of 1000 fpm at 120 KIAS. q As survey elevation increases TAS increases and achievable rate of climb decreases. 45 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending q 46 An Example: Ø At sea level 120 KIAS and rate of climb (ROC) of 1000 feet per minute (fpm) results in a climb gradient of 8. 3% (i. e. 83 metres per km) Ø At 5000 feet 120 KIAS equals 129 KTAS and ROC will typically decrease to 900 fpm. Climb gradient reduces to 7. 0% Ø Add a 15 knot tailwind and climb gradient decreases to 6. 25% www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending q Desirable to have the aircraft maintain constant height over the ground q In practice the maximum sustainable climb gradients are between 5 and 10% (slower airplane; steeper gradient) q Landing approach gradients are typically 3 - 3. 5% q Anything above 4% is considered steep for a landing approach – and the aircraft is configured to achieve a good descent rate gradient (slow, flaps out, landing gear down, low power setting) 47 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending q Survey flying, depending on terrain, necessitates frequent climbs and descents. q We don’t reconfigure the aircraft (landing gear and flaps down) to increase drag to optimise descent gradients on survey q Reluctant to reduce power too aggressively only to reapply for the subsequent climb; speed builds up when descending and limits descent gradient q Achievable descent gradients tend to be shallower than climb gradients!!! q Difficult to calculate accurate descent gradients due to lack of performance chart data – obtained by experience and testing 48 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending Want to climb and descend at same gradient in order to achieve consistent heights at intersections; Generate a “drape” surface 49 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending q Over such steep terrain we “drape” the surface to match the aircraft’s performance; descent performance is usually the limiting factor q The quality of the “drape” depends on the accuracy of the digital elevation data used – much of it is still insufficient for this purpose q Pilots need to be ready for errors in drape and have some performance margin available as shown in the following example: 50 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending Legend Blue: source terrain data Aircraft needs margin to High due to terrain “off-line” Terrain not modelled butclimb real! above then recapture drape Green: actual terrain Magenta: drape surface Red: actual flight profile Vertical interval: 200 metres each Horizontal distance: Approx 20 km 51 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending 52 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Climbing and Descending 53 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine “Twin engine aircraft are safer than single engine aircraft” Ø 54 Based on the premise if an engine fails the aircraft can return to an airport on the remaining engine www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Failure Rates for Turbine and Piston Engines q Actual figure for all Pratt & Whitney PT 6 engines in SE aircraft * = 1 in 300, 000 hrs (i. e. probability 3 x 10 -6) q Commonly accepted figure for piston engines = 1 in 20, 000 hours (i. e. probability 5 x 10 -5) q Therefore the piston engine is about 15 times more likely to fail than the turbine engine q The likelihood of BOTH engines failing on a piston twin is the product of the probabilities for each engine or 1 in 400, 000 hours (i. e. probability 2. 5 x 10 -9) * Report JAA/SE-IMC/AASG/6 Issue 2, 6 August 2001. “Power Loss Events on Single-Engine Turboprops: Phase of Flight”. 55 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q FAR Part 23 Certification requirements for a twin engine aircraft: Ø 56 In still air at 5000 feet density altitude an aircraft must be able to achieve a one engine inoperative climb gradient of 1. 5% subject to: • Maximum weight • Landing gear retracted • Flaps in the most favourable position • Propeller feathered • Maximum continuous power on the operating engine • 5 degrees angle of bank towards the operative engine • At OEI best rate of climb speed www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q At 5000 feet, air temperature of 20°C and maximum weight, a Cessna 400 series aircraft will achieve: Ø OEI climb rate of 150 fpm at 108 KIAS (about 1% gradient!) Ø If the propeller isn’t feathered, the aircraft descends at 250 fpm q There will be loss of altitude during the transition to single engine flight q At typical survey heights, there may be insufficient margin to enable the aircraft to climb away q Flight manual performance figures represent best case scenarios and do not account for any degradation due to survey equipment 57 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q The twin engine aircraft will provide the presumed safety advantage when operating offshore, or over relatively flat terrain at low elevations and temperatures q High elevations and/or temperatures may well exceed the single engine ceiling q Even modest terrain gradient may exceed the single engine climb gradient 58 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q 59 Why are performance figures so marginal? Ø For the original design operating environment (stable cruise flight at >5000 ft), resulting single engine climb performance is sufficient for the majority of cases Ø Aircraft used in survey were not designed to operate continuously in a low-level (<500 ft) environment www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q 60 Comments on One Engine Inoperative (OEI) Performance Ø Loss of one engine will result in ~ 80% reduction in performance; Ø Performance may be further degraded by installed survey equipment; Ø Many surveys are conducted at density altitudes that exceed the single engine ceiling of the aircraft; Ø Loss of power may be experienced at a low energy point (i. e. low airspeed and height above the ground) so technique must be perfect; Ø If survey drape parameters have been selected on the basis of twin engine climb gradient then the OEI climb gradient will be less than terrain gradient. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q 61 Comments on Pilot Workload Ø At the point of engine failure the aircraft will yaw rapidly, airspeed will begin to decrease and/or aircraft will begin descending; Ø Pilot must maintain speed above minimum single engine control speed, increase operating engine to maximum power, feather the correct propeller, apply 5 degrees of bank and keep the aircraft correctly balanced, and attain best rate of climb speed; Ø Failure to achieve any of the above will reduce climb performance; even optimum performance may not be sufficient to clear rising terrain; turning away will also reduce climb www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q 62 Comments on Pilot Workload (cont) Ø A decision to carry out a forced landing may be necessary. Ø Training and practice for handling an engine failure in a multi-engine aircraft is essential to achieving satisfactory performance Ø Such training is itself a hazardous activity especially if conducted at survey flying height Ø Frequent training in a simulator is the best way to maintain competence; there are few simulators available for the class of aircraft used in the industry www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine 63 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q Examples of where survey aircraft should have been able to maintain altitude with one engine inoperative Aircraft Type 64 Country Year Remarks C 404 South Africa 1991 Fatal – Loss of airspeed while setting up after engine failure Aero Commander Australia 1994 Fatal – Fuel system mismanagement led to engine failure and loss of control C 404 Zimbabwe 1995 Non fatal – forced landing after aircraft unable to maintain altitude on one engine Islander Brazil 1996 Non fatal – loss of aircraft, unable to maintain altitude on one engine Navajo Indonesia 1998 Fatal – engine failure implicated Cessna 404 Mozambique 2004 Fatal – engine failure implicated www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q As of mid 2007 no survey industry losses of single-engine turbine aircraft attributable to the engine q Provided maintenance and pilot training are done well, there is no reason not to use piston twin engine aircraft but in practice turbines have demonstrated far greater reliability q The principal reason for difficulty after engine failure with a twin is the combination of pilot workload and poor single engine performance (especially true for piston engine aircraft) 65 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety - Single Engine Vs Twin Engine q Single Engine (FAR Part 23) Certification Ø 66 Stall speed not to exceed 61 KIAS • Based on the expectation that an off-airport forced landing will be survivable at touchdown speeds • There is no such limitation for twin engine aircraft – typical stall speeds are ~ 80 KIAS except for STOL aircraft Ø In the event of an engine failure, there is a clear course of action. Ø On the other hand, a forced landing may be into hostile terrain www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Fixed Wing Safety Considerations Summary 67 Ø Fixed wing (and helicopter) performance limitations need to be considered when determining specifications such as ground speeds and drape parameters Ø Prevailing winds and temperatures have a significant impact on ground speed and climb (and descent) gradients Ø Specifying a twin engine aircraft does not automatically provide a higher safety standard unless all the conditions are met to enable a return to base on one engine Ø If a forced landing is the result following an engine failure, it is less likely to be survivable in a twin engine aircraft than in a single engine aircraft www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

End of Part 3 a: Fixed Wing Safety Considerations QUESTIONS? 68 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

BREAK! 69 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Part 3 b: Helicopter Safety Considerations In Airborne Geophysics John Issenman 70 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Safety Considerations q Safety considerations for fixed wing aircraft apply equally to helicopters (eg. IAS – TAS, single vs. twin, min safe speeds) q Many projects in mountainous areas require use of helicopters at high elevations q Can deliver better survey data because they can fly slower and climb steeper; therefore contour steep terrain more successfully than fixed wing q Usually light, single engine models such as Eurocopter AS 350 series are chosen but some twins also used 71 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Pros and Cons PROS: q Slower flight for greater data resolution q Ability to fly steeper gradients CONS: q Lower productivity due to lower speed and endurance q Higher operating costs q Unique additional hazards AS 350 Ecurieul (Squirrel) or ASTAR 72 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Autorotations q In the event of an engine failure, a helicopter can perform an autorotation to land safely q Successful autorotation is limited to certain combinations of height above ground (h) and speed (v) q Pilot is provided with a chart of the H-V avoid area within which an autorotation may not be successful 73 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Autorotations q Typical H-V avoid area chart - Robinson R-22. Hover at 625 feet q Pilot to “avoid operation in shaded area”. Hover at 400 feet 50 Knots & 200 feet q Note effect of increasing density altitude (combination of altitude with high temperature). 74 www. iagsa. ca Hover at 10 feet September 14, 2007

Helicopter Autorotations q Pilot procedure in event of engine failure(AS 350) Ø Ø Ø Ø Lower collective pitch control (left hand) to prevent loss of rotor speed Establish 65 knots using cyclic control (right hand) Turn into wind At 65 ft (20 m) flare to nose up attitude At 20 -25 ft (6 -8 m) and constant attitude apply collective pitch to reduce sink rate Resume level attitude, cancel sideslip, touch down Notes say to expect 1800 ft/min descent at 65 knots q That’s 10 seconds from 300 feet!! q That’s why we want to minimize time spent in “avoid area” 75 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Medium Helicopter with EM Bird – Bell 205/212 q 76 Photo reminds us that the pilot in this situation would also have to drop the “bird” whilst executing the auto rotation www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Autorotations 77 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Good Training – Good Outcome 78 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Safety Considerations – HOGE q IAGSA recommends that “Hover-out-of-ground-effect” (HOGE) capability should be the performance benchmark for helicopters q A helicopter can hover “in-ground-effect” (HIGE) at a higher weight than when far above the ground q To be in ground effect requires that the helicopter be no more than about half a rotor diameter above a level solid surface q Operating with HOGE capability means the pilot has some extra margin for downdrafts, or unexpected circumstances (like the unexpected terrain shown earlier!) 79 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Safety Considerations – HOGE Example: AS 350 – B 3 At max weight of 2250 kg (4960 lb) and 20˚C HOGE ceiling is 8500 feet HOGE at 10, 750 HOGE at 9, 500 HOGE at 8, 500 Can safely work at higher elevations by limiting to lower temperatures or reducing weight Same weight at 10˚C 200 kg lighter at 20˚C 80 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Safety Considerations q Twin Engine Helicopters Ø Most cannot land in a confined area vertically with one engine inoperative (OEI) Ø Maximum altitude with OEI tends to be low • Bell 412 EP OEI service ceiling: Max weight – 5400 ft Mid weight – 8400 ft Ø 81 At moderate to high elevation surveys failure of one engine will result in a forced landing www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Safety Considerations q Other Helicopter Specific Considerations Ø Dynamic roll over Ø Ground resonance Ø Run on landing – tail rotor failures The landing area (size, surface, obstacles) has a significant impact 82 Ø Settling with power Ø Wire strikes Ø Towed bird strikes Ø Tail rotor strikes www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Safety Considerations 83 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Helicopter Safety Considerations - Summary 84 Ø Helicopters offer advantages because of slower speed and steeper gradients Ø Can operate away from airfields but the landing area needs to be carefully considered Ø Minimum survey speed to remain outside the H-V avoid area Ø Operate at weights that give a HOGE capability Ø Autorotative landings happen very quickly Ø There is no manufacturer data available to determine successful autorotation parameters at high elevations Ø Twin engine helicopters are unlikely to remain airborne following an engine failure at moderate to high survey elevations www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

End of Part 3 b: Helicopter Safety Considerations QUESTIONS? 85 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Part 5: Introduction to IAGSA Standards John Issenman 86 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Introduction to IAGSA Standards q Standards and Recommended Practices described in Safety Policy Manual with background information q Based on ICAO format q Also written in the form of a contractual clauses in the IAGSA Contract Annex for suggested use by those writing specifications. q The international oil industry through the Association of Oil and Gas Producers has adopted IAGSA Recommended Practices 87 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Introduction to IAGSA Standards q All Active Members agree to substantially comply with these and must demonstrate this as a condition of Accreditation q An Active Member who does not comply with one or more Standards, makes a declaration in the form of a “Notification of Difference” 88 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Introduction to IAGSA Standards q 89 Examples of some standards Ø Definitions Ø Flying height to be determined after risk analysis following a recommended format Ø Minimum speed for fixed wing aircraft Ø Use of helmets Ø Pilot training syllabus Ø Equipment required for over water and offshore surveys Ø Helicopter performance benchmarks Ø Helicopter avoid area recommendation www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

IAGSA STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES EXAMPLES Training and equipment for over water and offshore flight: exposure suits; life vests; egress practice Towed “birds” and refuelling from drums operations 90 www. iagsa. ca Helmets & appropriate clothing; survey flight training syllabus September 14, 2007

End of Part 5: Introduction to IAGSA Standards QUESTIONS? 91 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

LUNCH 92 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Part 6: Sample Survey Flight Specifications and Typical Risk Analyses Stan Medved 93 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Sample Survey Flight Specifications and Typical Risk Analyses Fixed Wing C 208 vs C 404 94 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007 Helicopter

Risk Analysis - General q IAGSA provides a standard format for fixed wing and helicopter risk analyses that each operator may use as-is or customize to suit q Risk Analysis is necessarily a subjective process but a consistent format will provide for a good basis for comparisons q We cannot explicitly quantify the risk; too many variables with unknown probabilities but…. . q We CAN effectively compare acceptability of risk for one aircraft type to another and propose mitigations for anticipated hazards whose risk level is unacceptable 95 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - General q Note that airborne geophysics hazards are often unlike those for air transport operation q For example: Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) is one of the major causes of aircraft accidents in both airline and airborne geophysics operations; but for different reasons q Mitigating strategies applicable to airline operations are often incompatible with airborne geophysics: airlines use EGPWS to combat CFIT but this equipment is totally useless for low level airborne geophysics 96 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - General q Start by gathering all information relevant to the survey being analyzed (i. e. survey location, terrain, surface cover, line lengths, prevailing weather, etc. ) q Specific data for each aircraft Type being analyzed must also be included q IAGSA form provides guidance on what information is required 97 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - General Client Resource Company Contact Name Client Contact Survey Title Big Survey Start Date Mid July Location A hot desert Est. End Date Mid Sept Aircraft Operator Contact Name Total Size (lkm) 75, 842 No. of Blocks 3 Proposed Aircraft Types Cessna C 208 B Cessna C 404 Remarks (list any general comments regarding this risk analysis): This analysis has considered both the Cessna 208 B and the Cessna 404. Target ground speed will be 130 knots. 98 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - General Block Name 1 Survey Type 150 m Direction 360˚ T Spacing 1, 000 m Average Length Total Trav. line length (lkm) Control Lines 104 km 111 km 118 km 20, 105 lkm 18, 359 lkm 21, 927 lkm Direction 90˚ T Spacing 4, 000 m Average Length Total Control line length (lkm) 139 km 156 km 185 km 5, 179 lkm 4, 715 lkm 5, 557 lkm Total line kilometers this Block (lkm) 75, 852 Fixed Height, Drape or Contour? Drape If Drape 99 3 Aeromagnetic Terrain Clearance Traverse Lines 2 Planned Gradient (ft/nm) 250 ft/nm Manual / Auto Guidance? Auto Guidance www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - General Prevailing wind Direction Avg. wind speed (knots) Add other relevant general information including airport data Mean min temp ( C) Weather Mean max temp ( C) Remarks / Source Elevation (Feet MSL) Minimum Median (this value is required) Maximum Fuel Supplier Name Fuel Storage / Delivery method (tanker, buried tanks, bladder, drums? ) Fuel Filtration / Quality Control Flight Following Primary Comm Method Alternate method (if applicable) Planned Communication Time interval 100 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Terrain information Terrain Gradient (m/km) % of Block Surface % of Block Flat (< 10) 30 Water 0 Gentle (11 -50) 60 Desert 90 Undulating (51 -150) 10 Scrub 10 Steep 0 Pastoral 0 Total (must be 100) 100 Wooded 0 Tree height n/a Planned drape gradient ft/nm 250 Jungle 0 Canopy height n/a m/km 41 Total 100 101 (>150) www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Other Hazards None Few Power lines X Towers/Masts X Known bird Activity X Farm houses X Airstrips X Blasting areas X Restricted/Danger areas www. iagsa. ca Remarks X Urban areas 102 Many X Known aircraft activity Politically sensitive areas Moderate X X September 14, 2007 R - 51 Border 5 km

Risk Analysis – Aircraft Data q 103 This section allows for entry of data describing: Ø the maintenance status of the aircraft (ie. will any major components require replacement during the survey) Ø weight and balance based on the survey equipment and crew complement plus any special safety equipment required (life raft; emergency water rations) Ø fuel required, including reserve fuel based on IAGSA standards Ø Maximum planned flight endurance www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Climb Performance Data Aircraft Type C 404 Titan Flight Manual Performance Gear / Flap KCAS KTAS G/S Stall Speed 83 89 99 Up / up Survey Speed 140 150 160 Up / up All engines climb speed 120 128 138 Up / up OEI climb speed (ME aircraft) 109 117 127 Start Survey wt. 8, 173 Climb rates Up / up Compare these gradients with Climb gradient Fpm Configuration ft/nm m/km the planned All engines climb rate 780 339 55. 8 drape gradient OEI climb rate (ME aircraft) 170 80 13. 17 (if applicable) 250 41 Planned drape gradient 104 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - General q Identify the applicable HAZARDS (IAGSA standard RA form assists with this) q Estimate and rank the severity of the consequences should the hazard be encountered q Estimate and rank the exposure to the hazard or likelihood that it will be encountered q Rate the “Risk factor” as the product of the severity and the exposure/likelihood q Decide on the acceptability of the calculated risk factor 105 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – One Engine Inoperative Risk Matrix q Using a risk matrix the OEI scenario is to be considered. This is an assessment of the risk relating to the requirement to execute a forced landing or ditching in a twin-engine aircraft in the event of an engine failure q The terrain and performance data from the general section are required to complete this analysis q First assign the severity rating of the consequences of a ditching or forced landing q Next assign the likelihood rating that such an outcome would occur 106 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – One Engine Inoperative Risk Matrix SEVERITY q 107 Ø 5 - Assigned when there is no forced landing or ditching area available. Survey site is completely wooded or over jungle. Any attempt to conduct a forced landing will probably not be survivable. Ø 4 - Assigned when the aircraft is considered to be able to execute a survivable forced landing or ditching for some (25%) of the survey area. Ø 3 - Assigned when the aircraft is considered to be able to execute a survivable forced landing or ditching for about half of the survey area. Ø 2 - Assigned when the aircraft is considered to be able to execute a survivable forced landing or ditching for most (75%) of the survey area. Ø 1 - Assigned when the complete survey area is suitable for survivable forced landing or ditching scenario www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – One Engine Inoperative Risk Matrix q LIKELIHOOD 108 Ø 5 - Assigned when the gradient of the terrain or drape exceeds the maximum climb gradient of the aircraft in normal two engine operation and precludes a controlled descent to lower altitudes at which sustained OEI flight can be achieved. Ø 4 - Assigned when the gradient of the terrain or drape exceeds the maximum climb gradient of the aircraft in single engine climb configuration for the complete survey area and precludes a controlled descent to lower altitudes at which sustained OEI flight can be achieved. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – One Engine Inoperative Risk Matrix q LIKELIHOOD (Con’t) 109 Ø 3 - Assigned when the gradient of the terrain or drape exceeds the maximum climb gradient of the aircraft in single engine climb configuration and descent to altitudes at which sustained OEI flight can be achieved is not possible for more than 50% of the survey area. Ø 2 - Assigned when the maximum gradient of the terrain or drape is less than the maximum climb gradient of the aircraft in single engine operation calculated at the mean survey weight and temperature or it is possible to descend to altitudes at which sustained OEI flight is achievable. Ø 1 - Assigned when the maximum gradient of the terrain is less than the maximum climb gradient of the aircraft in single engine operation calculated at the start survey weight and maximum projected temperature. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – One Engine Inoperative Risk Matrix q Enter the resulting severity and likelihood ratings into the risk matrix to calculate a “risk factor” LIKELIHOOD q 110 SEVERITY 5 4 3 2 1 5 25 20 15 10 5 4 20 16 12 8 4 3 15 12 9 6 3 2 10 8 6 4 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 Note that the numerical value has only “relative” meaning (i. e. Risk factor of “ 4” is not twice as risky as “ 2” only “greater than”) www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - Use of The Risk Matrix q The matrix is presented below, complete with suggested methods of reducing risk factors. The following index is then to be used to determine the risk management required for the proposed survey. RISK FACTOR 111 SURVEY CONDITIONS 16 -25 Survey not to proceed as currently planned. Consultation between Aviation Manager, Field Operations Manager and Chief Pilot/Senior Field Pilot required to significantly amend plans. 9 -15 Survey may proceed upon approval by Aviation Manager and/or Chief Pilot of amendments to current plan or other factors that mitigate identified risks. 1 -8 Survey may proceed as currently planned. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - Mitigation The likelihood of a forced landing as a result of engine failure can be reduced by the following: q Aircraft Selection - consider other aircraft types or categories (i. e. helicopter) if the performance characteristics are not suitable for the survey. q Aircraft Payload - By reducing the weight (i. e. fuel loading) of an aircraft the performance can be optimized. q Temperature Considerations - Planning of the survey for the coolest periods (daily and/or seasonal) may be necessary to optimize performance. q Maintenance Considerations - Engine Trend Monitoring, Fuel Quality Control and S. O. A. P. Sampling. 112 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis - Mitigation Where likelihood cannot be reduced, perhaps severity of forced landing event can be as follows: q Aircraft Selection - single engine aircraft and helicopters do not require areas as large as twin-engine fixed wing aircraft for successful forced landing and the landing speeds are lower q Height of Survey and Drape Parameters - Increasing the height of the survey can improve the probability of maintaining flight after experiencing an engine failure; will give a pilot greater reaction time to configure the aircraft, climb away from the ground, or turn towards lower ground. A similar result may be achieved by reducing the maximum allowable gradients used for the drape. q Protective Equipment - Consider adding more protective gear for crew members (helmet, 4 -5 point harness, ditching and survival gear, etc. ) 113 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Which Aircraft q We’ve seen that the piston multi engine C 404 is a low risk q The turbine single engine C 208 B is also a low risk – given the high probability of a successful forced landing over most of the area and the high reliability of its engine q The difference is that the C 404 will have a survey ground speed of 160 knots whilst the C 208 B can achieve a ground speed as low as 120 knots q Survey specification calls for 130 knots which can be achieved by the C 208 B 114 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Helicopter 115 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Helicopter Autorotation Risk Matrix q 116 Severity Ø 5 - Assigned when there is high probability of critical or fatal injury following an autorotation attempt at any altitude. Ø 4 - Probability of surviving, without critical injury, an autorotation attempt at any altitude is unlikely. Ø 3 - Probability of surviving, without a serious or critical injury, an autorotation attempt at any altitude, is poor. Ø 2 - Probability of surviving, without serious or critical injury, an autorotation attempt at any altitude is fair. Ø 1 - Probability of surviving, without critical injury, an unsuccessful autorotation attempt is good. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Helicopter Autorotation Risk Matrix q 117 Likelihood Ø 5 - Assigned when more than 75% of the survey area would be flown in the avoid area of the Height vs. Velocity chart. Ø 4 - Assigned when most, 50 - 75%, of the survey area would be flown in the avoid area of the Height vs. Velocity chart. Ø 3 - Assigned when 25 - 50%of the survey area would be flown in the avoid area of the Height vs. Velocity chart. Ø 2 - Assigned when less than 25% of the survey area would be flown in the avoid area of the Height vs. Velocity chart. Ø 1 - Assigned when the helicopter would be flown outside of the avoid area on the Height vs. Velocity chart for the entire survey area. www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Helicopter Autorotation Risk Matrix q Enter the resulting severity and likelihood ratings into the risk matrix as in previous fixed wing example LIKELIHOOD q 118 SEVERITY 5 4 3 2 1 5 25 20 15 10 5 4 20 16 12 8 4 3 15 12 9 6 3 2 10 8 6 4 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 Mitigations include more rigorous AR training for pilots; more rigorous maintenance standards (HUMS) www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risk Analysis – Helicopter Risk Matrices q Other Risk matrices for: Ø HOGE performance Ø Hazards of executing a forced landing with power (due to weather or other factors) q For airplanes and helicopters also consider hazards that are independent of aircraft class and number of engines 119 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Risky Behaviour 120 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

End of Part 6: Sample Survey Flight Specifications and Typical Risk Analyses QUESTIONS? 121 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Part 7: Accident Case Studies Stan Medved 122 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Survey Accident Case Studies q 123 Two survey accidents will be examined and how planning and appropriate controls may have prevented them: Ø May 1997, Cessna 210 N – Emerald, Australia Ø November 1994, Aero Commander 680 F – Cloncurry, Australia www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Cessna 210 N - Background q Single engine Cessna 210 N conducting survey west of Emerald, Australia in the Drummond Range area q One pilot and one operator on board q Planned height of 80 m q East – West lines q Early morning departure for an expected ~ 5 hour flight q Generally open flat terrain except crossing Drummond Range (400 m above surrounding terrain) with a number of narrow valleys q One line over rugged terrain needed to be reflown 124 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Cessna 210 N - Background 125 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Cessna 210 N - Background q Aircraft departed at 6. 38 am q No radio communications planned or made with Company or ATC Flight Service q When the aircraft did not return by 11. 30 am as expected, the Company reported the aircraft as overdue. q Search initiated and three days later the wreckage was located in the survey area with no survivors q Aircraft had impacted trees in a steep turn (85 – 90 deg) coming to rest 30 m below the ridge top q Emergency locator transmitters destroyed on impact 126 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Cessna 210 N - Conditions q Prior to the accident the aircraft was flying on an easterly heading q Sun was relatively low on the horizon q Broken layer of cloud between 2000 and 3000 ft (close to level of high terrain) - visibility beneath the cloud layer was good q Moderate wind, however severe mechanical turbulence was reported in the area at low level q No evidence of any airframe or engine abnormality or birdstrike 127 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Cessna 210 N - Conditions q No evidence of any physiological condition affecting either crewmember q Pilot had moderate levels of experience (1, 445 hrs total and 450 on survey in Cessna 210 N) q No regulatory requirements for specific survey low level flying training for pilots q Survey operators approval required company pilots to have completed a general low flying course q No record of the pilot having undergone this training 128 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Cessna 210 N - Conditions q Company provided some guidance on low level operations but no information on escape manoeuvres or operations in restricted areas q Company advocated trading airspeed for height technique to climb over rising terrain 129 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Cessna 210 N - Findings q Wind conditions were conducive to severe mechanical turbulence q Data quality in the accident area was poor the previous day flown in similar conditions q Sun glare and cloud may have affected pilot’s visibility q Pilot had not received appropriate low flying training for the environment q Company guidance was inadequate for the operating environment q Failure of ELTs resulted in a very large search area 130 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F – November 1994 131 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F - Background q Aeromagnetic survey, 80 m height, 140 knots, ~ 5 hr duration q Aircraft departed between 7. 00 and 7. 30 am with pilot and operator on board q No radio communications planned or made with Company or ATC Flight Service q When the aircraft did not return by 12. 30 pm as expected, a field crew member started making calls to see if the aircraft had landed elsewhere q Formal SAR action initiated at 8. 45 pm 132 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F - Conditions q Aircraft wreckage found next morning q Aircraft was 3. 4% above maximum takeoff weight q Calculated best single engine rate of climb was 160 ft/min q Weather conditions were good – clear skies and light winds, 37 C q Aircraft was out of control at impact (120 deg bank and 35 deg nose down) q At time of impact right engine was operating at full power, left engine shutdown and propeller feathered 133 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F - Conditions q No mechanical abnormalities in airframe, both engines and propellers q Left engine fuel selector valve: Centre and Outboard tanks in closed position q Right engine fuel selector valve: Centre tank open; Outboard tank closed 134 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F - Pilot q Pilot was experienced in survey operations q Pilot had 710 hours in Aero Commander 500 series aircraft but had only flown the 680 F model once, the day before and had not flown any other Aero Commander series aircraft in the preceding four months q Pilot had received a verbal briefing from another company pilot on the differences in the fuel system between the 500 series and 680 F Aero Commander models q Pilot had left the hotel at 5. 00 am and did not have breakfast 135 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F – Fuel System q The Aero Commander’s fuel system has a number of fuel tanks that need to be manually selected and managed q Attention is needed to ensure that as the outboard tank gets close to empty the centre tank is selected before the engine is starved of fuel q Company pilots used different procedures for managing fuel usage q The fuel tanks, fuel usage rates and fuel selector panel differ between the 500 series and 680 F q The outboard tanks empty in ~60 minutes in the 500 series and ~20 minutes in the 680 F (left tank 3 – 5 minutes quicker than the right tank) 136 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F – Fuel System 680 F 500 Series Fuel Selector Panels – located on the overhead console 137 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F – Hypothesis q The pilot’s only flight in the 680 F was 2 hours long and not long enough to need to use the outboard fuel tanks q During the flight both outboard tanks were selected feeding their respective engines q After about 20 minutes the left engine began to run roughly and the pilot reached up to the overhead panel and instinctively selected what he thought was the Centre tank, instead he switched the fuel off q The pilot assuming an engine failure secured the failed engine and began to turn away from the survey area and towards Cloncurry 138 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F – Hypothesis q 3 – 5 minutes later the right engine began to surge and then run rough due to air entering the fuel line to the engine q The resultant power loss on the one operating engine would have caused a rapid reduction in speed and climb rate q Realising his error the pilot selected the correct Centre fuel tank position which restored fuel flow to the right engine q However with the aircraft at very low speed (below Vmc) the sudden restoration of power on one engine caused the aircraft to go out of control 139 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F – Findings q The pilot was unfamiliar with the fuel system on the Aero Commander 680 F q The company did not provide sufficient training on the differences q The briefing provided to the pilot was done in a hotel room without reference to aircraft manuals or the aircraft itself q Company pilots used different fuel management techniques q The pilot had not eaten since the evening meal the day before the accident 140 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Aero Commander 680 F – Findings q The pilot would have been subjected to significant heat stress q The aircraft was overloaded q The Company’s emergency response plan was inadequate q Pilot incapacitation or birdstrike were ruled out by the investigating agency as likely causes 141 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Accident Case Studies q Both involved failures in a number of controls or defences culminating in the accident q We use the risk assessment process to understand the hazards, assess the risk and ensure that we have effective controls in place 142 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Part 8: Conclusions Stan Medved & John Issenman 143 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Conclusions q Airborne geophysical survey is a relatively high risk activity q The nature of the activity provides little margin q Through detailed planning and understanding of the risks and controls available we can make it as safe as routine charter flying q It takes a cooperative approach involving both the survey provider and client commissioning the surveys q The controls developed and implemented have proven to be effective q Whilst these risk controls increase cost they also allow surveys to be carried out more efficiently 144 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

How Quickly Things Go South 145 www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007

Exploration 07 q More information at: www. iagsa. ca q 146 Questions? www. iagsa. ca September 14, 2007