Evaluation of Samaritans Purse Church and Community Mobilisation

Evaluation of Samaritan’s Purse Church and Community Mobilisation Programme Jodi Blackham Samaritan’s Purse

Background n n n Samaritan’s Purse started church mobilisation programming in 2005 In response to HIV problem in African countries Grew to incorporate OVC and developed “My Family” Became boarder to address economic challenges, “Livelihoods Lens” Piloted “open-ended” in Swaziland Kyrgyzstan (e. g. church respond to any need they identify)

Church Mobilisation Partnerships n n n n Belarus Kyrgyzstan Kenya Liberia Rwanda Swaziland Uganda

The Model Step One Pre-Process Step Two Envisioning and Empowering Step Three Action Group Formation Step Four Planning and Sector Training Step Five Outreaches Begin Step Six Further Capacity Building and Support

The Evaluaiton n n Conducted in Rwanda, Swaziland Kyrgyzstan Assessed the programme from different perspectives: q q q n n SP – funder Partner – implementer Church action groups – local faith community Conducted with local churches that the partners had stopped supporting at least 18 months previously Structured interviews and a scalar tools

Sample of the Research Questions n Is the programme effective in addressing root causes of poverty in a number of holistic areas not just treating the symptoms? n Does the model continue to evolve and impact at consistent levels after the end of external assistance? What are some of the facilitator or inhibitors for continuing impact? n To what extend, after SP’s engage ceases, is the model being replicated effectively by the local church and community?

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS COUNTRIES: Kyrgyzstan and Swaziland FOCUS of findings presented here: Capacity of Church Action Groups and Sustainability of Activities

Functioning church action groups n After min. of 18 months without any external trainings/mentoring, majority of churches still have an active functional action group: q q q n SW: 95% (47% thriving, 35% ticking over, 18% struggling) KG: 59% (80% thriving, 20% ticking over) KG: continuing after six months lead to 90% chance of long-term activity Varying impact of senior pastor/leader moving on: q q SW: 15% senior pastors moved on, but no association with ceasing of activities KG: 18% of senior pastors moved on, higher amongst churches that subsequently stopped activities

Facilitators/Motivators Swaziland Kyrgyzstan Improvement of livelihoods Consistent and supportive leadership Success of savings and loans schemes Consistency in group members New initiatives undertaken “SP didn’t promise us anything and after a while we knew they meant it. SP promised nothing and now we have learned that we have what we needed all along. ” – church member

Inhibitors Swaziland Kyrgyzstan Drought Leadership changes Financial constraints External pressures/discouragement Financial constraints

The Model n Fidelity: recognizable as the original model q q n n SW: 67% ‘clearly recognisable’ and 33% ‘partly recognisable’ KG: 90% “clearly recognisable” Vision: majority maintain the vision SW Holistic support of specific vulnerable families 50% More aid-related 37% General community services 13% Replication: those that thrive are likely to multiply q q SW: 69% birthed at least one other group KG: 80% birthed at least one other group KG 90% 10%

Impact on the Church n Church action groups impact the church beyond their activities: almost all church leaders state the action groups have positively impacted the church: q q SW: 95% KG: 90% “Spiritually our people are seeing themselves as ministers because they are visiting homes more than they ever have in the past. ” – pastor

Perception of the Community “We have people who come to our churches who used to spend Sundays at the local drinking spots who have told us they came after seeing what we have done for their families. ” – action group member Percentage of population considering the church active in caring for vulnerable families 100 87. 2 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 12. 1 10 0 Baseline Endline *previous research from CCMP in Uganda 2006 - 2010

Conclusions n n Model is successful in changing the perspective of the churches in their ability to reach the vulnerable and influence change Different inhibitors and facilitators in the different contexts: q q n n Livelihoods gains important in Swaziland External pressures influencing factor in Kyrgyzstan Continuing activities in the short-term good indication of longterm success Model has a positive impact on the church

Next steps n n Complete data analysis and consolidate learning from other countries Disseminate findings Adapt model based on findings Further research q q q Livelihoods component in SW? External factors in KG? Length of programming cycle?