Evaluation of Machine Protection Systems and Machine Protection

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Evaluation of Machine Protection Systems and Machine Protection Functions contribution to availability Szandra Kövecses

Evaluation of Machine Protection Systems and Machine Protection Functions contribution to availability Szandra Kövecses Lead Integrator for Machine Protection European Spallation Source ERIC 2019 -11 -11

Content • • • Introduction Case 1: Damage Case 2: Correct interlock Case 3:

Content • • • Introduction Case 1: Damage Case 2: Correct interlock Case 3: Uninterrupted operation Case 4: Incorrect Interlock Summary 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 2

European Spallation Source • • European Spallation Source (ESS) Lund, Sweden The brightest neutron

European Spallation Source • • European Spallation Source (ESS) Lund, Sweden The brightest neutron source User program is planned for 2023 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 3

Availability • 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS,

Availability • 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 4

Availability at ESS • Availability at accelerator driven facilities = science production • ESS

Availability at ESS • Availability at accelerator driven facilities = science production • ESS has very high availability requirements (neutron beam delivery) • Reduce downtime! 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 5

Reduce downtime • • Increase component quality Simplify design Add redundancy Add overcapacity Design

Reduce downtime • • Increase component quality Simplify design Add redundancy Add overcapacity Design for inspectability Design for maintainability Have spare parts and manpower for repairs Avoid damage (Machine Protection) 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 6

Machine Protection Systems Support availability by transferring long downtimes (due to damage) into shorter

Machine Protection Systems Support availability by transferring long downtimes (due to damage) into shorter downtimes (due to interlocks*) *an intended interruption of operations due to a detected damage risk 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 7

Table – introduction Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO uninterrupted operation

Table – introduction Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO uninterrupted operation unnecessary interlock desired case undesired case 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 8

Table - Damage risk No Interlock YES damage Interlock NO desired case undesired case

Table - Damage risk No Interlock YES damage Interlock NO desired case undesired case 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 9

Hazard – Damage risk 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection

Hazard – Damage risk 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 10

Timeline - Damage Availability lost <1 h uptime downtime t 1 Damage repaired uptime

Timeline - Damage Availability lost <1 h uptime downtime t 1 Damage repaired uptime Availability lost 1 h-1 day downtime t 2 Damage 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 Damage repaired 11

Table – Correct interlock Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO desired

Table – Correct interlock Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO desired case undesired case 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 12

Timeline – Interlock and damage Availability lost <1 h uptime downtime t 3 Problem

Timeline – Interlock and damage Availability lost <1 h uptime downtime t 3 Problem detected (interlock) Problem solved uptime Availability lost 1 h-1 day downtime t 2 Damage 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 Damage repaired 13

Interlocks cause downtime • If a damage risk exists an interlock is the desired

Interlocks cause downtime • If a damage risk exists an interlock is the desired behavior • But an interlock causes downtime • The downtime is allocated to the protection system or the system causing the damage risk • An interlock is registered as downtime instead of a reduction of downtime, an “availability gain” 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 14

Timeline – Availability gain Availability lost Availability gained uptime downtime t 3 Problem detected

Timeline – Availability gain Availability lost Availability gained uptime downtime t 3 Problem detected (interlock) Problem solved uptime downtime t 2 Damage 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 Damage repaired 15

Availability gain – formula • 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine

Availability gain – formula • 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 16

Table - Operation Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO uninterrupted operation

Table - Operation Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO uninterrupted operation desired case undesired case 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 17

Uninterrupted operation • Everything works as intended • Science production is supported 2022 -01

Uninterrupted operation • Everything works as intended • Science production is supported 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 18

Table – “Unnecessary interlocks” Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO uninterrupted

Table – “Unnecessary interlocks” Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO uninterrupted operation unnecessary interlock desired case undesired case 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 19

Unnecessary interlocks • • Spurious trips (unreliable equipment) Overprotection (no real damage risk) “Deadlocks”

Unnecessary interlocks • • Spurious trips (unreliable equipment) Overprotection (no real damage risk) “Deadlocks” (not possible to restore operational conditions) Inflexible (some operational scenarios were not taken into account)* * talk by Enric Bargalló 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 20

Contribution to availability - Correct Interlocks Increases Availability - Uninterrupted operation 2022 -01 -30

Contribution to availability - Correct Interlocks Increases Availability - Uninterrupted operation 2022 -01 -30 - Damage - Unnecessary Interlocks - Machine protection system downtime Decreases Availability Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 21

Table – Summary • • • Unforeseen events Damage risk not detected Incorrect reaction

Table – Summary • • • Unforeseen events Damage risk not detected Incorrect reaction to damage risk Damage risk No Interlock YES damage correct interlock NO uninterrupted operation unnecessary interlock • Operation without interruption 2022 -01 -30 • Correctly implemented protection • Reduction of downtime due to damage prevention • • False trips Overprotection “Deadlocks” Inflexible Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 desired case undesired case 22

Thank you! Szandra Kövecses Lead Integrator for Machine Protection European Spallation Source ERIC 2019

Thank you! Szandra Kövecses Lead Integrator for Machine Protection European Spallation Source ERIC 2019 -11 -11

Questions/Discussion • Are you evaluating machine protection systems contribution to availability? • How do

Questions/Discussion • Are you evaluating machine protection systems contribution to availability? • How do you allocate interlock downtime? • Are you measuring/estimating “availability gain”? • Are you measuring/estimating “cost gain”? 2022 -01 -30 Szandra Kövecses, Lead Integrator for Machine Protection at ESS, szandra. kovecses@esss. se, ARW 19 24

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