ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Paul F Diehl
- Slides: 9
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Paul F. Diehl Political Science and Law University of Illinois
Overview n The Need for Compliance Mechanisms n Basic Compliance Mechanisms n International and Domestic Legal Structures and. Processes
Compliance Mechanisms n 1. “Habit” Professional Militaries n Less Professional Militaries n Rebel Groups, Militias, Mobs n n 2. Reciprocity POW Treatment n Problems of Asymmetry n
Compliance (con’t) n 3. Reputation (“diffuse reciprocity”) n n “shadow of the future” 4. Direct Enforcement Institutional capability n Institutional willingness n
LEGAL STRUCTURES: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE n n n n VIOLATIONS ADJUDICATED – PLANTIFF V. DEFENDENT LIMITATIONS ONLY STATES CAN BE PARTIES OPTIONAL CLAUSE EXCEPTIONS PREFERENCE FOR LOW POLITICS TIME CONSUMING ENFORCEMENT DEPENDS ON UNSC
LEGAL STRUCTURES: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT n 122 state parties Notable Exceptions: US, Russia (signed not ratified), China, Israel, All Arab states (except Jordan), Pakistan n Case Referral n By Member States or Security Council Jurisdiction n Prosecute Individuals, not States n Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Aggression Crimes on Territory of Member or Person is a National of a State Party (or Security Council refers the case) n n Current Cases n Uganda, Congo, Darfur, Central African Republic, Mali, Kenya
ICC Limitations n n n Small Set of Crimes Cooperation of States Apprehension of Suspects Very Slow Creates Perverse Incentives for Leaders
LEGAL STRUCTURES: DOMESTIC COURTS n n Jurisdiction: Territorial, Nationality, or Universal Limitations Must have appropriate domestic laws n Must be willing and able to prosecute n
POLITICAL STRUCTURES: UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL n 47 member states Investigates and reports on abuses Normative power n Limitations n n no reciprocity incentive (opposite is true) source of UN information - government themselves Politicized membership (major violators are members)