Emergency Management Assessing Risks and Improving Emergency Preparedness

Emergency Management: Assessing Risks and Improving Emergency Preparedness especially in Existing Chemical Plants Prof. Dr. Christian Jochum, Consultant chr. jochum@t-online. de Chairman, German Commission on Process Safety Director, European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) New Delhi, February 11 -13, 2009 ©Prof. Jochum Seite 1

European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) www. epsc. org Network funded by 40+ mainly European based (petro)chemical multinationals to develop best practice in major accident/process safety Objectives: • Information/know how exchange • Legislation (esp. Seveso II & ATEX) • participation & co-ordination of EU funded projects Outputs: • Internal reports & books • User groups & public conferences • EU projects & working groups Major topics 2008/09: • Process Safety Indicators/Learning from Accidents • Safety Critical Equipment • Fostering Senior Management Involvement in Process Safety (with EFCE) • LOPA Experience & Development ©Prof. Jochum Seite 2

Disaster Management Disaster management is a multi-stage process starting with prevention of major accidents. . . • identify hazards comprehensively • avoid or control risks • communicate remaining risks • mitigate consequences • remediate damages • restore trust . . . pursuing the goal to define and train as much as possible in advance ©Prof. Jochum Seite 3

Safety of New and Existing Plants New plants: safety is generally not an issue of financial resources, but sometimes of a lack of professionalism • “Integrated Safety” is most effective and cheap, if considered right from beginning of design • “End of Pipe Safety” is less effective and/or expensive, as late design changes may be necessary Existing Plants need another approach to come close to today´s safety standards • Upgrading may be technically and economically difficult • Operating experience is major asset Experience in Germany after 1960 demonstrates that safety of existing plants can be dramatically improved ©Prof. Jochum Seite 4

Development of accidents at and on the way to the worplace in Germany since 1950 „Arbeitsunfälle“ = occupational accidents „Wegeunfälle“ = acc. on the way to work ©Prof. Jochum Seite 5

Plant & Process Safety: improvement of existing („old“) plants Make best use of limited resources by a stepwise approach: 1. Have full knowledge about hazardous properties of all substances (e. g. Material Safety Data Sheets, data bases, etc. ) 2. Identify and rank critical points (human- and eco – toxicity, hold-up of hazardous substances, reaction conditions) by e. g. „What-if“- or HAZOP – studies 3. Document this in a safety study as a tool for use by the plant and by authorities 4. Focus improvements (manpower, money, additional safeguards etc. ) and inspections on the most critical points. 5. The higher the risk, the more independent safeguards („barriers“) should be considered. 6. Use the scenarios developed under (2) for emergency planning ©Prof. Jochum Seite 6

Plant & Process Safety: Use existing knowledge Most accidents and eco – incidents have a previous history. . . • Preliminary events leading up to the accidents (failure of preliminary safeguards) have not been identified • Prior to most major accidents similar smaller incidents or near misses have happened, but not evaluated . . . which should be used for prevention • Raise the awareness of the workers • Use the experience of workers – Encourage reporting of deviations, near misses and even minor incidents as well as suggestions for improvements. Consider contests and awards for groups working together – Have a system for following up such reports/suggestions ©Prof. Jochum Seite 7

Plant & Process Safety: The Human Factor Workers are risks and resources for safety • They have to know the risks to cope with • Detailed written procedures are a tool both for workers and for management. They should. . . – describe the procedure as it is in the plant step by step – use a language and expressions which are understood by the workers (no scientific or technical paper) – highlight hazards, safety measures and critical process parameters (temperature, pressure, . . . ) – make independent double checks mandatory for critical parameters and procedures (e. g. charging the right products!) – include start-up, shut-down, maintenance and process-specific information for emergencies • Use other procedures (e. g. GMP) for safety purposes, too. • Include normal and abnormal situations in training ©Prof. Jochum Seite 8

Emergency Preparedness Accidents may happen even in most modern plants. They cannot be planned, but they should be considered. • Use the scenarios identified for prevention of major incidents for emergency planning and training, too. • Cover all relevant scenarios in the emergency plan. • Assign responsibilities rather than regulating details. • The emergency organisation is different from the normal organisation, but is empowered to use it. • Adjust the emergency organisation to the dimension of the incident (e. g. „blue, yellow, red alert“) • Clearly document all available resources (site, company, neighbouring sites, authorities, . . . ) for the different scenarios. Ensure that they can be used in emergencies (e. g. co-operative agreements). • Before you rely on off-site resources, consider the time until availability. • Industrial zones with many chemical companies close together need special attention („domino-effects“) ©Prof. Jochum Seite 9

Emergency Response The basic principle: the faster and more effective the initial response, the smaller the consequences for men, environment and economy. • Provide the infrastructure for fast response (fire brigade, emergency control room, notification and availability of key personnel, etc. ) • Encourage immediate reporting of incidents (not to wait until own efforts failed. . . ), do not blame for false alarms. • Site fire brigades (or shared with adjacent sites) usually are faster and more efficient then municipal brigades, which rather serve as a back-up. • If the fire brigade is (partly) staffed by chemical workers be aware of the risks of understaffed chemical production. • Better start with a higher level of alarm (worst case assumption) and grade it down later than vice versa. • Notify and involve public fire brigades and authorities as soon as possible. • Analyse every incident and the response to improve the organisation without blaming anyone ©Prof. Jochum Seite 10

The Role of Authorities The cooperation between authorities and companies at an incident depends on their cooperation before the incident. • Open communication about risks and safety measures on a regular basis (e. g. in a local or regional committees) builds up trust which is urgently needed during emergency response • Authorities need to know about the possible scenarios for major accidents to do their own preparations • Authorities should have clear rules about their responsibilities in handling major incidents to avoid conflicts between the different agencies (e. g. labour safety, environment, civil protection, police etc. ) • Mitigation of consequences should come first, prosecution of individuals responsible for the incident later. ©Prof. Jochum Seite 11

Neighbours, Journalists and Environmentalists The basic issue: Neighbours and the general public share the risks of chemical sites, but not necessarily the benefits. • Communication of relevant risks has to be done openly and in an adequate form („not scientific“) prior to incidents (e. g. “neighbourhood councils“, brochures, . . . ) – to build up trust in the competence of the company to handle risks – to enable the neighbours to react adequately during an incident • The response of neighbours etc. to incidents depend on the companies response to requests and complaints prior to the incident. • Fast and open information after an incident is crucial. • Fears and worries of neighbours etc. have to be taken seriously even if they are based on emotions rather than science • On the long term, conflicts with neighbours etc. endangers the „licence to operate“ • Committees with all stakeholders like the German Commission on Process Safety are an effective tool for cooperation and communication. ©Prof. Jochum Seite 12

Commission on Process Safety (Kommission fuer Anlagensicherheit [KAS]) Mandated by the Federal Immission Control Act • Advises government as well as plant operators and state and local authorities on process safety • 32 members with different professional and educational background representing different stakeholders („Round Table“) • Any group needs „allies“ to win votes • Consensus intended, but majority decisions possible About 55 guidelines issued on different topics, e. g. • Land Use Planning (Safety distances) • Risk evaluation and perception • Emergency Planning • Industrial parks • Provisions against terrorist attacs on chemical plants All publications of the Commission are available (partly in English) at www. kas-bmu. de ©Prof. Jochum Seite 13

Conclusions • Investing in safe and eco-efficient plants pays off at least on the long term • The (remaining) risks of chemical/pharmaceutical plants can be assessed and are the basis for scenarios for emergency planning. • The knowledge and experience of the operators should be used by all means. • Risks should be communicated as well as benefits with all stakeholders, esp. the neighbours. • The resources for emergency response (manpower, equipment, communications, organisation etc) have to be planned in advance and readily available in case of an incident. People usually accept the risk of a chemical/pharmaceutical plant, but not incompetence in handling it. • Authorities should involve themselves actively in emergency planning, balancing this out with their law enforcement duties. • Combined efforts will definitely lead to safer and more accepted plants, as the figures from Germany may show. ©Prof. Jochum Seite 14

Thank you for your attention! ©Prof. Jochum Seite 15