Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia Elections with Limited Choice

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia: Elections with Limited Choice Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St. Petersburg / University of Helsinki) LMU Munich, 7 May 2014

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Russia’s political regime, 1991 -2014: the path from the Soviet version of Communism to electoral authoritarianism • What are the major features of elections under such a regime in case of Russia? • What is the meaning of elections and why they are necessary for rulers and voters? • Why and how the mode of electoral conduct in Russia changed over time? • And which ways might they evolve in the foreseeable future?

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • The rise of “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2002) is a global phenomenon; • These regimes are based upon meaningful elections, but the essence of these elections is an uneven level playing field (prohibitively high entry barriers, unequal access of competitors to resources, abuses of power of the state apparatus, and multiple instances of electoral fraud); • Why “electoral” authoritarianism replaces “classical” forms of “elections without choice” (including Communist and other one-party regimes)? • (1) elections as a tool of monitoring of elites and citizens by the ruling groups (risk-aversion strategy); • (2) elections as a tool of domestic and international legitimacy of the status-quo regime;

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Why in some countries electoral authoritarian regimes survived for a long while (Mexico under PRI, Egypt before the “Arab Spring”), while others are short-lived (victims of “color revolutions” from Serbia to Georgia)? • Post-Soviet Russia as a “crucial case”, which might shade light on sources of strengths and/or weaknesses of electoral authoritarianism in a comparative perspective; • Scholars tend to focus on causes of failures of electoral authoritarian regimes (international linkages/leverages, strength of the state/ruling party, role of the opposition, etc. ) but paid less attention to their “success stories”

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Russia (until the rise of the mass protests in 2011 -2012) - a “success story” of electoral authoritarian regime? • Russia’s rulers invested tremendous efforts into building their political monopoly upon successful institutional engineering and effective political techniques: high entry barriers on political market, implementation of divide-and -conquer tactics, cooptation of loyal “fellow travelers” and coercion of “non-systemic” actors; • Although the rise of protest activism in 2011 -2012 did somewhat shake the previous equilibrium, there is no grounds to consider the inevitabile failure of electoral authoritarianism in Russia, at least, in the short run

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Why electoral authoritarianism emerged after the Soviet collapse? • There almost no politicians, who would like to lose power voluntary, but “democracy is political regime where parties lose power by electoral means” (Przeworski, 1991); • Thus, the most rational strategy of new power-holders after the collapse of the previous authoritarian regime is aversion of risk of power loss through electoral competition – the building of a new electoral authoritarian regime is an effect of the failure of electoral democracy; • However, the reality is different: many countries at the globe actually became electoral democracies despite self -interests of political actors

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Why electoral democracies emerged in various countries at the globe (but not in Russia)? • (1) electoral democracy as side effect of power struggle among elites (as an alternative to zero-sum solutions) and/or between elites and masses (democratic class struggle via electoral means); • (2) international influence of the West through “linkages” and “leverages” (Levitsky, Way, 2010); • (3) the impact of ideologically-driven perceptions of leaders of authoritarian regimes, who might perceive elections as a tool of their legitimation (for example, Gorbachev’s perestroika)

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Russia met none of the conditions for building of electoral democracy after the Soviet collapse: • (1) major elite conflicts resolved as zero-sum games (1991, 1993, 1999 -2000); • (2) mass political participation (at least, before 20112012 protests) was rather unimportant factor of Russian politics; • (3) international influence on Russia was and still rather weak; • (4) ideology not matter much after the Soviet collapse (aka “Gorbachev’s curse”);

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • First (and last? ) steps toward electoral democracy (19891991): • March 1989 – semi-free elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR (“stunning elections”); • March 1990 – almost free elections to the republican and local Soviets; • June 1991 – first free presidential elections in Russia (Boris Yeltsin won among six candidates with 57% of votes); • August 1991 – ultimate power seized by Russia’s leaders; • Why free elections are needed anymore?

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • October 1991 – the adoption of the new Russia’s constitution has been postponed; the moratorium on new elections (including regional and local chief executives) has been imposed; • October 1993 – the parliament was disbanded by Yeltsin’s camp; • December 1993 – first elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council, held simultaneously with the referendum on the new constitution; • “Electoral puzzle”: LDPR, populist critics of the regime, actually won, full electoral results were never published

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Yeltsin’s dilemma of presidential elections of 1996: • Presidential popularity was low (5% in the beginning of campaign); • The cost of losing power by electoral means is extraordinarily high (due to empowerment of the president in the constitution) – threat to political, if not physical survival; • Two options: (1) abolishment of elections or (2) unfair conduct of elections; • Abolishment of elections – a risky game in terms of legitimacy and political control (March 1996: attempt of dissolving the State Duma and postponing presidential elections was stopped at the very last moment); • Unfair conduct of elections – abuse of all state machinery for the sake of Yeltsin’s re-election bid (ranging from vote buying to elements of electoral fraud)

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • 1999 parliamentary elections – “war on Yeltsin’s succession”, major conflict between inter-regional bloc Fatherland-All Russia and pro. Kremlin bloc Unity (“information wars”); • After 2000: Putin’s dilemma – “corrections of errors” of the 1990 s; • Rewriting “rules of the game”: • (1) laws on political parties – tough membership requirements (up to 50000 members from 2006): elimination of most of previous political parties (46 parties in 2003, 7 parties in 2007); • (2) increasing of electoral threshold in national and regional elections from 5% in 2003 to 7% in 2007; • (3) prohibition of electoral blocs in national and regional elections – no room for minor parties; • (4) turn from mixed to PR electoral system in national elections – no room for independent candidates;

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Institutional changes aimed to shrink the level playing field, but still there was a room for maneuver for regional elites; • 2004 – abolishment of popular elections of regional chief executives (turn to de facto appointments); • Consequences: • (1) almost all appointed regional leaders joined the “party of power”, United Russia; • (2) performance of regional leaders was evaluated by the use of political rather than socio-economic criteria, by their ability of bringing votes to the Kremlin (Reuter, Robertson, 2012); • (3) incentives to bring votes at any cost (increasing scope of electoral fraud)

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Lessons learned from the 1990 s: • (1) cooptation of local “political machines”, controlled by regional governors and city mayors, into a nation-wide Kremlin-driven “echelon” (“power vertical”) – centralization of sub-national authoritarianism; • (2) reformatting of the party system into a highly controlled manipulative hierarchy under the dominance of United Russia; • Public opinion – insensitive to unfair elections because its results fit popular expectations, and almost nobody cares about political representation and procedural issues: “everything was fair… but 50% of the results were falsified” (Wilson, 2012: 152)

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • However, electoral authoritarian regimes are vulnerable: leadership succession – an «Achilles heel» (Hale, 2006): • Russia 2007 -2008: a loyal successor (Dmitry Medvedev) as a solution of the succession problem (to what extent risks were over/underestimated? ) • Russia 2011 -2012: «return substitution» (Vladimir Putin’s return to power) as an unexpected problem (risks were not considered as serious enough)

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • «Return substitution» - a poorly prepared demolishing of democratic Potemkin village: neither sticks, nor carrots for voters? • Inertia-based expectations of the Kremlin: • (1) the abuse of administrative resources on all layers of the «power vertical» ; • (2) the genuine support of the status-quo regime among peripheral voters; • (3) apathy and passivity among «advanced» part of voters (young, educated, well-to-do, big city residents)

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Efficiency of opposition-driven negative campaign (“vote for anyone but United Russia!”); • Parliamentary voting of December 2011: «voters are not fools» (Key, 1966) • (1) despite to outrageous and blatant fraud, UR was unable to catch 50% of votes even though was able to get 238 out of 450 seats (the costs of regime’s victory were higher than its benefits); • (2) the regime was merely discredited in the eyes of «advanced» voters; • (3) the rise of post-election protests in 2011 -2012 (up to 100000 participants in Moscow)

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Subsequent institutional changes – an «asymmetric response» of regime vis-à-vis protests or, rather, just meaningless maneuvering? • Liberalization of legislation of political parties – lifting of membership rules (500 members are required), but still many informal barriers; • Regional chief executives elections – the use of municipal «filter» (effective barrier for “unwanted” candidates); • Electoral system reform – back to mixed system in the State Duma elections and SMD system in regional elections

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Sub-national elections – new “bumps on the road”? • Yekaterinburg, 2013 – a local hero, an anti-drug crusader and maverick, Yevgeny Roizman, won mayoral elections despite resistance of regional authorities; • Moscow, 2013 – an opposition leader, Alexey Navalny, got 27. 3% of votes in mayoral elections vis-à-vis 51% of votes for the incumbent, Sergey Sobyanin • Novosibirsk, 2014 – Anatloy Lokot’, a representative of the Communist Party, won mayoral elections over United Russia, being a leader of coalition of five opposition candidates (who withdrawn from the race in his favor)

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • New wave of institutional changes (2014): • Abolishment of popular elections of city mayors (mayors will be elected among members of local councils); • Toughening rules of electoral participation for new and minor parties (collection of signatures of voters); • Restoration of “against all” option for voters; • To what extent these maneuvers will resolve major problems of electoral authoritarianism – maintaining of regime’s legitimacy and keeping regime’s control over elites and voters?

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Possible regime’s further trajectories: • (1) the preservation of the status quo – elections with limited choice; • (2) the turn to a systematic “tightening of the screws” by the ruling group and the use of “elections without choice”; • (3) a step-by-step creeping (and quite probably, inconsistent) democratization with increasing effects of “stunning elections”. • The real practice of Russian politics could develop as a combination of these trajectories or as a shift from one trajectory to another.

Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia • Thanks for your attention!