Economie Publique II FebruaryMay 2010 Prof A Estache
Economie Publique II February-May 2010 Prof. A. Estache Lecture 1 Overview 1
Some organizational issues • • Course organization Course content and coverage What I assume you know already… Required readings and what they mean to you • Exam…a first sense of what you will get • What this course could do for you 2
Course organization • Lectures are on Wednesdays 10 -12 at H 5. 164 • You will have 12 lectures • I will post the lectures and any related material on my web site (bottom of the entry page for a list of courses) http: //164. 15. 69. 62/index. php? option=com_compro filer&task=user. Profile&user=107&Itemid=263 • You will have to follow the reading list • Trying to read ahead of time will help you understand the lectures • I will also post any readings not easily available in pdf format on the course web site. • Always happy to meet with you or hear from you if something is not working out the way you 3 want…my email is aestache@ulb. ac. be
Course content (1) • This course will focus on how best to regulate firms with significant market power. – A crucial role of governments and hence central to public economics knowledge • It will get both into theory and the practice of regulation. • Network industries will offer the main illustration of the concepts 4
Course content (2) • • • Week 1: Introduction and Overview (…today!) Week 2: Regulation with complete information Week 3: Regulation with asymmetric information Week 4: Extensions to the basic model Week 5: The regulation of prices Week 6: The regulation of quality Week 7: Equity-efficiency trade-offs in regulation Week 8: Incentives issues built-in the design of regulatory institutions Week 9: Financial Modeling of Regulated Industries Week 10: Asset Valuation of Regulated Industries Week 11: Cost of Capital of Regulated Industries Week 12: Efficiency Measurement in Regulated Industries 5
What I assume you know already • You NEED to be familiar with everything you have been taught on theory of monopolies!!!! – If you don’t, review it before next class • IT IS CRITICAL since that is at the core of everything you will see in this class – To make it easier for you to review this theory, I have attached in the annex the slides from Varian on this topic…you really need to know this! • You need to be able to set up an optimization problem under constraint • You need to be able to have a sense of synthesis since you will have to read a fair amount of material 6
You need to remember everything that goes around this graph! Euros per Kwh Profits from standard monopoly profit maximization $120 E MC ATC 80 MR 30 D Number of Kwh consumed 7
Price Regulation: Government can make solution more efficient as long as PC < PR < PM Monopolistic equilibrium PM MC PR PC Competitive Equilibrium Demand MR 8
Required readings (1) • 4 basic texts – Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, “Recent developments in theory of regulation”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization (vol 3), edited by Armstrong and Porter, North Holland – Armstrong, M. and D. Sappington, (2006), “Regulation, competition and liberalisation”, Journal of Economic Literature – Estache, A. and L. Wren-Lewis (2009), “Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont’s Lead”, (Forthcoming), Journal of Economic Literature (forthcoming), available at http: //ideas. repec. org/p/eca/wpaper/2008_018. html – Estache, A. , M. Rodriguez-Pardina, J. M. Rodriguez and G. Sember (2002), “An introduction to Financial and Economic Modeling for Utilities Regulators”, Policy Research Working Paper 3001, World Bank, Washington, D. C. , available at http: //papers. ssrn. com/sol 3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=636363 • Some additional required reading for some of the lectures 9
Required Reading (2) • For every required reading, I will give you a few questions you need to be able to answer • You will have to provide me with a 1 page summary of your replies. – These replies will be due 1 week before the end of the course. – They should force you to make sure you understand the material you are supposed to be familiar with. 10
Exam • You will have to know the required readings for the exam • You will also have to know well the lecture slides • You will find some of the suggested reading useful if you have not understood the lectures in class. – But these are not required and I will not ask any questions on those readings. – They may simply be useful of you decide to specialize in regulation. • Your understanding of the course material will be assessed by means of a three hour examination • More details on the exam will be provided at the 11 end of the course.
What this course could do for you • Most courses on regulation of network industries are highly technical…(e. g. Toulouse, Oxford, Florida, MIT, …) • This course is a combination of theory and practice • It will provide you with enough theory to give you a sense of what to deal with in a Ph. D thesis or research in the field of regulation • It will provide you also with a set of tools you would need to have if you were to work as a consultant or in a regulatory agency or…in a regulated company! 12
Overview of the course • • • A working definition The policy problem The view of the world of regulation today The evolution of research A zoom on the lessons from theory on institutional design • The measurement of the effects of regulation of network industries • Concluding comments 13
What exactly is regulation? • Government regulation of industry is – local, federal or state government control – of individual or firm behavior – via the mechanisms of setting or controlling • the prices • the quantity (of service, environmental, safety, …) • the quality of goods and services produced. – E. g. setting rates for electricity service. – E. g. setting quality standards for auto seat belts. 14
The dimensions of the problem • The actors • Their objectives • Their constraints • The trade-offs 15
The actors • • the government (local, national) a firm (monopolist) the users (final or intermediate) a regulation and a competition agency the tax payers other firms (as users or competitors) other agencies. . . 16
The objectives of the actors • the monopolist maximizes its private profits • the gvt wants to foster efficiency and fairly distribute the rents: – accepts monopoly structure (size economies) and maximizes social welfare…but private agenda (re-election, …) • the users maximize their net utility • the agency is a surrogate for the government…but private agenda (maximizes its net resources érisks of capture). Governance problems. • the tax payers react to the fiscal burden that distorts relative prices • the other firms maximize their profits é horizontal dimension of the strategy • other agencies: idem 17
The constraints on policymakers • technological and economic – costs, preferences • legal – privatization law, concession law, sector laws, antitrust law, … – contract design (including duration) – accounts rules and reporting obligation • institutional – who is involved and who decides and how (price control, wage control, barriers to entry) – enforcement power – financing opportunities • informational – imperfect but symmetric information – asymmetric information: adverse selection, moral hazard 18
The trade-offs as the main dimension of the policy problems • Efficiency: – concern of sector people/economists • • • cost reflecting prices cost minimizing production choices getting the investments going as needed • Fiscal and financial viewpoints: – concern of the finance team • «fiscal pay-off to gvt » (annually/1 time shot) – Whether it goes to the treasury or to finance political campaigns and other expenses by the politician is also relevant • Social Concerns: – concerns of politicians • • • lowest possible price and related considerations best possible quality largest cheap expensive looking investments • Votes!!! – Concerns of the politicians • Only real instrument consumers and taxpayers have to voice their happiness or discontent 19
The big picture on the problem • Economists and Politicians are against monopolists and agree they need regulation…but for different reasons: – – economists: monopolists do not produce enough politicians: monopolists charge too much …and the solution to their concerns could converge: lower price means more volume. . but often don ’t: • • economist wants price discrimination; politician prefers price cap which yields rationing but a politically manageable price economist wants to push competition (entry), politician not necessarily (strong emotions attached to ownership of assets supporting public services) 20
What has theory had to tell us about this policy problem? • Traditional theory (with benevolent gvt and focus on market failures--monopolies, externalities, …) • The recognition of the non-benevolence of government • The information asymmetry issue as a revolutionary shock • A zoom on the empirical research 21
Traditional theory • Assumes benevolent gvt • Focus on market failures – Solved by regulation or otherwise • Pigouvian taxes & subsidies (1920 s) • Marginal cost pricing debate (Boiteux (1949, 1956)) • Ramsey, peak load & other fancy pricing (Baumol/Bradford (1970)) • Coase theorem and bargaining (1960) • Demsetz auction and competition for the mkt (1968) • Contestable markets (Baumol, Panzar, Willig (197080 s)) 22
The problems with traditional theory – Problems are that regulation is: • Bounded by transaction costs – Williamson (1960 s), Dixit, Martimort (1990 s) • Bounded by information and related incentive problems – Baron and Meyerson (1981) Laffont, Tirole, Armstrong, Milgrom, Newbery, Sappington, Vickers, Willig (1980 -90 s), … • Often responsive (endogeneity issue) • Driven by complex gvt motivation and structures and multiple gvt objectives 23
New theories: NON BENEVOLENT GVT (1) • Capture theories • Role of auction design in achieving competitive outcomes in regulated markets • Scope for renegotiation • Heterogeneity of goals from heterogeneous gvts (multiprincipals) • Concerns for coordination • Political entrepreneurs vs. public service concern • Governance aspects and voting mechanisms 24
New theories: NON BENEVOLENT GVT (2) The various focuses of research – Regulatory design • P cap, Ro. R, Hybrid regime – Incentive mechanism design • Accounting explicitly for effort level and degree of information asymmetry and related strategic concerns – Institutional design • • Degree of financial and political autonomy Degree of corruption Degree of competence Governance structures – Timing and sequencing of regulatory reforms 25
New theories: NON BENEVOLENT GVT (3) • Instruments – Agency models, game theory, advanced simulation techniques • Literature – Theory: Posner (1971), Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Becker (1983, 1985), more recently, Laffont-Tirole, Noll, Spiller, … – Empirics: a lot on some aspects but little on many others! • Problems: – Disagreements on degree of common knowledge of information needed for regulation and related strategic interactions – Bridge from theory to practice cuts lots of theory corners 26
New theories: NON BENEVOLENT GVT (4) Main practical messages are: • regulation and competition policy generate rents worth fighting for …but they distort outcomes and users usually lose if decision makers are unaccountable • there are trade-offs between rents and efforts level by the operators and short term losses by users may become long term losses if weak “regulators” • Various types of risks matter to effort and investment incentives and should drive choices • Distributional consequences can be dramatic 27
A zoom on what theory tells us about institutional design • not much advise from traditional theory • many more possibilities offered by information economics and agency theory on organizations • a lot more coming from recent developments on collusion theory • need to build a positive theory of government around these recent developments • need to recognize transaction costs and political constraints 28
What are the problems leading to transaction costs? • information asymmetries: demand elasticity? exact technologies? costs? • limits to the markets as an implementation tool for policies private police? private regulators? • incompleteness of contracts: non-contingent contracts + contracts viewed as non-binding by future gvts which renders renegotiation of some type unavoidable • multiple principals: multiple government agencies share responsibility but fail to coordinate because discretionary politics drives decision-making by bureaucrats; all this reduces accountability of regulators 29
Why should we care? Because it tells is that • structures matter: – – – distribution of regulatory rights definition of regulatory goals voting procedures driving decisions • processes matter – – – timing of government intervention length and span of control design of communication channels • Both affect regulatory outcomes: work on the efficiency-rent trade-off 30
The specific government failure to address • lack of commitment of government and need for renegotiation • multiprincipal nature of government • discretion of political principal • discretion of regulator 31
Lack of Commitment and Unavoidable Renegotiation (1) • new information can change the goals of the game • under full commitment: optimal regulation is well understood • without full commitment: strategic behavior by both the gvt and the firm is likely and time inconsistency problem in the firm’s behavior, reducing incentive to be efficient in 1 st period • MAIN MESSAGE: Incentive compatibility constraints are hardened by simple existence of 32 renegotiation
How to improve commitment? • maintain flexibility to renegotiate but spell out renegotiation rules early on • there is an optimal degree of separation of powers but this acts on incentives • consider a sequential move of regulatory decisions and overincentivate in period 1 • address explicitly the speed of reform • spell out checks and balances • independence and accountability of agency 33
The Multiprincipal Nature of Government (1) • multiple agencies dealing with regulation (environ, health, economic) • it means multiple not necessarily cooperative objectives • this means allocative distortions because coordination problems • suboptimal decentralization cuts incentives; too many players decreased efficiency of regulatory decisions; risk of free riding 34
The Multiprincipal Nature of Government (2) • if regulation of complementary activities, risk of overregulation and cuts incentives built in contracts due to lack of coordination • if regulation of substitute activities, risk of underregulation (too much incentives) due to regulatory competition 35
Excessive discretion of the political and regulatory principal • distinction between formal and real authority is crucial • real authority in the hands of implementing agents (regulators/bureaucrats) • formal authority in the hands of political decision makers 36
Need to reduce discretion of the Political Principal • structures drive the distribution of power among interest groups • politicians end to favor median voter (his constituency) over majority of voters (society as a whole) • apparently suboptimal contracts (average cost pricing) now could have a rational: they tie the hands of politicians by cutting discretion 37
Need to reduce discretion of the Regulators • increase accountability to deal with the imperfect monitoring of the regulators • collusion proof constraint can reduce conflicts between legislative and regulators: low powered incentive contracts are usually better since cuts discretion (influences efficiency-rent trade-offs) • need to avoid side contracts between regulators and interest groups: this requires more established, clear and transparent structures 38
How much empirical evidence do we get from academic research? • It measures the effects of regulation and competition on – – Average price levels Price structures Access pricing Static efficiency • • • Input distortions (Averch-Johnson effect (1962), Unions, …) “X-inefficiency” (are we on the production frontier? ) Rent size Cost of capital Regulatory costs – Dynamic efficiency • Rate of innovations and productivity growth – – Product quality and variety Contract sustainability Macroeconomic variables Distributional implications • Redistribution of existing rent between players • Allocation of rents from changes 39
The methodology of measurement (1) • (1) Comparing regulated and unregulated firms and markets • ( 2) Tracking variations in regulation intensity • (3) Controlled environment experiments • (4) Structural models and simulation • [(5) Detailed case studies with statistically weak evidence] 40
The methodology of measurement (2) • (1) Comparing regulated and unregulated firms and markets – Approaches • Across countries, states (cross-section) • Historical data (time-series) – Product/service markets – Financial markets (track the stock market) – Additional use • Generates data for yardstick competition • Generates data for tariff revisions/price caps, … – Problems: • • Heterogeneity of regulatory regimes and enforcement Endogeneity of regulation (responds to local conditions) Specific legal environment and instruments Timing, sequencing 41
The methodology of measurement (3) • (2) Tracking variations in regulation intensity – Quantitative differences in regulatory constraints • e. g. Different levels of rate of return allowed – Differences in regulatory resources • e. g. budgets, skills, autonomy – Specificity of instruments and procedures • e. g. anglo-saxon vs. napoleonian traditions – Need for independent rating of quality of regulator – Interactions with economic environment (inflation, growth, corruption, risks…) 42
The methodology of measurement (4) • (3) Controlled Environment Experiments – Field experiments • Peak load pricing vs uniform • Bulk markets vs retail markets – Problems: expensive to implement and hard to control correctly – Laboratory experiments • Experimental economics – Problems: risky extrapolations 43
The methodology of measurement (5) • (4) Structural models and simulations – (i) Demand cost systems • • • Need to estimate cost and production functions Need to estimate demand Useful to simulate alternative regimes A lot of good results available and used Drawbacks: – – – Endogeneity of input prices Short term vs long term Regulatory distortion Changing environment Interaction with environment 44
The methodology of measurement (6) • (ii) Computable General Equilibrium Models – Solve models as if full price control by monopoly or full competition and the comparison yields the size of the rent and hence the value of regulation: • 0. 3% of GDP for Argentina • (iii) Counterfactuals – Reconstruct operators accounts and impose new restrictions • Galal, et alt. : huge gains from privatization • Gasmi, Laffont, Sharkey: measures impact of incentive based regimes vs cost + on telecom prices 45
Summing up the academic view of regulation theory: • Difficult to come up with a single clean story due to heterogeneity of: – – Initial conditions Variables monitored Dimension of regulation Sectoral diversity • Regulators and competition agencies have not generated the data that will help research make them better regulators, collectively at least • But plenty of actions in the real world and useful to know how regulation sometimes work in practice • So how do you go from theory to practice? 46
Back to basics: How to come up with fair regulation of a Natural Monopoly Dollars Unregulated monopoly $60 A C $29 $15 "Fair rate of return" production F MR 50, 000 B LRATC MC D 100, 000 85, 000 Number of Household s Served 47
This faire regulation builds on basic economics! SUPPLY Cost Recovery = Allowed Revenue Operational expenses or OPEX Capital expenses or CAPEX Average TARIFF Economic Signal Tariff Structure DEMAND 48 ©World Bank Institute
A checklist of tools to do the job! • • • Asset valuation Estimates of the cost of capital Regulatory Accounting Guidelines Tariff Rules Penalties Efficiency measures The contract with the government The economic and financial regulatory model Indicators of financial viability A clear view of the analytical decision criteria 49
The Tools of the Regulators Asset Valuation • At the core of everything • With the cost of capital, allows the determination of the allowed revenue for required efficiency levels • With the specified deprecition rules, defines the amortization expenses allowed in OPEX forecast • Be clear on which method you pick • Update regularly 50
The Tools of the Regulators Estimate of the cost of capital • Minimum rate of return allowed to the operator of a monopoly • Imposes going through a fair assessments of risks • Require a methodological discussion • To be reviewed periodically 51
The Tools of the Regulators Regulatory Accounting Guidelines • Core instrument to generate the information required to regulate • Includes ALL guidelines – Depreciation rules – Cost allocation rules – Expenditures forecast processes • Unavoidable as few countries tend to generate good economic information for regulators • Should be included in contract with operators 52
The Tools of the Regulators Tariff rules • • • Sector law and/or related decrees Legal specification of tariff structure Indexation rules « pass-through » rules Ordinary and extraordinary tariff revision rules • Clarify behavior subject to penalties and relevance for tariffs • Specify penalties in legal documents 53
The Tools of the Regulators Efficiency Measures • Efficiency gain is economic rent to be redistributed => MUST be measured • Announce how it will be measured • Ensure accounting guidelines will generate the data needed • Explain how results will be used in regulatory decisions • Specify a related consultation process 54
The Tools of the Regulators The contract with the government! • Specifies rights and obligations of the various actors – Investments – Quality – Timing of obligations – Payment to gvt – Subsidies • Includes information obligations • Core reference document of regulator 55
The Tools of the Regulators The financial and economic model • Analytical framework which – Ensures internal consistency of: • All obligation to all parties and any change to these • The combination of regulatory instruments, • Assumptions on the behavior of actors – Quantifies impact of options to all actors in case of conflict based on transparent rules • Calculates the business’ s Internal Rate of Return – Which means nothing unless compared to the cost of capital !!! 56
The Tools of the Regulators A clear decision criteria • IF IRR = Co. C => ideal – NPV of activity is 0 – No « excess » profit for the operator – Comparable to a competitive markets returns • If IRR > Co. C => « Excessive » Profit =>Regulatory action needed t revision time (e. g. cut tariff, subsidies, …) • If Co. C > IRR => Risk of bankruptcy =>Regulatory action may be needed to ensiure service continuity (e. g. e: subsidy, change in service obligations level or timing, …) 57
The Tools of the Regulators Financial viability criteria • Control of standard financial indicators: • What credit rating agencies would look at to check credit worthiness • Cash flows in term of equity, assets and free cash flows • Debt ratios, liquidity, debt composition • …also need to check the consequences of limited access to capital markets 58
ANNEX: What Varian taught you about Monopolies….
Pure Monopoly • A monopolized market has a single seller. • The monopolist’s demand curve is the (downward sloping) market demand curve. • So the monopolist can alter the market price by adjusting its output level.
Pure Monopoly $/output unit p(y) Higher output y causes a lower market price, p(y). Output Level, y
Why Monopolies? • What causes monopolies? – a legal fiat; e. g. US Postal Service
Why Monopolies? • What causes monopolies? – a legal fiat; e. g. US Postal Service – a patent; e. g. a new drug
Why Monopolies? • What causes monopolies? – a legal fiat; e. g. US Postal Service – a patent; e. g. a new drug – sole ownership of a resource; e. g. a toll highway
Why Monopolies? • What causes monopolies? – a legal fiat; e. g. US Postal Service – a patent; e. g. a new drug – sole ownership of a resource; e. g. a toll highway – formation of a cartel; e. g. OPEC
Why Monopolies? • What causes monopolies? – a legal fiat; e. g. US Postal Service – a patent; e. g. a new drug – sole ownership of a resource; e. g. a toll highway – formation of a cartel; e. g. OPEC – large economies of scale; e. g. local utility companies.
Pure Monopoly • Suppose that the monopolist seeks to maximize its economic profit, • What output level y* maximizes profit?
Profit-Maximization At the profit-maximizing output level y* so, for y = y*,
$ Profit-Maximization R(y) = p(y)y y
$ Profit-Maximization R(y) = p(y)y c(y) y
$ Profit-Maximization R(y) = p(y)y c(y) y P(y)
$ Profit-Maximization R(y) = p(y)y c(y) y* y P(y)
$ Profit-Maximization R(y) = p(y)y c(y) y* y P(y)
$ Profit-Maximization R(y) = p(y)y c(y) y* y P(y)
$ Profit-Maximization R(y) = p(y)y c(y) y* y At the profit-maximizing output level the slopes of P(y) the revenue and total cost curves are equal; MR(y*) = MC(y*).
Marginal Revenue Marginal revenue is the rate-of-change of revenue as the output level y increases;
Marginal Revenue Marginal revenue is the rate-of-change of revenue as the output level y increases; dp(y)/dy is the slope of the market inverse demand function so dp(y)/dy < 0. Therefore for y > 0.
Marginal Revenue E. g. if p(y) = a - by then R(y) = p(y)y = ay - by 2 and so MR(y) = a - 2 by < a - by = p(y) for y > 0.
Marginal Revenue E. g. if p(y) = a - by then R(y) = p(y)y = ay - by 2 and so MR(y) = a - 2 by < a - by = p(y) for y > 0. a p(y) = a - by a/2 b a/b y MR(y) = a - 2 by
Marginal Cost Marginal cost is the rate-of-change of total cost as the output level y increases; E. g. if c(y) = F + ay + by 2 then
$ Marginal Cost c(y) = F + ay + by 2 F $/output unit y MC(y) = a + 2 by a y
Profit-Maximization; An Example At the profit-maximizing output level y*, MR(y*) = MC(y*). So if p(y) = a - by and c(y) = F + ay + by 2 then
Profit-Maximization; An Example At the profit-maximizing output level y*, MR(y*) = MC(y*). So if p(y) = a - by and if c(y) = F + ay + by 2 then and the profit-maximizing output level is
Profit-Maximization; An Example At the profit-maximizing output level y*, MR(y*) = MC(y*). So if p(y) = a - by and if c(y) = F + ay + by 2 then and the profit-maximizing output level is causing the market price to be
Profit-Maximization; An Example $/output unit a p(y) = a - by MC(y) = a + 2 by a y MR(y) = a - 2 by
Profit-Maximization; An Example $/output unit a p(y) = a - by MC(y) = a + 2 by a y MR(y) = a - 2 by
Profit-Maximization; An Example $/output unit a p(y) = a - by MC(y) = a + 2 by a y MR(y) = a - 2 by
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand • Suppose that market demand becomes less sensitive to changes in price (i. e. the own-price elasticity of demand becomes less negative). Does the monopolist exploit this by causing the market price to rise?
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand Own-price elasticity of demand is
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand Own-price elasticity of demand is so
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand Suppose the monopolist’s marginal cost of production is constant, at $k/output unit. For a profit-maximum which is
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand E. g. if e = -3 then p(y*) = 3 k/2, and if e = -2 then p(y*) = 2 k. So as e rises towards -1 the monopolist alters its output level to make the market price of its product to rise.
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand Notice that, since
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand Notice that, since
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand Notice that, since That is,
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand Notice that, since That is,
Monopolistic Pricing & Own. Price Elasticity of Demand Notice that, since That is, So a profit-maximizing monopolist always selects an output level for which market demand is own-price elastic.
Markup Pricing • Markup pricing: Output price is the marginal cost of production plus a “markup. ” • How big is a monopolist’s markup and how does it change with the own-price elasticity of demand?
Markup Pricing is the monopolist’s price.
Markup Pricing is the monopolist’s price. The markup is
Markup Pricing is the monopolist’s price. The markup is E. g. if e = -3 then the markup is k/2, and if e = -2 then the markup is k. The markup rises as the own-price elasticity of demand rises towards -1.
A Profits Tax Levied on a Monopoly • A profits tax levied at rate t reduces profit from P(y*) to (1 -t)P(y*). • Q: How is after-tax profit, (1 -t)P(y*), maximized?
A Profits Tax Levied on a Monopoly • A profits tax levied at rate t reduces profit from P(y*) to (1 -t)P(y*). • Q: How is after-tax profit, (1 -t)P(y*), maximized? • A: By maximizing before-tax profit, P(y*).
A Profits Tax Levied on a Monopoly • A profits tax levied at rate t reduces profit from P(y*) to (1 -t)P(y*). • Q: How is after-tax profit, (1 -t)P(y*), maximized? • A: By maximizing before-tax profit, P(y*). • So a profits tax has no effect on the monopolist’s choices of output level, output price, or demands for inputs. • I. e. the profits tax is a neutral tax.
Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist • A quantity tax of $t/output unit raises the marginal cost of production by $t. • So the tax reduces the profit-maximizing output level, causes the market price to rise, and input demands to fall. • The quantity tax is distortionary.
Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist $/output unit p(y) p(y*) MC(y) y y* MR(y)
Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist $/output unit p(y) MC(y) + t p(y*) t MC(y) y y* MR(y)
Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist $/output unit p(y) p(yt) p(y*) MC(y) + t t MC(y) y yt y* MR(y)
Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist $/output unit p(y) p(yt) p(y*) The quantity tax causes a drop in the output level, a rise in the output’s price and a decline in demand for inputs. MC(y) + t t MC(y) y yt y* MR(y)
Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist • Can a monopolist “pass” all of a $t quantity tax to the consumers? • Suppose the marginal cost of production is constant at $k/output unit. • With no tax, the monopolist’s price is
Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist • The tax increases marginal cost to $(k+t)/output unit, changing the profitmaximizing price to • The amount of the tax paid by buyers is
Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist is the amount of the tax passed on to buyers. E. g. if e = -2, the amount of the tax passed on is 2 t. Because e < -1, e /(1+e) > 1 and so the monopolist passes on to consumers more than the tax!
The Inefficiency of Monopoly • A market is Pareto efficient if it achieves the maximum possible total gains-to-trade. • Otherwise a market is Pareto inefficient.
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit The efficient output level ye satisfies p(y) = MC(y). p(y) MC(y) p(ye) ye y
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit The efficient output level ye satisfies p(y) = MC(y). p(y) CS MC(y) p(ye) ye y
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit The efficient output level ye satisfies p(y) = MC(y). p(y) CS p(ye) MC(y) PS ye y
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit p(y) CS p(ye) The efficient output level ye satisfies p(y) = MC(y). Total gains-to-trade is maximized. MC(y) PS ye y
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit p(y) p(y*) MC(y) y y* MR(y)
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit p(y) p(y*) CS MC(y) y y* MR(y)
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit p(y) p(y*) CS MC(y) PS y y* MR(y)
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit p(y) p(y*) CS MC(y) PS y y* MR(y)
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit p(y) p(y*) CS MC(y) PS y y* MR(y)
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit p(y) p(y*) CS PS MC(y*+1) < p(y*+1) so both seller and buyer could gain if the (y*+1)th unit of output was produced. Hence the MC(y) market is Pareto inefficient. y y* MR(y)
The Inefficiency of Monopoly $/output unit Deadweight loss measures the gains-to-trade not achieved by the market. p(y) p(y*) MC(y) DWL y y* MR(y)
The Inefficiency of Monopoly The monopolist produces $/output unit less than the efficient quantity, making the p(y) market price exceed the efficient market p(y*) MC(y) price. e DWL p(y ) y* y ye MR(y)
Natural Monopoly • A natural monopoly arises when the firm’s technology has economies-of-scale large enough for it to supply the whole market at a lower average total production cost than is possible with more than one firm in the market.
Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) p(y) MC(y) y
Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) p(y*) MC(y) y* MR(y) y
Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly • A natural monopoly deters entry by threatening predatory pricing against an entrant. • A predatory price is a low price set by the incumbent firm when an entrant appears, causing the entrant’s economic profits to be negative and inducing its exit.
Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly • E. g. suppose an entrant initially captures one-quarter of the market, leaving the incumbent firm the other three-quarters.
Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) p(y), total demand = DI + DE DE DI MC(y) y
Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) An entrant can undercut the incumbent’s price p(y*) but. . . p(y), total demand = DI + DE DE p(y*) p. E DI MC(y) y
Entry Deterrence by a Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) An entrant can undercut the incumbent’s price p(y*) but p(y), total demand = DI + DE DE p(y*) p. E p. I the incumbent can then lower its price as far as p , forcing I DI the entrant to exit. MC(y) y
Inefficiency of a Natural Monopolist • Like any profit-maximizing monopolist, the natural monopolist causes a deadweight loss.
Inefficiency of a Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) p(y*) MC(y) y* MR(y) y
Inefficiency of a Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) p(y) Profit-max: MR(y) = MC(y) Efficiency: p = MC(y) p(y*) p(ye) MC(y) y* MR(y) ye y
Inefficiency of a Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) p(y) Profit-max: MR(y) = MC(y) Efficiency: p = MC(y) p(y*) DWL p(ye) MC(y) y* MR(y) ye y
Regulating a Natural Monopoly • Why not command that a natural monopoly produce the efficient amount of output? • Then the deadweight loss will be zero, won’t it?
Regulating a Natural Monopoly $/output unit At the efficient output level ye, ATC(ye) > p(ye) ATC(y) p(y) ATC(ye) p(ye) MC(y) MR(y) ye y
Regulating a Natural Monopoly $/output unit ATC(y) p(y) ATC(ye) p(ye) At the efficient output level ye, ATC(ye) > p(ye) so the firm makes an economic loss. MC(y) Economic loss MR(y) ye y
Regulating a Natural Monopoly • So a natural monopoly cannot be forced to use marginal cost pricing. Doing so makes the firm exit, destroying both the market and any gains-to-trade. • Regulatory schemes can induce the natural monopolist to produce the efficient output level without exiting.
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