e passports Erik Poll Digital Security Group Radboud

e- passports Erik Poll Digital Security Group Radboud University Nijmegen

overview • e-passports • functionality and security mechanisms • problems, so far • future Erik Poll Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 2

e-passports • e-passport contains RFID chip / contactless smartcard – in Dutch passports, a Java Card • chip stores digitally signed information: – initially just facial images (photos) – soon also fingerprints – later maybe iris • aka biometric passport or MRTD with ICC/chip • introduction pushed by US in the wake of 9/11 • – to solve what problem? ? international standard by ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization, branch of United Nations) Erik Poll e-passport logo Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 3

Protocols & standards ISO 14443 • defines physical communication for RFIDs ISO 7816 • originally developed for contact smartcards • defines standard APDU commands & responses, ICAO standard for e-passports • defines specific IS 0 7816 commands and responses for passports additional EU standards • standardise optional parts of ICAO specs & fix timeline • additional advanced secuity mechanisms on top of ICAO Erik Poll Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 4

National id-cards & terminology • Nederlandse Identiteitskaart (NIK) conforms to the same ICAO specification NB possible confusion • e. NIK is a future extension of NIK, with digital signature capability • MRTD = Machine-Readable Travel Document just has Machine (OCR) Readable Zone, the MRZ, but need not contain a chip ie. e-passport = MRTD + chip Erik Poll MRZ Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 5

Basic Access Control (BAC) protects against unauthorised access and eavesdropping optically read MRZ Machine Readable Zone send MRZ receive additional info encrypted Erik Poll Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 6

Alternative: Faraday Cage • protects against unauthorised access, but not eavesdropping – used in US passports, initially instead of BAC Erik Poll Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 7

Active Authentication (AA) protects against passport cloning (which BAC doesn't) ie authentication of the passport chip public key, signed by government (DG 15) send challenge prove knowledge of corresponding private key Erik Poll Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 8

Questions? • Open source implementation of passport terminal and passport applet available at http: //jmrtd. sourceforge. net Erik Poll Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 9