DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint

DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism Friday August 16, 2002 Final Outbrief For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Sponsors USD(AT&L)/Commander JFCOM Special Operations & Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism Dr. Ted Gold Mr. Don Latham Prior CT Insights MG Bob Scales Dr. Wick Murray Advanced CT Technologies & Systems Dr. Mim John Dr. Ron Kerber Future Force Capabilities GEN Bill Hartzog VADM Dave Frost We drew on past DSB studies Enduring Freedom Intel Panel Dr. Joe Markowitz ADM Bill Studeman Psyops Managed Information Dissemination We leveraged current DSB Studies Unconventional Use of Nuclear Weapons Against U. S. Dr. Rich Wagner Dr. Bill Graham Precision Targeting Defensive Information Operations 11/21/2020 Others Biological Warfare Dr. Anna Skalka Mr. Larry Lynn For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute Discriminant Use of Force Dr. Ted Gold Dr. Josh Lederberg 22

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Real War, A New Type of Adversary • Committed, resourceful, globally dispersed adversary with strategic reach • A long, at times violent, and borderless war • Requires new strategies, postures, and organization This study only scratches the surface of what will eventually be needed For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Elements of a National Strategy: Orchestrate All Instruments of National Power in a Global Campaign • Preemption/proaction/interdiction/disruption/quick-response capabilities • Be proactive in securing partners and help from allies, friends, and others • Hold states/sub-state actors accountable • Foster information sharing • Fight forward • Focus particular attention on WMD • Sophisticated, aggressive public diplomacy All the above in parallel with consequence management and protecting the homeland Do. D’s missions and forces For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Guidance From Our Terms of Reference • Focus is overseas military operations – Military instrument is only part of the necessary capabilities – Examined the role of intelligence in some detail • Did not address homeland defense explicitly – But difficult to segment theaters in this war – We did consider threats to US military force projection from the US For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

The Toughest Challenge: Identify and Find Terrorist Networks • Very small “signals” hidden in massive clutter and noise • Some similarities with Cold War anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts • Extensive differences as well For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring Terrorists OEF demonstrated substantial progress toward desired force capabilities • From – Air, land, sea, space • To – – – Robust connectivity Horizontally integrated, pervasive ISR Agile ground forces able to operate dispersed Effective remote fires Adaptive joint command control Assured access and supply (expeditionary mindset) These emerging capabilities will be critical for an effective military role in GWOT For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will Persist • A more central role for SOF and specialized capabilities • Joint integration at very low levels • Discriminant use of force • Interagency partners play major roles • Creative operational arrangements with coalition partners For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Recent Do. D Initiatives in the GWOT • Expanded Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) initiatives – Interagency • Operational net assessment (ONA) capabilities at Combatant Commands – JFCOM • – CENTCOM • • • – NORTHCOM New Campaign Support Group at Ft. Bragg – Multi-agency • – Link analysis – Joint – Global perspective – New analysis tools – Multi-option analysis Joint Program Office – Special Technology Countermeasures: Mission Assurance Analysis Counter-terrorism Technology Support Office – Technical Support Working Group Physical Security Equipment Action Group Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center J 8 Chem/Bio Warfare Requirements Section Do. D Support to DEA Special Intelligence JFCOM Initiatives – Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Joint Interagency Coordination Group – Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System - Near Term – Enhanced C 4 ISR Homeland Operations Center – Joint National Training Capability • • • USN Deep Blue (Navy Operations Group) USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group Proof of Concept USMC/SOCOM Integration Initiatives For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Recent Do. D Initiatives in the GWOT • DARPA projects, e. g. : – – – – – • Genoa Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery Translingual Information Detection, Extraction, and Summarization Babylon Human Identification at a Distance Modern Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors Foliage Penetration Radar (SAR and GMT I) Standoff Precision Identification from 3 D Data Digital Radio Frequency Tags Advanced ISR Management ACTDs: – – – – – High-Altitude Airship Pathfinder Active Denial System Thermobaric Adaptive Joint C 4 ISR Mode Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness Language and Speech Exploitation Resources Cave and Urban Assault Urban Reconnaissance Hyperspectral Collection and Analysis System (Hy. CAS) For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Major Concerns • Do. D should take the terrorist threat as seriously as it takes the likelihood and consequences of major theater war • Do. D still struggling to get joint C 4 right • Pentagon processes overly focused on materiel • Defense and Intelligence processes and cultures remain inputrather than product-oriented For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute Not the focus of our study

Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors 2 “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets 1 Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence A much more responsive, flexible, and effective military capability 3 4 Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making

Discussion Outline • Organization, context, and themes • Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence • “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities • Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations • Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities • Recap For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability 1. Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks 2. “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities 3. Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations 4. Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Understanding New Adversaries and Providing “Actionable” Intelligence: Deep Penetration - Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the Terrorists and Their Networks - Key Initiatives – • Transformation of HUMINT (and human-technical) operations • Aggressive, proactive, preemptive, operations • Intelligence surge/unsurge capability • Expanded analytical capabilities and throughput against asymmetrical adversaries • Understand adversaries as complex adaptive systems 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 17

Transformation of HUMINT Operations • Sec. Def (working with DCI) expand overall Directorate of HUMINT Services (DHS)/Service roles and explore SOF opportunities • Increase HUMINT forward/operational presence • Work with DCI to deploy new Do. D clandestine technical capabilities • NSA/Combatant Commanders/Services pay more attention to support of Do. D HUMINT in the field • SOF continue to work Advance Force Operations (AFO) • Define HUMINT role in “Proactive” Ops; ensure Covert Action (CA) and IW/IO connections • Explore development of USAF/Navy HUMINT capabilities (beyond current compartmented programs) • A major covert HUMINT program needs to be made joint • Explore new and more varied HUMINT modes – described on next chart For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Transformation of HUMINT Operations Classified HUMINT Chart 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 19

Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P 2 OG) CLASSIFIED 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 20

Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations • Creation of a Proactive Preemptive Operating Group (P 2 OG) of creative subject matter operational experts such as: – IW/IO – Covert Action – Diplomacy – Cover & Deception – Intelligence Operations – PSYOPS – HUMINT – SIGINT – SOF • Improves information collection by stimulating reactions • Enhance operational preparation of the battlespace to support preemptive options and actions • Signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk • Vest responsibility and accountability for the P 2 OG to a “Special Operations Executive” in the NSC* who shall: – – Define the national strategy Coordinate action Enunciate policy Execute to a plan coordinated with the Sec. Def and DCI and others as appropriate * The position exists in the NSC and is called: “National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism”, NSPD-8, Oct. 24, 2001 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability • Maintain a robust global cadre of retirees, reservists, and others who are trained and qualified to serve on short notice, including expatriates – Make investments now – Exercise and engage (through gaming) at least annually – Maintain a database of individuals and skills – Focus on Tier 4 countries where CT operations may be necessary – Contracted roles for industry, universities, and think tanks • Focus on analytic expertise and capabilities, CA/SOF issues, scientists and engineers, linguists/area experts, and personnel recovery skills • Work with Do. D and Congress on “unsurge” issues, particularly related to callups • Develop innovative “data surge” capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput • Create a new and larger analytic workforce with skills and innovative tools focused on counterterrorism (CT) • Focus on “actionable intelligence, ” improved situational awareness, targeting and reachback support and “connecting the dots” using JWAC-like analysis approaches • Full-time collaborative connections between all the critical centers working CT intelligence and support • Analysis components of national intelligence organizations physically or virtually collocated to improve all-source multi-INT “analysis” collaboration and production • Support for intelligence collection-related “target development” • Develop new security/sanitization concepts to aid analysts in protecting new sources and methods • Identify roles for analysts in operational net assessment process/joint experimentation, vulnerability analysis/Red Teaming, and CT-related gaming and simulation For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence Counterterrorism Information • Sec. Def/DCI establish a group to define a future path to achieve a truly joint interoperable CT Common Operating Picture (COP) • Improve chat windows and secure collaborative means/directories for direct access to relevant analysts and related data environments • Converge large e-gov programs currently underway in SIGINT and IMINT for improved customer access to intelligence data/collaboration • Pursue an integrated family of “small terminal programs” for field/small unit access to intelligence data (data, imagery, etc. )—smart push and pull • DCI/Sec. Def provide portals, tools and pointers for access to unclassified open sources data bases, commercial sources etc. • Develop advanced visualization concepts for conveying intelligence and situational information For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems • Further expand enhance Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)-like capabilities – Expand the number of countries/actors as well as the factors considered – Address non-physical as well as physical dimensions – Address money flow, cronies, family, intra-military, other • The capabilities must be coupled closer to campaign planning and execution (effects-based operations): – To influence as well as respond – Support information/influence ops in peace/crisis/war as well as more traditional maneuver/fires • These capabilities are also needed to: – Focus information collection efforts – Provide context to better understand collected data For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Recommendation: Proactive Operations Recommendation • Lead Responsibility Develop an entirely new capability to proactively, preemptively evoke responses from adversary/terrorist groups – Form a new elite Counter-terrorism Proactive Preemptive Operations Group (P 2 OG) at the NSC level – Highly specialized people with unique technical and intelligence skills such as information operations, PSYOP, network attack, covert activities, SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence warfare/deception operations – Reports to NSC principal level 11/21/2020 • NSC lead with DCI, Sec. Def, State, Justice participation For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute “Cost” • 100 “new” people • $100 M/yr for operations and support 26

Recommendation: Improve Intelligence Recommendation • • Develop new capabilities, sources, and methods to enable deep penetration of adversaries – DO/DHS develop new modes and methods for covert operations – See classified chart on HUMINT – Increase emphasis on CT CA to gain close target access – Develop new clandestine technical capabilities Create a surge capability in intelligence to preempt and deal with rapidly emerging crises in the GWOT – Maintain a robust cadre of retirees reservists and specialists, qualified to serve on short notice – Contract roles for industry universities and think tanks 11/21/2020 Lead Responsibility “Cost” • DCI Lead Sec. Def/CJCS • $1. 7 Billion/FY beginning in FY-04 and continuing Supports CIA DO/DDS&T initiatives • ASD(C 3 I) and DCI Community Management Staff (CMS) • DCI/Do. D co-shared lead For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute • $100 M/yr for exercises, engagement in the form of gaming, and real operations 27

Recommendation: Improve Intelligence (cont. ) Recommendation • Expand counter terrorism and asymmetric adversary analytical capabilities and throughput – Increase Service and intelligence agency analytic specialties, unique to CT challenges, by 500 people over the next 18 months to add depth of expertise – Focus on understanding effects of globalization, radicalism, cultures, religions, economics, etc. , to better characterize potential adversaries – More virtual collaboration architecture for analyst support and customers interaction 11/21/2020 Lead Responsibility “Cost” • CMS shared lead with ASD(C 3 I) • $800 M/yr for technical capabilities development and 500 new staff For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 28

Recommendation: Gain Deeper Understanding of Terrorist Organizations and Their Supporters as Complex Adaptive Systems Recommendation Lead Responsibility • Establish additional “centers” of • JFCOM excellence to handle the greatly increased work load and to augment JWAC to support “targeting” (in the broadest sense) of terrorist organizations and their supporting infrastructure— these activities will draw upon intelligence feeds, Red Teaming, and a great variety of subject matter experts (regional, cultural, psychological, soft and hard sensors) • Pursue and expand JFCOM’s operational net assessment activity employed in millennium challenge 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute “Cost” • Add to existing initiatives up to $100 M per FY as appropriate • $100 M initiative at JFCOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and DARPA 29

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability 1. Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks 2. “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities 3. Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations 4. Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

“Tools” to Handle Tough Environments and Difficult Targets and to Understand Our Vulnerabilities - Key Initiatives • Tough Environments: Urban Warfare • Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction - Theater and CONUS protection - The consequence management challenge • In-theater • CONUS - Finding terrorists and WMD—persistent ISR - The Red Team • Asymmetric Adversaries and Force Projection For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Inadequate Attention and Resources Devoted to Improving Capabilities to Operate in Urban Environments • URBAN OUR FOCUS: Most likely terrorism environment and the one for which we are the least prepared • Shortfalls in doctrine, training, and technology for urban operations – Doctrine: JFCOM Executive Agent in FY 03 • – Training: Current urban ops training facilities inadequate • – Put priority and resources behind the effort to create joint urban operations doctrine and address DOTMLPF challenges Include an urban facility in the Joint National Training Capability Initiative Technology: Develop urban-specific technologies including: • • • Knowledge systems Movement capabilities Precision fires Special sensor systems Communications unique to urban environment Integrated system solutions For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Challenges for Military Operations in Urban Terrain • Urban terrain presents unique challenges in: – Precision strike to avoid collateral damage – Command control communications limitations – Need for diverse, manpower intensive operations – Standoff weapons’ advantages diminish – The need to call for and control supporting arms at platoon and squad levels • To meet the unique urban challenge, we need better capabilities in: – Ground aerial surveillance (GPS-guided UAV helos) – Situation awareness (persistent layered ISR) – Urban training and development (dedicated center) – Command, control and communications (DARPA SUO/SAS system) – Low level combined arms maneuver – Precision supporting fires – Detecting and preempting WMD threats For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Progress – USMC “Project Metropolis” • USMC battalion-sized MAGTF experiment • Concept – Penetration, thrust – Combined arms to squad level (infantry, tank, helo, etc. ) – 4 -5 weeks intense training – Packaged combat support teams – Bounding overwatch – Spherical security • Schedule – Victorville, California – Summer 02 – Urban ground reconnaissance • Rotary-wing tactics • Command control • Small unit logistics For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

The Way Ahead • Develop an urban strategy on the strategic and operational levels – We don’t do cities – We do cities into rubble – We have some good ideas for new urban warfare operations • Develop a dedicated joint urban training and development center – Part of joint West Coast training centers – Subordinate to JFCOM • Develop specialized tools for urban environments – Many good ideas • Develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) emphasizing: – Urban intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) techniques – Small unit action – Leadership initiative and flexibility – Low level call for and control of supporting fires • Develop a precise urban environment representation For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Urban Point Position Database (City. Map) Utility Creation • Gridlock sensor and report data for fusion and handoff • Theater-based sensors (LADAR, IFSAR) update a priori maps • Precisely locate targets for remote fires • Semi automated feature extraction to model structures • Perform accessibility analysis to find routes in and around city • Update/revisit rate much higher than traditional maps • Coordinate movement and position of forces • Urban context added to basic geometry using other sources (e. g. , building plans, Integrated Survey Program, …) • Construct urban IPB 11/21/2020 • Precision 3 D representation of • Structures (windows and doors) • LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground) • Obstacles (power lines) • Critical infrastructure elements (water, power, comm) • Database of supporting information • Addresses, occupants, functions, more For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 36

Urban OPS Are Enabled by Precise Environment Representation Gridlock of sensor data Gridlock of report data • Enable HD multi-sensor processes • Locate and track targets for long epochs Mission planning and rehearsal • Critical node analysis • Accessibility analysis (ground air) 11/21/2020 • Fuse disparate INT types precisely • Locate targets for remote precision fires • Precision 3 D representation of: • Structures • LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground) • Obstacles (power lines) • Critical infrastructure elements (water, power, comm) • Database of supporting information • Addresses • Occupants • Functions • More Urban C 2 • Coordinate movement • Select / prioritize targets for remote precision fires For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 37

Finding the Enemy and WMD in Complex Environments Engagement Chain Critical Required Capabilities • Intelligence for target engagement Intelligence Data to Focus Engagement Region Monitoring • Very smart sensor management • Understanding the asymmetric adversary and his tactics • Sensors for detecting and locating people and WMD weapons – especially in urban areas • Achieving local high density persistent ISR coverage • Communications for difficult environments Target Detection and Identification Target Preparation, Precision Strike and Kill Assessment • Data processing and fusion for target detection, ID, and precision location • Precision location of sensor and shooter assets to minimize collateral damage and aid precision strike • Integrated systems solutions for strike and kill assessment 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 38

The Integrated Battlespace Space: ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of Earth’s Surface Navigation / Position Fixing Precision Time Ballistic Missile Launch Warning • • • Weather Air: • • ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of Ground and Sea Airborne Object Detection / Tracking / ID Atmospheric Sampling Localized Weather Terrestrial / Ocean Surface: • • • ISR: SIGINT, EO / IR, Acoustic, Seismic, Magnetic Terrain & Man-made Feature Data Weather • • Oceanographic Data Internet & World Wide Web • Weapons of Mass Destruction Data & Warning 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute Undersea: • ISR • • Oceanographic Data Other 39

Improved and Persistent Battlefield ISR Capabilities • Capable of search, synoptic coverage, and space, air, ground sensor dwell (persistent ISR) – Balanced space, air and ground capabilities to create a layered capability and an integrated ISR battlespace – Optimize resource allocation to achieve localized, persistent, high density coverage – Address the unique urban ISR problems – Include ground-based improved tagging, tracking, locating (TTL), close and clandestine technologies • More centralized planning and coordination of architectures, technology, and capabilities – Joint SIGINT Avionics Architecture (JSAA) program • Acquisition of system-of-system (strategic-operational-tactical) ISR architectures and systems – Multimission Command Control Constellation (MC 2 C) • New approaches to acquisition, architecture development and systems engineering – capabilities-based approach being used in the MDA For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

An Integrated Joint C 2/BM Capability Supported Through A Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII) Synchronous Orbit Relay Satellite Optical Link Communications Node with Multi. Beam Antenna and Data Switching Capability Intel Data / CONUS Commands Optical Links Broad-Area Surveillance Radar UAV Covert Uplink Multiple RF Circuits Low-Altitude UAVs Ground/Maritime Sensors Airborne Command Center Forward deployed data to everyone Forces Attributes: • All entities: people, platforms, sensors, weapons are interconnected 11/21/2020 • All entities can pull data in real time • All entities have access (as appropriate) to relevant data at all times For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 41

New Sensor Capabilities Are Needed for Locating People and WMD Four Tiers of Sensors Needed Sensor Tier I. Space II. High-Altitude Surveillance Radar Role • Global reference data • Coherent change detection • Automated urban feature extraction • Sensor interoperability across tiers • Detecting fixed and moving targets • Cueing lower-tier sensors • Foliage and building penetration • People detection with differential imaging radar • Precision real-time tracking and EO/IR imaging techniques of moving objects • Identification of fixed and moving targets • Tracking targets including people • Airborne platforms with long-range and endurance III. Medium-Altitude Optical Imagers IV. Netted Tactical Sensor Arrays 11/21/2020 New Technology • Ultra low-power sensors and data processors • Energy for long-term power • LPI communications • Sensor Network Fusion • WMD sensors For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute • Determining terrorist objectives with persistent close-up surveillance • Provide tactical commander “a look over the next hill” 42

Tracking Individuals • Many ideas are in the laboratory phase – Passive/active – Line of sight/non-line of sight – Cooperative/non-cooperative • Emphasis is on tags vs. systems/emplacement/environment • Spectrum of ideas/options – Short term (6 mos. )/long term (years) – Physical tags – Remote biometrics • Need coordinated program to provide a toolkit of capabilities and operationalize concepts, especially in placement and exfiltration schemes For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Priority Challenge for Counter-WMD Warfare: Detecting, Identifying, and Localizing WMD Nuclear detection • • Chemical Detection Biological Detection • • • WMD Sensor Systems • 11/21/2020 State-of-the-Art No operational stand-off capability • • No clandestine stand-off capability “Shoe box” size requiring agent collection with limited agent list capability, in development • No operational standoff capability Bio assays requiring agent collection/contact for detection • Nothing yet to support clandestine operations • • • Needed Standoff detection and tracking at kilometer ranges Active interrogation; highresolution, high-efficiency devices Passive spectral systems with km’s stand-off range for detection Low false alarm Remotely emplaced sample collection and retrieval Handheld units for ID characterization in seconds to minutes with low false alarms Emplacement, networking, data processing, exfiltration – all clandestine For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 44

WMD—The Way Ahead • Remote sensing has not proved out—seems to require in place sensors • Sensor systems should be considered end-to-end, but initial work should focus on phenomenology and sensing techniques • Network monitoring and analysis of inferential signatures (e. g. , deliveries, manifests, people movement) should be undertaken • Stimulated emissions may hold promise for nuclear choke point monitoring • Energize followup on the Zebra Chip recommendation • No matter the sensing, “agent defeat” is critical and requires additional resources For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

WMD—The Way Ahead re u t a lys a An is nt e ym plo e D gn y i h) r t t S l s n ea ng ial i t mi o t r i e S h at en n ito r( r r C t o / n o l e i i f t s g o s c n xf In ic M in u e E s s t r d t S in ta hy en n an es o a P S o k P i D D r r k ) o c nt so ke cis D a w e t e n o t P t A Pr (L Ag Se Ch Ne Chem Nuclear Consider Provocative Deployment CONOPS Proposed Relative Investment Among N, C, B Bio 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 46

An Expanded In-Theater and CONUS Counter-WMD Consequence Management Capability • The Counter-WMD Force Element: expanding on today’s capabilities – A joint, deployable counter-WMD force element, trained and equipped for CONUS or overseas: force/base protection, quarantine ops, WMD ISR, helping to plan counter-WMD offensive ops, search and render-safe • Must address consequence management capabilities and serious shortfalls – CONUS • National Guard has civil support teams in 32 locations today • Greatly expand role of National Guard and Reserves and improve training and equipage • The 50 states need to define their roles and budgeting for this mission and other disaster relief missions – Overseas • Any use of WMD in-theater directly impacts host nation as well as US forces • A coalition developed plan for consequence management is needed – country by country – with US assistance • No plans, and little capability, in place today For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Counter-WMD Mission and Relation to CONUS Protection • Create a special WMD “Red Team” dedicated to planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the US homeland forces overseas – Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in WMD mischief making and terrorist cultural beliefs – Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts and collectors who derive “observables” from scenarios and focus collection on these – Major reach out to creative people outside government for their ideas, scenarios, and postulated adversary capabilities – Major intelligence analytic support on counter-terrorism, counterproliferation, and WMD For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Assessing Do. D Force Projection Vulnerabilities in a GWOT Environment • Do. D GWOT force projection capabilities are highly dependent on both commercial and Defense Department infrastructure – Approximately 450 Do. D bases involved in some aspect of force projection – (Unknown numbers) of commercial sites are involved as well • No systematic mapping of this infrastructure and associated vulnerabilities to mission requirements exists – Currently multiple Do. D entities have some responsibility for assessing site-by-site vulnerabilities: • Local installation/base commanders • Joint Program Office-Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC) at Dahlgren with NIMA and DTRA in support • Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) with DTRA in support – Others responsible based upon the attack vector • The responsibilities for Do. D force projection risk assessment effort must be clarified – Do. D asset vulnerabilities must be ranked in importance and reported to the appropriate levels within Do. D – The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NORTHCOM must add the Do. D critical commercial infrastructure required force projection to their critical national infrastructure protection priorities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Responsibilities for Force Projection Risk Mitigation • Responsibilities for mitigation of identified force projection risks must be clarified – The Combatant Commander does not have the resources to fix the problem – Resources must flow from who “owns” the site day to day, not the “gaining command” – At the base level, risk assessment and mitigation funding competes with other installation sustainment demands • Sec. Def should consider establishing a new line item in each Service and Agency budget force projection risk mitigation – Segregates the funding – Enables assessments to be matched against mitigation efforts – Provides senior Do. D leadership better visibility into this issue For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Missiles Made in Tucson The following list of missiles are manufactured in Tucson, Arizona: • AIM-9 X • AMRAAM • EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle for the BMD system) • ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow) • Javelin • Maverick • Phalanx • Phoenix • RAM • Sparrow • Standard Missile • Stinger • TOW (anti-tank missile) • Tomahawk All of Raytheon’s missiles except Hawk and Patriot (Massachusetts) 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 51

Sustainability Enables Force Projection Classified 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 52

Recommendation: Take Urban Environment Seriously by Building on Emerging Activities Recommendation • Create infrastructure to enable new capabilities in urban operations – New urban-like facility able to support battalionsize forces to train, exercise, and experiment realistically • • • – – – • Lead Responsibility • • • JFCOM with Army, USMC DARPA NIMA “Cost” $300 M/yr for POM period Replicates different types of urban environments Large numbers of structures – some high rise Networked to other ranges/facilities Mission rehearsal capability Equipment evaluation Develop urban-unique modeling and simulation tools Develop the Urban Point Positioning Database DARPA develop a major R&D thrust Provide guidance and resources to JFCOM in their new role as Executive Agent for Joint Urban Operations – – Develop new concept at operational level Integrate Service efforts Conduct and sponsor experiments, exercises, and ACTDs Work with allies and draw lessons learned fostering urban-relevant M&S 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 53

Recommendation: Improve ISR Recommendation • Lead Responsibility Significant improvement in battlespace ISR and supporting analysis – – – • ASD(C 3 I) and CMS Develop the capability to employ a 24/7 Persistent ISR in a designated area for days or weeks A layered architecture from space, air, and a rich set of new ground sensor capabilities for now, next and after-next ISR systems Overlay with Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII) for support of network centric and gridlock capabilities 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute “Cost” • $1. 6 Billion/FY over FY-04 POM period • IOC in FY-06 • FOC in FY-09 54

Recommendation: Scenarios, Plans, and Templates: An Important Initiative For a “Red Team” Lead Responsibility Recommendation • For the WMD issues, there should be a dedicated team of smart, creative individuals dedicated to planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the US homeland forces overseas – Collect and collate terrorist MOs from previous incidents – Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in WMD mischief making – Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts and collectors who derive “observables” from the scenarios and focus collection on these • DCI with support from Sec. Def and CJCS • Includes comprehensive tagging, tracking and locating critical componentry • Includes monitoring of support structures • Monitoring individuals and institutions with critical knowhow “Cost” Hiring/finding the two dozen skilled people Resources to reach out to nongovernment skills Operations support cost of $20 M/yr – Provide the systems support so that the notional components can be stored and recombined, and can index into intelligence reports • Avoid premature focus on one or several end-to-end scenarios – Reports to Director CIA 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 55

Recommendation: Develop and Implement a Comprehensive Counter-WMD Plan Recommendation Lead Responsibility “Cost” • Execute consolidated oversight and funding of an aggressive and coordinated RDT&E program • USD(AT&L), ATSD(NCB) – Services, SOCOM $1 B/yr – Create and exercise WMD operational decision support systems – Push R&D on WMD sensors, sampling, and retrieval concepts – Develop networked C 4 ISR systems specific to WMD targets – Get serious about acquiring a WMD agent, device, and/or delivery defeat • SOCOM • Provide resources for near-term staffing and equipage for an expanded Counter-WMD Force – Services Element $500 M/yr – Joint, deployable; CONUS or overseas – Force protection, offensive action, consequence management 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 56

Recommendation: Identify and Redress Force Projection Vulnerabilities Recommendation • • Increase tenfold (over three years) the people and resources devoted to assessing vulnerabilities of our Do. D force projection capabilities and critical infrastructure – Support with extensive Red Teaming and R&D on new analysis techniques Assign Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security [ASD(HLS)] as Executive Agent for Do. D Critical Infrastructure Protection and assure the vulnerabilities are addressed Task NORTHCOM and ASD(HLS) to coordinate the vulnerability assessments and develop a plan to redress the vulnerabilities Move funding for the JPO-STC to a new NORTHCOM funding line 11/21/2020 Lead Responsibility • JPO-STC For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute “Cost” > $100 M Personnel costs. Need to coordinate multiple groups conducting vulnerability assessments $150 M/year 57

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability 1. Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks 2. “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities 3. Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations 4. Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations Traditional “SOF-Centric” SOF Allied SOF US Conventional Forces Combat Support & Combat Service Support 11/21/2020 Allied Conv. Forces Covert Action US USSOF Conventional Forces Combat Support & Combat Service Support For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 59

Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations - Key Initiatives - • Provide operational command flexibility • Increase SOF capabilities • Couple SOF and conventional forces more tightly • Enhance the contributions of conventional forces • Make SOF more central in our military planning with our Allies For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Provide Operational Command Flexibility • Prepare SOF to be the supported command in at least some phases of future campaigns – Enhance the robustness of theater special operations commands and joint special operations task force (JSOTF) headquarters (level/resources, skills, C 4) – Expand exercises and training with conventional forces • Provide for seamless transition of supported/supporting commands during a campaign; task JFCOM and SOCOM to: – Develop transition phasing experiments and exercises – Ensure interoperable situational awareness capabilities among SOF and conventional forces For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Increase SOF capabilities • A greater role in “preparing the battlefield” – Focus SOF worldwide day-to-day presence to exploit human and geographic access in potential crisis locations – Exploit SOF’s inherent intelligence collection capabilities • “Modest” increase in personnel – ~2% per year (+ some additional growth from transfers possible) – CENTCOM crisis response element • Substantial increase in equipage: • • • Blue force tracking Sensor “emplacement” Common Operating Picture Communications and other equipment Upgrade special mission aircraft, maritime and ground mobility For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Couple SOF and Conventional Forces More Tightly • More training and rehearsal for both SOF-led and conventional-led operations • Standardize TTPs between SOF and conventional forces for SOFinitiated operations – – • Command relationships Enhanced institutional and unit education Tailor force packaging to enhance pre-conflict/post-conflict capabilities – – Identify “packages” of engineers, civil affairs, military police, and medical personnel that can be coupled to in-theater SOF These resources reside mostly in Reserve Component (RC) For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Enhance Conventional Force’s Contributions in the GWOT • Improve selected conventional capabilities to support SOF-centric operations – – • Night vision/night flying/tactical resupply Sea-basing Fire support Foreign internal defense (training) Explosive ordnance disposal Consequence management Force protection Combat service support Accelerate development and fielding of specialized capabilities in selected conventional forces – Includes changes to training, professional military education, equipage, personnel practices • • • – – Operate dispersed and distributed Leverage remote fires and aerial ISR Use language and cultural awareness as force multipliers Leverage indigenous ground forces Have conventional forces with requisite capabilities assume missions currently being performed by SOF - E. g. , USMC MEU(SOC) For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Make SOF More Central in Military Engagement Planning With Our Allies/others • One of few areas where allies can be near peer partners – JSOTF-South in OEF provides a model: forces of eight nations • Focus efforts at early stages of emerging crisis • Center Allied and coalition planning operations at Combatant Command level • Prioritize engagement opportunities • Aggressively fund combined exercises and training events For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Recommendation: Preparing For More, Larger and More Complex Operations in Which SOF (and SOF-like) Capabilities Play a Central Role Recommendation Lead/Supporting Responsibility “Cost” • Provide operational command flexibility • Sec. Def/JFCOM $10 s of M • Increase SOF capabilities • Sec. Def/SOCOM Billions • Couple more tightly SOF and conventional forces • CJCS/JFCOM & SOCOM/Services • Enhance the contributions of conventional forces in – Warfighting – Shaping • Sec. Def/JFCOM/Services $100 s of M • Make SOF more central in our military planning with our Allies and coalition partners • Sec. Def/ASD(SO/LIC) $10 s of M 11/21/2020 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute $10 s of M 66

A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability 1. Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks 2. “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities 3. Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations 4. Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Operationalizing New Approaches and Capabilities - Key Initiatives Business as usual puts us at risk of not having capabilities when needed. Achieving capabilities will require • Extensive joint experimentation, training, and doctrine development • Adaptive joint C 4 systems • Interoperability at low levels • Hard-headed assessment of real world operations and experiments For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Creating an Organizational Center for Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT • Sec. Def/CJCS should formally and visibly recognize JFCOM’s new focus – As their “executive agent” for joint doctrine, training, experimentation, and joint integration to meet GWOT requirements • Linchpin for integration of joint and special ops efforts by services, USSOCOM, and other Combatant Commands • Relieved of geographic and homeland defense responsibilities • Transition to NATO functional Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation or divest SACLANT For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Accelerate Maturation of JFCOM to Fulfill Joint Doctrine, Training, Experimentation Roles • Create and sustain continuous experimentation/spiral development capability – flexible to connect to real world operations • New responsibility for joint doctrine • Establish closer links to other Combatant Commands and Services • Enlarge interagency and multinational initiatives • Serve as Executive Agent for improving Joint Urban Operations • Joint training capability For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Accelerate Development and Fielding of More Adaptive and Capable Joint Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Systems • Provide, through spiral development, continuous improvement of joint C 4 systems (including Joint Headquarters) at the Regional Combatant Commanders • Work closely with: – Regional Combatant Commands to tailor to theater – SOCOM to empower SOF-centric operations – The new STRATCOM in their potential role as provider of global sensors and comms For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Empower JFCOM to Ensure Jointness and Interoperability at Appropriate Levels • Establish Service acquisition program standards for processing/formatting (not just interface) • Make JFCOM effective “gatekeeper” for interoperability for all Service requirements • Accelerate integration of common operational pictures For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Turning Lessons into Lessons Learned and Acted Upon Needed: a standing process for development and top-down direction of lessons learned – – – – Make Joint Center for Lessons Learned subordinate to JFCOM Collect from operations, experiments, and training events (US and others) Create synthesis capability Develop an integrated electronic library Facilitate horizontal dispersion Create action plan Routinely report high priority lessons to Sec. Def/CJCS Result: Greater likelihood of discovering weaknesses before our adversaries do For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Resourcing Jointness to Support the GWOT • Create a program (set of program elements) to provide JFCOM the resources (through control of the funds) to fulfill the responsibilities we have laid out for: – – – Joint training, doctrine development, and experimentation Providing of joint C 4 at the Combatant Commands Ensuring interoperability at all joint levels Joint urban operations Joint Center for Lessons Learned Should include funds and contracting authority for limited “acquisition” of products and other opportunities in support of this mission Should make maximum use of existing acquisition and procurement organizations in carrying out these responsibilities • Provide JFCOM additional intellectual resources – JFSC and NDU – A formal relationship with counterpart activities in the Services (TRADOC, NWDC, AFDC, MCCDC/MCWL) • Establish a premier system-of-systems engineering and integration capability to support JFCOM For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

Recommendation: Creating an Organizational Center for Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT Lead Responsibility Recommendation • Create a program to provide JFCOM the resources (through control of the funds) to fulfill the responsibilities we have laid out • Provide them premier system engineering and integration support • Assign NDU/JFSC to JFCOM to ensure more influence of Service institutional counterparts 11/21/2020 “Cost” • Sec. Def/CJCS For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute 75

What Will You Get If You Implement Our Recommendations • Understanding of the adversary – Proactive operations for Intelligence – Deeper understanding and broader coverage • • • A new and new kind of expansion of HUMINT Intelligence surge capability Understanding the enemy as a complex adaptive system (beyond physical dimensions) – Deeper, broader, and more expert analysis – Customer and query-driven analysis • More capabilities for “tough” operations – – – – • • • Facilities for urban operations, experiment, training, and mission rehearsal/planning 3 D maps of urban environments Responsive ISR, persistent focus Tagging, tracking, and locating – even of people Sensors for WMD A “red team” to anticipate the terrorists A “SWAT-like” team to contain WMD weapons Powerful SOF-centric military options tailored to the GWOT – Greater contributions from the conventional forces Robust, adaptive, and flexible operational-level C 4 Finally, interoperability of C 4 – and at the lower levels needed For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

What It Will Mean • Much better able to anticipate terrorist behavior and react to “bolts-out -of-the-gray” • Much richer set of proactive/preemptive options • More responsive, flexible, and effective military instrument to prosecute the GWOT – better prepared for simultaneous campaigns – more capable in tough environments and against difficult targets • Allies much more capable (and perhaps willing) to contribute militarily • Do. D’s missions much less vulnerable to terrorist disruption • A catalyst for a broad and deep transformation of Do. D’s capabilities and practices For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

“ Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen…What is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance, and freedom. ” President George W. Bush September 20, 2001 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute