Do Not Distribute to DTIC or other data
Do Not Distribute to DTIC or other data depositories Distribution Limited to Do. D and Do. D Contractors Only Premature dissemination (15 May 2009 statement applied). Other requests shall be referred to: Commanding Officer SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS CENTER, SAN DIEGO Code 21511 SAN DIEGO, CA 92152 -5001 Logistics Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Assessment Annotated Brief 15 May 2008
Logistics Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Assessment Executive Brief 15 May 2008
The Future • Uncertain, Unstable, Unpredictable • • • Temporary incursions Longer-term campaigns Short notice Forward afloat MAGTFs Contingency formation and expansion • The Operational Environment • Urban, suburban, mountainous • Interdicted • Lethal, technological 15 May 2008
The Requirement • Personnel • Highly trained skilled Marines • Skilled leaders • Small unit capabilities • Concepts • • • STOM Operations on a distributed battlefield Sea-based operations (e. g. , GFS) Highly responsive maneuver/tactical mobility (Assault Support Transport (AST)) Logistics distribution • The Likely Constraints • • Strained budgets Few new major systems OPTEMPO Supply support 15 May 2008
The Resulting Operational Imperatives • Enhance rotary-wing and tilt-rotor AST capabilities • Mitigate risks to the rotary-wing and tilt-rotor force (i. e. , preserve vital MAGTF mobility and maneuver) • Provide dispersed logistic support on interdicted battlefields The Question: Can the cargo UAV make a significant contribution to these three closely related operational imperatives? How did we answer this question? 15 May 2008
Findings The following results and conclusions contribute to the requirements for increased operational flexibility and enhanced risk reduction demanded by the operational environment forecast in CMC’s The Long War: Send In The Marines, A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept To Meet An Uncertain Security Environment. 15 May 2008
Findings 1. A cargo UAV with a 1, 500 -pound payload capacity could deliver 94% of all logistics support items required by the MAGTF in this scenario. 2. The employment of a cargo UAV virtually eliminated the need for manned aircraft to execute logistics support missions. • All logistics missions executed by UAVs except for two days (1 -2 manned missions on each of those days). 3. The addition of the cargo UAV significantly enhanced MAGTF operational flexibility by increasing the number of manned aircraft flight hours available for other missions. 15 May 2008
Findings 4. The addition of the cargo UAV enhanced MAGTF operational responsiveness by keeping more total aircraft available more often to meet unexpected mission requirements. 5. The addition of the cargo UAV reduced the total risk to manned aircraft by 64%. a. UAV assumption of virtually the entire logistics mission significantly reduced the time during which manned aircraft would have been exposed in the descent-to-hover, hover-andoffload, and ascent-to-altitude phases of the resupply mission. The cumulative impact of Findings 3, 4, and 5 contributes directly to preserving the tilt-rotor and rotary-wing force while increasing the operational flexibility available to the MAGTF. 15 May 2008
Findings 6. The loss of a UAV has far less impact on measured mission support than the loss of one manned helicopter. a. For example, in the case of the MEU, the loss of one CH-53 K equals 10% of the unit’s total capacity versus 1% for the loss of one cargo UAV. 7. A mix of manned and unmanned aircraft (UAV) can provide increased operational capability and reduce risk. a. The assessment’s intent was to create a logical mix of aircraft that could accomplish the Assault Support Transport (AST) missions and provide sufficient UAVs for the logistic missions. In fact, the number of UAVs required was overestimated (available UAVs exceeded the daily demands in all cases except the heaviest MEU days). Thus it should be possible to create an optimum aircraft balance with fewer unmanned aircraft. 15 May 2008
Qualitative Considerations • • • How UAVs Get to the Sea Base UAV Storage on MPF(F) UAV Support and Maintenance UAV Control UAV Operational Considerations UAV Vulnerability 15 May 2008
Summary Among the most pressing operational imperatives facing Marines are enhancing AST flexibility (availability and responsiveness), reducing risks to the manned aircraft, and providing a viable means of resupply to dispersed MAGTF elements. The cargo UAV could make a significant contribution to all three. 15 May 2008
Logistics Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Assessment Overview and Approach 15 May 2008
Assessment Overview • Base Case: Current & planned 2020 manned aircraft • MV-22 and CH-53 K focus • AH-1, UH-1, AV-8 B occupy space, but operations not modeled in detail • Excursion: Introduce cargo UAV • Cargo UAVs take place of some manned aircraft • Cargo UAVs focus on sustainment, particularly for smaller units • Mission and sea base air deck space same for both cases • Assumption is that expeditionary forces deploy with full decks • To introduce cargo UAVs, must “trade” for some manned aircraft • Assessment focus is on air operations, mainly logistics aspects • Cargo UAV not suitable for manned missions such as troop transport • Manned air operations addressed to show results of UAV trade-off and areas where UAV complements manned aircraft 15 May 2008
Assessment Approach • Model “stressing” days • Focus on UAV/manned aircraft trade-offs • Calculate other impacts as feasible (e. g. , inserts and extracts) • Determine OPTEMPO impacts on manned aircraft • Determine reduction in manned aircraft OPTEMPO by substituting cargo UAVs 15 May 2008
Stage 1 Relief efforts to refugee camps Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations with Nigerian Armed Forces LPD 60 nm LHD+LSD 15 May 2008
Stage 2 1. MEU platoons move to new positions. LPD 3. Reembark MEU platoons. LHD+LSD 2. MEB lead elements relieve MEU forces. MPG LHD+LMSR 15 May 2008
Stage 3 MEU ESG MEB Bn 1 MPG Small 1 LHD 1 LMSR 1 MLP 1 T-AKE MEB Bn 2 MEB Bn 3 MPG Large 2 LHA(R) 2 LMSR 2 MLP 2 T-AKE 15 May 2008
Air Operations Assumptions • Aircraft maintenance availability • MV-22: 0. 8 • CH-53 K: 0. 7 • Cargo UAV: 0. 8 • Cargo UAV Capacity 1, 500 lb • Cargo UAV not limited by crew rest requirements, but deliveries were deconflicted in time, space, or both 15 May 2008
Mono Tiltrotor (MTR) Cargo UAV 15 May 2008
Relative Aircraft Size (Folded) MV-22 CH-53 K UAV 15 May 2008
Relative Aircraft Size (Operational) MV-22 CH-53 K UAV 15 May 2008
Relative Aircraft Size (Area) Possible UAV-to-Helicopter Exchange Ratios: 7: 1 for MV-22 s and 9: 1 for CH-53 Ks. Taking advantage of all space, it would be possible to achieve these exchange ratios. However, we chose a more conservative approach (illustrated on the next two slides). 15 May 2008
Aircraft Ratios Used for Assessment MV-22 CH-53 K Conservative UAV-to-Helicopter Exchange Ratios: 3: 1 for MV-22 s and 5: 1 for CH-53 Ks. Note: During flight operations, each UAV is assumed to occupy one operating spot (same as manned aircraft). 15 May 2008
Aircraft Ratios Used for Assessment MV-22 CH-53 K Conservative UAV-to-Helicopter Exchange Ratios: 3: 1 for MV-22 s and 5: 1 for CH-53 Ks. Note: During flight operations, each UAV is assumed to occupy one operating spot (same as manned aircraft). 15 May 2008
Aircraft Mixes Base Case UAV Excursion MV-22 12 10 CH-53 K 4 3 Cargo UAV 0 11 MV-22 48 36 CH-53 K 20 12 Cargo UAV 0 76 MEU MEB Assumption is that the capacity of the sea base remains constant. 15 May 2008
Numbers of Aircraft by Stage Organization Aircraft Base Cargo UAV Excursion (Available 1 / Total) MV-22 6 / 12 2 4 / 10 2 CH-53 K 3/4 2/3 Cargo UAV n/a 9 / 11 MV-22 10 / 12 8 / 10 CH-53 K 3/4 2/3 Cargo UAV n/a 9 / 11 MV-22 13 / 16 10 / 12 CH-53 K 4/6 3/4 Cargo UAV n/a 19 / 25 MV-22 39 / 48 29 / 36 CH-53 K 14 / 20 8 / 12 Cargo UAV n/a 61 / 76 MEU (Stage 1 -2) Full MEU (Stage 3) Lead MEB Elements (Stage 2) Full MEB (Stage 3) 1. Reduced number due to maintenance availability. 2. 4 available MV-22 s dedicated to Lagos AO in Stages 1 -2. 15 May 2008
Logistics Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Assessment Quantitative Assessment 15 May 2008
Quantitative Measures • Transport Capacity – fraction of logistics-related type items that the UAV can transport • Cargo Comparison – min, average, and max loads carried by aircraft • Flexibility – manned aircraft flight hours available because UAV is conducting some missions • Responsiveness – likelihood that an appropriate aircraft is available when a non-planned request is made • Risk Reduction – amount of high-risk manned flight avoided by UAV performing logistics missions. 15 May 2008
Cargo UAV Transport Capability Cargo UAV with 1, 500 lb payload capacity can transport 94 percent of logistics-related items (352 of 375 type items). 15 May 2008
Items Cargo UAV Can Not Lift Category Quantity Remarks AMALs (As Packaged) 7 2 categorized as equipment and would likely be inserted with medical units. 5 are consumables that could potentially be broken down into smaller, more easily transportable packages. Anti-Air Missiles 6 If used at all, these would likely be transported to relatively-secure airfields or other areas. HIMARS (MLRS) Rocket Pods 3 HIMARS reloads are 5, 000+ lb pods. Used only by artillery. MCLCs 3 Mine Clearing Line Charges weigh 3, 000+ lbs. Used only by combat engineers. 4 Used by many units. May be prudent to develop smaller containers, particularly for distributed small units. 300 - and 500 -Gallon Fuel and Water Containers 15 May 2008
Aircraft Load Comparison AST Loads: Weight (lbs) and (Percent of capacity) Aircraft MV-22 (10, 000 lb) CH-53 K (28, 000 lb) Minimum Average Maximum 584 (6%) 5534 (55%) 9988 (100%) 5928 (21%) 15810 (56%) 26668 (95%) Logistics Loads: Weight (lbs) and (Percent of capacity) Aircraft Minimum Average Maximum CH-53 K (Base Case) 41 (0. 1%) 5579 (21%) 1 20000 (71%) 2 Cargo UAV (1, 500 lb) 27 (2%) 1270 (85%) 1500 (100%) 1. Distances and mission profiles result in operational efficiency being more important than logistics efficiency. 2. Payload capacity reduced due to ship-to-objective distances. • For manned aircraft, AST loads were more efficient than log loads. • For log missions, UAV capacity was more efficiently employed because of force distribution. • Key Point: UAVs complement manned aircraft capabilities.
Cargo Comparison • Full Capacity • CH-53 K: 28, 000 lb • UAV: 1, 500 lb • Ratio: 18. 7: 1 • Average Logistics Load in this Scenario • CH-53 K: 5, 579 lb • UAV: 1, 270 lb • Ratio: 4. 6: 1 • Maximum Logistics Load in this Scenario • CH-53 K: 20, 000 lb • UAV: 1, 500 lb • Ratio: 13. 3: 1 UAV is a more efficient (in terms of capacity used) logistics carrier for this scenario. However, only the CH-53 K can do heavy lift. 15 May 2008
Flexibility • Measured by: • Number/percent of manned aircraft flight hours made available by UAV taking on logistics missions • Assumes NATOPs (OPNAV Instruction 3710. 7 T) average 3. 3 flight hours per day over sustained period • Takes into account differing numbers of manned aircraft available in the base case/excursion • Some days will be worse in UAV case (e. g. , heavy force movement with little logistics) 15 May 2008
(No Log missions) Flexibility: Manned Flight Hours Avoided The cargo UAV eliminates the need for all manned logistics missions except on Day 17 (1 CH-53 K mission) and Day 18 (2 CH-53 K missions).
Flexibility: Impact on Manned Flight Hours Available Surge rate Sustained rate UAV avoids need for virtually all manned logistics missions. But fewer manned aircraft available, so on heavy AST days >% hours used. (Note: UAVs only “maxed out” on heavy MEU days, so a different mix could mitigate this effect. )
Responsiveness • Measured by • Manned: # of hours that at least one manned aircraft is available for unplanned requests each type day • Unmanned: # of hours that at least one UAV and/or one manned aircraft is available for unplanned requests • Also used minimum number of aircraft available during each day • Takes into account differing numbers of manned aircraft available in the base case/excursion 15 May 2008
Responsiveness Hours No Aircraft are Available / All Are in Use 15 May 2008
Responsiveness Minimum Number of Aircraft Available in Any Hour (82) UAV Case Manned The Cargo UAV Case always has more aircraft available but fewer manned aircraft available than the Base Case. Note: Does not include 4 MV-22 s “dedicated” to Lagos AO during Stages 1 and 2 (2 on LPD-17, 2 reserved on LHD for swap).
Aircraft Usage D+0 Insert 6 Platoons Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Aircraft Usage D+1 Log 6 Platoons Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Aircraft Usage D+4 Log 6 Platoons / Swap 1 Platoon Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Aircraft Usage D+13 Log / Move 6 Platoons Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Aircraft Usage D+14 Insert 2 Companies / Log 6 Platoons (28 UAVs available) Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Aircraft Usage D+15 Log 2 Companies / Extract 6 Platoons (28 UAVs available) Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Aircraft Usage D+16 MEB (-) Insertion / Log All Ashore (70 UAVs available) Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Aircraft Usage D+17 Continue MEB (-) Insertion / Log All Ashore (70 UAVs available) Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Aircraft Usage D+18 Log All Ashore (70 UAVs available) Note: Horizontal lines are available aircraft for graph lines of the same color.
Risk Profile 1 2 LZ 1 • Risk Level Definitions: • • 1 = airborne over water 2 = airborne over land 3 = approach/landing/take-off in LZ in initial insertion 4 = approach/landing/take-off in LZ after initial insertion 3, 4 2 Note: Risk level numbers are just labels, not intended to imply quantitative relationships other than higher numbers imply higher risk. Distinction between levels 3 and 4 makes no significant difference: All level 3 missions are force insertion; the same for both cases.
Risk • Focus on level 3 and 4 risks • Initial force insertion is level 3 • Logistics missions after insertion are level 4 • Extraction is level 4 • Measure is number/percent of manned mission time risk 3 or 4 avoided because UAV performed mission. Note: All level 3 risks were during force insertion missions, all delivered by manned aircraft for both the base case and UAV excursion. In short, the distinction between levels 3 and 4 made no significant difference in the results. 15 May 2008
Summary by Type Day Activity "High" Risk (min) MV-22 AST CH-53 K AST CH 53 K Log Risk Level D 0 Insert 6 Plts Base Case 120 168 0 3 UAV Exc 120 168 0 3 Base Case 0 0 108 4 UAV Exc 0 0 0 4 Base Case 40 64 108 4 UAV Exc 40 64 0 4 Base Case - ext 204 300 108 4 Base Case - ins 120 168 0 3 UAV Exc - ext 204 300 0 4 UAV Exc - ins 120 168 0 3 Base Case 220 0 108 4 UAV Exc 220 0 0 4 Base Case 204 300 120 4 UAV Exc 204 300 0 4 Base Case 1460 336 216 3 for initial ins, 4 for other ins and Log UAV Exc 1460 336 0 3 for initial ins, 4 for other ins and Log Base Case 1632 378 459 4 UAV Exc 1632 378 9 4 Base Case 0 0 666 4 UAV Exc 0 0 18 4 D 1 Log 6 Plts D 4 Log 6/Swap 1 Plt D 13 Log/Move 6 D 14 Ins 2 Co, Log 6 Plt D 15 Log 2, Ext 6 D 16 MEB(-) Ins, Log all D 17 Cont Ins, Log all D 18 Log all
Risk: Percent Manned Risk Avoided by UAV (No Log missions) Levels 3 and 4 100 percent of Logistics risk avoided on all but Day 17 and 18. All high-risk manned missions are AST except 3.
Risk: Percent Manned “High” Risk Avoided by UAV (No Log missions) Level 4 Only significant effect is on D+13, 16 Note: Level 3 risk is the same for both base case and UAV excursion, only the percentage is impacted because the insertion missions are not counted.
(No Log missions) Manned High Risk Avoided by UAV 15 May 2008
Risk Avoidance Example • Calculate risk avoided during a 30 -day operation, by combining appropriate numbers of the various type days. • Possible profile: • D 0 + (D 1× 2 + D 4)× 4 = 13 days of MEU operations • D 13 + D 14 + D 15 = transition period, insertion of MEB lead elements • D 16 + D 17 + D 18× 13 = MEB insertion, log support for ongoing operations • Gives us a 30 -day profile to calculate risk avoided using the numbers on the following two slides. 15 May 2008
Risk Avoidance Example Stage 1: MEU Operations Day / Activity Minutes Avoided Minutes Not Avoided (AST) Percent Avoided D 0 (x 1) 0 120 0 D 1 (x 8) 864 0 100 D 4 (x 4) 432 416 51 1, 296 536 71 Total Stage 2: Transition Day / Activity Minutes Avoided Minutes Not Avoided (AST) Percent Avoided D 13 108 792 12 D 14 108 220 33 D 15 120 504 19 Total 336 1516 18 15 May 2008
Risk Avoidance Example Stage 3: MEU & MEB Operations Day / Activity Minutes avoided Minutes not avoided (AST+log) Percent Avoided D 16 216 1, 796 11 D 17 450 2, 019 18 D 18 (x 13) 8, 424 234 97 Total 9, 090 4, 049 69 Minutes Avoided Minutes Not Avoided (AST) Percent Avoided 10, 722 6, 101 64 30 -Day Constructive Campaign 30 Days Combined 15 May 2008
Cost Comparison (Parametric) Aircraft Hourly Operating Cost Maintenance Hours / Flight Hour $ 28, 000* 44* Kaman K-Max $1, 000 1. 75 S 92 $2, 000 4 EC-135 $ 725 2. 3 Bell 407 $ 650 1. 5 CH-53 E (current) Average Cargo Ratio (Manned: UAV) 5: 1 Other “small” helos Cargo UAV Comparison at 5: 1 Low end $1, 000 2 $5, 000 / 10 hours High end $2, 000 4 $10, 000 / 20 hours * Note: flight hour costs and maintenance increase as aircraft age; new CH-53 K costs may be lower than current CH-53 E costs UAV cost to deliver “X” cargo should compare favorably to CH-53. • Other Operational Cost Considerations: • Pilot hours, management of surge and sustained rates • • Reduced TRAP, SEAD, escort requirements for UAVs Simplified planning/air tasking requirements (backup plan for downed UAV is send another by a different route)
Other Cargo UAV Concepts • Lighten the load: Dedicate UAV to a dismounted unit • Risk Management/Adjusting PPE • 1 UAV could carry ~1/2 of a platoon’s PPE • UAV on-call either from sea base or positioned ashore • UAV can be risked in bad weather/dangerous conditions • Overcoming lack of well deck in LHA(R) • Dedicate manned aircraft to AST missions only • Dedicate UAVs to logistics/light equipment • Can fly manned aircraft at surge rate for AST missions, no need to adjust for expected logistics requirements • UAV can be risked in bad weather 15 May 2008
Logistics Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Assessment Qualitative Considerations (Most impact potential UAV designs. Remainder depend on mission tasking and sea base loadout. ) 15 May 2008
Qualitative Considerations • • • How UAVs Get to the Sea Base UAV Storage on MPF(F) UAV Support and Maintenance UAV Control UAV Operational Considerations UAV Vulnerability 15 May 2008
How UAVs Get to the Sea Base • Initial loadout (requires knowledge of likely missions) • At sea swap from MPF(F) ship • Break out/prep UAVs on ship, fly to amphib (or transport via other sea base connector) • Fly MV-22 s/CH-53 Ks to MPF(F) ship or other area (could also transport UAV support equipment back) • Significant range of UAV and manned aircraft a plus • Cross-deck from MPF(F) in port/forward base • May be necessary to cross-load UAV support equipment if it cannot be flown to ship in an at-sea swap • Attach MPF(F) ship to sea base for UAV operations • Fly-in UAV det ashore (requires establishment of UAV operations, support, and required security) 15 May 2008
UAV Storage on MPF(F) • No experience with impact of long storage of aircraft aboard ship • Aviation generally more complex than ground vehicles • Time and maintenance required to break out UAVs and prepare for flight ops • Reliability after storage • Requirement for trained personnel to be deployed to MPF(F) ship for breakout and prep • Operation from MPF(F) ships (see following “UAV Support and Maintenance” slide) • Cost of UAVs • May want to have “pool(s)” of active UAVs for training and operations, deploy (e. g. , in C-130 s, C-17 s) as required 15 May 2008
UAV Support and Maintenance • Design complexity • More capable generally correlates to more complex • More complex generally correlates to more support • UAV design ability to use components/maintenance procedures common to manned A/C undetermined • Additional parts block/stowage requirement • Additional training/separate MOS for maintenance • Additional support equipment/personnel • Shipboard operations/modifications undetermined • Shipalts for UAVs and/or support equipment (e. g. , fueling, fire suppression) and training of ship personnel • RF interference/electronics hardening and compatibility • Disc-loading and downwash • Deconfliction with other ship operations (e. g. , manned A/C, LCAC operations, HERO impact) 15 May 2008
UAV Control • Fully autonomous (assumed for assessment) • Requires sophisticated sensors to see clutter • Requires sophisticated control to avoid clutter/land on moving ship deck, especially in high sea state • Use of beacons for final approach/landing • Manual control for backup/difficult areas • Manned control for take-off/landing • Simple, easy-to-use terminal control carried with tactical unit (requires ease of use and training, small size/weight) • Dedicated operator/control equipment attached to tactical unit and/or onboard ship • Comm in complex terrain (steep valleys, urban canyons) • Link/guidance (e. g. , GPS) jamming • Redirect in flight or RTB • Requires NLOS communication • Could be directed from other aircraft in area (requires control capability on aircraft) 15 May 2008
UAV Operational Considerations • Airspace deconfliction • Consideration for all UAV operations • But cargo UAV likely to be operating more often, in more areas, in same airspace as manned aircraft • Attaching/detaching loads • Autonomous, directed, manual • Aerodynamic fairing/JMIC left in area or returned to ship with UAV • • Downwash/safety/FOD/brownout in landing zones Weather/icing/limited visibility Sea state and wind conditions Take-off and landing in complex/uneven terrain (see previous “UAV Control” slide) • Operational ceiling • Ability to avoid ground fire (small arms and MANPADS) • Ability to reach high elevations (e. g. , Afghanistan) 15 May 2008
UAV Vulnerability • UAV more vulnerable than manned aircraft • Not likely to have chaff, ECM, etc. (which would reduce cargo payload) • Will not have human reaction/discrimination/flexibility • Loss of UAV less impact than loss of manned aircraft • No loss of life or requirement for TRAP • Smaller fraction of cargo lift capacity (in MEU example, loss of CH-53 K ~10% of lift, MV-22 ~5% of lift, UAV ~1% of lift) • Tactical measures may mitigate enemy “willingness” to engage UAVs • May want enemy to expend expensive missiles on relatively low cost UAVs • May “teach” enemy that shooting means high probability of asset loss (e. g. , CAP A/C engages MANPADS shooter) 15 May 2008
For More Information Col Anthony A. Wood, USMC (Ret. ) Vice President, CDM Technologies, Inc. awood@cdmtech. com (805) 541 -3750 x 243 Assessment Services assessment@cdmtech. com Dwight Lyons Senior Research Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies dlyons@potomacinstitute. org (703) 562 -4535 15 May 2008
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