Democratization and democratic survival Political Economy of the

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Democratization and democratic survival Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Democratization and democratic survival Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Questions • Why do some countries democratize and others remain dictatorships? • Why do

Questions • Why do some countries democratize and others remain dictatorships? • Why do some democracies survive and others fail/revert to dictatorship?

Lipset (1959) • Empirical pattern: – More developed countries are more likely to be

Lipset (1959) • Empirical pattern: – More developed countries are more likely to be democratic than the less developed • Argument: – Economic development => social development (education, industrialization, middle class, etc. ) => stable democracy

Correlation is not causation

Correlation is not causation

Does high income level help countries become democracies? … Source: PWT & Polity IV

Does high income level help countries become democracies? … Source: PWT & Polity IV via Qo. G; Year: 2007

Or does democracy help countries achieve high income levels? 6

Or does democracy help countries achieve high income levels? 6

We will address effects of democracy next lecture

We will address effects of democracy next lecture

Income level appears to have little/no effect on democratization post WW 2 (However, wealthier

Income level appears to have little/no effect on democratization post WW 2 (However, wealthier nations were more likely to democratize pre-1925) Source: Boix & Stokes 2003 9

Democracy is less likely to survive in poor countries than in wealthy ones (in

Democracy is less likely to survive in poor countries than in wealthy ones (in any era) Source: Boix & Stokes 2003 10

Models of democratization as strategic interactions between elites and citizens • Rich Rulers vs.

Models of democratization as strategic interactions between elites and citizens • Rich Rulers vs. Poor Ruled – Boix (2003), Acemoglu & Robinson (2001), etc. – Taxes redistribute from poor to rich in democracies – May be more relevant for economic elite-based regimes, e. g. , Bolivia • Revenue maximizing rulers versus politically powerless citizens – North and Weingast (1989), Olson (1993), etc. – May be more relevant for state-based elite regimes, e. g. , Zaire – Taxes redistribute from ruled to rulers in dictatorships

Boix (2003): Rich rulers allow for democracy to avoid expropriating revolution Rich/Minority group Repress

Boix (2003): Rich rulers allow for democracy to avoid expropriating revolution Rich/Minority group Repress Don’t Repress Poor/Majority group Revolt Acquiesce WAR Poor win Rich win Revolution Poor expropriate fixed assets Mobile assets flee Cost of war for all Democratic Redistribution, including mass education, etc. Dictatorship No redistribution Cost of repression for rich Dictatorship No redistribution Rich take assets from poor Cost of war for all 12

Stable democracy is least likely when inequality is high (demand for redistribution) and economic

Stable democracy is least likely when inequality is high (demand for redistribution) and economic assets are immobile (wealth cannot exit)

How democratization has changed • Market economy vs. state ownership and regulation – Countries

How democratization has changed • Market economy vs. state ownership and regulation – Countries ruled by economic elites are often marketbased (e. g. , in Latin America, esp. pre-WW 1) – Post-WW 2, most authoritarian regimes used state intervention/ownership in economy • International influences – Trade, investment, and aid can affect democratization • Why? – During Cold War, Super Powers were willing to support dictatorships

High income level increases probability of democratization if the economy is neither centrally controlled

High income level increases probability of democratization if the economy is neither centrally controlled nor oil-dependent Source: Boix & Stokes 2003 16

Characteristics of the regime & democratization • Military dictatorships prefer negotiated democratization to revolution

Characteristics of the regime & democratization • Military dictatorships prefer negotiated democratization to revolution or war – Why? • Personalist leaders have most to lose from democratization, less willing to democratize than military or party-based dictatorships • Monarchies that share power with the family are more durable than monarchies with concentrated power

Post-Cold War • At end of Cold War, income level had less effect on

Post-Cold War • At end of Cold War, income level had less effect on probability of democratization • Countries in economic crisis often democratize, unless oil-rich • Oil-rich countries often held multi-party elections but these often were not free & fair • Foreign aid from the West had no effect on democracy level during Cold War, but had positive effect after CW in Africa (Dunning 2004) • But the War on Terror, and increasing aid from China, brings back some CW-style geopolitics… 19

The Economist: “Crying for Freedom” (2010) • Number of electoral democracies down to lowest

The Economist: “Crying for Freedom” (2010) • Number of electoral democracies down to lowest number since 1995 • Multiparty elections without quality institutions (e. g. , rule of law) can create problems • Some argue that economic growth under democratization should preceed democratization – For example, China & Singapore have grown dramatically without democratizing – Other dictatorships seek to emulate • More on democracy and growth next class…