Deepwater Horizon COMMUNICATION AND FAILURE WITHIN BP Annie

Deepwater Horizon COMMUNICATION AND FAILURE WITHIN BP Annie Dai Jonathan Pearson Boiar Qin Victoria Wong Jason Zeng

Did you know…? Deepwater Horizon left 11 men dead and spilled millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico—the worst oil spill of all time. 2

BP has had 3 CEOs in the last decade Wall of Shame John Browne 1989 -2007 Tony Hayward 2007 -2010 Bob Dudley 2010 -? ? ? 3

All levels of BP were responsible for disaster CEO Misguided safety regulations No accountability for accidents Managers Narrow, profit-oriented mindset Information loss and corruption Bad decisions on project changes Engineers and Operators Failure to interpret data Lack of communication with managers 4

Background A HISTORY OF RISKY BEHAVIOR 5

For bigger oil deposits and greater profits… … oil companies move further offshore and deeper into the ocean. Depth increase in oil wells from 1940 to 2010 6

BP finds success in the Gulf of Mexico… BP drilling sites in the Gulf 7

BP disregards safety and proper protocol Texas City Refinery, 2005 Alaska Oil Spill, 2006 8

The CEO LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY 9

Personnel safety vs. Process safety “[We will] renew our commitment to safety. “ (2000) “[There will be] no stone left unturned [in the Texas City investigation]“ (2005) John Browne, CEO 1989 -2007 10

“[We will focus] like a laser [on safety]” Tony Hayward, CEO 2007 -2010 11

Hayward’s testimony to Congress “It’s an accident still under investigation. No one is yet accountable. This could happen to any oil company in the industry. ” 12

Hayward’s Priorities http: //www. youtube. com/watch? v=EIA_s. L 4 c. Slo 13

Tony Hayward faces public backlash 14

Change in CEO; no change in attitude “If you put aside this Macondo, 2009 was the best year we’d had, and 2010 was also heading in that direction. ” Bob Dudley, CEO 2010 -? ? ? 15

The Managers INFORMATION LOSS AND CORRUPTION 16

BP commissioned Halliburton for cement expertise Cement samples 17

Halliburton February Sev Fai ere lur e March 8 th Fai April 13 th BP ? lur Fai e lur e April 26 th “Tweaks” Parameters April 18 th-20 th Suc ces s! April 20 th – BP pours cement Suc ces s! 18

BP is behind schedule First Macondo oil rig overturns 19

Centralizers ensure even cementing “One Piece” model “Slip On” model 20

Poorly Cemented Well 21

Centralizers ensure even cementing “One Piece” model “Slip On” model 22

15 missing centralizers “…who cares, it’s done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine and we’ll get a good cement job. ” 23

Underwater view of the well 24

The Engineers and Operators FAILURE TO INTERPRET DATA 25

First Negative Pressure Test Uneven pressures before test Ideal pressure with open valve Actual test: uneven pressure with open valve 26

Second Negative Pressure Test Manual Pressure Bleed Unknown Pressure Build-up Manual bleed lowers pressure Pressure builds up almost immediately 27

Third Negative Pressure Test Manual pressure bleed on kill line Pressure inside pump remains 28

“Bladder Effect” 29

? r a Ignoran Fe f o k c La k c a b Feed Misin terpr Data eted ? ce? UNCERTAINTY Assumption: Successful Negative Pressure Test! 31

Kicks Drill pipe pressure log shows that when the pump (black) was off the pressure inside the well (red) increased 32

Conclusions FINAL THOUGHTS 33

BP engineer recalling the Deepwater Horizon disaster "―[a]t the end of the well sometimes they think about speeding up. This may be because everybody goes to the mindset that we‘re through, this job is done. . . everything‘s going to be okay. " 34

Conclusions All Companies Don’t just fire the CEO after disaster Investigate internal communications Management Sustainability before profit Facilitate open communication Engineers Take responsibility for your work Be honest about your limits Focus on doing the job correctly 35

Questions? 36