Dallas Area Office Most Interesting Cases Basil Singh

Dallas Area Office Most Interesting Cases Basil Singh 2018 Annual North Texas OSHA Regulatory Update Seminar September 7, 2018

Marshall Pottery, Inc. • Inspection Numbers – 1226618 Safety – 1231190 Health • Issued: October 11, 2017 • Total Penalty: $829, 891

Company Profile Marshall Pottery was founded in 1895 in Marshall, Texas. In the 1940’s Marshall Pottery began making terra cotta clay flower pots which is still their primary item of production. In 1998 a new fully automated terra cotta manufacturing facility was constructed which is the facility that was inspected. Marshall Pottery, Inc. is a nonunion facility that employs approximately 130 employees (of which approximately 60 are temp agency employees). Marshall Pottery produces approximately 150, 000 pots per day.

OSHA Inspection History Inspected two previous times since 1991 • 1991 Marshall Pottery was cited for hearing conservation and lock out / tag out. At this time, Marshall Pottery was under different ownership but there are some current supervisors at the facility that were at the facility during that inspection. • 2008 Marshall Pottery was cited for lock out tag out violations after a fatality occurred where an employee was crushed to death while working on the drier elevator. During this inspection, the employer was under the same ownership as it is now. Most of the upper management is currently the same as it was during the 2008 fatality investigation.

Company Attitude Toward Safety Plant Manager: I am the plant manager, I take care of technical aspects. Safety is not my job, that is what a safety manager is for…July 18, 2017 Safety Manager: I have too many other things to do, I have to worry about logistics and shipments. I am too overwhelmed to worry about safety…July 17, 2017

Company Attitude Toward Safety Maintenance Manager: At my prior company I was trained on Permit Required Confined Spaces. We don’t do it like that at Marshall Pottery, the training is not adequate. I went along with it because that is the way they do things here. I have brought safety issues to the Safety Manager but he does not follow through with them…. July 18, 2017

Company Attitude Toward Safety Former Plant Manager: I knew that there were many things that we were supposed to be doing for safety but when the senior technicians come in from Italy and don’t follow the rules it made it very difficult for us to enforce the safety rules. I felt like they put more pressure on us for production over anything else. After seeing how my new company handles safety, I see how bad Marshall Pottery actually was with no senior management support…. August 2, 2017

Safety Manager Interview Highlights April 19, 2017: During his initial interview, Management said that he was the Logistics Manager and the safety coordinator for Marshall Pottery. Management played down his role in safety is saying that he only coordinates the phone calls to the consultant company that they use and sets up dates for them to come out for training. All of the hands on Safety stuff was handled by former plant manager Management and the third party consultant, CIH. May 4, 2017: Again, Management says that he is only the coordinator for the Consultant and Marshall Pottery and that they take care of all the safety at the facility. Management denies knowing anything about any Noise monitoring or surveys done at the facility. Management says that he does not walk through or do any safety checks in the production area as he is in charge of logistics and shipping. Says no one at Marshall Pottery has the responsibility to write or review safety programs and SOP’s. Management says that the last person to have written any were previous Manager and (wife of company president). She updated the safety and health manual in 2011. She told me to put my name on it. Management said that he knew that there were confined spaces in the facility and had some basic awareness training on permit required spaces.

Safety Manager Interview Highlights July 17, 2017: Management was confronted with his role as Safety Manager with Marshall Pottery as everyone else with the company (including all senior management) identified Management as the company safety manager and was in charge of safety at the facility. Management admitted that he was the safety manager and that the tasks that were assigned were his responsibility. Throughout the interview when asked why he did not ensure programs and procedures were not being implemented, he would only answer he did not know why he did not do anything. Towards the end of the interview, he admitted that he had other tasks that were more important than dealing with the safety of the employees at the facility such as ensuring that the manufactured pots were shipped in a timely manner. Management admitted to knowing the need for employees properly doing lock out tag out, assessing and entering confined spaces correctly and knowing the need for a hearing conservation program. He repeatedly tried to down play his role as Safety Manager to OSHA although all of upper management and employees knew he was the Safety Manager for the facility.

Reason for Inspections The Dallas Area Office was contacted by the employer about an employee who was found deceased in the tunnel kiln when employees arrived for work.

Citations • WILLFUL - 6 • SERIOUS - 21 • Other than Serious - 4

Fatal Incident On Easter Sunday 2017, the Assistant Plant Manager, Arturo Gonzalez, went to the plant with his 17 year old son to ensure that the production process was still running. This is something that Arturo was required to do on the weekends to ensure that the automated production continued throughout the weekend. The process would stop frequently due to mechanical errors. The most common mechanical error that would occur is the “limit switches” that told the computer to continue the process would become stuck due to the heat and foreign debris in the kiln. It would be a common thing for employees to go into the kiln to unstick the limit switches with a lubricant such as WD-40. According to the PLC computer, the process had stopped prior to Arturo arriving. The PLC said that the process then began after the error was cleared. It is believed that Arturo went into the Tunnel Kiln to lube some limit switches when the process closed the main door and then started the process. Arturo was found Monday morning by coworkers while Arturo’s son was still in the control room.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 146(c)(1): The employer did not evaluate and identify all of the permit required confined spaces located at its facility in Marshall, Texas. Employees enter and perform maintenance and repair work in these spaces. Marshall Pottery and Management had a Consultant rewrite their confined space program in March of 2014. This program was given to Management. Consultant informed Management that this was just the written program and that Marshall Pottery would need to implement it. The program states that Marshall Pottery needs to evaluate and identify all of their permit required confined spaces in the facility. Maintenance Manager knew what a permit required confined space was from awareness training he received at Marshall Pottery and from previous places of employment.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 146(c)(1): (continued) Management stated that he knew there were other spaces at the facility but did not evaluate and identify them all. He stated that sometimes they had used the Consultant for monitoring when they went into spaces and sometimes they did not. Former Plant Manager stated that he and the CIH, had walked the plant in 2014 when CIH pointed out a potential PRCS. Management stated that they had a PRCS program and did air monitoring and permits when they entered those spaces.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 146(c)(1): (continued) CIH stated that he had identified potential PRCSs’ to Management told him that they had a program and did permits. CIH stated that he was not asked to identify and evaluate all the PRCSs’ in the facility so he did not. CIH stated that he was asked to revise Marshall Pottery’s confined space program by Management and also to do some awareness training for managers and employees. CIH revised the program and permits for Marshall Pottery. Part of that program stated that Marshall Pottery needed to evaluate their facility for PRCSs’. CIH did air sampling a few times in 2014 and 2015 for Marshall Pottery while they made entry. No permits or monitoring was done after 2015.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 146(c)(1): (continued) The revised PRCS program that was given to Management specifically says that Marshall Pottery would be responsible for identifying and evaluating the facility for all PRCSs that they may enter.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 146(e)(1): The employer did not document entry conditions when employees entered permit required confined spaces located at its facility in Marshall, Texas. Employees enter and perform maintenance and repair work in these spaces. Marshall Pottery had previously completed PRCS entry permits through 2015. Since then, Marshall Pottery continued to do PRCS entries but did not document entry conditions. Management stated that he knew permits were required as he had contacted his Consultant in the past to come out and do monitoring and permits for them. Management stated that he had not done that since 2015 even though he knew that employees were still entering PRCSs’

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 146(e)(1): (continued) Management contracted the Consultant to conduct awareness training for managers and employees including himself on PRCSs’. This training was conducted in 2014 and 2015. This training specified the requirement to complete permits to document the entry conditions. The revised PRCS program that the Consultant provided to Management also specified the requirement to complete permits to document entry conditions into PRCSs’

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 146(g)(1): The employer did not train employees who entered permit required confined spaces on the duties and requirements of them. Management stated that he was aware that employees needed to be trained on the specific duties when employees enter PRCSs’. Management contracted the Consultant to do some PRCS awareness training for employees and managers in 2014 and 2015. Management was informed by the Consultant that what they were conducting was only awareness training and not specific training on the PRCSs’ at Marshall Pottery and the specific duties of the supervisor, attendant and entrant. Maintenance Manager stated that they had a turnover rate of about 40% to 60% and employees who were hired after the last awareness training in 2015 had not received any training.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 146(g)(1): (continued) Plant Manager stated that he knew that employees entering PRCSs’ needed to be trained. Plant Manager stated that he had not attended any of the awareness training in 2014 and 2015 as he was in Italy. Plant Manager also stated that he knew there had not been any other PRCS training at the facility yet he continued to direct employees to enter PRCS as late as July 2017 (the week before his interview on July 18, 2017). CIH stated that he informed Management that he was only doing awareness training for employees and managers in 2014 and 2015. CIH stated that he told Management that specific training needed to be completed. CIH stated that was not contracted by Management to do that specific training so he did not do it.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 147(c)(4)(ii): The employer did not utilize their specific procedures to isolate all energy sources while performing lock out tag out. Marshall Pottery revised and updated their specific energy control procedures for all of their equipment including the tunnel and roller kilns, tunnel and roller dryers, tunnel and roller presses and other equipment in 2010. These procedures are detailed and states the shutdown and start up procedures. Management wrote the procedures but stated in his interview that Marshall Pottery management does not follow these procedures as it takes too long to do everything. Instead, all they do is push the e-stop and place one lock on it. Maintenance Manager stated that they do not follow the energy control procedures and only turn whatever machine they are working on off. Management stated that they work on a variety of machines including the

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 147(c)(4)(ii): (continued) Kilns on a frequent basis, generally daily or every other day. He stated that he knew they had procedures and were suppose to use them but did not as that is not the culture at Marshall Pottery. Management and technicians from Italy do not do it or enforce it so they do not. Management was aware that specific procedures were needed and were supposed to be used as he participated in the informal conference and abatement process from the lock out tag out citations that were issued following the fatality that occurred in 2008.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 147(c)(6)(i): The employer did not conduct periodic inspections of the energy control program. Marshall Pottery revised and updated their specific energy control procedures for all of their equipment including the tunnel and roller kilns, tunnel and roller dryers, tunnel and roller presses and other equipment in 2010. These procedures are detailed and states the shutdown and start up procedures. Marshall Pottery conducted the inspection of the in 2010 when they were updated and have not done anything since. Marshall Pottery has a written Lockout Tagout program that specifically states that the Safety Manager and the Maintenance Manager will conduct periodic inspections on the energy control procedures annually.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1226618: 1910. 147(c)(6)(i): (continued) Management stated that he knew about the lockout tagout program and the requirement to conduct periodic inspections. Management stated that he had not conducted those since the procedures were revised in 2010. He stated that he had not conducted periodic inspections because Management would not get back with him whenever he brought up safety concerns so he did not push the issue as he had other tasks to complete.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1231190: 1910. 95(g)(1): The employer did not do audiometric testing on employees who were exposed to occupational noise over the action level. In March of 2014 Marshall Pottery contracted with CIH to conduct a noise survey in the facility. Management were given a copy of the report that showed 2 employees were exposed to noise above the action level. The areas that those two employees worked were at the roller kiln presses and the packaging areas. The report also stated that Marshall Pottery needed to do audiometric testing of the employees working in those areas and have them in the hearing conservation program. CIH also had conversations with Management about this and other requirements of the hearing conservation program.

Willful-Serious Citation Inspection #1231190: 1910. 95(g)(1): (continued) Management stated that he is not sure why Management did not have audiometric testing conducted but assumed that it was because of a financial issue because during that time the company was concerned about finances and expenses. Management stated that he was overwhelmed and had other tasks he was responsible and held accountable for. When asked what those tasks were he said that he is held accountable for ensuring that the shipping and logistics of the pots to their customers was being done.

Willful-Serious Citation Settled: October 24, 2017