Cyber Operation and Penetration Testing Basic Cryptography and

Cyber Operation and Penetration Testing Basic Cryptography and Applications Cliff Zou University of Central Florida

Acknowledgement Some slides modified from slides by textbook: v. Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach Featuring the Internet, J. Kurose & K. Ross, Addison Wesley, 5 rd ed. , 2009 v. Message Authentication Code slides modified from textbook: v. Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice, Network Security by William Stallings 72

Why This Introduction? Some students may have no knowledge of basic cryptography and basic network security ◦ Such knowledge is important ◦ Such knowledge is necessary for continuing learning malware and software security

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy well-known in network security world Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely” Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages Alice data channel secure sender Bob data, control messages secure receiver Trudy data

Who might Bob, Alice be? Web client/server (e. g. , on-line purchases) DNS servers routers exchanging routing table updates Two computers in peer-to-peer networks Wireless laptop and wireless access point Cell phone and cell tower

There are bad guys (and girls) out there! Q: What can a “bad guy” do? A: a lot! ◦ eavesdrop: intercept messages ◦ actively insert messages into connection ◦ impersonation: can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet) ◦ hijacking: “take over” ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place ◦ denial of service: prevent service from being used by others (e. g. , by overloading resources)

The language of cryptography Alice’s K encryption A key plaintext encryption algorithm Bob’s K decryption B key ciphertext decryption plaintext algorithm symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identical public-key crypto: encryption key public, decryption key secret (private)

Classical Cryptography Transposition Substitution Cipher ◦ Simple substitution cipher (Caesar cipher) ◦ Vigenere cipher ◦ One-time pad

Transposition Cipher: rail fence Write plaintext in two rows in column order Generate ciphertext in row order Example: “HELLOWORLD” HLOOL ELWRD ciphertext: HLOOLELWRD Problem: does not affect the frequency of individual symbols

Simple substitution cipher substituting one thing for another ◦ Simplest one: monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another (Caesar Cipher) ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABC Example: encrypt “I attack”

Problem of simple substitution cipher However: ◦ Previous cipher has a key with only 26 possible values ◦ English texts have statistical structure: the letter “e” is the most used letter. Hence, if one performs a frequency count on the ciphers, then the most frequent letter can be assumed to be “e”

Distribution of Letters in English Frequency analysis

Vigenere Cipher Idea: Uses Caesar's cipher with various different shifts, in order to hide the distribution of the letters. A key defines the shift used in each letter in the text A key word is repeated as many times as required to become the same length Plain text: I a t t a c k Key: 2342342 Cipher text: K d x v d g m (key is “ 234”)

Problem of Vigenere Cipher Vigenere is easy to break (Kasiski, 1863): Assume we know the length of the key. We can organize the ciphertext in rows with the same length of the key. Then, every column can be seen as encrypted using Caesar's cipher. The length of the key can be found using several methods: ◦ 1. If short, try 1, 2, 3, . . ◦ 2. Find repeated strings in the ciphertext. Their distance is expected to be a multiple of the length. Compute the gcd of (most) distances. ◦ 3. Use the index of coincidence.

One-time Pad Extended from Vigenere cipher Key is as long as the plaintext Key string is random chosen ◦ Pro: Proven to be “perfect secure” ◦ Cons: How to generate Key? How to let bob/alice share the same key pad? ◦ Code book

Symmetric key cryptography KAB plaintext message, m encryption ciphertext algorithm K (m) AB decryption plaintext algorithm m=K AB ( K (m) ) AB symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share know same (symmetric) key: K AB e. g. , key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Symmetric key crypto: DES: Data Encryption Standard US encryption standard [NIST 1993] 56 -bit symmetric key, 64 -bit plaintext input How secure is DES? ◦ DES Challenge: 56 -bit-key-encrypted phrase (“Strong cryptography makes the world a safer place”) decrypted (brute force) in 4 months ◦ no known “backdoor” decryption approach making DES more secure (3 DES): ◦ use three keys sequentially on each datum ◦ use cipher-block chaining

Symmetric key crypto: DES operation initial permutation 16 identical “rounds” of function application, each using different 48 bits of key final permutation

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard new (Nov. 2001) symmetric-key NIST standard, replacing DES processes data in 128 bit blocks 128, 192, or 256 bit keys brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

Block Cipher loop for n rounds 64 -bit input 8 bits 8 bits T 1 T 2 T 3 T 4 T 5 T 6 T 7 T 8 8 bits 8 bits one pass through: one input bit affects eight output bits 64 -bit scrambler 64 -bit output r multiple passes: each input bit affects most output bits r block ciphers: DES, 3 DES, AES

Cipher Block Chaining cipher block: if input block repeated, will produce same cipher text: t=1 … t=17 m(1) = “HTTP/1. 1” block cipher c(1) m(17) = “HTTP/1. 1” block cipher c(17) r cipher block chaining: XOR ith input block, m(i), with previous block of cipher text, c(i-1) m m c(0) transmitted to receiver in clear what happens in “HTTP/1. 1” scenario from above? m(i) c(i-1) + block cipher c(i) = “k 329 a. M 02”

Public Key Cryptography symmetric key crypto requires sender, receiver know shared secret key Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never “met”)? public key cryptography r radically different approach [Diffie. Hellman 76, RSA 78] r sender, receiver do not share secret key r public encryption key known to all r private decryption key known only to receiver

Public key cryptography + Bob’s public B key K K plaintext message, m encryption ciphertext algorithm + K (m) B - Bob’s private B key decryption plaintext algorithm message + m = K B(K (m)) B

Public key encryption algorithms Requirements: 1 + K B . ( ) and. B- K. need ( ) such that K - (K + (m)) = m B B 2 + given public key KB , it should be impossible to compute private key K B RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

RSA: Choosing keys 1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e. g. , 1024 bits each) 2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1) 3. Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors with z. (e, z are “relatively prime”). 4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: ed mod z = 1 ). 5. Public key is (n, e). Private key is (n, d). + KB - KB

RSA: Encryption, decryption 0. Given (n, e) and (n, d) as computed above 1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute e e c = m mod n (i. e. , remainder when m is divided by n) 2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute d m = c d mod n (i. e. , remainder when c is divided by n) Magic d m = (m e mod n) mod n happens! c

RSA example: Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24. e=5 (so e, z relatively prime). d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z). encrypt: decrypt: letter m me l 12 1524832 c 17 d c 48196857210675091411825223071697 Computational extensive c = me mod n 17 m = cd mod n letter 12 l

RSA: Why is e mod n) m = (m that d mod n Useful number theory result: If p, q prime and n = pq, then: y y mod (p-1)(q-1) x mod n = x mod n e (m mod n) d mod n = med mod n = m ed mod (p-1)(q-1) mod n (using number theory result above) 1 = m mod n (since we chose ed to be divisible by (p-1)(q-1) with remainder 1 ) = m

RSA: another important property The following property will be very useful later: - + B B K (K (m)) + = m = K (K (m)) B B use public key first, followed by private key use private key first, followed by public key Result is the same!

Digital Signatures Cryptographic technique analogous to handwritten signatures. sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator. verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document

Digital Signatures Simple digital signature for message m: Bob - signs m by encrypting with his private key KB, creating “signed” message, KB(m) Bob’s message, m Dear Alice Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! …(blah) Bob K B Bob’s private key Public key encryption algorithm K B(m) Bob’s message, m, signed (encrypted) with his private key

Digital Signatures (more) Suppose - Alice receives msg m, digital signature KB(m) Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s public + + key KB to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m. If + - KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used Bob’s private key. Alice thus verifies that: ü Bob signed m. ü No one else signed m. ü Bob signed m and not m’. Non-repudiation: ü Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court and prove that Bob signed m.

Message Digests Computationally expensive to public-key-encrypt long messages Goal: fixed-length, easy- to -compute digital “fingerprint” apply hash function H to m, get fixed size message digest, H(m). large message m H: Hash Function H(m) Hash function properties: many-to-1 produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint) given message digest x, computationally infeasible to find m such that x = H(m)

Hash Function Algorithms MD 5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321) ◦ computes 128 -bit message digest in 4 -step process. ◦ arbitrary 128 -bit string x, appears difficult to construct msg m whose MD 5 hash is equal to x. SHA-1 is also used. ◦ US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180 -1] ◦ 160 -bit message digest

Digital signature = signed message digest Alice verifies signature and integrity of digitally signed message: Bob sends digitally signed message: large message m H: Hash function Bob’s private key + - KB encrypted msg digest H(m) digital signature (encrypt) encrypted msg digest KB(H(m)) large message m H: Hash function No confidentiality ! KB(H(m)) Bob’s public key + KB digital signature (decrypt) H(m) equal ?

Trusted Intermediaries Symmetric key problem: Public key problem: How When do two entities establish shared secret key over network? Solution: trusted key distribution center (KDC) acting as intermediary between entities Alice obtains Bob’s public key (from web site, e-mail, diskette), how does she know it is Bob’s public key, not Trudy’s? Solution: trusted certification authority (CA)

Key Distribution Center (KDC) Alice, Bob need shared symmetric key. KDC: server shares different secret key with each registered user (many users) Alice, Bob know own symmetric keys, KA-KDC KB-KDC , for communicating with KDC KA-KDC KP-KDC KB-KDC KA-KDC KX-KDC KY-KDC KB-KDC KZ-KDC

Key Distribution Center (KDC) Q: How does KDC allow Bob, Alice to determine shared symmetric secret key to communicate with each other? KA-KDC(A, B) Alice knows R 1 KDC generates R 1 KA-KDC(R 1, KB-KDC(A, R 1) ) KB-KDC(A, R 1) Bob knows to use R 1 to communicate with Alice and Bob communicate: using R 1 as session key for shared symmetric encryption Why not R 1=KB-KDC?

Certification Authorities Certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E. E (person, router) registers its public key with CA. ◦ E provides “proof of identity” to CA. ◦ CA creates certificate binding E to its public key. ◦ certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA – CA says “this is E’s public key” - + K CA(KB ) Bob’s public key Bob’s identifying information + KB digital signature (encrypt) CA private key K- CA + KB certificate for Bob’s public key, signed by CA

Certification Authorities When Alice wants Bob’s public key: ◦ gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere). ◦ apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get Bob’s public key + KB - + K CA(KB ) digital signature (decrypt) CA public key + K CA Bob’s public + key KB

A certificate contains: Serial number (unique to issuer) info about certificate owner, including algorithm and key value itself (not shown) r info about certificate issuer r valid dates r digital signature by issuer

Internet Web Security Architecture CA K+ B Web Server B use a side channel K-CA(K+B) Client A Cert Request K-CA(K+B) K+B(KAB, R) KAB(m)

Internet Web Security Conditions Clients’ web browsers have built-in CAs are trustable Web servers have certificates in CAs. Q: What if a server has no certificate? ◦ Example: SSH servers

SSH Example Web Server B Client A K+B(KAB, R) KAB(m) Initial setup: ◦ Trust the first-time connection ◦ Save the server’s public key

Secure Communication q. Assumption: Public keys are pre-distributed securely q. E. g: through CA, or pre-established like SSH q. Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob. KS m KS Alice: q q . K S( ) + . K B( ) K+ B KS(m ) + Internet + KB(KS ) generates random symmetric private key, KS. encrypts message with KS (for efficiency) also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key. sends both KS(m) and K+B(KS) to Bob.

Secure Communication q Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob. KS m KS K (. ) S + K+ B Bob: . K B( ) KS(m ) + + KB(KS ) . K S( ) - Internet + KB(KS ) q uses his private key to decrypt and recover K S q uses KS to decrypt KS(m) to recover m KS - . K B( ) KB m

Secure Communication • Alice wants to provide sender authentication message integrity. m H(. ) KA - . K A( ) - - KA(H(m)) + + KA Internet m • Alice digitally signs message. m + . K A( ) H(m ) compare . H( ) H(m ) • sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature.

Secure Communication • Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication, message integrity. m . H( ) KA - . K A( ) - KA(H(m)) + . K S( ) m KS KS + . K B( ) K+ B + Internet + KB(KS ) Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s public key, newly created symmetric key

Hash Function and Message Authentication Code (MAC)

MD 5 designed by Ronald Rivest (the R in RSA) latest in a series of MD 2, MD 4 produces a 128 -bit hash value until recently was the most widely used hash algorithm ◦ in recent times have both brute-force & cryptanalytic concerns specified RFC 1321 as Internet standard

MD 5 Overview 1. pad message so its length is 448 mod 512 • Padding of 1 -512 bits is always used. • Padding: 1000…. 0 2. append a 64 -bit length value to message • Generate a message with 512 L bits in length 3. initialise 4 -word (128 -bit) MD buffer (A, B, C, D)

MD 5 Overview

SHA Overview pad message so its length is 448 mod 512 2. append a 64 -bit length value to message 3. initialise 5 -word (160 -bit) buffer (A, B, C, D, E) to 1. (67452301, efcdab 89, 98 badcfe, 10325476, c 3 d 2 e 1 f 0) 4. process message in 16 -word (512 -bit) chunks: ◦ expand 16 words into 80 words by mixing & shifting

Revised Secure Hash Standard NIST have issued a revision FIPS 180 -2 adds 3 additional hash algorithms SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 ◦ Different lengths of hash bits designed for compatibility with increased security provided by the AES cipher structure & detail is similar to SHA-1

Message Authentication Code (MAC) generated by an algorithm that creates a small fixed-sized block ◦ depending on both message and some key ◦ like encryption though need not be reversible appended to message as a signature receiver performs same computation on message and checks it matches the MAC provides assurance that message is unaltered and comes from sender

Message Authentication Code Ø a small fixed-sized block of data Ø generated from message + secret key Ø MAC = C(K, M) Ø appended to message when sent Append operator

Message Authentication Codes as shown the MAC provides authentication can also use encryption for secrecy ◦ generally use separate keys for each ◦ can compute MAC either before or after encryption ◦ is generally regarded as better done before why use a MAC? ◦ sometimes only authentication is needed ◦ sometimes need authentication to persist longer than the encryption (eg. archival use) Note: MAC is not a digital signature

Keyed Hash Functions as MACs Ø want a MAC based on a hash function lbecause hash functions are generally faster lcrypto hash function code is widely available Ø hash includes a key along with message Ø original proposal: Keyed. Hash = Hash(Key|Message) lsome weaknesses were found with this Ø eventually led to development of HMAC (Hash-based message authentication code)

HMAC Design Objectives Ø use, without modifications, hash functions Ø allow for easy replaceability of embedded hash function Ø preserve original performance of hash function without significant degradation Ø use and handle keys in a simple way. Ø have well understood cryptographic analysis of authentication mechanism strength

HMAC specified as Internet standard RFC 2104 uses hash function on the message: HMACK(M)= Hash[(K+ XOR opad) || Hash[(K+ XOR ipad) || M)] ] ◦ where K+ is the key padded out to size ◦ opad, ipad are specified padding constants any hash function can be used ◦ eg. MD 5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160, Whirlpool

HMAC Generation Overview SHA-1 HMAC Generation Image comes from Wikipedia. com: https: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Hashbased_message_authentication_code