CSC 382 Computer Security Access Control CSC 382

CSC 382: Computer Security Access Control CSC 382: Computer Security 1

Access Control • What is Access Control? • Access Control Matrix Model – Protection State Transitions – Special Rights – Principle of Attenuation of Privilege • Groups and Roles • Implementation of the Access Control Matrix – Access Control Lists: by column (object). – Capabilities: by row (subject). – UNIX, Windows NT, and SQL ACLs. • Hardware Protection CSC 382: Computer Security 2

What is Access Control? “Its function is to control which principals (persons, processes, machines, …) have access to which resources in the system— which files they can read, which programs they can execute, how they share data with other principals, and so on. ” – Ross Anderson, Security Engineering CSC 382: Computer Security 3

Why study Access Control? • Center of gravity of computer security – Why do we authenticate users? – What security features do OSes provide? – What’s the purpose of cryptography? – Access Control is pervasive. • Access Control is where Computer Science meets Security Engineering. – We’ll start with theory (computer science) – Then examine implementations (engineering) CSC 382: Computer Security 4

Access Control is Pervasive Application Middleware Operating System Hardware CSC 382: Computer Security 5

Access Control is Pervasive 1. Application • • Complex, custom security policy. Ex: Amazon account: wish list, reviews, CC 2. Middleware • • Database, system libraries, 3 rd party software Ex: Credit card authorization center 3. Operating System • File ACLs, IPC 4. Hardware • Memory management, hardware device access. CSC 382: Computer Security 6

Access Control Matrix • Precisely describes protection state of system. P Q • Sets of system states: – P: Set of all possible states. – Q: Set of allowed states, according to security policy. – P-Q: Set of disallowed states. • ACM describes the set of states Q. CSC 382: Computer Security 7

Access Control Matrix • As system changes, state changes. – State transitions. – Only concerned with protection state. • ACM must be enforced by a mechanism that limits state transitions to those that go from one element of Q to another. CSC 382: Computer Security 8

ACM Description objects (entities) subjects o 1 … om s 1 … sn s 1 s 2 • Objects O = { o 1, …, om } – All protected entities. • Subjects S = { s 1, …, sn } – Active entities, S O • Rights R = { r 1, …, rk } … • Entries A[si, oj] R • A[si, oj] = { rx, …, ry } means subject si has rights rx, …, ry over object oj sn CSC 382: Computer Security 9

Example: File/Process • Processes p, q • Files f, g • Rights r, w, x, a, o p q f g rwo r a ro p q rwxo w r rwxo CSC 382: Computer Security 10

Example: Concurrency Control • Procedures inc_ctr, dec_ctr, manage • Variable counter • Rights +, –, call counter inc_ctr + dec_ctr – manage inc_ctr dec_ctr call CSC 382: Computer Security manage 11

Copy Right • Allows possessor to give rights to another • Often attached to a right, so only applies to that right – r is read right that cannot be copied – rc is read right that can be copied • Is copy flag copied when giving r rights? – Depends on model, instantiation of model CSC 382: Computer Security 12

Own Right Usually allows possessor to change entries in ACM column – So owner of object can add, delete rights for others – May depend on what system allows • Can’t give rights to specific (set of) users • Can’t pass copy flag to specific (set of) users CSC 382: Computer Security 13

Attenuation of Privilege Principle: Subject may not give rights it does not possess to another. – Restricts addition of rights within a system – Usually ignored for owner • Why? Owner gives herself rights, gives them to others, deletes her rights. CSC 382: Computer Security 14

How can we implement the ACM? • Problem: scale – Thousands of subjects. – Millions of objects. – Yet most entries are blank or default. • Solutions – Group subjects together as a single entities • Groups and Roles – Implement by row: Capabilities – Implement by column: Access Control Lists CSC 382: Computer Security 15

Groups and Roles • Collect subjects together to express: – Need to share objects. – Security categories (e. g. , admin, faculty, student, guest) • role: group that ties membership to function • Problem: loss of granularity. CSC 382: Computer Security 16

Groups and Roles • Implementing groups: – static: groups are aliases for sets of subjects. – dynamic: user belongs to one group at a time; changes group to switch sets of rights. CSC 382: Computer Security 17

Capabilities • Implement ACM by row. • Access Control associated with subject. • Example: UNIX file descriptors – System checks ACL on file open, returns fd. – Process subsequently uses fd to read and write file. – If ACL changes, process still has access via fd. User ls homedir rootdir james rx rw r CSC 382: Computer Security 18

Capability Questions • How to prevent user from modifying capabilities? • How to prevent user from copying capabilities? • How to revoke rights to an object? CSC 382: Computer Security 19

How to prevent user from modifying? • Memory protection – Capabilities are readable, but not writable. • Indirection – Capability is pointer to per-process table whose access control prevents user from touching. • Cryptography – Cryptographically secure checksum associated with capability and checked before usage. CSC 382: Computer Security 20

How to prevent user from copying? • Copying capabilities allows users to grant rights to others. • Solution: – Use indirection or cryptographic techniques from prev slide to prevent direct access. – Add copy flag to capability, as a specific right given to copy capabilities in order to give rights to other users. CSC 382: Computer Security 21

How to revoke rights to an object? • Direct solution – Check capabilities of every process. – Remove those that grant access to object. – Computationally expensive. • Alternative solution – Create a global object table. – Capabilities reference objects indirectly via their entries in the global object table. – Invalidate entry in global object table to revoke. CSC 382: Computer Security 22

Access Control Lists (ACLs) • Implement ACM by column. • Access control by object. • Example: UNIX ACLs – Short “rwx” user/group/other. – Long POSIX ACLs. CSC 382: Computer Security User audit data root rw james r joe 23

Ethics Discussion A student discovers a flaw in a university computing system. To verify the existence of the flaw, the student exploits the flaw to gain additional privileges. These privileges allow the student to read any file on the system, including private files of other students and professors. 1. Did the student act ethically in exploiting the flaw? 2. Since the security mechanisms were insufficient to stop the student, was the action a violation of security or not? 3. When the student reports the problem, the university files charges against the student. Did the university act ethically? CSC 382: Computer Security 24

ACL Questions • Which subjects can modify an object’s ACL? • Do ACLs apply to privileged users? • Do ACLs support groups and wildcards? • How are ACL conflicts resolved? • What are default permissions? • How can a subject’s rights be revoked? CSC 382: Computer Security 25

Which subjects can modify an ACL? • Create an own right for an ACL. – Only subjects with own right can modify ACL. • Creating an object also creates object’s ACL. – Usually creator given own right at this time. – Other default rights may be set at creation too. • Some systems allow anyone with access to object to modify ACL. – What are the security implications of sharing access to a file on such a system? CSC 382: Computer Security 26

Do ACLs apply to privileged users? • Many systems have privileged users. – UNIX: root. – Windows NT: administrator. • Should ACLs apply to privileged users? – Need read access to all objects for backups. – What security problems are produced by ignoring ACLs for privileged users? CSC 382: Computer Security 27

Do ACLs support groups and *? • Easier to use ACLs when they support: – Groups – Wildcards CSC 382: Computer Security 28

How are ACL conflicts resolved? • What happens when multiple ACL entries give different permissions to same subject? – First entry wins. – Last entry wins. – Deny wins over allow. CSC 382: Computer Security 29

What are the default permissions? • Interaction of ACLs with base permissions. – POSIX ACLs modify UNIX base permissions. • How are default ACLs determined? – Subject • Subject sets default permissions, like UNIX umask. – Inheritance • Objects in hierarchical system inherit ACLs of parent object. • Subjects inherit sets of default permissions from their parent subjects. CSC 382: Computer Security 30

How are rights revoked? • Removal of subject’s rights to object. – Delete entries for subject from ACL. – If ownership doesn’t control granting rights, matters can be complex: • If A has granted rights to B, what should happen to B’s rights if you remove A’s rights? • Removal of subject’s rights to all objects. – Very expensive (millions of objects. ) – Most systems don’t support. – Why isn’t disabling subject’s account sufficient? CSC 382: Computer Security 31

ACLs vs Capabilities ACLs Capabilities • Slow: OS has to read • Fast: OS always knows ACL foreach object subject identity. accessed. • Easy to find/change rights on a particular subject. object. • Difficult to revoke privileges to a subject privileges for a specific object. subject. CSC 382: Computer Security 32

UNIX Access Control Model • UID – integer user ID – UID=0 is root • GID – integer group ID – Users can belong to multiple groups • Objects have both a user + group owner CSC 382: Computer Security 33

UNIX Access Control Model • OS checks EUID + EGID on object access • Usually: EUID=UID, EGID=GID • setuid/setgid programs run with different EUID/EGID, allowing you privileged access – ex: crontab, login, lp, passwd, su – Target for attackers wanting elevated privilege CSC 382: Computer Security 34

UNIX File Permissions • Three sets of permissions: – User owner – Group owner – Other (everyone else) • Three permissions per group – read – write – Execute • UID 0 can access regardless of permissions • Files: directories, devices (disks, printers), IPC CSC 382: Computer Security 35

UNIX File Permissions • Best-match policy – OS applies permission set that most closely matches. – You can be denied access by best match even if you match another set. • Directories – read = listing of directory – execute = traversal of directory – write = add or remove files from directory CSC 382: Computer Security 36

Special File Permissions • Each object has set of special permission bits – sticky • On a directory, means users can only delete files that they own – setuid • Execute program with EUID = owner’s UID – setgid • Execute program with EGID = owner’s GID • On directories, causes default group owner to be that of directory owner’s GID. CSC 382: Computer Security 37

Changing Permissions: chmod • Permission set specifiers – u = user – g = group – o = other # remove other access chmod o-rwx *. c # add group r/w access chmod g+rw *. c • Permissions – r = read – w = write – x = execute CSC 382: Computer Security # allow only you access chmod u=rwx * 38

Octal Permission Notation • Each permissionset (u, g, o) is octal digit • Each permission (r, w, x) 4 is one bit 2 • ex: chmod 0644 file 1 – u: rw, g: r, o: r read setuid write setgid execute sticky • ex: chmod 0711 bin – u: rwx, g: x, o: x CSC 382: Computer Security 39

Changing Ownership • newgrp – Group owner of files is your default group. – Changes default group to another group to which you belong. • chgrp – Changes group owner of existing file. • chmod – Changes owner of existing file. – Only root can use this command. CSC 382: Computer Security 40

Default Permissions: umask • Determines access permissions given to newly created files • Three-digit octal number – Programs default to 0666 – Umask modifies to: 0666 & ~umask – ex: umask=022 => file has mode 0644 – ex: umask=066 => file has mode 0600 CSC 382: Computer Security 41

setuid/setgid • Solution to UNIX ACLs inability to directly handle (user, program, file) triplets. • Process runs with EUID/EGID of file, not of user who spawned the process. • Follow principle of least privilege – create special user/groups for most purposes • Follow principle of separation of privilege – keep setuid functions/programs small – drop privileges when unnecessary CSC 382: Computer Security 42

ACL Programming: fchmod #include <sys/types. h> #include <sys/stat. h> /* example: BSS, pp. 195 -196 */ int set_perms_to_0600(FILE *f) { int fd = fileno(f); if( fchmod(fd, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) ) { perror(“set_perms_to_0600”); return -1; } return 0; } CSC 382: Computer Security 43

ACL Programming: umask • Ensure that no one else can read files created by process: #include <sys/types. h> #include <sys/stat. h> mode_t set_safe_umask() { mode_t old_umask = umask(066); return old_umask; } CSC 382: Computer Security 44

Limitations of Classic ACLs • ACL control list only contains 3 entries – Limited to one user. – Limited to one group. • Root (UID 0) can do anything. CSC 382: Computer Security 45

POSIX Extended ACLs • Supported by most UNIX/Linux systems. – Slight syntax differences may exist. • getfacl • setfacl – chmod 600 file – setfacl -m user: gdoor: r-- file – File unreadable by other, but ACL allows gdoor CSC 382: Computer Security 46

Immutable Files • Immutable Files on Linux – chattr +i – Cannot delete, rename, write to, link to – Applies to root too – Only root can remove immutable flag • Immutable Files on Free. BSD – chflags +noschg – Cannot be removed by root in securelevel >0 CSC 382: Computer Security 47

Host-based Access Control • /etc/hosts. allow and /etc/hosts. deny • used by tcpd, sshd, other servers • Identify subjects by – hostname – IP address – network address/mask • Allow before Deny – use last rule in /etc/hosts. deny to deny all CSC 382: Computer Security 48

Windows NT Access Control • Security IDs (SIDs) – users – groups – hosts • Token: user SID + group SIDs for a subject • ACLs on – files and directories – registry keys – many other objects: printers, IPC, etc. CSC 382: Computer Security 49

Standard NT Permissions • Read: read file or contents of a directory • Write: create or write files and directories • Read & Execute: read file and directory attributes, view directory contents, and read files within directory. • List Folder Contents: RX, but not inherited by files within a folder. • Modify: delete, write, read, and execute. • Full Control: all, including taking ownership and changing permissions CSC 382: Computer Security 50

Windows NT Conflict Resolution 1. If user not present in ACL and not a member of any group in ACL, access is denied. 2. If ACL explicitly denies user access, access is denied. 3. Otherwise, if user named in ACL, user has union of set of rights from each ACL entry in which user is named. CSC 382: Computer Security 51

Special NT Permissions • • • • Traverse Folder/Execute File List Folder/Read Data Read Attributes Read Extended Attributes Create Files/Write Data Create Folders/Append Data Write Attributes Write Extended Attributes Delete Subfolders and Files Delete Read Permissions Change Permissions Take Ownership CSC 382: Computer Security 52

SQL Access Control • Subjects – Users. – Roles. create role faculty grant faculty to james • Objects – Databases, table columns. • Rights – Select, insert, update, delete, references, grant. CSC 382: Computer Security 53

SQL Access Control • The grant command gives access to a user grant select on students to james or a role: grant select, insert, update on grades to faculty and includes power to grant options: grant insert on students to registrar with grant option • The revoke command removes access remove insert on grades from faculty CSC 382: Computer Security 54

Hardware Protection • Confidentiality – Processes cannot read memory space of kernel or of other processes without permission. • Integrity – Processes cannot write to memory space of kernel or of other processes without permission. • Availability – One process cannot deny access to CPU or other resources to kernel or other processes. CSC 382: Computer Security 55

Hardware Mechanisms: VM • Each process has its own address space. – Prevents processes from accessing memory of kernel or other processes. • Attempted violations produce page fault exceptions. – Implemented using a page table. – Page table entries contain access control info. • • Read Write Execute (not separate on Intel CPUs) Supervisor (only accessible in supervisor mode) CSC 382: Computer Security 56

VM Address Translation CSC 382: Computer Security 57

Hardware Mechanisms: Rings • Protection Rings. – Lower number rings have more rights. – Intel CPUs have 4 rings • Ring 0 is supervisor mode. • Ring 3 is user mode. • Most OSes do not use other rings. – Multics used 64 protection rings. • Different parts of OS ran in different rings. • Procedures of same program could have different access rights. CSC 382: Computer Security 58

Hardware Mechanisms: Privileged Instructions • Only can be used in supervisor mode. • Setting address space – MOV CR 3 • Enable/disable interrupts – CLI, STI • Reading/writing to hardware – IN, OUT • Switch from user to supervisor mode on interrupt. CSC 382: Computer Security 59

Hardware Mechanisms: System Timer • Processes can voluntarily give up control to OS via system calls to request OS services. – SYSENTER, INT 2 e • Timer interrupt – Programmable Interval Timer chip. – Happens every 1 -100 OS, depending on OS. – Transfers control from process to OS. – Ensures no process can deny availability of machine to kernel or other processes. CSC 382: Computer Security 60

Why is Access Control hard? • Complex Objects – Identifying objects of interest. • Is your choice of objects too coarse or fine-grained? – Hierarchical structure like filesystem or XML • Subjects are Complex – Identifying subjects of interest. – What are the relationships between subjects? • Access Control states change. • Security objectives often unclear. CSC 382: Computer Security 61

Key Points • Center of gravity of security; pervasive. • Access Control Matrix simplest abstraction mechanism for representing protection state. • ACM is too big, so real systems use either: – ACLs: columns (objects) of ACM. – Capabilities: rows (subjects) of ACM. • Access Control in Practice: UNIX. • Access control rests on hardware foundation. – Virtual memory, rings, privileged instructions. CSC 382: Computer Security 62

References 1. Anderson, Ross, Security Engineering, Wiley, 2001. 2. Bishop, Matt, Introduction to Computer Security, Addison-Wesley, 2005. 3. Bovet, Daniel and Cesati, Marco, Understanding the Linux Kernel, 2 nd edition, O’Reilly, 2003. 4. Silberschatz, et. al. , Database System Concepts, 4 th edition, Mc. Graw-Hill, 2002. 5. Silberschatz, et. al. , Operating System Concepts, 7 th edition, Wiley, 2005. 6. Viega, John, and Mc. Graw, Gary, Building Secure Software, Addison-Wesley, 2002. CSC 382: Computer Security 63