Counteractive Lobbying David AustenSmith and John Wright GOVT

“Counteractive Lobbying” David Austen-Smith and John Wright. GOVT 747: Legislation and Lobbying Spring 2011 1

Counteractive Lobbying Literature is Unclear Influence of Organizational interests on Legislative process is unclear. Puzzles: 1. Focus on allies: Literature indicates Lobbyists (LB) focus on allies –those who already agree with them. 2. Legislation is not the product of competing interests (LG are unresponsive, LB is irrelevant) (Wahlke, 1962) Research Question: Why do LB expend precious resources on LG that already agree with them? 2

Counteractive Lobbying Lobbyists can target three (3) types of Legislators (LG): 1. Allies 2. Opponents 3. Undecided Evidence Suggests that Target Each Group: LB lobby the undecided and opponents. Their goal is to lessen the degree of opposition they face and to increase support for…preferred legislative outcomes. They also lobby friends/allies. 3

Counteractive Lobbying: Thesis: Counteractive lobbying, as a theory, rests on the idea that LB not only reinforces LG voting predispositions but also changes LG decisions from what they would have been in the absence of lobbying. Counteractive lobbying : Strategy Counteractive lobbying is based on the idea of “strategic information Transmission from a group (LB) to a LG. ” LB lobby LG opponents as well as their supporters and that lobbying of allies is both strategic and counteractive. 4

Counteractive Lobbying: Literature Counteractive lobbying: Deviates from the Literature: Dominant school of thought is the “communication” school which holds that LB have little effect on LG decision-making because most LB reinforce LG existing positions (Milbrath 1963). 5

Counteractive Lobbying: Literature Counteractive lobbying: Deviates from the Literature: Milbrath (1963): LB has limited Influence on LG LG are only receptive to certain ideas. LB target those that are receptive to their issues and ignore opponents. Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963): LB focus on Allies Paint a complex and unclear picture of Lobbying process: Information, interests are not clearly transferred to govt by interest groups. Buss leaders are often unsure of the leg they want, also inter groups are disorg. As a result of disorg, LB focus on allies in leg. (442) 6

Counteractive Lobbying : Literature LB Focus on allies (27) Matthews (1960) made the same point: LB focus on the “already convinced. ” Zeigler (1964): success of LB (as a career) depends on the upon degree to which LG already agrees with the position. (pg. 267 -268) Dexter (1969) LB try to work with and help allies. (see, pg. 63) 7

Counteractive Lobbying: Literature Why LB focus on allies (27) Bauer, Pool and Dexter: LB lobby allies because of a human tendency to take the “easy path. ” (353) Dexter (1969) Lobbying opponents is “counter-productive. ” Hayes (1981) LB need to lobby allies, as Bauer, Pool and Dexter suggest b/c they need to prove that they have “access” in order to maintain and attract members/supporters. (86) 8

Counteractive Lobbying: Literature Each Theory Implies that LB have little or no Influence on LG (27) 1. LG make their mind prior to Lobbying process (27 -28). 2. LG are thought to hear from only one side, and are not pressured by opposing lobbies. 9

Counteractive Lobbying Which variables shape the Interaction or Relationship between Lobbyists (LB) and Legislators (LG)? Traditional View (early 1960 s): LG Independent LB had limited influence on LG. LB Influence ? 1. Have already made up their mind 2. Only listen to LB who agree with them. 3. Costly to Confirm LB info. LG 10

Counteractive Lobbying Which variables shape the Interaction or Relationship between Lobbyists (LB) and Legislators (LG)? Traditional View (early 1960 s): LB Have Limited Effect LB focus on Allies (LG who already agree with them). LB 1. Focus on the “already convinced. ” 2. Take the “Easy Path. ” 3. Need to Look Effective Influence ? LG 11

Counteractive Lobbying: Road Map Roadmap: Look at LB that support and opposed Robert Bork nomination (28) They test their predictions about counteract lobbying (CONTLB) empirically by using data provided by orgs that LB for and against the Robert Bork nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987. 12

Counteractive Lobbying: Bork Nomination: 1987 13

Counteractive Lobbying: Road Map Theory: Counteractive Lobbying LB groups target allies to offset lobbying by opposing groups. They also will lobby opponents, which is not well understood in the lobbying lit. 14

Counteractive Lobbying: Hypotheses Hypothesis 1: When a LG is lobbied by only one side, it is when that LG opposes LB interests. (31) LG supports B and will vote in favor of group B if group A does not lobby LG to change their prior beliefs. (32) Lobbying is costly for g. B, so g. B will not lobby if g. A does not lobby. Given that LG supports g. B interests, g. A will lobby opponents whenever they Lobby. (Me: does g. A have no friends? ) (33) Hypothesis 2: The decision of a group to lobby its opponents is independent of lobbying decision of opposing groups. (33) Hypothesis 3: If a LB(1) lobbies an ally after the ally has been lobbied by an opposing LB(2), LB(1) is engaging in counteractive (CONTLB) lobbying. 15

Counteractive Lobbying: Findings Applying Counteractive LB to Bork Nom. (36) Hypothesis 1: LG who are expected to pro-Bork will be lobbied by fewer pro-Bork LB. Pro-Bork LB would focus on anti-Bork LG. Hypothesis 2: Number of pro-Bork LB is not dependent on number of anti-Bork LBs. Hypothesis 3: The greater the number of anti-Bork LB who lobby a pro-Bork LG, the more pro-Bork will lobby. 16