COMPLEX OPERATING ENVIROMENT MALLS MAINE MALL PLANNING EXERCISE

COMPLEX OPERATING ENVIROMENT / MALLS MAINE MALL PLANNING EXERCISE 2014

OBJECTIVES CONDUCT RAPID ASSESSMENT OF THE SCENE EVALUATE THE MAINE MALL COMPLEX AND IDENTIFY A SAFETY AND ACTION PLAN IMPLIMENT AND USE THE ICS SYSTEM FOR A HAZ MAT OR MCI RESPONSE PRE PLAN SITE TO ESTABLISH A TREATMENT AND TRANSPORT LOCATION FOR AN EVENT AT THE MALL COMPLEX EVALUATE THE MOST LIKELY RISKS TO THIS COMPLEX

OTHER LOCATIONS WAINWRIGHT FIELDS SCHOOLS OUTSIDE CONCERT VENUE WORKPLACE (FAIRCHILDS, SOUTHBOROUGH, TEXAS INSTRUMENTS) MAINE YOUTH CENTER

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Complex Operating Environment for First Responders During Emergency Responses-Shopping Malls The September 2013 al-Shabaab attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 67 people, underscores the need to understand plan for the complex operating environment in today’s shopping malls. The physical attributes of shopping malls create formidable security challenges

1. Common characteristics—open access, friendly/leisurely atmosphere, and crowds carrying bags/packages—are inherent vulnerabilities. 2. Size and multiple access points makes it very difficult to manage the population of the Mall 3. Victim and or Patient access needs to be coordinated with Law Enforcement through the cleared unsecure area

Understanding the terrorist attack planning cycle can help first responders recognize preoperational activities. Terrorist attack planning and preparation generally proceed through several stages, although the details, sequencing, and timing may vary greatly and change as operational circumstances evolve. The stages that are often observable – such as pre-attack surveillance, training, and rehearsals – offer potential opportunities for first responders to disrupt plots or deter attacks.

UNSECURE CLEARED/ SECURE / UNSECURE May be multi-level Elevator Multiple Entrances/Exits Staff areas not open to the public Shared commercial and/or government office spaces Unrestricted attached or interior parking garages/lots Open areas with benches, food courts, plants, trash Receptacles Sewage and waste systems Electrical systems, telecommunications, plumbing, water systems Delivery and pickup areas not open to public Heating, ventilation, air-conditioning (HVAC systems) Fire alarm, fire suppression systems, security systems Stairs

CLEARED/UNSECURE AREA Initial law enforcement sweep complete; attacker(s) return possible; possible blast/structural damage - fire, smoke-unexploded IEDs remain a concern SECURE AREA Cleared by law enforcement, security measures in place, area monitored

ACTIVE/UNSECURE AREA Unrestrained attacker(s), high risk to first responders and civilians

MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS: • Can rapidly overwhelm local hospital surge capacity requiring ongoing coordination of existing resources (bed capacity, consumables, specialty, burn, surgical services) • Victims will likely include pediatrics, the elderly, and those with special needs • Triage will complicate evidentiary and forensic collection requiring close coordination with law enforcement • Protect the safety of civilians in the active/unsecure area • Perform rapid initial sweep by law enforcement of entire area • Establish and monitor secure areas (command posts, treatment & transport areas, resource staging areas, personnel rehabilitation sites)

Command / Control What we can control What we cannot control Our response Resources requested Setting outer perimeters Criminal’s actions Self evacuations All of the exits

Preoperational Surveillance Roll Call Release – 9 July 2010 Almost any criminal act—from a purse-snatching to a violent extremist bombing—involves some degree of preoperational surveillance. This is a common denominator, whether a threat is from common criminals, a violent extremist group, or a lone offender.

CRITICAL ASSET CHARACTERISTICS LOCATION OF CRITICAL ASSET 1. Main Entrance 6 main entrances made of glass and steel frame. 2 entrances are major bus stops. One is a promotional entrance that allows cars and boats to enter mall. 10 additional entrances to mall exist through anchor stores, and an additional 8 service court entrances also exist and are open during normal business hours. Entrances are located on all sides of the mall. Mall only has one level. 2. Food Court Location in the Mall that is most populated and Food Court is located on the dense, especially during the holiday seasons and Southeast corner of the mall on the weekends from 1100 – 1300 hours. directly adjacent to the inner road that surrounds the mall. Cars can approach with 10 feet of the food court, which has a glassed main entrance. 3. General Public 35 to 40 thousand persons visit the mall every The public are in every area of Saturday and Sunday. Crowds increase upwards the Mall, inside and out. of 75, 000 on weekends and during the holidays. 4. HVAC There are over 120 HVAC systems on the roof All 120 HVAC systems are on of the mall. The food court has 3, 20 ton, HVAC the roof of the mall. systems that allow cool or warm air pumped into the food court.

RELATED THREAT STREAM METHOD OF ATTACK ASSETS VULNERABLE TO METHOD 1. Aviation Crash of a small plane into mall Entrances, Mall Roof/HVAC, Food Court and General Public 2. Bombings/Explosives/Arson Car or truck-bomb driven into food court; Suicide bomber; accelerantborne fire Ricin, Anthrax, botulism spores placed into the HVAC systems that feed the food court Entrances, HVAC, Food court, General Public 4. Chemical Material Chlorine could be introduced into the HVAC system, General Public, Food Court, Entrances 5. Maritime 6. Nuclear/Radiological Material N/A Dirty bomb detonated inside or outside of Mall Gas lines could be broken to allow the food court to flood with natural gas and detonated The 235 gallon diesel tank that fuels backup generator could be sabotage to create a large fire. 3. Biological Material 7. Sabotage/Hazardous Materials HVAC system, General Public, Food Court, Entrances General Public, HVAC, Food Court, Entrances HVAC, Entrances, Food Court, General Public 8. Cyber Attacks N/A 8. Firearms Small or large caliber, “active. Food Court, General Public shooter” weapons attack inside or outside mall property and/or hostage or non-hostage, armed barricaded incidents. N/A

MALL SECURITY RESPONSE PLAN Escalating threat levels and suggested property responses have been developed. Threat levels are identified as Level 1, Level 2, Level 3 and Level 4. Level 1 being the lowest, and Level 4 being the most severe. • THREAT LEVEL 1 - Credible information has been released indicating there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. Given the current threat to the United States and the public nature of shopping centers, we will maintain at minimum status of “Threat Level 1” until further notice. • THREAT LEVEL 2 - Credible information has been released indicating there is a nonspecific threat of a terrorist attack. • THREAT LEVEL 3 - Credible information has been released indicating there is a specific threat of a terrorist attack. • THREAT LEVEL 4 - Credible information has been released indicating that plans are being carried out to attack a mall in the United States or an attack has just occurred. HSAS RED Threat levels may increase or decrease based on information released from Federal, State, local authorities or other credible sources. Threat levels may vary from one Region of the Country to the next depending on the specifics of the information. Mall teams who learn of local threats that may change the current threat level should contact the Vice President of Security. Please be prepared to identify the source of the information.

Maine Mall Area Population 22, 846

EMPLOYEES 53, 533

WHO’S IN CHARGE

PLANNING OBJECTIVES Assemble all Response Disciplines Respond as a “Community” Think about “logistical” issues Awareness of role of other responding agencies Encourage relationship building

INCIDENT COMPLICATORS STATE CRIME FEDERAL CRIME SCENE DISASTER AREA

ASSUMPTIONS The local community will be on its own for a minimum of 6 hours. The FBI may be the only federal asset considered a part of the local emergency response. The possibility of multiple targets may impact whether federal assets will be immediately available.

OUTER PERIMETER Fairly Quick to Set Use Main Cross Street to Allow for Dispersing of Traffic Allow Enough Space for a Buffer Zone with Inner Perimeter Keep Streets Accessible for Emergency Vehicles

INNER PERIMETER Much Slower to Gain Full Control Will Contain Both First Responders and Citizens May Need to Evacuate to Gain Full Control and Set Hard Perimeter

RESPONSE PRIORITIES SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY DEVELOP PROPER ICS PRIORITIES LOCATE EQUIPMENT AND COMMAND POST EARLY IN THE INCIDENT REQUEST RESOURCES STAGE INCOMING UNITS AND ASSIGN AN INDIVIDUAL TO ACT AS A MANAGER OF THE BRANCH

Most possible scenarios

Explosive Device Backpack Car bomb Natural Gas Explosion

Individual with a Weapon Shooting Event Hostage Situation

Haz Mat Event Odor Investigation Pepper Spray Gas Leak White Powder Chemical Agents Radiological B-NICE Multiple Patients General Sickness

Food Court Entrance

View of Food Court

View of Food Court

JC Penney Bus Stop

Unguarded Entrances

Mall Entrance Next to Sears

Best Buy Entrance

Service Court

Maine Mall Corridor

Maine Mall Corridor

Maine Mall Entrance Next to Macy’s

INCIDENT COMMAND PIO LIAISON SAFETY OFFICER EMS BRANCH OPERATIONS CHIEF PLANNING CHIEF HAZ MAT BRANCH STAGING BRANCH PRIMARY TRIAGE RECON GROUP 1 PERSONNEL POOL SECONDARY TREATMENT RECON GROUP 2 AMBULANCE STAGING TREATMENT OFFICER UTILITIES GROUP APPARATUS STAGING LOADING OFFICER DECON GROUP HAZ MAT STAGING RIT POLICE STAGING ICS Chart LOGISTICS CHIEF FINANCE CHIEF

Tactical Objectives Establish Command do a very quick initial size up Review ICS Chart Establish a Medical Branch (assign someone to run it) and set up MCI Plan (SPFD SOG 844. 10) Set up staging areas (create a Staging Branch Manager) Ambulances Fire Apparatus Manpower Assign the Operations area and Treatment/Transport area (which should be different from each other) Assign Recon teams to enter mall to check for victims, assess scene. (bring meters and digital cameras) Obtain access to security room for site camera control. Secure Utilities Secure scene (crime scene) Don’t forget about service courts (General Public is usually not aware of them allowing easier FD access)

Issues/Challenges Large number of walking wounded Traffic issues Departing traffic will exacerbate existing traffic issues Arriving traffic (parents) will clog incoming arteries which will delay emergency responders Limited initial manpower and command staff Establishing a perimeter Accountability Securing utilities (gas) as there around 120 individual HVAC units

Pre-designated Staging Areas Incident at Food Court and/or vicinity Command Operations in parking lot 5 by old Filenes/Service Court 8 Treatment /Transport in parking lot 3 by Chuck-E-Cheese Incident at Center Court vicinity Command Operations in parking lot 6 by Service Court 7 Treatment /Transport in parking lot 5 or 4 depending on where victims are exiting from Incident between Macys and Center Command Operations in parking lot 6 by Macys Treatment /Transport in parking lot 1 or 6 depending on where victims are exiting from Incident between Sears and Center Command Operations in parking lot 3 by Sears Treatment /Transport in parking lot 2 or 3 depending on where victims are exiting from

Predestinated Staging Areas