CLAUSEWITZ Classroom Graphics from C Bassford National War

CLAUSEWITZ Classroom Graphics from C. Bassford, National War College

Clausewitz drinkin’ with the boyz. ©C. Bassford 2007

WHO WAS CLAUSEWITZ? Professional combat soldier. Man of action: Tauroggen, Waterloo Campaign. Staff Officer in the German tradition. One of us. Also, BTW, PME guy, historian, and theorist. ©C. Bassford 2007

DEMO VIDEO ©C. Bassford 2007

Clausewitz’s Qualities As a Thinker v ruthless intellectual integrity v profound realism v dialectical approach v description, not prescription v exposure of his full thought process v respect for the reader’s intelligence ©C. Bassford 2007

WHAT IS ON WAR ABOUT? The conduct of military operations in war. Not about policy or politics, nor about human nature or the nature of reality Practical theory about how to deal with the complexities of war (without ignoring the Complexity) Complexity of war – intrinsic, not extrinsic ©C. Bassford 2007

WINDOW or MIRROR? ©C. Bassford 2007

SOME KEY CONCEPTS IN ON WAR - the dialectical approach to military analysis - War is an expression of Politik/Policy/Politics with the addition of other means - the “remarkable/paradoxical/fascinating trinity" of war - the methods of "critical analysis" - the uses and abuses of historical studies - the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism - The relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war - the asymmetrical relationship between attack (+) and defense (-) - defense is inherently the stronger form of war - the nature of "military genius" - "absolute war" vice "real war" - limited war vice war “to render [the enemy] politically helpless or militarily impotent" - the fundamentally social—rather than artistic or scientific—character of war - the “moral elements” in war (vice the “bean-count”) - the "fog" of war - "friction" - the essential unpredictability of war - strategic and operational centers of gravity - the "culminating point of the offensive" - the "culminating point of victory" ©C. Bassford 2007

"The Apostle of Total War. " B. H. Liddell Hart, 1934 "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times. " Robert E. Osgood, 1979 ©C. Bassford 2007

An unsettling truth: Clausewitz is for losers.

FLIGHT PLAN My approach—give you the tools to do the job TOPIC 7 Clausewitz’s historical context Clausewitz’s subject Clausewitz’s dialectical method Purpose of theory Categories of War: “ideal” vs “real” – “limited” vs …? Politik, politics, policy War as an “instrument” of policy, of politics Clausewitz and “humanity” or morality The “trinity of” war emotion and violence interplay of chance and probability rationality in war PAGanism war of “limited objectives” vs war to “disarm” the enemy--to “render [the enemy] politically helpless or militarily impotent” “Destruction of the enemy” ©C. Bassford 2007

PURPOSE OF THEORY

THE PURPOSE OF THEORY: [A] satisfactory theory of war … will never conflict with reality…. The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled…. Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls…. Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.

THE PURPOSE OF THEORY: “The conception of war defined here will be the first ray of light into the fundamental structure of theory, which first sorts out the major components and allows us to distinguish them from one another. ” “The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled…. Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. ”

Everybody has a theory.

THE DIALECTIC

CLAUSEWITZ’S DIALECTIC THESIS ANTITHESIS SYNTHESIS BLACK WHITE GRAY Joe Sixpack’s Dialectic R CONNECTICUT 137 A More Realistic Dialectic Platonic, not Hegelian or Marxist The tensions between thesis and antithesis are seldom resolved, because these tensions continue to exist in nature, politics, and war. Examples: Offense/Defense, limited and unlimited objectives, etc. Seldom explicit. Special case: The nature of war THESIS: War is nothing but an act of force…. ANTITHESIS: War is merely the continuation of policy SYNTHESIS: The dynamic interactions of the Trinity ©C. Bassford 2007

CATEGORIES OF WAR

ABSOLUTE OR “IDEAL” WAR ABSTRACTION, “LOGICAL FANTASY” REAL WAR Interaction between generic opponents logically leads to extremes i. e. , war as we actually experience it Political and military interaction in realtime and real-space between actual opponents with real characteristics imposes practical constraints on the conduct of war ©C. Bassford 2007

ABSOLUTE OR “IDEAL” WAR ABSTRACTION, “LOGICAL FANTASY” REAL WAR Interaction between generic opponents logically leads to extremes i. e. , war as we actually experience it Political and military interaction in realtime and real-space between actual opponents with real characteristics imposes practical constraints on the conduct of war Overlap: Sometimes the real-world political and military objectives approach the absolute, in that we actually do seek the complete military and/or political overthrow of the enemy. ©C. Bassford 2007

REAL WAR “Limited War” i. e. , war as we actually experience it War to achieve limited aims War to render the enemy politically helpless or militarily impotent ? “____ War” Clausewitz does not use the term “total war. ” ©C. Bassford 2007

“LIMITED” and “NOT LIMITED” usually apply to objectives, not means. Examples: Bosnia, Panama, Iraq, Japan ©C. Bassford 2007

POLITIK POLITICS, and POLICY

POLITIK/POLICY/POLITICS (Bassford’s definitions) Politik – “Statecraft” (but this isn’t limited to the “state”) Politics: “The highly variable process by which power is distributed in any society. ” Multilateral, Interactive. Policy: The conscious and one-sided subcomponent of politics; the reasoned purposes and actions of each of the various individual actors in the political struggle. Unilateral, Rational. ©C. Bassford 2007

POLITIK/POLICY/POLITICS ©C. Bassford 2007

POLITIK/POLICY/POLITICS [W]ar is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. If this is firmly kept in mind throughout it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject and the whole will be easier to analyze. Although the main application of this point will not be made until Book Eight. (p. 69, prefatory note) From Chapter 6 B. “War is an Instrument of Policy” (Should be “politics”) We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase "with the addition of other means" because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise? Do political relations between peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? (p. 605 – Book Eight)

That it [policy] can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there. . here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community. Clausewitz

THE TRINITY

THE TRINITY (BASSFORD) 28. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THEORY (Bassford translation; Compare to p. 89 of Howard/Paret translation) War is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some extent in each concrete case. It is also, however, when it is regarded as a whole and in relation to the tendencies that dominate within it, a fascinating trinity —composed of: 1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; 2) the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and 3) its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason. The first of these three aspects concerns more the people; the second, more the commander and his army; the third, more the government. The passions that are to blaze up in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope that the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone. These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. The task, therefore, is to keep our theory [of war] floating among these three tendencies, as among three points of attraction. What lines might best be followed to achieve this difficult task will be explored in the book on theory of war [i. e. , Book Two]. In any case, the conception of war defined here will be the first ray of light into the fundamental structure of theory, which first sorts out the major components and allows us to distinguish them from one another. Violent Emotion – Chance & Probability – Rational Calculation People – Army – Government (PAG) ©C. Bassford 2007

Irrational EMOTION Human Intent RATIONAL CALCULATION Rational Concrete Reality CHANCE and PROBABILITY Nonrational ©C. Bassford 2007

PEOPLE EMOTION PASSION and ENERGY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP RATIONAL CALCULATION Intelligent Analysis and Policy Design MILITARY LEADERSHIP and FORCES CHANCE and PROBABILITY CREATIVITY and SKILL ©C. Bassford 2007

Multiple players, multiple interpenetrating trinities. PEOPLE EMOTION PASSION and ENERGY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP RATIONAL CALCULATION Intelligent Analysis and Policy Design MILITARY LEADERSHIP and FORCES CHANCE and PROBABILITY CREATIVITY and SKILL ©C. Bassford 2007

+ Technology + Economics ©C. Bassford 2007

THE TRINITY: VISUAL METAPHORS ©C. Bassford 2007

POLITICAL and MILITARY OBJECTIVES

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN WAR High-end SURVIVAL LIMITED or HIGH-END MILITARY OBJECTIVES Two forms of military objective: Coercion (PAPE) Exhaustion (DELBRÜCK) Attrition (TRAD. ) Erosion (USMC-MCDPs) War to achieve “limited aims” - offensive war with a limited aim - defensive war HIGH-END MILITARY OBJECTIVE (DISARM) Compellance (PAPE) Overthrow (CLAUSEWITZ) Incapacitation Annihilation (DELBRÜCK) Disarm (CLAUSEWITZ) War to “disarm” the enemy “to render [the enemy] politically helpless or militarily impotent" ©C. Bassford 2007

High-end SURVIVAL LIMITED MILITARY OBJECTIVE (Inflict Stress) Coercion Exhaustion Attrition Erosion Coercion EROSION TARGET: The adversary’s WILL to continue the struggle } Compellance Overthrow Incapacitation Annihilation DISARM or INCAPACITATE HIGH-END MILITARY OBJECTIVE (DISARM) { MILITARY OBJECTIVE TARGET: The adversary’s MILITARY CAPACITY to continue the struggle ©C. Bassford 2007

High-end SURVIVAL LIMITED MILITARY OBJECTIVE (Inflict Stress) Coercion Exhaustion Attrition Erosion Coercion Compellance Overthrow Incapacitation Annihilation DISARM or INCAPACITATE HIGH-END MILITARY OBJECTIVE (DISARM) These two things are not easily EROSION MILITARY from distinguishable OBJECTIVE each other. TARGET: The adversary’s MILITARY CAPACITY WILL to continue the struggle } { ©C. Bassford 2007

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN WAR SURVIVAL LIMITED or HIGH-END MILITARY OBJECTIVES High-end HIGH-END MILITARY OBJECTIVE (DISARM) CONTAIN (Military is not the decisive instrument) ©C. Bassford 2007

TOPIC 8 Fog/Friction Attack & Defense Military genius Center(s) of Gravity Culminating point of the offensive “Art of War” or “Science of War” – or…. Uses and abuses of historical studies Revisit the Trinity Revisit the relationship between political and military objectives ©C. Bassford 2007

THEY EXCLUDE GENIUS FROM THE RULE Anything that could not be reached by the meager wisdom of such one-sided points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of genius, which rises above all rules. Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules, not good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No; what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show and why this should be the case. Don’t forget that Clausewitz can be a sarcastic SOB. You have to pay attention to his discussion—if you’ve ripped one sentence out of context, you’ve missed the point. The last line, in red, is his actual argument. ©C. Bassford 2007

High-end SURVIVAL LIMITED or HIGH-END MILITARY OBJECTIVES Two forms of military objective: EROSION HIGH-END MILITARY OBJECTIVE (DISARM) DISARMING/ INCAPACITATION These are objectives, not methods (ways or means), time-lines, intensity levels, or casualty ratios. ©C. Bassford 2007

US allies ROK KOREA 1950 -53 Anti-Gov’t Guerrillas in ROK CHINA Actual “structure” of the war? USA DPRK USSR ©C. Bassford 2007