Classical Compatibilism According to one strand within classical

Classical Compatibilism According to one strand within classical compatibilism, freedom of the sort pertinent to moral evaluation is nothing more than an agent's ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. For instance, Hobbes writes that a person's freedom consists in his finding “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do. ” 30

Hobbes' brief remarks represent an exemplary expression of the classical compatibilist account of freedom. It involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists' benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some foreign or external source to act contrary to one's will. 31

Now, free will is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants. It is plausible to assume that free will, so understood, is compatible with determinism since the truth of determinism does not entail that no agents ever do what they wish to do unencumbered. 32

Is the classical compatibilist account of free will OK? How convincing is the classical compatibilist account of free will? As it stands, it cries out for refinement. To cite just one shortcoming, various mental illnesses can cause a person to act as she wants and do so unencumbered; yet, intuitively, it would seem that she does not act of her own free will. For example, imagine a person suffering from a form of psychosis that causes full-fledged hallucinations. While hallucinating, she might “act as she wants unencumbered, ” but she could hardly be said to be acting of her own free will. Since the classical compatibilist account of free will is not convincing, we need to consider alternative accounts. 33

Free Will and the Challenge from Causal Determinism We naturally think of ourselves—“normal” adult human beings—as “free. ” That is, we take it that we have a certain distinctive sort of control. Let’s use “free will” (or “freedom of the will”) as an umbrella term to refer to the sort of freedom or control we presuppose that we human beings possess, and that is connected in important ways to ascriptions of moral responsibility. Note that “free will” in this sense need not entail that we have a special faculty of the will, but only that we have a certain kind of freedom or control. But what is this freedom? 34

What is freedom？ It is extremely natural and plausible to think that the typical adult human being has freedom in the sense that we often (although perhaps not always) have the freedom to choose or refrain from choosing a particular course of action (where “course of action” can refer to an omission as well as an action, narrowly construed) and to undertake or refrain from undertaking this course of action. 35

That is, we take it that we often (although perhaps not invariably) have “alternative possibilities”: although we actually choose and undertake a particular course of action, we had it in our power (or “could have”) chosen and undertaken a different course of action. 36

Of course, we recognize that sometimes we are “coerced” or “compelled” to choose or act as we do; and some individuals never have control over their choices and actions (because of significant mental illness, brain damage, and so forth). But we assume that the typical adult human being, at least sometimes, has more than one available path. That is, we assume, in Borges’s phrase, that the future is a garden of forking paths. 37

Challenge from Causal Determinism But there are various skeptical worries or challenges to the intuitive notion that we have free will in the sense that involves alternative possibilities. One of the most important such challenges comes from the doctrine of causal determinism. Causal determinism is thesis that every event (and thus every choice and bit of behavior) is deterministically caused by some event in the past; thus, every choice and bit of behavior is the result of a casual chain, each link in which is deterministically caused by some prior link (until one gets to the beginning, if there is a beginning). 38

Causal Determinism More specifically, causal determinism is the doctrine that a complete statement of the laws of nature and a complete description of the facts about the world at some time T entail every truth about the world after T. That is, if causal determinism is true, then the past and the natural laws entail a unique present and future path for the world. 39

Note further that if someone had available to her the description of the past and the statement of the laws, she could with certainty say what happens in the present and what will happen in the future. But it does not follow from the truth of the metaphysical doctrine of causal determinism that anyone actually has access to the relevant truths about the universe or its laws. 40

No human being currently knows whether or not the doctrine of causal determinism obtains. Certain physicists believe that the study of physical phenomena at the micro level renders it very plausible that causal determinism is false (and thus that `indeterminism' is true). But other physicists (and philosophers) cling to the view that causal determinism is true, and that what appear currently to be genuine metaphysical indeterminacies reflect mere inadequacies in our knowledge of the world (Honderich, 1988). 41

Since we cannot be certain at this point that causal determinism is false, it is perhaps worthwhile to think about what would follow, if it turned out that causal determinism is true. It is troubling that there is a very potent argument, employing ingredients from common sense, which appears to show that if causal determinism indeed turned out to be true, then no human being would have free will in the sense that involves alternative possibilities. The following is an informal and intuitive presentation of the argument: 42

Why free will is not compatible with causal determinism? Suppose I make some ordinary choice C at time T 2. If causal determinism is true, then the total state of the universe at T 1 together with the laws of nature entail that I make C at T 2. Thus, it was a necessary condition of my making a different choice at T 2 that either the state of the universe at T 1 have been different from what it actually was or some proposition that expressed a natural law would not have expressed a natural law. 43

But, intuitively, I cannot—do not have it in my power—at any time so to behave that the past would have been different from the way it actually was. And, similarly, I cannot at any time determine which propositions express the natural laws. Intuitively, the past and the natural laws are “fixed” and not “up to me. ” It seems to follow from the foregoing ingredients that I could not have chosen otherwise than C at T 2, if causal determinism turned out to be true. 44

This argument for “incompatibilism”—the incompatibility of causal determinism and the sort of free will that involves alternative possibilities —has been the focal point of much discussion. Indeed the argument is controversial, and it can be resisted in many ways. 45

如果不相容論是對的，那會怎樣？ Now, despite the fact that the argument for incompatibilism of free will and determinism is controversial, let’s assume that the argument is sound and explore the implications of this assumption. 46

Deliberation and Practical Reasoning One of the most central aspects of human “persons” is that we can engage in significant deliberation and practical reasoning. In deliberating, we consider and weigh reasons for (and against) various courses of action. We seek to “figure out what is best to do” and to act in accordance with this sort of judgment about what is best, all things considered. We are fallible in our judgments, of course, and certainly we sometimes fail to act in accordance with our judgment about what is best to do, all things considered. But in any case, the process of deliberation (or practical reasoning) involves identifying and weighing reasons with an eye to figuring out what we have sufficient reason to do. 47

Richard Taylor’s argument Some philosophers have argued that it is a conceptual truth that I cannot engage in deliberation if I do not believe that I have free will, in the sense that involves alternative possibilities. Richard Taylor : “I cannot deliberate about what to do, even though I may not know what I am going to do, unless I believe that it is up to me what I am going to do” He goes on to argue that the relevant notion of “up to me” is incompatible with causal determinism; on this notion, an act's being “up to me” implies that it is up to me whether or not I do it. 48

Why Taylor’s argument fails As long as I do not know what I will in fact choose, it seems that there is a perfectly reasonable point to deliberation; after all, I still need to figure out what I have sufficient reason to do and to seek to act in accordance with this judgment. This purpose of deliberation would not disappear, in a world in which I knew that it is not “up to me” (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities in which the actual past and natural laws are held fixed) what I will choose. 50

Note that it may still be true, even in a causally deterministic world, that in a particular context I would choose a course of action if and only if I were to judge it best. Further, it does not follow simply from causal determinism that there is some special sort of obstacle to my choosing a particular course of action; causal determinism does not entail that I have some kind of phobia or compulsion that would rule out my choosing a certain sort of action. 51

And if one insists that it is a conceptual truth that my process of weighing reasons would not count as “deliberation, ” then so be it: call it “deliberation*” or simply “figuring out what it would be best to do, ” and there can be a clear point to such activities even in a world in which I know that I have only one path that is genuinely available into the future. 52

Peter van Inwagen’s argument Peter van Inwagen holds a view that is similar to, but slightly different from, Taylor's. On van Inwagen's account, an agent who believes that he does not have free will (in the sense of alternative possibilities) can deliberate, but in so doing he would be contradicting himself. 53

Van Inwagen says: “In my view, if someone deliberates about whether to do A or to do B, it follows that his behavior manifests a belief that it is possible for him to do A—that he can do A, that he has it within his power to do A—and that it is possible for him to do B. ” Thus, an individual who sincerely believes that he lacks free will (understood as earlier) would be contradicting himself in deliberating—he would be holding an inconsistent set of beliefs. Whereas this is not impossible, it is certainly undesirable; for example, holding inconsistent beliefs guarantees that at least one of one's beliefs is false. 54

Inwagen: “Anyone who doubts that this is indeed the case may find it instructive to imagine that he is in a room with two doors and that he believes one of the doors to be unlocked and the other to be locked and impassable, though he has no idea which is which; let him then attempt to imagine himself deliberating about which door to leave by. ” 55

Problems with Inwagen’s argument Is it correct to say that deliberation manifests the belief in free will? I agree that it would be odd to think that I could deliberate about which door actually (or “successfully”) to open. But surely in such a case I could deliberate about which door to choose to open. That is, I could weigh reasons and come to a judgment about which door it would be best to seek to open, and I could form an intention—choose—to act in accordance with my judgment. 56

How Inwagen might reply But van Inwagen may reply that the apparent lack of oddness in supposing that I could deliberate about which door (say) to choose to open stems precisely from the fact that I can suppose that I am able either to choose to open door A or choose to open door B. 57

Problems with Inwagen’s argument However, it is doubtful that this is the right explanation of the asymmetry in our intuitions between deliberating about which door to open and deliberating about which door to choose to open. 58

Suppose I do in fact choose to open door A. Now if causal determinism is true and the argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and free will (understood as involving alternative possibilities) is sound, then it turns out that, unbeknownst to me, just prior to my choice I did not have it in my power to choose to open door B. Further, it seems to me that I could know that causal determinism is true and that the incompatibilist's argument is sound, and thus that whichever choice I make is the only one I actually can make. 59

This knowledge does not eliminate the point of deliberation (the need to figure out which door it would be best to choose to open); and I do not have any hesitation in supposing that, even with the knowledge that whatever door I choose will be the only door I in fact can choose to open, I can deliberate about which door to choose to open. Thus I do not believe that the asymmetry in our intuitions between deliberating about which door to open and deliberating about which door to choose to open stems from an asymmetry in our beliefs about alternative possibilities. 60

In a causally deterministic world (and given the incompatibilistic argument), every choice and action would be such that, if I make it (or perform it), I could not have made another choice (or performed another action). But it seems to me that there could still be a perfectly reasonable point to deliberation, and that I need not contradict myself in accepting the truth of causal determinism, the soundness of the argument for incompatibilism, but nevertheless deliberating. 61

All that is required is that I have an interest in figuring out what I have sufficient reason to choose, and that I do not know which course of action I will in fact choose to take (and take). Further, van Inwagen has not produced an example in which it is obvious that this yields an odd result. 62

John Searle’s argument John Searle has argued for a point related to the claims of Taylor and van Inwagen, but it is slightly different. Searle‘s contention is that there would be no point to practical reasoning or deliberation, if I knew that causal determinism were true. Searle says: “The gap can be given two equivalent descriptions, one forward-looking, one backward. 63

Forward: the gap is that feature of our conscious decision making and acting where we sense alternative future decisions and actions as causally open to us. Backward: the gap is that feature of conscious decision making and acting whereby the reasons preceding the decisions and the actions are not experienced by the agent as setting causally sufficient conditions for the decisions and actions. As far as our conscious experiences are concerned, the gap occurs when the beliefs, desires, and other reasons are not experienced as causally sufficient conditions for a decision (the formation of a prior intention. . . ). ” 64

Searle goes on to say: “I am advancing three theses here. 1. We have experiences of the gap of the sort I have described. 2. We have to presuppose the gap. We have to presuppose that the psychological antecedents of many of our decisions and actions do not set causally sufficient conditions for those decisions and actions. 3. In normal conscious life one cannot avoid choosing and deciding. 65

Searle’s argument for 2 and 3 If I really thought that the beliefs and desires were sufficient to cause the action then I could just sit back and watch the action unfold in the same way as I do when I sit back and watch the action unfold on a movie screen. But I cannot do that when I am engaging in rational decision making and acting. I have to presuppose that the antecedent set of psychological conditions was not causally sufficient. 66

An additional argument for 3 Even if I became convinced of the falsity of thesis of the gap, all the same I would still have to engage in actions and thus exercise my own freedom no matter what. . For example, there is a kind of practical inconsistency in maintaining the following two theses: (1) I am now trying to make up my mind whom to vote for in the next election. (2) I take the existing psychological causes operating on me right now to be causally sufficient to determine whom I am going to vote for. 67

The inconsistency comes out in the fact that if I really believe (2), then there seems no point in making the effort involved in (1). The situation would be like taking a pill that I am sure will cure my headache by itself, and then trying to add some further psychological effort to the effects of the pill. If I really believe the pill is enough, then the rational thing to do is to sit back and let it take effect. ” 68

Is Searle’s argument convincing? It seems that Searle's view about deliberation falls prey to the same objections as the views of Taylor and van Inwagen: I believe that there would be a clear point to deliberation and practical reasoning, even if I were to reject the gap: I would still have an interest in —and deeply care about—figuring out what I have reason to do, and seeking to act accordingly. Even if the gap thesis is false, and antecedent psychological states are causally sufficient for my decision, and I know this, it does not follow that I know what decision I will make and what action I will perform. 69

Hence, insofar as I care about acting in accordance with what I have, all things considered, reason to do, there is a clear point to engaging in deliberation. 70

Recall that Searle says that there is a practical inconsistency in maintaining the following. (1) I am now trying to make up my mind whom to vote for in the next election. (2) I take the existing psychological causes operating on me right now to be causally sufficient to determine whom I am going to vote for. He says holding these two theses would be like “taking a pill that I am sure will cure my headache by itself, and then trying to add some further psychological effort to the effects of the pill. ” 71

But in Searle's analogy, you know that the pill will cure your headache; in contrast, I am not assumed to know whom I will vote for in the next election. If I did know whom I would vote for, I agree that the point of making up my mind would appear to vanish. 72

Suppose I know that my decision about the next election is causally determined by my current configuration of mental states (desires, beliefs, and so forth). Still, I can also know that my decision will depend on my practical reasoning in the following sense: if I were to judge it best, all things considered, to vote for candidate A, I would vote for candidate A; but if were to judge it best, all things considered, to vote for candidate B, I would vote for candidate B. 73

Further, I can know that nothing distorts or impairs my practical reasoning —my ability to recognize the reasons there are, and to weigh them with an eye to making an all things considered judgment as to what is best. That is, nothing in the doctrine of causal determinism entails that the counterfactuals (that specify the relevant sort of dependency) are false, and nothing in this doctrine entails that I have any special sort of impairment of my capacity to engage in practical reasoning—certain phobias, compulsions, mental illnesses, and so forth. 74

And, finally, nothing in the doctrine of causal determinism entails that I do not care about choosing and acting in accordance with my judgment about what is best to do. So there is a clear point to deliberation, even if I believe that antecedent mental states are causally sufficient for my decision. 75

Imagine, to make the point dramatically, that there are two doors in front of you, and you must choose which door to open. You know that behind door 1 is a million dollars, and behind door 2 is a den of rattlesnakes. Imagine, further, that you know that causal determinism is true, that causal determinism rules out alternative possibilities, and that causal determinism in itself does not entail that one has any physical paralysis or impairment of the human capacity for practical reasoning (no intense phobias, compulsions, paranoid schizophrenia, and so forth). 76

Would Searle really not deliberate? What would he do—flip a coin, act arbitrarily, or what? Would he simply “sit back and watch the action unfold”? It would seem perfectly reasonable (at the very least) to take into consideration what is behind the doors, and to choose and act accordingly. Having collected the million dollars, you might pause to reflect that it turns out that was the only thing you could have done (as long as this thought would not unduly delay the celebration!). 77

回到第三項主張 現在讓我們考慮第三項主張： Some philosophers have argued that if we lacked free will (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities), then we could not legitimately be considered morally responsible agents. 78

為何第三項主張有道理 As said above, we naturally think that the future is a garden of forking paths—that we at least at some important points in our lives have more than one path branching into the future. If this intuitive picture turned out to be false, then it would seem that we could not legitimately be held morally responsible for our behavior. After all, if I don't have free will in a sense that involves alternative possibilities, then I have to choose (and do) what I actually choose (and do). And if I have to choose what I do in fact choose, then presumably I am compelled so to choose, and cannot fairly be considered morally responsible for my choice. 79

It is very plausible, then, to accept something like the “principle of alternative possibilities” (PAP), according to which an agent is morally responsible for (say) an action only if she could have done otherwise. If PAP is true, then moral responsibility requires free will (in the sense that involves alternative possibilities); and if causal determinism rules out such alternative possibilities, it would thereby rule out moral responsibility. 80

van Inwagen’s defense of PAP “If we do not have free will, then there is no such thing as moral responsibility. This proposition, one might think, certainly deserves to be a commonplace. If someone charges you with, say, lying, and if you can convince him that it was simply not within your power not to lie, then it would seem that you have done all that is necessary to absolve yourself of responsibility for lying. . 81

[W]ithout free will there is no moral responsibility: If moral responsibility exists, then someone is morally responsible for something he has done or for something he has left undone; to be morally responsible for some act or failure to act is at least to be able to have acted otherwise, whatever else it may involve; to be able to have acted otherwise is to have free will. Therefore, if moral responsibility exists, someone has free will. Therefore, if no one has free will, moral responsibility does not exist. ” 82

PAP questioned But whereas PAP might appear to be an obvious truth, it has been questioned by some philosophers. These philosophers contend (in one way or another) that what matters for moral responsibility is how the relevant choice or action is brought about, not whether the agent has alternative possibilities available to him. In contemporary philosophy, Harry Frankfurt has helped to focus the case against PAP with a set of examples with a characteristic structure. 83

These examples contain fail-safe mechanisms that (allegedly) both make it the case that the agent has no (relevant) alternative possibilities and also play no role in the agent's actual choice and action. Frankfurt says that if something plays no role in the agent's choice and action, then it cannot be relevant to his moral responsibility; thus, it would follow that the mechanisms in question both make it the case that the agent has no alternative possibilities and do not thereby threaten the agent's moral responsibility. 84

A version of `Frankfurt-type case' Jones is in a voting booth deliberating about whether to vote for the Democrat or the Republican. After weighing reasons and deliberating in the “normal” way, he chooses to vote for the Democrat. Unbeknownst to him, Black, a neurosurgeon with Democratic sympathies, has implanted a device in Jones's brain that monitors Jones's brain activities. If he is about to choose to vote Democratic, the device does not intervene. If, however, Jones were about to choose to vote Republican, the device would trigger an intervention that would involve electronic stimulation of the brain sufficient to produce a choice to vote for the Democrat and an actual vote for the Democrat. 85

If Jones is about to choose at T 2 to vote for the Democrat at T 3, he shows some involuntary sign—say a blush, a furrowed brow, or a neurological pattern in his brain readable by some sort of “neuroscope”—at T 1. If it detects this, Black's device does not intervene. But if Jones is about to choose at T 2 to vote Republican at T 3, he shows a different involuntary sign at T 1. This would trigger Black's device to intervene and cause Jones to choose at T 2 to vote for the Democrat and actually to vote for the Democrat at T 3. 86

It seems that Black's device is precisely the kind of fail-safe device described earlier: it plays no role in Jones's deliberations, choice, or action, and yet its presence renders it true that Jones could not have done otherwise than choose and vote Democratic. Indeed, it seems that in this case Jones freely chooses to vote Democratic, freely does so, and can be considered morally responsible for his choice and action, even though he does not have alternative possibilities (given the presence of Black's device). 87

This suggests that there is a kind of freedom or control—corresponding to choosing and acting freely—that does not require alternative possibilities, and that this sort of control (and not the alternative-possibilities control) is the freedom-relevant condition necessary for moral responsibility. There seem to be two kinds of freedom or control, and the Frankfurt-type examples help us to prize them apart. It appears, then, that we have a counterexample to PAP. 88

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 維基百科 / Unknown 。 http: //commons. wikimedia. org/wiki/File%3 AThomas_Hobbes_by_John_Michael_Wright. jpg 本作品已超過著作財產權存續期間，屬公共領域之著作。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 30 -1 30 -3 63 -1 作者／來源 維基百科 / User: Hannah。 http: //zh. wikipedia. org/wiki/File: Wen_Tianxiang. jpg 本作品已超過著作財產權存續期間，屬公共領域之著作。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 22 30 -2 版權標示 According to one strand …in her way Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Compatibilism http: //plato. stanford. edu/entries/compatibilism/#3 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do Thomas Hobbes, ‘Chapter 21 - Of The Liberty Of Subjects’ , Leviathan http: //www. literature. org/authors/hobbes-thomas/leviathan/chapter-21. html 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 WIKIPEDIA / Original uploader was Matro http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/File: John_searle 2. jpg 本作品以創用CC「姓名標示－相同方式分享」3. 0版授權釋出。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 92

版權聲明 頁碼 31 32 -2 33 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 Hobbes' brief remarks … to one's will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Compatibilism http: //plato. stanford. edu/entries/compatibilism/#3 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 free will is the … do what she wants. . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Compatibilism http: //plato. stanford. edu/entries/compatibilism/#3 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 It is plausible to…to do unencumbered. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Compatibilism http: //plato. stanford. edu/entries/compatibilism/#3 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 How convincing is …own free will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Compatibilism http: //plato. stanford. edu/entries/compatibilism/#3 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/3/18 。 93

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 34 We naturally think … of moral responsibility. 35 It is extremely …course of action. 36 That is, we take …course of action. 37 Of course…of forking paths. 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 94

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 38 But there are …is a beginning). 39 40 41 -1 More specifically…for the world. Note further that …or its laws. No human being …indeterminism' is true). 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 95

版權聲明 頁碼 41 -2 作品 But other physicists …of the world 42 Since we cannot …of the argument 43 Suppose I make …a natural law. 44 But, intuitively…out to be true. 版權標示 作者／來源 Honderich, Ted. 1988. A Theory of Determinism. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Oxford: Blackwell. Fischer, John Martin. 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility. ” Ethics 110: 93– 139. Ginet, Carl. 1990. On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 96

版權聲明 頁碼 45 47 48 -1 48 -2 作品 This argument for…of much discussion. One of the most …reason to do. Some philosophers… possibilities. I cannot deliberate …going to do 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 Taylor, Richard. 1983. Metaphysics. 3 rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 97

版權聲明 頁碼 48 -3 作品 He goes on to …not I do it. 50 As long as I. . . will choose. 51 Note that it…sort of action. 52 And if one insists …into the future. 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 98

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 Peter van Inwagen … be contradicting himself. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 54 -1 Van Inwagen says…him to do B. ” van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 54 -2 Thus, an individual … beliefs is false. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 Anyone who doubts …which door to leave by. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 53 55 99

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 56 I agree that …with my judgment. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 57 But van Inwagen may…open door B. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 59 Suppose I do in …I actually can make. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 60 This knowledge does …alternative possibilities. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 100

版權聲明 頁碼 61 作品 In a causally deterministic …nevertheless deliberating. 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 62 -1 All that is required …take (and take). Bok, Hilary. 1998. Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 62 -2 Further, van Inwagen …an odd result. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 63 -2 John Searle has argued…determin ism were true. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 101

版權聲明 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 63 -3 The gap can be…one backward. Searle, John R. 2001. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 64 Forward: the gap is that…of a prior intention. . . ). Searle, John R. 2001. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 65 Searle goes on to say: …choosing and deciding. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 66 If I really thought …not causally sufficient. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 102

版權聲明 頁碼 67 68 69 作品 Even if I became …to vote for. The inconsistency comes …let it take effect. I believe that …I will perform. 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 Searle, John R. 2001. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 103

版權聲明 頁碼 70 71 72 作品 Hence, insofar as …to engaging in deliberation. Recall that Searle says …effects of the pill. ” But in Searle's analogy…would appear to vanish. 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 104

版權聲明 頁碼 73 74 75 作品 Suppose I know …for candidate B. Further, I can know …, and so forth. And, finally…for my decision. 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 105

版權聲明 頁碼 76 77 78 作品 Imagine, to make… and so forth). Would Searle really…delay the celebration!). Some philosophers have…responsibl e agents. 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 106

版權聲明 頁碼 79 80 81 作品 As said above…responsib le for my choice. It is very plausible…moral responsibility. If we do not …responsibility for lying 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 107

版權聲明 頁碼 82 83 -1 83 -2 84 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 [W]ithout free will …does not exist. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 But whereas PAP …available to him. David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 In contemporary philosophy. . . characteristic structure. These examples contain … moral responsibility. Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. ” Journal of Philosophy 66: 829– 839. 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 108

版權聲明 頁碼 85 86 87 作品 Jones is in a …for the Democrat. If Jones is about …for the Democrat at T 3. It seems that …Black's device). 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 109

版權聲明 頁碼 88 1 -110 作品 This suggests that …counterexample to PAP. 版權標示 作者／來源 David Copp / 2005 / The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory / Chapter 12 -Free Will and Moral Responsibility / Oxford University Press http: //www. oxfordscholarship. com/view/10. 1093/0195147790. 001. 0001/acprof 9780195147797 -chapter-13 依據著作權法第 46、50、52、65 條合理使用。瀏覽日期： 2014/5/16 。 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2003多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第 46、50、52、 65條合理使用。 110