Chapter TwentyFive The Global Crisis 1921 1941 Chapter

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis, 1921 -1941

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n The Diplomacy of the New Era – Limited Internationalism § Henry Cabot Lodge: This senior U. S. senator from Massachusetts was chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he led the fight against the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and U. S. membership in the League of Nations. He was not an isolationist, but he did believe that the U. S. should remain free of any obligations to any foreign powers and follow an independent path on the world stage. – U. S. Foreign Policy in the 1920 s § Contradiction: While critics of U. S. foreign policy in Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge the 1920 s accused the Republican administrations of (R), 1850 -1924 isolationism, the U. S. in fact was playing a greater role on the world stage than it ever did previously. 2

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis Charles Evan Hughes (1862 -1948) in 1921 n The Diplomacy of the New Era – Replacing the League § Charles Evans Hughes: The former governor of New York and 1916 Republican presidential candidate became Secretary of State under Harding in 1921, and wanted to find a way of replacing the League of Nations as means of keeping the peace. § Washington Conference of 1921: Hughes wished to prevent a destabilizing naval arms race between Japan, Great Britain, and the U. S. (and to a lesser extent, France and Italy), so he called a meeting in which each party agreed to stop building new major warships and reduce the size of its fleet. To everyone’s surprise, all attending powers signed the Five-Power Pact of February 1922, agreeing to limits on warship construction. § Kellogg-Briand Pact: In 1927, when French foreign minister Aristide Briand asked then U. S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg (1856 -1937) to have the U. S. join an alliance against Germany, Kellogg instead proposed a multi-lateral treaty outlawing war as an instrument of policy. On August 27, 1928, fourteen nations signed the agreement; forty-eight signed it later. The pact had no enforcement mechanism. 3

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n The Diplomacy of the New Era – Debts and Diplomacy § American Commerce Abroad: Hughes, Kellogg, and other American policymakers agreed that making sure U. S. overseas trade faced no obstacles was the first duty of American diplomats. § Foreign Debt: The Allied powers in Europe were struggling with the $11 billion in loans they had borrowed from the U. S. during the war, while Germany was struggling paying its hefty reparations to France and Britain, which caused hyperinflation that made its currency nearly valueless. 4

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis Vice President to Calvin Coolidge, Charles G. Dawes (1865 -1951) n The Diplomacy of the New Era – Debts and Diplomacy § The Dawes Plan: In 1924, a committee led by Vice President Charles Dawes proposed a solution to the European debt problem: the U. S. government would allow Germany to take out enormous new loans from U. S. banks; it would then use this money to the reparations to France and Germany, who in turn would agree to reduce the size of the German payments until the German economy recovered. The Allies would also remove troops from the highly industrial Ruhr Valley of Germany. Dawes won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1925 for the plan. § Economic Expansion in Latin America: During the 1920 s, the U. S. doubled its investments in Latin America, often extending giant loans that likely would not be paid back. The U. S. also maintained military presences in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, etc. High U. S. import tariffs made it hard for these countries to pay back these debts. 5

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n The Diplomacy of the New Era – Hoover and the World Crisis § Rising Nationalism: In Europe and Japan, a rising nationalism began to rise in 1931 that eventually would push the world to war. § Roosevelt Corollary Repudiated: FDR tried to repair the damage in Latin America by previous policies by going on a goodwill tour of the region before his inauguration, and not invoking the Roosevelt Corollary when foreign banks defaulted on U. S. loans, as in October 1931. He also pulled troops out from Nicaragua and Haiti by 1934. § After the Crash: With European economies faltering, many economists had advised Hoover to impose a temporary moratorium on their debt payments, but he refused to do so. 6

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n The Diplomacy of the New Era – Hoover and the World Crisis § New European Challenges: The U. S. proved diplomatically ineffective during the 1920 s, especially dealing with two troubling situations: the rise of the Italian fascist dictatorship, which Benito Mussolini had consolidated by 1925; and the highly unstable Weimar Republic in Germany, which by the 1920 s had been largely discredited for a variety of reasons, including the return of inflation. Weimar would soon follow Italian footsteps into fascism, with the takeover of the Nazi Party led by Adolph Hitler in early 1933. 7 Mussolini in 1925

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n The Diplomacy of the New Era – Hoover and the World Crisis § Crisis in East Asia: In the early 1930 s, The Japanese were suffering from a severe economic downturn and were concerned with expanding Soviet power and the Nationalist Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) reasserting its influence in Manchuria, a peninsula over which the Japanese had informal economic control since the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. § Manchuria Invaded: By September 1931, Japan’s military leaders were growing more and more assertive over the civilian government. They used the pretext of an explosion on a Japanese-built railroad that became known as the “Mukden Incident” to invade Manchuria. § U. S. Reaction: Secretary of State Henry Stimson (1867 -1950) issued sharp rebukes about the invasion, but Hoover did not allow him to cooperate with the League of Nations to impose economic sanctions. By early 1932, they had reached Shanghai, where they killed thousands. 8

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n Isolationism and Internationalism – Depression Diplomacy 9 § Dual Challenge: FDR’s new administration not only had to deal with a global economic crisis in 1933, but also the decaying international system of relations that had been set up at the end of World War One. § FDR’s “Bombshell Message”: Roosevelt attended the World Economic Conference in London in June 1933, and decided that the gold value of the dollar had to be allowed to fall to make U. S. goods competitive on the global market. Most conference attendees had the conservative goal of wanting to stabilize currencies, but not Roosevelt. His “bombshell message”—outlining his plan to let the dollar to drop—shocked them, and triggered a quick dissolution of the conference. § Stopping Growth of American-Owned European Debt: In April 1934, Roosevelt signed a prohibiting U. S. banks from extending loans to countries already in default. War debt payments lurched to halt shortly afterward, with only Finland continuing.

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n Isolationism and Internationalism – Depression Diplomacy § Soviet Union Recognized: The U. S. had still not recognized the Soviet Union as of 1933, but some advocates were for its recognition since the U. S. S. R. was a possible source of trade. The Russians wanted American help in containing Japan. By November, formal diplomatic relations had been established, although the rapprochement was short-lived, souring by the end of 1934: trade never took off, and the U. S. was not interested in containing Japan. § “Good Neighbor Policy”: FDR’s administration reversed older Latin American policy by signing an agreement at a 1933 Inter-America Conference in Uruguay that stated, “No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of others. ” This repudiated the old “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. 10

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n Isolationism and Internationalism – The Rise of Isolationism § Sources of Isolationism: Some Wilsonian internationalists had grown weary of the League of Nations and its inability to stop Japanese aggression, while others believed that business interests had tricked the public into supporting World War I, especially bankers who wanted to protect the loans they had extended to the Allies. § Neutrality Acts: As Mussolini prepared to invade Ethiopia in the summer of 1935, many Americans feared that another European war would break out. Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1935 to try to keep the U. S. out of a war: it set up a mandatory arms embargo on both sides of the conflict, and directed the president to warn civilians not travel on the ships of warring parties. In 1937, another Neutrality Act was passed that allowed warring parties to buy non-military material from the U. S. on a “cash-and-carry” basis, and if they shipped it themselves; the law prohibited U. S. vessels from entering a war zone. 11

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis U. S. S. Panay, sunk by the Japanese on Dec. 12, 1937 n Isolationism and Internationalism – The Rise of Isolationism § Spanish Civil War: The Falangists of General Francisco Franco—a Spanish group much like the Italian fascists—revolted against the democratically elected Spanish government in July 1936. Italy and Germany openly supported Franco, but the U. S. joined Britain and France in agreeing to offer no assistance to either side (this did not keep some U. S. citizens from volunteering to fight for the republic). § “Quarantine” Speech: In the summer of 1937, Japan intensified its military operations in China, attacking all five of the country’s northern provinces. In a speech in October 1937, Roosevelt said the Japanese should be “quarantined” to prevent the contagion of war from spreading, but was deliberately vague about what this meant. Roosevelt backtracked from the speech when it was met with hostility by the public. When the Japanese bombed a U. S. gunboat on the Yangtze River near Nanjing, China, in Dec. 1937, FDR quickly accepted their apology. 12

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain (1869 -1940) n Isolationism and Internationalism – The Failure of Munich 13 § Hitler’s Posturing: In 1936, Hitler moved the revived German army into the Rhineland, which Germany had been forbidden to do by the treaty of Versailles. Beginning in March 1938, Hitler started his quest for “lebensraum” by marching the German army into Austria, creating a “union” (anschluss), which was also forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. In September 1938, Hitler demanded that Czechoslovakia cede its western border territory known as the “Sudetenland, ” which was heavily populated by German-speaking peoples, but without which the country was indefensible. Czechoslovaks were ready to fight, but needed outside assistance (they had a treaty of mutual defense with the French). § “Appeasement”: On Sept. 29, the leaders of France and Britain met with Hitler and agreed to German demands in exchange for Hitler’s promise that his expansionist program would cease. This policy came to be known as “appeasement, ” and was most associated with Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, and viewed as a haunting failure for decacdes.

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis On September 29, 1938, Mussolini, Hitler, Daladier, and Chamberlain prepare 14 to sign the Munich agreement.

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n Isolationism and Internationalism – The Failure of Munich § Poland: Hitler next started making threats against Poland, and France and Britain quickly affirmed that they would come to Poland’s aid if it was attacked; an attempt to bring the Soviet Union into the pact failed as Stalin did not think he could trust the West as he was not even invited to Munich. In August 1939, the Soviets shocked the world by signing a nonaggression pact with the Germans, freeing Hitler at least temporarily from a two-front war. § War Breaks Out: In late August, Hitler staged an incident on the border that allowed him to make the claim that Germany had been attacked. On September 1, Hitler launched a full-scale invasion of Poland. Britain and France stayed true to their promises and declared war on Germany two days later. While war had been underway for roughly eight years already in East Asia, the war in Europe was just beginning. 15

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n From Neutrality to Intervention – Neutrality Tested 16 § Cash-and-Carry: FDR believed that the U. S. should make armaments available to the Allies, and needed to revise the Neutrality Acts. In Sept. 1939, he asked Congress to do away with the prohibition on selling arms to combatants, which it did, but it retained the clause forbidding U. S. ships to enter a warzone. It did permit combatants on a “cash-and-carry” basis as before—no credit would be extended. § Fall of France: After the quick defeat of Poland, the war entered a phase of quietness that some called “the phony war. ” But in the spring of 1940, the “blitzkrieg” started again with a vengeance. The Germans first attacked Denmark and Norway, and then swept across the Netherlands and Belgium. In May, Hitler’s forces swept into France from the north, crushing resistance (300, 000 French and British forces barely escaped to Britain at Dunkirk). Mussolini’s forces invaded from the south on June 10. By June 22, France surrendered. A puppet government controlled by the Nazis was set up in the French city of Vichy.

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis French citizens look on in horror as Germans march into Paris, June 14, 1940 Hitler posing in front of the Eiffel Tower 17

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n From Neutrality to Intervention – Neutrality Tested 18 § Circumventing Neutrality: Roosevelt requested and received $1 billion in defense spending from Congress on May 16, 1940, during the German offensive. Some Americans—like Ambassador to the U. K. Joseph P. Kennedy—thought that Britain would fall next, but FDR wanted to step up aid. He gave the British fifty destroyers in exchange for the U. S. being able to build bases in British Caribbean territories (Antigua, Jamaica, Trinidad, etc. ) § Burke-Wadsworth Act: By July, 1940, 66 percent of the public viewed Germany as a threat to the U. S. In September, Congress passed the first peacetime draft measure. § America First: Despite shifting public sentiment, the isolationist America First Committee was formed in Sept. 1940 by students at Yale Law School and gained national popularity, with aviator Charles Lindbergh as its chief spokesperson.

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis Iconic images of St. Paul’s Cathedral unharmed by a Blitz bombing raid in December 1940. First Mass Air Raid on London, September 7, 1940; this raid commenced “The Blitz, ” a German bombardment campaign that lasted until May 1941. 19

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n From Neutrality to Intervention – The Campaign of 1940 § FDR Runs Again: FDR had not been forthcoming about whether or not he would break with tradition and run for a third term, so no Democratic candidate emerged to replace him. At the convention in July, he said he would accept a “draft” from his party. Party leaders even accepted FDR’s choice of Agriculture Secretary Henry A. Wallace (1888 - 1965) of Iowa, who most felt was too controversial. § Wendell Willkie (1892 -1944): The GOP ran this liberal Republican corporate lawyer from Indiana—who had never held political office before —as a “dark-horse” candidate for president. Willkie was a good campaigner, but his internationalist position did not appeal to the Republican isolationist base. § FDR’s Victory: Roosevelt won 55 percent of the popular vote to Willkie’s 45 percent; 38 states to Willkie’s 10, and 449 electoral votes to Willkie’s 82. 20

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis A lend-lease tank being loaded on to a ship in a U. S. Atlantic port n From Neutrality to Intervention – Neutrality Abandoned 21 § “Lend-Lease”: FDR proposed a system changing the Neutrality Laws in which the U. S. could lend or lease weapons to countries “pivotal to the defense of the United States” as long as they were returned at the end of the conflict. Congress passed this bill in March 1941. § Submarine Attacks: German submarines in the North Atlantic were having a devastating effect on British shipping. Roosevelt declared that the safety of the Atlantic west of Iceland was the responsibility of American nations, so U. S. ships began patrolling this region as of July 1941. In September, Nazi subs started targeting U. S. ships. § The Atlantic Charter: In August 1941, FDR and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1874 -1965) met on a ship docked off Newfoundland, Canada. They hashed out a statement that became known as the “Atlantic Charter, ” which affirmed American support for Great Britain, outlined war aims, but also goals for the postwar world, including decolonization.

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n From Neutrality to Intervention – Neutrality Abandoned German Troops in Russia, 1941 22 § Lend-Lease Extended to the Soviets: The Nazis broke the Non-Aggression Pact that they had signed with the Soviets in 1939 and invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. When the Soviets refused to surrender, FDR convinced Congress to extend Lend-Lease privileges to them.

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n From Neutrality to Intervention – The Road to Pearl Harbor § Tripartite Pact: In September 1940, Japan signed a loose defensive alliance agreement with Germany and Italy. § Southeast Asia: The Japanese invaded French Indochina (Vietnam) in July 1940. The U. S. , having broken some Japanese codes, knew that the oil-rich Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) was next. FDR froze all Japanese assets in the U. S. in response, limiting the Japanese ability to buy supplies (including oil) from the U. S. § Japanese Assets Frozen: U. S. supplies were critical for Japan’s continued imperialists war drive, so it had to either repair relations with the U. S. or find other sources of supplies, namely Dutch and British possessions in the Pacific. In October, a militant general, Hideki Tojo, replaced a more moderate prime minister as Japan’s leader. 23

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis n From Neutrality to Intervention – The Road to Pearl Harbor § Imminent Attack: The U. S. gave up on a peaceful solution and understood from intercepted and decoded messages that a new Japanese attack was imminent, but not necessarily on the U. S. (many though British or Dutch territory was more likely). § Pearl Harbor Attacked: On 7: 55 a. m. on December 7, 1941, a wave of bombers attacked the U. S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, followed by a second wave an hour later. The U. S. lost 8 battleships. 3 cruisers, 4 other vessels, and 188 airplanes, and more than 2, 400 soldiers and sailors had died. Fortunately for the U. S. , all three aircraft carriers of the Pacific Fleet had been out to sea on December 7. § War Declared: On Dec. 8, Roosevelt gave his stirring “a date which will live in infamy” speech, which was followed by the Senate voting for a declaration of war unanimously, and the House voting 388 to 1. Germany and Italy declared war on the U. S. on Dec. 11. 24

Chapter Twenty-Five: The Global Crisis Debating the Past: The Question of Pearl Harbor § Historians on Whether or Not FDR Knew of the Impending Attack: From what you’ve read, what do you think? U. S. S. Arizona sinking in the wake of the attack 25