Chapter 12 Price and Output Determination Under Oligopoly

Chapter 12 Price and Output Determination Under Oligopoly © 2002 South-Western

Economic Principles • The concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) • Balanced and unbalanced oligopoly • Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers 2

Economic Principles • Cartels • Game theory • Price leadership • Kinked demand • Brand multiplication • Price discrimination 3

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios For a vast number of US manufacturing industries, the competition among firms in the industry is essentially competition among the few – oligopoly. 4

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios An industry may consist of many firms, but if only a few of the many dominate the industry, then the industry is oligopolistic. 5

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios Concentration ratio A measure of market power. It is the ratio of total sales of the leading firms in an industry (usually four) to the industry’s total sales. 6

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios A criterion for determining whether an industry is an oligopoly: If the leading four firms in an industry account for 40 percent or more of total industry sales, then an industry is likely to be an oligopoly. 7

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios Herfindahl-Hirschman index A measure of industry concentration, calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares held by each of the firms in the industry. 8

EXHIBIT 1 CONCENTRATION RATIOS—PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INDUSTRY SALES PRODUCED BY THE LEADING FOUR FIRMS, AND HHI Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1992 Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, 1996. 9

Exhibit 1: Concentration Ratios – Percentage of Total Industry Sales Produced by the Leading Four Firms, and HHI: 1992 How many industries in Exhibit 1 have market shares greater than 50 percent at the four-firm level? • Eleven of the fifteen industries. 10

EXHIBIT 2 DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES BY FOUR-FIRM SALES CONCENTRATION Source: F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Third Edition, Copyright © 1990 by Houghton Mifflin Company, Adapted with permission. Data refer to 1982. 11

Exhibit 2: Distribution of Manufacturing Industries by Four. Firm Sales Concentration: 1982 How many industries had fourfirms controlling 40 -59 percent of the industry sales in 1982? • 120 out of 448 total industries had four firms controlling 40 -59 percent of the total industry sales. 12

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios Contrary to many people’s intuition, there is no convincing evidence that the share of industry sales controlled by the four leading firms in the US manufacturing economy is growing. 13

EXHIBIT 3 PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INDUSTRIAL SALES PRODUCED BY INDUSTRIES WITH FOUR-FIRM SALES CONCENTRATION RATIOS OF 50 PERCENT OR MORE: 1895– 1982 Source: F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Third Edition, Copyright © 1990 by Houghton Mifflin Company, Adapted with permission. 14

Exhibit 3: Percentage of Total Industrial Sales Produced by Industries with Four. Firm Sales Concentration Ratios of 50 Percent or More: 1895 -1982 What is the trend in the percentage of industrial sales produced by the largest four firms since 1963? • There is a downward trend in the percentage of industrial sales by the largest four firms from 1963 to 1982. 15

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios Market power A firm’s ability to select and control market price and output. 16

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios Unbalanced oligopoly An oligopoly in which the sales of the leading firms are distributed unevenly among them. 17

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios Balanced oligopoly An oligopoly in which the sales of the leading firms are distributed fairly evenly among them. 18

EXHIBIT 4 BALANCED AND UNBALANCED OLIGOPOLY 19

Exhibit 4: Balanced and Unbalanced Oligopoly 1. What percentage of their industry’s total sales do the leading four firms in Industry A and B control? • The leading four firms in both industry A and B control 80 percent of their industry’s sales. 20

Exhibit 4: Balanced and Unbalanced Oligopoly 2. Why is industry B considered an unbalanced oligopoly? • The largest firm in industry B controls 50 percent of the industry’s sales. It’s market share is greater than the other three leading industries combined and more than four times greater than the next 21 largest firm’s sales share.

Oligopoly and Concentration Ratios • The dominance of oligopolies in industry is not unique to the US. • The concentration ratios for US industries are similar to other modern industrialized economies. 22

EXHIBIT 5 PRODUCTION CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN JAPANESE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES BY LEADING AND FIVE LEADING FIRMS: 1991 Source: Nippon, A Charted Survey of Japan, 1994/95, Yano, I. , ed. , The Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, p. 162. 23

Exhibit 5: Production Concentration Ratios in Japanese Manufacturing Industries by Leading and Five Leading Firms: 1991 In how many Japanese industries do the five leading firms have greater than a 90 percent production concentration ratio? • Four industries – beer, nylon, glass, and tires and tubes – are controlled by the five leading firms at a concentration of 90 24 percent or greater.

Concentrating the Concentration An oligopoly can build market power in two ways: • Reinvesting its profit and painstakingly expanding its production capacity. • Merging with and/or acquiring other firms. 25

Concentrating the Concentration There are three reasons why firms merge: 1. To exercise greater market control. 2. To increase control over the supplies of their inputs or the buyers of their goods. 3. To expand diversify their asset holdings. 26

Concentrating the Concentration There are three types of mergers: 1. Horizontal merger. 2. Vertical merger. 3. Conglomerate merger. 27

EXHIBIT 6 THE GROWTH OF MERGERS 28

Exhibit 6: The Growth of Mergers Complete this sentence: On the whole, the number of mergers per year in the US has ____ between 1890 and 1990. i. Increased. ii. Remained the same. iii. Decreased. 29

Exhibit 6: The Growth of Mergers Complete this sentence: On the whole, the number of mergers per year in the US has ____ between 1890 and 1990. i. Increased. 30

Concentrating the Concentration Horizontal merger A merger between firms producing the same good in the same industry. 31

Concentrating the Concentration A number of high-profile horizontal mergers occurred in the 1990 s. • Boeing and Mc. Donnell Douglas in the aircraft industry. • Staples and Office Depot in the office supply industry. • Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Rail in the railroad industry. 32

Concentrating the Concentration Vertical merger A merger between firms that have a supplier-purchaser relationship. 33

Concentrating the Concentration An example of vertical merging is that of Anheuser-Busch. The firm has acquired malt plants, yeast plants, a cornprocessing plant, beer can factories, and a railway that ships freight by rail and truck. 34

Concentrating the Concentration Conglomerate merger A merger between firms in unrelated industries. 35

Concentrating the Concentration The conglomerate merger is the most common type of merger. 36

Concentrating the Concentration • One reason for conglomerate mergers is the desire to diversify operations. • While horizontal and vertical mergers strengthen the firm’s position within the industry, the fate of the firm rests on the health of the industry. • Acquiring unrelated firms insures the conglomerate against catastrophe if one industry faces severe problems. 37

Concentrating the Concentration Cartel A group of firms that collude to limit competition in a market by negotiating and accepting agreedupon price and market shares. 38

Concentrating the Concentration Collusion The practice of firms to negotiate price and market share decision that limit competition in a market. 39

Concentrating the Concentration Cartels are an example of a merger in which firms don’t have to actually buy each other’s assets, yet they enjoy the benefits of having market power. 40

Concentrating the Concentration • While cartels are illegal in the United States, it is difficult to prove collusion. • Some cartels are disguised. Agricultural cooperatives in regions of the US behave like cartels. • Some governments encourage cartels to form in their countries. OPEC is one example. 41

Concentrating the Concentration Many studies support the contention that price and concentration ratios move in the same direction – an increase in one is associated with an increase in the other. 42

EXHIBIT 7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCENTRATION RATIO AND PRICE 43

Exhibit 7: Relationship Between the Concentration Ratio and Price Where on the curve in Exhibit 7 does the concentration ratio have the strongest effect on price? • The effect is the strongest in the middle of the S-shaped curve. 44

Theories of Oligopoly Pricing Game theory A theory of strategy ascribed to the firms’ behavior in oligopoly. The firms’ behavior is mutually interdependent. 45

Theories of Oligopoly Pricing In monopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect competition, firms react only to the demand cost structures they face. Prices tend toward equilibrium. 46

Theories of Oligopoly Pricing In oligopoly, firms are continually second guessing how the competition will respond to price decision they make. Prices are subject to fits of change. 47

EXHIBIT 8 FIRM PROFIT, GENERATED BY HIGH AND LOW PRICING 48

EXHIBIT 9 PAYOFF MATRIX 49

Exhibit 9: Firm Profit, Generated by High and Low Pricing How does total profit change as Dell and Compaq change their prices? • When both firms price high, total profit is 20. When one firm prices high and the other prices low, total profit is 18. When both firms price low, total profit is 12. 50

Theories of Oligopoly Pricing Price leadership A firm whose price decisions are tacitly accepted and followed by other firms in the industry. The theory explains pricing in unbalanced oligopolies. 51

EXHIBIT 10 PRICE AND OUTPUT UNDER CONDITIONS OF GODFATHER OLIGOPOLY 52

Exhibit 10: Price and Output Under Conditions of Godfather Oligopoly How is the price of chocolate determined in Exhibit 9? • Hershey is the “godfather” in the chocolate business. Hershey produces where its MR=MC. That is, 5 tons of chocolate at $5 per pound. The other firms in the chocolate industry accept the $5 per pound price. 53

Theories of Oligopoly Pricing Kinked demand curve The demand curve facing a firm in oligopoly; the curve is more elastic when the firm raises price than when it lowers price. 54

EXHIBIT 11 CONSTRUCTING AN OLIGOPOLIST’S DEMAND CURVE 55

Exhibit 11: Constructing an Oligopolist’s Demand Curve 1. If Lipton were to raise its price above $0. 80 per box, what would its competitors do, according to the curve in panel b? • Lipton’s competitors would not follow suit. Lipton’s demand curve above $0. 80 (NK) is relatively elastic. 56

Exhibit 11: Constructing an Oligopolist’s Demand Curve 2. If Lipton were to lower its price below $0. 80 per box, then what would its competitors do? • Lipton’s competitors would feel compelled to follow suit. Lipton’s demand curve below $0. 80 (YK) is relatively 57 inelastic.

EXHIBIT 12 PRICE RIGIDITY IN OLIGOPOLIES WITH KINKED DEMAND CURVES 58

Exhibit 12: Price Rigidity in Oligopolies with Kinked Demand Curves The marginal revenue curve associated with a kinked demand curve is: i. Continuous. ii. Discontinuous. 59

Exhibit 12: Price Rigidity in Oligopolies with Kinked Demand Curves The marginal revenue curve associated with a kinked demand curve is: ii. Discontinuous. 60

Exhibit 12: Price Rigidity in Oligopolies with Kinked Demand Curves As long as the MC curve crosses the gap created by the discontinuity in the MR curve, price will remain unchanged, as shown in panel b. 61

Exhibit 12: Price Rigidity in Oligopolies with Kinked Demand Curves If the MC curve cuts the MR curve above the gap, output will decrease and price will increase. This scenario is depicted in panel c. 62

Oligopoly and Brand Multiplication Brand multiplication Variations on essentially one good that a firm produces in order to increase its market share. 63

Oligopoly and Brand Multiplication • A firm’s market share = (number of brands) x (brand market share). • As the number of brands in the industry increases, market share per brand diminishes. 64

Why Oligopolists Sometimes Discriminate Price discrimination The practice of offering a specific good or service at different prices to different segments of the market. 65

Why Oligopolists Sometimes Discriminate • Oligopolists sometimes segment the market in order to charge consumers what they are willing to pay for a good or service. • Differences in airline ticket prices are a good example. 66

EXHIBIT 13 DEMAND SCHEDULE FOR A UNITED AIRLINES ROUND-TRIP FLIGHT BETWEEN LOS ANGELES AND NEW YORK 67

Exhibit 13: Demand Schedule for a United Airlines Round-Trip Flight Between LA and NY If United chose not to segment its market in Exhibit 12, what would be its total revenue? • The maximum total revenue for United would be achieved at a ticket price of $318 each, for a total of $119, 250. 68

EXHIBIT 14 DEMAND BY MARKET SEGMENT FOR A UNITED AIRLINES ROUND-TRIP FLIGHT BETWEEN LOS ANGELES AND NEW YORK 69

Exhibit 14: Demand by Market Segment for a United Airlines Round-Trip Flight Between LA and NY What is United’s total revenue when it segments its market into a multiple-fare system? • United’s total revenue is $210, 635. This is an increase of $91, 385 over the unsegmented market. 70

Why Oligopolists Sometimes Discriminate • Price discrimination exists in virtually every market. • Some differences in price are not clear cases of price discrimination, however. 71

Why Oligopolists Sometimes Discriminate • For example, many would argue that upper balcony seats are not the same as front row seats at a concert. If the goods are different, then it is not necessarily price discrimination to charge more for the front row seats. 72

Cartel Pricing • A cartel determines price by acting as if it is a monopoly. • Price and quantity are determined using the MR=MC rule. 73

EXHIBIT 15 CARTEL PRICING AND OUTPUT ALLOCATIONS 74

Exhibit 15: Cartel Pricing and Output Allocations Why is there an incentive for cartels to “cheat” and produce greater quantities than they are assigned? • The price and output decisions made by the cartel are determined by the MR=MC rule. 75

Exhibit 15: Cartel Pricing and Output Allocations Why is there an incentive for cartels to “cheat” and produce greater quantities than they are assigned? • The price and quantity assigned to individual firms within the cartel may not coincide with where the firm would maximize profit using its own MR and MC curves. 76

Exhibit 15: Cartel Pricing and Output Allocations Why is there an incentive for cartels to “cheat” and produce greater quantities than they are assigned? • There is an incentive for the firm to try to secretly increase quantity and thereby increase its own profit. 77