Chapter 12 Capital Structure Concepts 2001 SouthWestern College

Chapter 12 Capital Structure Concepts © 2001 South-Western College Publishing

Capital Structure Vs. Financial Structure u. Capital Structure Permanent s-t debt ä L-T debt u. Financial Structure Total current liabilities ä P/S ä L-T debt ä C/S ä P/S ä C/S 2

Capital Structure Terminology u Optimal capital structure Minimizes a firm’s weighted cost of capital ä Maximizes the value of the firm ä u Target capital structure ä Capital structure at which the firm plans to operate u Debt capacity ä Amount of debt in the firm’s optimal capital structure 3

What Determines the Optimal Capital Structure ? u. Business risk of the firm u. Tax structure u. Bankruptcy potential u. Agency cost u. Signaling effects 4

Capital Structure Assumptions u. Firm’s investment policy is held constant u. Capital structure changes the distribution of the firm’s EBIT among the firm’s claimants Debtholders Preferred stockholders Common stockholders u. Constant investment policy leaving the debt capacity of the firm unchanged 5

Factors Influencing a Firm’s Business Risk u Variability of sales u Extent of product volume u Variability of selling price u Variability of cost u Amount of market power diversification u Firm’s growth rate u Degree of operating leverage ( DOL ) u Both systematic and unsystematic risk 6

Financial Risk u Variability of EPS and increased probability of bankruptcy u Factors indicating financial risk O O O O Debt-to asset ratio Debt-to-equity ratio Fixed charge coverage ratio DFL Probability distribution of profits Times interest earned ratio EBIT-EPS analysis 7

Capital Structure Theory u. Studies the relationship between: u. Capital Structure Cost of capital debt/assets value of the firm Capital Structure Models u. Show the role of: Taxes Bankruptcy costs Agency costs on the determination of an optimal capital structure 8

Modigliani and Miller ( MM ) On Capital Structure u. Assumed perfect capital markets including: ä No taxes ä No bankruptcy ( B ) costs ä No agency ( A ) costs u. If leverage increases, the cost of equity (ke), increases to exactly offset the benefits of more debt financing ( kd ), leaving the cost of capital ( ka ) constant see model 1 9

Model 1 Cost of Capital ke ka kd Debt The overall cost of capital is independent of the capital structure The firm’s value is independent of the capital structure Total Assets 10

MM Arbitrage Proof u. Value of U = D/ ke u. Value of L = D/ ke + I/ kd u. D paid to L’s stockholders are reduced by the amount of I paid on the debt uke is higher for L because of the additional leverage-induced risk u. The values of U and L are identical due to arbitrage 11

What Happens with Taxes ? u Same two equations u VU = D/ke VL = D/ke + I/kd u D distributed to U’s stockholders are reduced by the taxes paid on operating income and the value of U drops u Since I is tax deductible, L realizes a tax savings u PV of tax shield = value of debt ( B ) tax rate (T) 12

VL = VU + Value of Tax Shield VL Mkt Value of Firm PV of Tax Shield VU Debt $ 13

Model 2 Cost of Capital ke ka ki = k d ( 1 - T ) Debt Total assets The cost of capital decreases with the amount of debt Firm maximizes its value by choosing a capital structure that is all debt 14

What Happens With Taxes, Bankruptcy, & Agency Costs ? u B & A costs increase with the amount of leverage u Eventually offset the marginal benefits from the value of the tax shield u Market value of levered firm = Market value of unlevered firm + PV of tax shield - PV of bankruptcy costs - PV of agency costs See optimal debt ratio slide 15

Bankruptcy Costs u. Lenders may demand higher interest rates u. Lenders may decline to lend at all u. Customers may shift their business to other firms u. Distress incurs extra accounting & legal costs u. If forced to liquidate, assets may have to be sold for less than market value 16

Agency Costs Stockholder-Bondholder Relationship u Investing in projects with high risk and high returns can shift wealth from bondholders to stockholders u Stockholders may forgo some profitable investments in the presence of debt u Stockholders might issue high quantities of new debt and diminish the protection afforded to earlier bondholders u Bondholders will shift monitoring and bonding costs back to the stockholders by charging higher interest rates 17

Optimal Debt Ratio Mkt Value of the Firm f o lue irm f ed r e le v PV B&A Costs a v t k M PV of Tax Shield VL VU Debt Ratio Optimal Debt Ratio 18

Model 3 Least Cost Capital Structure is Optimal Cost of Capital ke ka ki 0 Optimal Capital Structure B B+E 19

Other Impacts on the Optimal Capital Structure u. Personal tax effects u. Could reverse some tax benefits u. Industry effects u. Profitability and bankruptcy patterns u. Signaling effects u. Asymmetric information u. Managerial preferences u. Pecking order theory 20

Capital Structure Implications for Managers u. A centrally important management decision u. Benefits of the tax shield from debt provide an incentive to use debt financing u. To the point that increasing A & B costs offset the debt advantage u. Optimal capital structure is heavily influenced by business risk 21

Capital Structure Implications for Managers u. Changes in capital structure signal important information to investors u. Pecking order theory u. Internal equity First choice u. Debt u. External equity Least preferred by management 22

LBO u Can eliminate agency problems u Increased operating efficiencies are often achieved Eliminating jobs Reducing other payroll expenses Closing inefficient plants u Bondholders typically realize a loss in the value of their bonds u Ethical issues u Is it in the long-run interest of employees ? u Are bondholders harmed in a LBO ? u Managers acting as both buyers and sellers 23

Multinational Firms u Have more complex capital structure decisions u Finance investments in host country funds u Some countries use more financial leverage than others u Some host countries restrict foreign investment u Risk of expropriation u Some host countries provide low-cost financing 24