Causes of Mughal Rebellion Richards v Aligarh School

Causes of Mughal Rebellion. Richards v. Aligarh School

Bigotry, Economy, or, the State as “victim of its own success”? • Early 20 th C. historians and popular history still identify religious discrimination as the primary motivator of rebellions under Aurganzeb • More recently the economic arguments put forward by Richards and historians of the Aligarh school (Marxist) have gained ground (look for refs. to Habib in text) • More nuanced analysis of peasant mobility

Rajputs and Aurangzeb • Religious policy inconsistent in the case of the Rajputs – Jaswant Singh’s conduct in 1658 -59 and later as an ally of Shivaji put him under suspicion: poor relations w/ his clan has political roots – Rajput officers were exempted from the Jizya – Aurangzeb continued to patronize and support other Rajputs during the war with Mewar/Marwar. Raja Jai Singh was entrusted with the Deccan Campaign until 1666.

The Marwar-Mewar Rebellion • Has longer subtext—Jaswant Singh was a younger son who gained the throne of Marwar due to Shah Jahan’s patronage • His behavior during 1658 -59 aroused Aurangzeb’s suspicions, upon his death in 1678, Aurangzeb tried to manipulate succession and failed. • The Marwar and Mewar clans rallied around the infant Ajit Singh, Jaswant Singh’s son, guerilla warfare begins • Mughal army subdues urban areas, dynastic temples are destroyed, tensions are aggravated • Prince Akbar joins Rajputs, criticizes policies • Rebellion contained, but trust of two major clans broken

Pressure from Marathas The Emperor’s growing frustrations with the Maratha insurgency had an impact on both administrative and religious policies • During suc. Struggle of 1658 -59 Shivaji and allies capture forts on the Konkan coast • Raid Deccani and Mughal territory demanding revenue • 1664 Shivaji raids Surat • Captured by Jai Singh in 1665, escapes in 1666 • 1667 raids Surat again • 1680 Shivaji dies, sons and wives fight over succession

Maratha Advantages • Clan-based confederacy, with tight links to local peasants, Bijapur • Bases in remote fortresses in Western Ghat hills • Use guerilla tactics, not conventional warfare • Use money from raids and piracy to create revenue

How are we to assess Aurangzeb’s early rule? • Keep in mind that despite dramatic political events the revenue system in fact continued to expand be reformed under Aurangzeb • Greater urban expansion necessitated a change in taxation and administrative systems—merchants had been lightly taxed till now, maj. of merchants Hindu • Despite battles the bulk of the peasantry—especially khud kasht peasants and pioneering zamindars continued to profit from economic expansion • Their success, in fact, was both beneficial and problematic for the empire—Why? • Emperor needed greater cooperation from administrative officials to capitalize on these expansions—yet ran into political problems due to clumsy policies

How did Aurangzeb fail to build support? • It is not clear if Aurangzeb always understood the complicated power-sharing between Hindus and Muslims – Bijapur Sultanate and Marathas – Arrangement between Hindu financiers and Muslim pioneer farmers in Bengal, an example also found elsewhere – Attitudes of a mixed nobility towards an increasingly hybridized culture • Reactions to Imperial policy were unexpected—many Muslim mansabdars critical of these shifts • Hindus continue to join system, largest numbers by end of Aurangzeb’s rule

Questions Framing this Lecture • How did the Emperor and nobles harness taxes from the new economy? • Who did this new prosperity benefit the most? • Did it have a role in rebellions? • Do the changes in religious policy have anything to do with the above?

The Emperor’s Finances • The succession struggle had been costly for all those involved—nobles and princes • Shortly after coming to the throne Aurangzeb announces austerity measures – Islamic asceticism or personal finances? • These problems appear to have been temporarily resolved. The productivity of the empire helped recoup costs—however financial strains re-appear by the end of Aurangzeb’s reign – The strains are not on the Emperor, who has large reserves, gets revenues from most fertile lands

Mansabdars • The personal fortunes of mansabdars did not recover as quickly • Inflation of Mansabdari rank and salaries increase in the latter half of the period • While some mansabdars were not impacted, those with jagirs in the rebellious areas of the Deccan and the North-west had problems

Sikhs Rebellions Rajputs Jats Marathas

Areas of Rebellion in late 17 th. C • All are contained and except for marathas fairly small during Aurangzeb’s liftime – Sikhs under 10 th Guru, Guru Gobind Singh in the Punjab hills – Jats and Satnamis in the north – Rajputs of Marwar (supporting Ajit Singh) – Marthas under various chiefs after Shivaji’s death • After his death they will proliferate

Zamindars • The financial picture for Zamindars is mixed. As the hereditary chiefs of lineage groups they had an ambiguous position. • Some start becoming Taluqdars—revenue contractors for Jagirdars who have trouble collecting revenue in rebellious areas. • Some remain unabsorbed into the system • Those in newly-settled areas of expanding agriculture (ex. Bengal) were most likely to profit.

Peasants • Many groups show signs of prosperity, particularly in areas of commercial agriculture—cotton, indigo, silk • Increased diversification of income— revenue collection, military labor, textile production under the “putting out” system • Considerable stratification—peasants in less productive areas less likely to profit

Who benefits from this system in rural areas? --what about urban areas?

Post-1681 developments • Aurangzeb moves to the Deccan to personally supervise – Complete subjugation of Bijapur and Golconda (by 1689) – Suppression of Marathas (never happens) – Neutralize the rebellion by Prince Akbar (Un? )expected problems occur in the north

Peasant rebellions • By the end of Aurangzeb’s reign peasant and zamindari groups are already showing signs of rebellion: – Increased collusion with Marathas in Deccan – Jats in central area of Agra/Delhi rebel – Sikh Jats under Guru Gobind Singh in Panjab – Afghan and other zamindars in Bengal

What does the economy have to do with Rebellion? • The situation is different in the Deccan (discuss next week) • In the north Jats and Afghans had benefited from rural agrarian expansion • More appear as Khud Kasht peasants in Aurangzeb’s time • While religious motivations are sometimes also present, economic/political ones have to be considered

Revenue Collection in the North after 1681 • Increased signs of taluqdari and other forms of privitization of state functions • Incidents of corruption (though these increase more quickly after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707) • Peasants appear less willing to hand over income when imperial supervision is weak • Lineage zamindars appear to be leaders in this —groups quickly claim warrior caste status

Geographical/Economic Factors • Production of muskets becomes cheap in this period—rural zamindars and peasants can easily afford them • Some areas, the Lakhi Jungle in Punjab, Kathiawar, Maratha territories have local breeds of horses (good for guerilla war) • Groups with pastoral/nomadic backgrounds have raiding/cavalry background, some peasants (Marathas/jats/afghans) have military experience under mughals

Pasturage

Case Study Bengal • Revenue rights and tax concessions for newly-settled land auctioned • In most cases bids purchased by Hindu trading groups in cities • Depute Afghans as pioneer settlers/supervisors • More land cleared for rice cultivation and sericulture • Complex Hindu patronage of cultural Islamiciation of tribes on the agrarian frontier • When rebellion occurs involves Afghan/Hindu Khatri collusion against Imperial officials – Source Richard Eaton, “The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier”

Shifting zone Of cultivation

Case Study: Punjab Sikh Rebellion • Jats in Panjab benefit from agricultural boom, Khatris from trade (though these also impacted by afghan rebellions) • Hostility of Mughal Faujdar against both Sikh Guru, Gobind Singh and Jats appears to be partially involved • Aurangzeb does not address their repeated petitions • Rebellion occurs after other means of redressing problems did not work—Jats in particular had the economic resources and local support to continue rebellion long after the Guru’s Assassination in 1708

Did the Economy have a role in Rebellion? • A partial case can be made—keep in mind past rebellion had been managed through a carrot and stick approach • Peasants have greater resources and lax imperial supervision--a perception of unfair treatment does appear to tilt the scale in favor of rebellion • Mansabdars whose Jagirs were in rebellious territories were squeezed from two sides—had to decided between Imperial loyalty and rebellion (until 1707 the first is favored). However the loyalties are being strained. • In the Deccan the twin issues of Maratha raids and Mughal retaliation squeezed peasants—fanning their own resentment of taxes in insecure times