BULGARIAN NATIONAL CUSTOMS AGENCY Customs Intelligence and Investigation

BULGARIAN NATIONAL CUSTOMS AGENCY Customs Intelligence and Investigation ---------------WESTERN BOLKANS REGIONAL SEMINAR BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation , 2005 October 1 9/15/2020

BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 2 9/15/2020

An integral component of export controls measures is an effective regime for the verification of licensed exports of controlled or restricted goods. This stage of the export control process is generally referred to as border control and is frequently the responsibility of a separate agency from the one that issued the export permit/licence. Effective border controls are heavily reliant on a high level of ongoing communication between the border verification agency and the permit issuing authority. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 3 9/15/2020

Elements of an Effective Export Control System Legal Framework Policy Control Lists Export Control System Country Lists Licensing and Pemission Authority Customs Authority BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation Critical Elements • Information Sharing • Regime Adherence • Catch-all (export) • Interagency Process • Confidentiality • Verification especially in site • Transshipments • Training • Penalties 4 9/15/2020

Legal Framework Nonproliferation Export Control National Export Control BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 5 9/15/2020

Nonproliferation Export Control Multilateral Export Control Arrangement Nonproliferation Legal Instrumemts and Tools National Export Control BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 6 9/15/2020

Nonproliferation Export Control National Export Control: l l l l A legal basis (catch-all clause) A policy making mechanism An executive mechanism Control lists A licensing system Customs acts A compliance/enforcement mechanism BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 7 9/15/2020

LEGISLATION • Law on Control over Foreign Trade with Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies • Implementing Regulation on the Law on Control over Foreign Trade with Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies • List on Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies • Law for Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons and for Control over the Toxic Chemical Substances and their Precursors BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 8 9/15/2020

LEGISLATION • Law on Control over Explosives, Firearms and Ammunitions • List of Embargo States • Customs Act • Implementing Regulation on the Customs Act • Order No 51/2003 issued by Director General of the NCA BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 9 9/15/2020

“CATCH-ALL” clause Follows the content of the identical provision in the EU acquis and allows control (issuing permit) of dual-use goods and technologies, not included in the control lists, when these goods/ technologies could be used for developing, producing, using, maintaining, storing, detecting, identifying or proliferating chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or when they could be employed for military end-use. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 10 9/15/2020

Why Are Export Controls Important? They increase the cost for undesirable countries to acquire weapons of mass Destruction l They delay the process of acquisition, buying time for other nonproliferation measures to Work l They create political and economic bond among like-minded countries l BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 11 9/15/2020

Export Control Objectives l l Interdiction Investigation Intelligence International Cooperation BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 12 9/15/2020

Proven Mechanisms: International Organizations l Universal Membership - United Nations (UN) - International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 13 9/15/2020

Proven Mechanisms: International Organizations l Limited Membership - Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - Zangger Committee - Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - Australia Group - Wassenaar Arrangement - Conference on Disarmament BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 14 9/15/2020

Proven Mechanisms: Regional Initiatives l North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/ Partnership for Peace (Pf. P) l European Union (EU) l Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) l Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) l Annual International Export Control Conferences BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 15 9/15/2020

Bilateral Relationships l Some of Bulgaria’s significant bilateral relationships – United States – Greece – Romania l Relationship with EU BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 16 9/15/2020

Proliferator Factors l Technology availability l Process equipment availability l Scientific and engineering talent required l Technology risk l Process signatures l Cultural bias BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 17 9/15/2020

Threat From Terrorists CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, WEAPONS: – More attractive to terrorists – Technologies, materials, information are widely available – Some chemical/biological agents cheap to produce – Potential for mass casualties BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 18 9/15/2020

The International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) is designed to strengthen nonproliferation export control practices and procedures in partner countries. INECP helps establish the infrastructure needed to control proliferation-sensitive commerce by improving licensing procedures and practices, promoting industry compliance, and strengthening enforcement capabilities in other countries. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 19 9/15/2020

Breaches of Border Controls Wherever export controls exist, efforts will be made to avoid or circumvent them. Breaches of export controls can occur in several ways: Ø Diversion of goods exported with a legitimate permit/licence away from the permitted destination /consignee; Ø Transit/transhipment of goods with a legitimate permit/licence exported through the permitted country of destination to a third (non-permitted) country; Ø Misdescription of the goods to avoid permit/licence controls; Ø Breaches of permit/licence conditions regarding the quantity and/or type and/or destination of goods. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 20 9/15/2020

The most commonly encountered means employed to breach permit and border controls are the use of front companies, diversion, constant change and systematic exploitation of legitimate trade facilitation processes. Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Front Companies Diversion Constant Change their name Systematic Exploitation of Legitimate Trade Facilitation Processes Transhipment Courier Processing Passenger Baggage Transhipment and Transit cargo Transit Cargo BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 21 9/15/2020

Routes & Trends Trafficking In Strategic, Chemical, Biological, And Nuclear Related Goods European criminal elements operate behind front companies l Suspects possess licenses, bank accounts & trade in illegal commodities l Russian organizations maintain significant smuggling capabilities l BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 22 9/15/2020

Smuggling Routes BALKAN COUNTRIES Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece & Part of Turkey l cross-roads for organized crime activity in Eastern Europe l 3 traditional Balkan Routes between Turkey, Serbia, Romania, and Macedonia. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 23 9/15/2020

Smuggling Routes BALTIC COUNTRIES Estonia, Latvia & Lithuania l a transit corridor to Europe for Russia BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 24 9/15/2020

Smuggling Routes THE CAUCASUS Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan l Eurasia transit cooridor to Western & Central Europe from Russia, Iran & Central Asia l Limited border controls due to separatist activities BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 25 9/15/2020

Smuggling Routes CENTRAL ASIA Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan & Tajikistan l May be greatest trafficking threat l Porous borders can be used for transshipment of controlled items related to WMD BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 26 9/15/2020

Most frequent Export Schemes – Third Country as Conduit – Items Mislabeled, Repackaged & Reshipped – Multiple Diversion Countries as Conduits – Shipment Concealed in Luggage – Use of Chartered Transport – Illegal Redirection Enroute BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 27 9/15/2020

Indicators of Illicit Activity All organised human activity occurs through a discrete set (no matter how small) of particular actions. Over time, actions can be observed and the sequence for an activity established. Indicators are those events in the sequence of an activity which are most readily identifiable and which point to the possibility of a specific activity occurring. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 28 9/15/2020

Red flags On the on the basis of UN and US experience and obtaining information we able to indicate following indications (“RED FLAGS”), that examiner authority BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 29 9/15/2020

Red flags l l l The goods and technologies are intended for a country in respect of which the Security Council of the UN has undertaken measures for the maintenance or re-establishment of international peace and security, The goods and technologies are in respect of a country, in whose territory military operations are being conducted or which participates in a military conflict. The customer or purchasing agent is reluctant to offer information about the end-use of the item. The product's capabilities do not fit the buyer's line of business, such as an order for sophisticated computers for a small bakery. The item ordered is incompatible with the technical level of the country to which it is being shipped, such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment being shipped to a country that has no electronics industry. The customer is willing to pay cash for a very expensive item when the terms of sale would normally call for financing. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 30 9/15/2020

Red flags l l l l l The customer has little or no business background. The customer is unfamiliar with the product's performance characteristics but still wants the product. Routine installation, training, or maintenance services are declined by the customer. Delivery dates are vague, or deliveries are planned for out of the way destinations. A freight forwarding firm is listed as the product's final destination. The shipping route is abnormal for the product and destination. Packaging is inconsistent with the stated method of shipment or destination. When questioned, the buyer is evasive and especially unclear about whether the purchased product is for domestic use, for export, or for reexport. The Control body and special services dispose an information about commited violations by customer, seller, shipping or forwarding company , as well as on Bulgaria’s area thereby on another countries. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 31 9/15/2020

CONCLUSION BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 32 9/15/2020

Elements of an Effective Export Control System Control Lists Export Control System Critical Elements Country Lists BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 33 9/15/2020

What is under Export control? The International Control Regimes specify Export Control standards upon: – Conventional arms – Dual-use items – Items specialized for nuclear energy – Dual-use items which could be used for both nuclear and non-nuclear purposes – Missiles, sensitive and dual-use items therefor – Related to biological and chemical weapons BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 34 9/15/2020

Arms and Dual – Use goods and Technologies Goods and technology designed to kill people or defend against death in a military setting (e. g. , tank, fighter aircraft, nerve agent defensive equipment) Includes most space-related technology because of application to missile technology Includes technical data related to defense articles and defense services (furnishing assistance including design, engineering, and use of defense articles) military items (“munitions” or “defense articles”) dual-use items Items designed for commercial purpose but that can have military applications (e. g. , computers, pathogens, civilian aircraft) Covers both the goods and the technology BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 35 9/15/2020

Target to control and keynote arrangement of Bulgarian National Lists Chapter One Only for military purpose Munition List (ML) Chapter two Dual-use purpose BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation Dual-use Goods and Technologies 36 9/15/2020

What kind of represent is Dual-use Technology? BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 37 9/15/2020

Nuclear Power Plant “Kozloduy” BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 38 9/15/2020

Installing the First Bulgarian Reactor in Kozloduy BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 39 9/15/2020

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Root of the matter the dual use technologies The Dual-use technologies applicable is legitimate l The Dual-use technologies cant be prohibited l Irrespective their genuine end-use purpose, the export of dual-use goods and technologies can mask as legitimate end-use export l The effort can be direct just to end-use purpose / end-use consumer l BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 41 9/15/2020

Dual-Use Paradox • Many CW agents and production technologies have legitimate uses. • Because of legitimate uses, they cannot be banned. • This enables proliferating nations to acquire technologies and materials to develop chemical weapons. BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 42 9/15/2020

SOME ILLUSTRATIONS ABOUT ARMS AND DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES THAT BE UNDER AG'S CONTROL BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 43 9/15/2020

Dual Use Biological Technology BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 44 9/15/2020

Equipment Used in Bio weapons Manufacture – Fermentation vessels – Centrifuges or centrifugal separators – Freeze dryers – HEPA filters – Safety Hoods – Glove Boxes – Autoclaves – Animal exposure cages BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 45 9/15/2020

Nearly all BW production equipment is “dual use” Top: Bench top or lab-scale fermentor to enlarge a seed culture (5 -10 liters) Right: Next step: pilot-scale fermentor (50 liters) BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 46 9/15/2020

Production by Fermentation BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 47 9/15/2020

Dual Use Chemical Technology BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 48 9/15/2020

What is a Chemical Weapon? Chemical Agent BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation Delivery System 49 9/15/2020

CW production also uses dual-use equipment & dual-use precursors Pump Valves Chemical reactor vessel BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation Heat exchanger 50 9/15/2020

Chemical Production Equipment Incinerators and Monitoring Systems BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 51 9/15/2020

Delivery Methods: Chemical – Aerosol generators – Agricultural sprayers BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 52 9/15/2020

Protective Clothing l. Protective Clothing Suitable for Lethal Chemicals BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 53 9/15/2020

Chemical Weapons Precursor Chemicals: Uses and Equivalents Precursor Chemical CAS No. Civil Uses CW Agent Production Thiodiglycol 111 -48 -8 Organic synthesis Sulfur mustard (HD) Carrier for dyes in textile industry Sesqui mustard (Q) Lubricant additives Manufacturing plastics Phosphorus oxychloride 10025 -87 -3 Organic synthesis Tabun (G) Plasticizers Gasoline additives Hydraulic fluids Insecticides Dopant for semiconductors Flame retardants Dimethylphosphonate 756 -79 -6 Flame retardants Sarin (GB) (DMMP) Soman (GD) GF Methylphosphonyl difluoride 676 -99 -3 Organic synthesis Sarin (GB) Soman (GD) GF BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 54 9/15/2020

Chemical Weapons Precursor Chemicals: Uses and Equivalents Precursor Chemical CAS No. Civil Uses CW Agent Production Methylphosphonyl dichloride 676 -97 -1 Organic synthesis Sarin (GB) Soman GF Dimethylphosphite 868 -85 -9 Organic synthesis Sarin Lubricant additive Soman GF Phosphorus trichloride 02. 12. 7719 Organic synthesis VG Insecticides Tabun (GA) Gasoline additives Sarin (GB) Plasticizers GF Surfactants Soman (GD) Dyestuffs Trimethyl phosphite 121 -45 -9 Organic synthesis DMMP Thionyl chloride 07. 09. 7719 Organic synthesis Sarin (GB) Chlorinating agent Soman (GD) Catalyst GF Pesticides Sulfur mustard (HD) Engineering plastics Sesqui mustard (Q) Nitrogen mustard BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 55 9/15/2020

BULGARIAN NATIONAL CUSTOMS AGENCY Customs Intelligence and Investigation BNCA Customs Intelligence and Investigation 56 9/15/2020