Between Exit and Loyalty The Dealignment and Realignment
Between Exit and Loyalty: The Dealignment and Realignment in the Turkish Party System Thesis Defense by Emre Erdoğan
Major Aims of the Dissertation I • To understand the nature of the change in the Turkish party system • To explain the change by referring similarities between political parties • To show the significance of government programs as symbols of positions of different governments
Major Aims of the Dissertation II • To discover the relationship between government programs and governing parties’ electoral manifestoes • To present usefulness of the Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework to understand the change in the party system • To show validity of spatial voting models to understand the voting behavior of Turkish voters
Evidence for the Change • Fragmentation of the party system: – Effective Number of Political Parties Elections Parliament
Evidence for the Change • Fragmentation of the party system: – Power Fragmentation Index
Evidence for the Change • Volatility of the party system Pedersen’s Volatility Score Laakso and Taagepera’s Index of Electoral Volatility
Reasons of the Change • Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Hirschman, 1970) – Exit: the withdrawal from a relationship with a person or organization – Voice: consumers prefer to communicate their dissatisfaction stemmed of quality decline, rather than Exit – Loyalty: Consumer prefers to being loyal to his/her previous choice, despite the quality decline, without communicating his/her satisfaction
Reasons of Exit: Schematized Framework
Reasons of Exit: Turkish Case
Similarity in Promises: Government Programs Consensus on Declaration Consensus on Ignorance • Technology and infrastructure • Economic goals • Distributional Policies • Military • Government Efficiency • Social services expansion negative • Education expansion negative • Military negative • National unity negative • Minority Rights • Decentralization negative
Determinants of the Government Agenda 1980 s • Economic Orthodoxy • Free Enterprise • Democracy • Freedom and domestic human rights • Non economic demographic groups • Environmental protection • European community (+) • Economic Planning • Regulation of capitalism • Social services expansion (+) • Protectionism (+) • Labor groups (+) • Social justice • Technology and infrastructure • Constitutionalism (+) • Government effectiveness (+) • Military (+) • National effort • National way of life (+) • Traditional morality(+)
Determinants of the Government Agenda Interim Governments • Government efficiency • Government effectiveness and authority • Law and order • Constitutionalism (+) • Military (+) • Foreign relationships • Nationalization • Controlled economy • Agriculture and farmers • Social services expansion (+) • Labor groups (+) • National effort, social harmpny (+) • Traditional morality (+) • Defense of national way of life (+)
Determinants of the Government Agenda Electoral Government • Labor groups (+) • Free enterprise • Agriculture and farmers • Foreign relationships • European Community (+) • Technology and infrastructure • Government efficiency Coalition Governments • * European Community (+) • Government corruption • Democracy • Economic goals
Determinants of the Government Agenda Left in government • National effort, social harmony • Democracy • Labor groups • Law and order • Economic goals • Technology and infrastructure • Productivity • Social services expansion (-)
Grouping Turkish Governments
Grouping Turkish Governments 1960 -1980 -2000
Plotting Turkish Governments
Plotting Turkish Governments
Plotting Turkish Governments
Relationship Between Government Programs and Party Manifestoes • Determinants of the government agenda: – Party Effect: If the government program is totally determined by the governing parties’s programs – Issue Effect: If each issue in the government program has reserved spaces – The Basic Equation: G=f (P, I)
Additional Variables • Majority Effect: If the party is the major party or single party in the government • Post-1980 Effect: If the government is set up after 1980 • Coalition Effect: If the government is a coalition government
Findings • Issue effect dominates all other external variables. (R 2=0. 72) (Model 2) • There is no majority/single party effect • 1980 s: – Spaces reserved for issues changed – The effective power of Party declined • Being a coalition partner reduces the power of the Party Effect • Distributional policies are among first compromises given by the coalition partners
Perceptions of the Voter • Respondents are asked to position themselves and major parties in a seven item issue set • When perceptions (P) are compared with average positions of the voters (AV) – The WP and the NAP have no image gap – All other parties are moderate than perceptions
Findings • Left-Right and Religiosity are important components of the voter preferences • Some issues are ‘cross-cutting’: – Parties attract voters despite distances – Nationalism for the NAP, Local values for the TPP • When vote changers are considered: – Left-Right and Religiosity confirm our expectations – Other issues don’t confirm – Explanatory power remains limited
Findings • When utilities are considered: – The. NAP, the VP and the TPP don’t borrow voters – All other parties borrow voters from other parties
Why the Voice is not a valid option? • Voice: Dependent to the openness of communication channels • Party organization is the most important communication channel • History of organization of political parties, is the evolution of communication channels
Different Party Types The Old Cadre Party • Organized in the parliament • Connection of ruling elites • Personalistic network The Mass Party • Organized to mobilize the electorate • Strong Organization • Intra-party democracy • Financed by members’ fees • Uses the party newspaper • Electoral campaigns: labor intensive The Catch-all Party • Transformation of the traditional parties • Financed by contributions • Uses independent channels of communication • Electoral campaigns: labor and capital intensive • Party mechanism is not important
The Cartel Party • Aim: keeping in touch with resources of the state • Financed by state subventions • Electoral campaigns: professionalized and capital intensive • Has access to state regulated channels of information • Membership is not significant • The least sensitive type to the Voice
The Voice in the Turkish Case • Transition to democracy was mobilization of clientelist networks • Transformation to mass parties prevented by frequent military interventions • Post-1980 parties failed to takeover party mechanisms of old regime – Competition for old clientelist networks – Emergence of new patronage mechanisms • The WP, the NAP and the DLP – Emphasized on establishing party organizations – Strong intraparty discipline
Turkish Political Parties are Cartel Type Parties • Elections don’t serve to transform the power from one party to others. All political parties have continuous access to the state funds • Major source of finance is the state subventions • Electoral competition became clashing advertising campaigns • Major political parties dominate the use of the national media
Turkish Voter Don’t Use Party Organizations as Communication Channels • Political parties are among least trusted institutions • There is no intraparty democracy • Members don’t care about intraparty democracy and don’t participate
Future Research • Increased similarities between political parties – Similarity in reputations – Similarity in promises – Perceptions of voters • Effect of institutions • Party members and organizations • Development of the Cartel party
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