Background to the Doha Ministerial Drafters of the

Background to the Doha Ministerial Drafters of the WTO Agreement envisaged the organisation to be a forum for continuous negotiations The idea was to put an end to the practice of negotiating rounds The idea of a new round, however, gained currency even before the first Ministerial Conference of the WTO (Singapore, 1996) Developed countries pushed for expanding the remit of the WTO v Issues like investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation Developing countries highlighted the implementation problems v Argued that these issues must be addressed before the commencement of a new round Seattle Ministerial Conference (1999) was poised to commence the new round, but failed. . . Differences over the inclusion of labour standards was the flashpoint

Doha Round Mandate: Key Features Inclusion of the “Development Agenda” Needs and interests of developing countries put at the heart of WTO’s Work Programme Issues of concern of developing countries figured in the negotiating mandate Implementation related issues and concerns were included Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health v Allowed WTO Member countries to “grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted” v LDCs allowed to implement their TRIPS obligations (relating to pharmaceuticals) by 2016 Formal negotiations commenced in after the establishment of the Trade Negotiations Committee in 2002 and the negotiations were to concluded not later than 1 January 2005

Deliberations at Doha A number of safeguards were introduced to protect the interests of developing countries “Singapore issues”: Negotiations on these issues were to commence only “by explicit consensus” NAMA: Negotiations to take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and least-developed country participants, including through “less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments” Agriculture: Negotiations to effectively take account of the development needs of developing countries, including food security and rural development The EC was able to get trade and environmental standards included in the negotiations despite the opposition from the US

Areas Included in Doha Negotiations Agriculture Services Non Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Singapore Issues Trade and Investment Trade and Competition Policy Trade Facilitation Transparency in Government Procurement WTO Rules Dispute Settlement Understanding

Areas Included in Doha Negotiations (cont. . ) Trade and Environment Electronic Commerce Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries Duty-free, quota-free market access for LDCs’ exports Technical Cooperation for Capacity Building, Growth and Integration Working Groups Trade, Debt and Finance Trade and Transfer of Technology

National Preparations & Consultation Process Preparations: Pre-negotiation & impact assessment studies by eminent institutions: v. NCAER v. ICRIER v. RIS v. Centre for WTO Studies v. UNCTAD India Project v. MIDS These studies were then circulated for discussions & consultations so as to get as many inputs as possible Helped Government in taking informed positions on critical issues

National Preparations & Consultation Process Expert Groups: Department of Commerce constituted Expert Groups to discuss specific policy issues. The recommendations of Expert Groups formed part of Government policy formulation and negotiating position. It included eminent scholars, experts from related fields, stakeholders, representatives of Apex Chambers of Commerce & Industry and representatives of administrative Ministries/Departments. Expert Groups for Agriculture, NAMA, Trade Facilitation, Environment, Rules of Origin were constituted. In certain cases, the Expert Group also interacted with other stakeholders as well as regional/local industry associations or stakeholders & provided necessary inputs to Government.

National Preparations & Consultation Process The following processes were carried out: Inter-governmental consultations in Delhi Consultations with the State Governments Consultations with Apex Chambers & Industry Associations in Delhi Consultations in collaborations with the Apex Chambers & Industry Associations at various other places in India (on a sectoral/stakeholders cluster basis) Consultations done by UNCTAD – India Project as a part of their study, where the officials of the Department of Commerce also participated.

Negotiating Dynamics in Agriculture Deep divisions between the agricultural exporting countries (the Cairns Group) and the developing countries having defensive interests Chairman of the negotiating group on agriculture, Stuart Harbinson, presented the draft modalities in February 2003 taking on board the proposals on the table In August 2003, less than a month before the Cancun Ministerial Conference, the US and the EC presented a joint proposal that militated against the interests of both exporters and protection seekers in agriculture among developing countries Prominent developing countries, led by Brazil and India, came together to form the G-20 to articulate their interests

Negotiating Dynamics in NAMA Developing country groups emphasised the need to focus on the elements of the negotiating mandate that spoke of the needs and interests of developing countries Chairman of the negotiating group on NAMA, Pierre Girard, presented the draft modalities in May 2003 that proposed some flexibilities for developing and least developed countries besides proposing appreciable movement towards tariff liberalisation US, EC and Canada tabled a joint proposal in August 2003 that almost entirely ignored the developing country interests

The Cancun impasse Divergence of views on agriculture between the developed and the developing countries Besides the G-20, the G-33 advanced the cause of the developing countries in agriculture African group voiced their concern on the lack of transparency in the negotiating process But eventually, the insistence of the EC to push for negotiations on the four “Singapore issues” hastened the closure of the Cancun Ministerial Conference

Resurrection of the Doha Round in 2004 The Doha negotiations were resurrected through the July Framework Agreement in 2004 Progress made in getting a broad consensus on the agriculture and NAMA modalities Sectoral initiative on cotton was taken to address the problems of the “Cotton Four” (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) Except Trade Facilitation, all other “Singapore issues” were dropped from the current negotiating round Intensive negotiations were undertaken from fall 2004 onwards with a view to have a final deal in 2005 Focus eventually shifted to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference (December 2005) since divergences between members were too wide, particularly on agriculture and NAMA

The Road to the Hong Kong Ministerial From April 2005, attempts were made to get broad agreements on the modalities and to pave the way for the Ministers strike a deal in Hong Kong Ministerial Progress was more complicated as involving developing countries became essential after the Cancun impasse The new QUAD or G-4 (US, EC, Brazil and India) became the fulcrum of the negotiating process

Core Objectives of the Hong Kong Ministerial Getting broad agreement on the structure of the new discipline in agriculture and non-Agricultural Market Access Providing further fillip to negotiations on trade in services Getting better coherence in the “Rules” areas Taking key decisions pertaining to the Agreement on TRIPS Ensuring broad agreement on the structure of discipline on trade facilitation

Hong Kong Ministerial: The key Decisions Agriculture Steeper reductions on high levels of trade distorting support Elimination of export subsidies by 2013 – to be confirmed upon the completion of modalities Developing countries have the flexibility to “self-designate” an appropriate number of tariff lines Special Products (SPs) Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for developing countries NAMA Adoption of “Swiss Formula” with coefficients Tariff reduction by taking account of the special needs of developing countries including through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments Flexibilities for developing countries v Less than formula cuts for a proportion of the total tariff lines v Keeping a proportion of total tariff lines unbound Services Improvements in the Mode 4 Approach Plurilateral negotiations to complement the multilateral process Clear timelines, that would have ensured balance, were laid out

Hong Kong Ministerial: Other Decisions Developed countries to provide duty-free and quota-free for products originating from all LDCs Operationalising “Aid for Trade” initiative Formalisation of the Decision of the General Council of 6 December 2005 on an Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement Implementation of the TRIPS and public health issue for countries that did not have manufacturing capacities for producing pharmaceuticals

Post Hong Kong Agreement on all major areas was elusive - staggered and step-by-step approach was adopted in the negotiating groups Applied tariffs in developing countries continued to go down, giving vent to even higher demands by businesses in the developed world Pressure mounted in the developed countries for the retention of peaks and escalations as some developing countries became competitive in mid-range manufactures Domestic politics in the US thwarted moves for reforming the farm subsidies regime Continuous engagement of the Members over the market access issues in agriculture and NAMA kept the hopes alive for a Doha deal

Mounting pressures to seal the deal Spectre of global economic slowdown from the third quarter of 2007 put pressure on the trade negotiators to do the deal World Bank has predicted a substantial augmentation in global incomes if the Doha deal was done High food prices was attributed to the failure to clinch an agriculture agreement Agriculture and NAMA Chairpersons tried to move the process forward by producing two sets of draft modalities in 2008 Members decided to make a final push before the political exigencies in several key WTO Members took precedence

Is the deal possible in 2008? Broad convergence of positions was possible in several key areas in agriculture But the Geneva Mini-Ministerial among 30 odd WTO Members also broke down because of agriculture US refused to accept the developing country demand on SSM in agriculture Where are the bottlenecks? Disagreement over the structure of Special Safeguard Mechanism Percentage tariff lines that can be declared as Special Products (SPs) v DG Lamy has proposed 12% while G-33/African Group, ACP/SVEs have demanded 15% The cotton issue remains contentious as the US remains ambivalent about subsidy cuts No clear indications about the prospects of an agreement on NAMA v Anti-concentration clause and sectorals are the stumbling blocks for India

The Way Forward

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