BAB 13 Eksternalitas dan Barang Publik nuhfil hanani
BAB 13 Eksternalitas dan Barang Publik nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Topics to be Discussed u Externalities u Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Externalities u Common and Property Rights Property Resources nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Topics to be Discussed u Public Goods u Private Preferences for Public Goods nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities u Negative – Action by one party imposes a cost on another party u Positive – Action by one party benefits another party nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
External Cost u Scenario Steel plant dumping waste in a river – The entire steel market effluent can be reduced by lowering output (fixed proportions production function) – nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
External Cost u Scenario Marginal External Cost (MEC) is the cost imposed on fishermen downstream for each level of production. – Marginal Social Cost (MSC) is MC plus MEC. – nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
External Costs Price When there are negative externalities, the marginal social cost MSC is higher than the marginal cost. The differences is the marginal external cost MEC. MSC The profit maximizing firm produces at q 1 while the efficient output level is q*. Price MSCI MC S = MCI The industry competitive output is Q 1 while the efficient level is Q*. Aggregate social cost of negative externality P* P 1 MECI MEC D q* q 1 Firm output Q* Q 1 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com Industry output
External Cost u Negative Externalities encourage inefficient firms to remain in the industry and create excessive production in the long run. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities u Positive Externalities and Inefficiency – Externalities can also result in too little production, as can be shown in an example of home repair and landscaping. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
External Benefits Value When there are positive externalities (the benefits of repairs to neighbors), marginal social benefits MSB are higher than marginal benefits D. MSB D P 1 A self-interested home owner invests q 1 in repairs. The efficient level of repairs q* is higher. The higher price P 1 discourages repair. MC P* Is research and development discouraged by positive externalities? MEB q 1 q* Repair Level nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Assumption: The market failure is pollution – Fixed-proportion production technology v. Must reduce output to reduce emissions v. Use an output tax to reduce output – Input substitution possible by nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com altering technology
The Efficient Level of Emissions Dollars per unit of Emissions Assume: 1) Competitive market 2) Output and emissions decisions are independent 3) Profit maximizing output chosen MSC 6 At Eo the marginal cost of abating emissions is greater than the marginal social cost. Why is this more efficient than zero emissions? 4 At E 1 the marginal social cost is greater than the marginal benefit. The efficient level of emissions is 12 (E*) where MCA = MSC. 2 MCA E 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 E* 12 14 E 1 16 18 20 22 24 26 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com Level of Emissions
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Options for Reducing Emissions to E* – Emission Standard v. Set a legal limit on emissions at E* (12) v. Enforced by monetary and criminal penalties v. Increases the cost of production and the threshold price to enter nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com the industry
Standards and Fees Dollars per unit of Emissions MSC Standard Fee 3 E* 12 MCA Level of Emissions nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Options for Reducing Emissions to E* – Emissions Fee v. Charge levied on each unit of emission nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Standards and Fees Dollars per unit of Emissions MSC Cost is less than the fee if emissions were not reduced. Fee 3 Total Fee of Abatement. E* Total Abatement Cost MCA 12 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com Level of Emissions
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Standards Versus Fees – Assumptions v. Policymakers have asymmetric information v. Administrative costs require the same fee or standard for all firms nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Case for Fees Fee per Unit of Emissions The impact of a standard of abatement of 7 for both firms is illustrated. Not efficient because MCA 2 < MCA 1 MCA 2 If a fee of $3 was imposed Firm 1 emissions would fall by 6 to 8. Firm 2 emissions would fall by 8 to 6. MCA 1 = MCA 2: efficient solution. 6 The cost minimizing solution would be an abatement of 6 5 for firm 1 and 8 for firm 2 and MCA 1= MCA 2 = $3. 4 3. 75 3 2. 50 2 Firm 1’s Increased Abatement Costs Firm 2’s Reduced Abatement Costs 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com Level of 14 Emissions
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Advantages of Fees – When equal standards must be used, fees achieve the same emission abatement at lower cost. – Fees create an incentive to install equipment that would reduce emissions further. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Case for Standards C Fee per Unit of 16 Emissions Marginal Social Cost 14 12 Based on incomplete information fee is $7 (12. 5% reduction). Emission increases to 11. ABC is the increase in social cost less the decrease in abatement cost. E 10 A D 8 Based on incomplete information standard is 9 (12. 5% decrease). ADE < ABC B 6 Marginal Cost of Abatement 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Level of Emissions nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Summary: Fees vs. Standards – Standards are preferred when MSC is steep and MCA is flat. – Standards (incomplete information) yield more certainty on emission levels and less certainty on the cost of abatement. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Summary: Fees vs. Standards – Fees have certainty on cost and uncertainty on emissions. – Preferred policy depends on the nature of uncertainty and the slopes of the cost curves. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Transferable Emissions Permits – Permits help develop a competitive market for externalities. v. Agency determines the level of emissions and number of permits v. Permits v. High are marketable cost firm will purchase nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com permits from low cost firms
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Question – What factors could limit the efficiency of this approach? nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Costs and Benefits of Reduced Sulfur Dioxide Emissions u Cost of Reducing Emissions – Conversion to natural gas from coal and oil – Emission control equipment nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Costs and Benefits of Reduced Sulfur Dioxide Emissions u Benefits of Reducing Emissions Health – Reduction in corrosion – Aesthetic – nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Reductions Dollars per unit of reduction 60 Observations • MAC = MSC @. 0275 • . 0275 is slightly below actual emission level • Economic efficiency improved 40 Marginal Social Cost 20 Marginal Abatement Cost 0 0. 02 0. 04 0. 06 0. 08 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com Sulfur dioxide concentration (ppm)
Emissions Trading and Clean Air u Bubbles – Firm can adjust pollution controls for individual sources of pollutants as long as a total pollutant limit is not exceeded. u Offsets – New emissions must be offset by reducing existing emissions v 2000 offsets since 1979 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Emissions Trading and Clean Air u Cost of achieving an 85% reduction in hydrocarbon emissions for Du. Pont – Three Options v 85% reduction at each source plant (total cost = $105. 7 million) v 85% reduction at each plant with internal trading (total cost = $42. 6 million) v 85% reduction at all plants with internal and external trading (total cost = $14. 6 million) nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Emissions Trading and Clean Air u 1990 Clean Air Act – Since 1990, the cost of the permits has fallen from an expected $300 to below $100. u Causes of the drop in permit prices – More efficient abatement techniques – Price of low sulfur coal has fallen nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Ways of Correcting Market Failure u Recycling Households can dispose of glass and other garbage at very low cost. – The low cost of disposal creates a divergence between the private and the social cost of disposal. – nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Efficient Amount of Recycling Cost Without market intervention the level of scrap will be at m 1 and m 1 > m*. With a refundable deposit, MC increases and MC = MSC = MCR. MSC MCR MC + per unit refund MC 0 4 m* m 1 8 12 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com Scrap
Refundable Deposits $ The supply of glass is the sum of the supply of virgin glass (Sr) and the supply of recycled glass (Sr). Sr With refunds Sr increases to S’r and S increases to S’. S’r Sv Without refunds the price of glass is P and Sr is M 1. S S’ P P’ Price falls to P’ and the amount of recycled glass increases to M*. D M 1 M* Amount of Glass nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities and Property Rights u Property Rights – Legal rules describing what people or firms may do with their property – For example v. If residents downstream owned the river (clean water) they control upstream emissions. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities and Property Rights u Bargaining and Economic Efficiency – Economic efficiency can be achieved without government intervention when the externality affects relatively few parties and when property rights are well specified. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Profits Under Alternative Emissions Choices (Daily) Factory’s Profit Fishermen’s Profit No filter, not treatment plant 500 100 600 Filter, no treatment plant 300 500 800 No filter, treatment plant 500 200 700 Filter, treatment plant 300 600 300 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com Total Profit
Externalities and Property Rights u Assumptions Factory pays for the filter – Fishermen pay for the treatment plant – u Efficient Solution – Buy the filter and do not build the plant nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Bargaining with Alternative Property Rights Right to Dump Right to Clean Water No Cooperation Profit of factory $500 $300 Profit of fishermen $200 $500 Cooperation Profit of factory $550 $300 Profit of fishermen $250 $500 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities and Property Rights u Conclusion: Coase Theorem – When parties can bargain without cost and to their mutual advantage, the resulting outcome will be efficient, regardless of how the property rights are specified. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities and Property Rights u Costly Bargaining --- The Role of Strategic Behavior – Bargaining requires clearly defined rules and property rights. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities and Property Rights u. A Legal Solution --- Suing for Damages – Fishermen have the right to clean water – Factory has two options v. No filter, pay damages – Profit = $100 ($500 - $400) v. Filter, – no damages Profit = $300 ($500 - $200) nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities and Property Rights u. A Legal Solution --- Suing for Damages – Factory has the right to emit effluent – Fishermen have three options v. Put – in treatment plant Profit = $200 v. Filter – Profit = $300 ($500 - $200) v. No – and pay damages plant, no filter Profit = $100 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Externalities and Property Rights u Conclusion – A suit for damages results in an efficient outcome. u Question – How would imperfect information impact the outcome? nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Coase Theorem at Work u Negotiating an Efficient Solution – 1987 --- New York garbage spill (200 tons) littered the New Jersey beaches v. The potential cost of litigation resulted in a solution that was mutually beneficial to both parties. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Common Property Resources u Common Property Resource – Everyone has free access. – Likely to be overutilized – Examples v. Air and water v. Fish and animal populations v. Minerals nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Common Property Resources Benefits, Costs ($ per fish) Without control the number of fish/month is FC where PC = MB. Marginal Social Cost However, private costs underestimate true cost. The efficient level of fish/month is F* where MSC = MB (D) Private Cost Demand F* FC Fish per Month nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Common Property Resources u Solution – Private ownership u Question – When would private ownership be impractical? nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Crawfish Fishing in Lousiana u Finding the Efficient Crawfish Catch – F = crawfish catch in millions of pounds/yr – C = cost in dollars/pound nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Crawfish Fishing in Lousiana u Demand – C = 0. 401 = 0. 0064 F u MSC – C = -5. 645 + 0. 6509 F u PC – C = -0. 357 + 0. 0573 F nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Crawfish Fishing in Lousiana u Efficient Catch – 9. 2 million pounds – D = MSC nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Crawfish as a Common Property Resource C Cost (dollars/pound) Marginal Social Cost 2. 10 Private Cost 0. 325 Demand 9. 2 11. 9 Crawfish Catch (millions of pounds) nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Public Goods u Question – When should government replace firms as the producer of goods and services? nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Public Goods u Public Good Characteristics – Nonrival v. For any given level of production the marginal cost of providing it to an additional consumer is zero. – Nonexclusive v. People cannot be excluded from nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com consuming the good.
Public Goods u Not all government produced goods are public goods – Some are rival and nonexclusive v. Education v. Parks nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Efficient Public Good Provision Benefits (dollars) When a good is nonrival, the social marginal benefit of consumption (D) , is determined by vertically summing the individual demand curves for the good. $7. 00 Marginal Cost $5. 50 D 2 $4. 00 Efficient output occurs where MC = MB at 2 units of output. MB is $1. 50 + $4. 00 or $5. 50. D $1. 50 D 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com Output
Public Goods u Public Goods and Market Failure – How much national defense did you consume last week? nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Public Goods u Free Riders – There is no way to provide some goods and services without benefiting everyone. – Households do not have the incentive to pay what the item is worth to them. – Free riders understate the value of a good or service so that they can enjoy its benefit without paying for nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com it.
Public Goods u Establishing a mosquito abatement company – How do you measure output? – Who do you charge? – A mosquito meter? nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Demand for Clean Air u Clean Air is a public good – Nonexclusive and nonrival u What is the price of clean air? nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Demand for Clean Air u Choosing where to live – Study in Boston correlates housing prices with the quality of air and other characteristics of the houses and their neighborhoods. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Demand for Clean Air Dollars High Income 3000 2500 Middle Income 2000 Low Income 1500 1000 500 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Nitrogen Oxides (pphm) nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
The Demand for Clean Air u Findings – – – Amount people are willing to pay for clean air increases substantially as pollution increases. Higher income earners are willing to pay more (the gap between the demand curves widen) National Academy of Sciences found that a 10% reduction in auto emissions yielded a benefit of $2 billion--nuhfil hanani : webgreater site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com somewhat than the cost.
Private Preferences for Public Goods u Government production of a public good is advantageous because the government can assess taxes or fees to pay for it. u Determining how much of a public good to provide when free riders exist is difficult. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Determining the Level of Educational Spending Willingness to pay $ The efficient level of educational spending is determined by summing the willingness to pay for education for each of three citizens. AW W 1 $0 $600 W 2 $1200 W 3 $1800 $2400 Educational spending per pupil nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Determining the Level of Educational Spending Willingness to pay $ Will majority rule yield an efficient outcome? • W 1 will vote for $600 • W 2 and W 3 will vote for $1200 The median vote will always win in a majority rule election. AW W 1 $0 $600 W 2 $1200 W 3 $1800 $2400 Educational spending per pupil nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Private Preferences for Public Goods u Question – Will the median voter selection always be efficient? u Answer If two of the three preferred $1200 there would be overinvestment. – If two of the three preferred $600 there would be underinvestment. – nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Private Preferences for Public Goods u Majority rule is inefficient because it weighs each citizen’s preference equally---the efficient outcome weighs each citizen’s vote by his or her strength of preference. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Summary u There is an externality when a producer or a consumer affects the production or consumption activities of others in a manner that is not directly reflected in the market. u Pollution can be corrected by emission standards, emissions fees, marketable emissions permits, or by encouraging recycling. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Summary u Inefficiencies due to market failure may be eliminated through private bargaining among the affected parties. u Common property resources are not controlled by a single person and can be used without a price being paid. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Summary u Goods that private markets are not likely to produce efficiently are either nonrival or nonexclusive. Public goods are both. u. A public good is provided efficiently when the vertical sum of the individual demands for the public good is equal to the marginal cost of producing it. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
Summary u Under majority rule voting, the level of spending provided will be that preferred by the median voter---this need not be the efficient outcome. nuhfil hanani : web site : www. nuhfil. com, email : nuhfil@yahoo. com
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