Attributions Chapter 5 Introduction to Attributions Things happen

Attributions Chapter 5

Introduction to Attributions � Things happen… › Cars break down, people fail exams, sports teams win and lose, people fall in love, marriages end in divorce, people lose their jobs, loved ones die, people fight in the streets, people kill others in war, ethnic groups try to eliminate other groups Most people, most of the time, do not accept that the world we live in is random, unpredictable, and unreliable � For most people, most of the time, things happen for a reason � › Events are caused by something… � For life to be orderly and predictable, people attribute causes and explanations to events and try to understand why people behave the way they do › The ways in which people do this, the reasons why they attribute, how they attribute, the conditions under which they do and don’t attribute, all constitute the subject matter of attribution theory

Introduction to Attributions � Like chapter 4 on attitudes, we will review the study of attributions from 3 perspectives › Social cognition, social identity, and social representations � As with most social psychological topics, the study of attributions has largely been dominated by the social cognitive tradition › Which reflects the mainstream view of how people attribute causes to everyday events and behavior › But, the other approaches have attempted to provide a more social and contextual account of attributing causality in everyday life

Social Cognition and Attributions � Attribution theory dominated social psychology during the 1970 s and 1980 s and in that time a massive body of research was generated › During the 1970 s over 900 attribution studies had been published › By 1994 it was estimated that this number had quadrupled (3, 600… wow) › Today a search for attribution studies turns up 27, 700 articles � More recently, research on causal attributions has slowed down › Although much of this tradition has come to be subsumed under the field of “ordinary personology” �Ordinary personology – the processes by which ordinary people come to understand others by inferring their temporary states and feelings and other stable enduring traits and characteristics � However, this focus on understanding others shares many of the central concerns of the attribution theory

Social Cognition and Attributions Despite the enormous attention devoted to the study of attribution, social psychology has failed to develop a single, unifying, integrating theory of attribution � Rather, there are several “mini-theories” of attributional processes � › Historically, 3 of these are considered central �Heider’s (1958) Naïve Psychology �Jones and Davis’ (1965) Corresponding Inference Theory �Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model � These mini-theories are not seen as competing with each other or describing the same phenomena › Rather, these mini-theories are seen as complementing one another › They could be integrated into a single over-arching theory, but this has yet to be done

Social Cognition and Attributions: Heider’s (1958) Naïve Psychology Fritz Heider was an Austrian Jew who fled to the United States during WWII � His most important work is his 1958 book The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations � › Set the stage for most of the work on attributions that followed › Described a “common sense psychology or a naïve psychology of action” � This common sense psychology views people as naïve scientists (remember from chapter 2? ) › People in an intuitive way, or in a common-sense way, infer or deduce the causes of events around them › They naturally view the world as sets of cause and effect relations, even when there is no causal relationship at all

Social Cognition and Attributions: Heider’s (1958) Naïve Psychology � The arrangement of objects and events into cause and effect relations constitutes a causal system in our cognitive structure › The question of which objects and events will be seen as cause and which will be seen as effect is crucial �It almost defines the attributional process � Heider claimed that we tend to perceive a cause and its effect as a perceptual unit › Some objects and events combine more easily than others to form a causal unit �Especially when the object or cause is a human actor and the event or effect is a social behavior

Social Cognition and Attributions: Heider’s (1958) Naïve Psychology � Two prime determinants of “unit perception” are similarity and proximity › › � In our causal systems, two events are more likely to be seen as causally related if they are proximal rather than distal � Temporal proximity (being close in time) is especially potent in influencing causality Greater similarity between two events makes them more likely to be perceived as a causal unit than dissimilar events Two more important principles of causal inference › › People tend to attribute behavior to a single cause rather than to multiple causes Causes of behavior can be thought of as residing either within the actor or outside the actor somewhere in the situation � Dispositional causes – causes within the actor � Ex. Personality characteristics, motivation, ability, and effort � Situational causes – causes outside the actor � Ex. Social context and role obligations According to Heider, the more one of these causes is favored as an explanation of a particular behavior, the less likely the other will also be used � Heider also noticed that people tend to emphasize dispositional or internal causes and tend to overlook situational causes when explaining behavior � › Which has become known as the “fundamental attribution error”

Social Cognition and Attributions: Jones & Davis (1965) Correspondent Inference Theory � Edward Jones and Keith Davis’ theory of correspondent inferences (1965) › First systematic theory of Heider’s earlier ideas � The basic premise is that, under certain conditions, people tend to infer that people’s actions correspond to their intentions and dispositions › That is, people like to infer that a person’s behavior matches an underlying stable quality in the person › Ex. Correspondent inference would be to attribute someone’s aggressive behavior to an internal stable trait, such as “aggressiveness” � Jones and Davis argued that such inferences are motivated by our need to view people’s behavior as intentional and predictable, reflecting their underlying character › This in turn, enhances our sense of being able to predict and control other people’s behavior and thus our social interactions more generally

Social Cognition and Attributions: Jones & Davis (1965) Correspondent Inference Theory � In everyday life, however, making such correspondent inferences may not be straightforward › The information needed to make such inferences may be ambiguous, requiring us to draw upon cues that are maximally informative �i. e. that reduce uncertainty about the causes of those behaviors � Jones and Davis outline 3 major factors affecting the process of making correspondent inferences: › The social desirability of the behavior › A person’s choice in the behavior › The motivational variables of hedonic relevance and personalism � We will discuss each of these factors in more detail

Social Cognition and Attributions: Jones & Davis (1965) Correspondent Inference Theory � Behaviors judged to be socially desirable are less informative than behaviors judged to be socially undesirable › When a behavior is socially desirable in the context in which it occurs, it is normal or expected � Observing such behavior is not informative to the perceiver because there are several alternative, equally probable, reasons why the behavior occurred › Maybe because the actor is intrinsically a good person, chronically prone to commit socially desirable behaviors (dispositional attribution) › But, the behavior may also have occurred because it was expected; it was the right thing to do (situational or external attribution) � Either explanation is equally likely › The behavior is uninformative because it does not help the perceiver decide between the two competing explanations of the good, desirable, expected, normative behavior

Social Cognition and Attributions: Jones & Davis (1965) Correspondent Inference Theory � This is not the case for socially undesirable behavior › These behaviors are counter-normative; they are not what is expected � For this reason they are more informative than socially desirable behavior › For socially desirable behaviors, dispositional and situational explanations are equally likely › For socially undesirable behaviors, the situational explanation is eliminated (because the behavior is not expected); therefore, it is less likely than the dispositional explanation Thus, the perceiver, the intuitive scientist, has data that reduce uncertainty, which helps in deciding between competing explanations � Undesirable behaviors are more informative than desirable behaviors, and allow the perceiver to make a dispositional attribution about the actor with more confidence � › The attribution about the actor’s disposition is likely to be as negative as the observed behavior

Social Cognition and Attributions: Jones & Davis (1965) Correspondent Inference Theory � The second important factor in determining correspondent inferences is whether the actor freely chose the behavior: the principle of non-common effects › This principle applies particularly when an actor has, or at least is perceived to have, free choice in action between several behavioral alternatives � Again, this principle works because when someone is believed to have freely chosen this behavior it is informative › It reduces uncertainty by implicitly favoring one explanation for the behavior over other, competing explanations

Social Cognition and Attributions: Jones & Davis (1965) Correspondent Inference Theory The desirability of outcomes and the principle of non-common effects are both cognitive factors influencing the attributional process � The third factor is motivational � Includes 2 related constructs: hedonic relevance and personalism � › An action is said to be hedonically relevant for a perceiver if the consequences of the action affect the perceiver � The welfare of the perceiver is either harmed or benefited by the action › Personalistic actions are a subset of hedonically relevant actions, and are characterized by the intention of an actor for the action to have hedonic relevance for the perceiver � Does the perceiver think the actor is intentionally trying to affect his/her welfare � Actions that are perceived to be hedonically relevant or personalistic are more likely to produce a correspondent inference (the action matches some underlying trait in the actor) about the actor than are other actions

Social Cognition and Attributions: Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model The analogy between the professional scientist and the everyday perceiver, is emphasized in Kelley’s covariation model of attribution � The model rests on the principle of covariation � › Asserts that before two events can be accepted as causally linked they must covary with one another › If two events do not covary, they cannot be causally connected

Social Cognition and Attributions: Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model The principle of covariation was used by Kelley as an analogy for the way people infer causation in their everyday lives � Kelley suggested there are 3 factors crucial in assessing covariation � › And that different combinations of positions of these 3 factors lead to different types of causal conclusions regarding the specific behavior in question � Consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus � The general context in which these 3 dimensions are applied is one where a perceiver attributes a cause to a person’s response to a particular stimulus as a particular time › Consistency – whether that person responds in the same way to the same stimulus or similar stimuli at different times › Distinctiveness – whether the actor acts in the same way to other, different stimuli, or whether the actor’s response distinguishes between different stimuli › Consensus – is not a feature of the actor’s behavior, but of the behavior of others: is there consensus across actors in response to the same stimulus, or do people vary in response?

Social Cognition and Attributions: Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model � According to the covariation model, perceivers will decide, almost in a dichotomous way: › That the actor acts either in the same way at different times (consistency is high) or in different ways (consistency is low) › That the actor either shows similar responses to different stimuli (distinctiveness is low) or acts this way only in response to this particular stimulus (distinctiveness is high) › That the actor either acts in the same way as most other people (consensus is high) or acts differently (consensus is low) � Different combinations of positions on the 3 dimensions lead to different attributions › An internal or dispositional attribution is most likely when consistency is high, distinctiveness is low, and consensus is low › An external or situational attribution is most likely when consistency is high, distinctiveness is high, and consensus is low › Other combinations lead to less clear attributions

Social Cognition and Attributions: Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model 2 important factors were added to the covariation model by Kelley five years after his original formulation: discounting and augmentation � An event can have many causes � › It sometimes happens that several plausible causes co-occur � But some would be expected to augment the given effect, or make it more likely � And some would be expected to inhibit the given effect, or make it less likely � If the effect occurs even in the presence of inhibitory causes, the augmenting cause will be judged as stronger than if the augmenting cause and its effect had occurred without the inhibitory cause › Ex. If you have the opportunity to help an elderly lady get her shopping bags in her car but there are several inhibitory factors involved (ex. Its raining heavily and you are running late and in a hurry) but you have been raised to help the elderly (augmenting factor) and you end up helping the elderly lady, the augmenting factor will be seen as stronger � But if it wasn’t raining and you weren’t in a hurry, this factor may not be perceived to be as strong

Social Cognition and Attributions: Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model � Kelley’s model has one requirement that is not included in either Heider’s model or Jones and Davis’ model › Perceivers use information across times, situations, and actors � Without this information it is not possible to make consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus judgments › In contrast, perceiver in the naïve scientist model or in the correspondent inference model makes causal attributions based on a single action performed by a single actor on a single instance � This is an important point when we try to evaluate how well theory relates to everyday life › People don’t assign cause to an action as though they are unaware or ignorant of the likelihood that other people would perform the same action in response to the same stimulus, or the same person would repeat the behavior, or how that actor would perform in response to other stimuli › People do not consider each event as if it were new › On the other hand, people don’t engage in the complex mental calculations described by Kelley’s covariation model every time they assign a cause to an action

Social Cognition and Attributions: Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model � A resolution to this dilemma is offered by the concept of causal schemas › Kelley’s concept can be taken to refer to a set of stored knowledge about the relations between causes and effects › We each acquire an implicit causal theory of events through our socialization › This implicit theory gives us ready-made attributional accounts of most events we encounter from one day to the next › It allows us to run on default most of the time, and we only have to devote attention to unusual, exceptional or important cases

Social Cognition and Attributions: Sum of the 3 Theories All three of theories just discussed view people as naïve scientists that systematically seek the causes of events � A consequence of this is that it views the human perceiver as rational, as going about the attributional process in a fairly systematic, logical fashion � However, we all know that people do not typically act in this way, not even scientists � It is reasonable to think of attribution theory as being prescriptive � › It describes how attribution perhaps should be made Empirical research has found that people do not make attributions in such a systematic and calculated way � Rather, social perceivers demonstrate persistent biases when attributing causality to events and behavior �

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases When an attribution deviates from the prescribed model, it is thought of as a biased attribution � Some attribution researchers refer to biases as errors � › This implies that researchers know the true causes of behavior › But, in all probability, they don’t � There are no validity benchmarks for assessing the authenticity of an attribution › It is better, then, to refer simply to attributional biases, rather than errors

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Fundamental Attribution Error � Original conception › [The fundamental attribution error] is the tendency for attributers to underestimate the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional factors in controlling behavior More recently, Gilbert has referred to this phenomenon as the “correspondence bias” � The earliest empirical demonstration of the fundamental attribution error (FAE) was produced by Jones and Harris (1967) � › Participants were shown to make correspondent inferences about an actor’s attitudes based on the actor’s statements about an issue › These inferences occurred even when the participants knew the actor had no choice in making the statement

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Fundamental Attribution Error � 1 st experiment (conducted in NORTH CAROLINA!!!) › Participants read a short essay on Castro’s Cuba and then indicated what they thought the essay writers true attitude was › Each participant only read one essay, but half of the essays were pro-Castro and the other half were anti-Castro › Manipulation 1 � At the time, there were not many pro-Castro advocates in NC � Thus, the direction of the essay (pro- or anti-) constituted a manipulation of the probability of the behavior � Meaning that the pro-Castro essay was improbable and therefore more informative behavior › Manipulation 2 � Participants were led to believe that the essay’s position had been either assigned (no choice, uninformative) or chosen by the writer (choice, informative) › After reading the 200 -word essay participants answered questions about what they thought the essay writer’s TRUE attitude was towards Castro’s Cuba › And then indicated their own attitude

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Fundamental Attribution Error � If the informativeness of the behavior was the most important factor in determining whether or not a correspondent inference was made by the observer › Then such an inference should be most evident among those who read a pro-Castro essay written by someone who could have chosen to write an essay criticizing or defending Castro’s Cuba �Meaning that this condition should lead participants to believe the essay truly reflected the attitude of the essay writer › And should be least evident among those participants who read the anti-Castro essay written by someone who was instructed what to write �Meaning this condition should lead participants to believe the essay did not reflect the true attitude of the essay writer

� The mean “attributed attitude scores, ” the attitudes participants attributed to the essay writers › Range from 10 (anti-Castro) to 70 (pro-Castro) � There is indeed evidence that participants made correspondent inferences › The inferred attitude matched the essay direction › Inferences are stronger in the choice conditions than in the no-choice conditions � But, importantly for the FAE › Correspondent inferences are still evident in the no-choice condition › Even when participants were told that the essay writer was instructed to write either a pro- or and anti-Castro essay, they still infer that the essay writer has an attitude consistent with the views expressed in the essay � This is the FAE: attributers (participants in the experiment) have apparently underestimated the impact of situational factors and over estimated the role of dispositional factors in determining behavior Mean attributed attitude scores (and variances in parentheses), according to essay direction and degree of choice Essay Direction Choice Condition Pro-Castro Anti-Castro Choice 59. 62 (13. 59) 17. 38 (8. 92) No choice 44. 10 (147. 65) 22. 87 (17. 55)

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Fundamental Attribution Error � Further, in a second experiment › Demonstrated that emphasizing the choice manipulation did not diminish the attitude attribution effect › Even under no-choice conditions participants were correctly aware of the essay writer’s choice or lack of choice

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Dispositional Attributions are Spontaneous & Automatic � Recent research has drawn upon the work on automaticity in social perception › Suggesting that making correspondent inferences is so pervasive that dispositional attributions are made spontaneously and without conscious awareness � In the view of social cognition › Dispositional attributions are the “default option” › Perceivers spontaneously attributed behavior to people’s traits because these attributions are fast and require little effort

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Dispositional Attributions are Spontaneous & Automatic � Quattrone (1982) was the first to propose a sequential model of attribution › Once a behavior is identified, dispositional attributions are always made first, spontaneously and without conscious deliberation › But, these can be subsequently corrected by situational attributions if perceivers are motivated and have time to consider alternative explanations � Thus, trait attributions are easy and effortless, and situational attributions are corrections that require more effort and cognitive resources Identification Attribution Automatic dispositional inference Effortful situational correction

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Dispositional Attributions are Spontaneous & Automatic � A review by Trope and Gaunt (2003) concludes that situational attributions are more likely to be made if perceivers: › 1) are made accountable for their inferences › 2) are not cognitively busy or distracted by pursuing other goals; or › 3) when situational attributions are made salient, accessible and relevant � But why should dispositional attributions be so effortless and less cognitively demanding than situational attributions?

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the FAE � Explanations of FAE tend to belong to one of two types › Explanations based on psychological or cognitive processes › Explanations which seek the origins of the bias in social, cultural, and ideological processes � Heider was the first to suggest a cognitive explanation › Arguing that “behavior in particular has such salient properties it tends to engulf the total (perceputal) field” � Fiske and Taylor support this cognitive explanation › Describing situational factors that give rise to behavior, such as social context or situational pressures, are relatively less salient and unlikely to be noticed when compared with the dynamic behavior of the actor � Thus, the fundamental attribution error has primarily been explained by the dominance of the actor in the perceptual field

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the FAE � Another explanation is a motivational one › Emphasizes the degree to which attributions about a person give us a sense of predictive control of other people’s behavior � Jones and Davis (1965) stressed this aspect of correspondent inferences: › That such inferences are motivated by our need to view people’s behavior as intentional and reflecting their underlying personality traits � The main point being: › If we believed that people’s behavior was unstable and fluctuated according to the situations people are in, then this makes predicting their behavior and controlling our environment more difficult � Thus, dispositional attributions or correspondent inferences enhance our sense of prediction and control in everyday life › This is why we prefer them

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the FAE � Others have suggested that this bias toward dispositional attributions is not a universal law of cognitive functioning › But, rather, reflects the dominant ideology of individualism in European and American culture � The tendency to favor personal over situational causation was first noted by Ichheiser (1949) › Instead of viewing this phenomenon as an individual “error” or bias in cognitive judgment, he viewed it as an explanation grounded in American society’s collective and cultural consciousness The dominant representation of the person in western liberal democracies is that of an important causative agent, over and above situational and contextual forces � The FAE, then, may not be a cognitive or perceptual bias alone � › Rather, it may largely be a product of western, industrialized constructions of the “individual” as the source of behavior

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of FAE � If attributions and explanations are grounded in cultural representations of the person › Then cross-cultural differences should be evident in the prevalence of person attributions � Indeed, this has been largely confirmed by studies comparing the prevalence of dispositional attributions in individualist as compared to collectivist cultures › The “person” does not seem to enjoy the same degree of perceptual dominance among non-western people living in collectivist societies

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Actor-Observer Effect “There is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions. ” (Jones & Nisbett, 1972, p. 80) � Heider noted that actors and observers have different views of behavior, of the situation, and of the causes of behaviors in situations � › “The person tends to attribute his own reactions to the object world, and those of another, when they differ from his own, to personal characteristics in [the other]” (1958, p. 157) � Think of how easy it is for us to explain our own socially undesirable behavior (e. g. , being rude or impolite to a fast food worker) in terms of extenuating, stressful circumstances (we’re having a bad day) › But we are less sympathetic when others behave in this way (the teller at the bank was rude to you), and attribute the behavior to the person’s character (the teller was just a mean person) � � Heider referred to this as a “polar tendency in attribution” Jones and Nisbett called it the “actor-observer effect” (AOE)

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Actor-Observer Effect � Classic AOE experiment Ross, Amabile, and Steinmez (1977) › Setup was a quiz game, involving pairs of same-sex participants � One member of the pair was randomly assigned the role of questioner, the other the role of contestant (participants were aware the roles were assigned randomly) › 12 pairs of participants were in the experimental condition � Questioners were told to make up 10 “challenging but not impossible” general knowledge questions to ask to the contestant � While the questioner did this, the contestant was told to compose 10 easy general knowledge questions, “just to get into the spirit of the study” › 6 pairs of participants were in the control condition � The questioner and participant both made up 10 easy questions � During the quiz game itself, participants were told the questioner would ask the contestant 10 questions made up before the study by someone else › During the quiz game � Experimental condition: questioners asked the contestants the 10 “challenging but not impossible” questions they themselves had made up � Control condition: questioners asked 10 questions given to them by the experimenter

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Actor-Observer Effect In the experimental condition the average number of correct answers in the quiz game was 4 � After the quiz game � › Questioners and contestants rated themselves and their partner on a number of dimensions, most importantly “general knowledge compared to the average Stanford student” (experiment was conducted at Stanford) › Participants rated self and other on a scale from 0 to 100, with 50 being “the average Stanford student”

� Results › Control condition: questioners and contestants didn’t really distinguish between self and other in terms of general knowledge relative to the average Stanford student � Everyone rated self and other as about average › Experimental condition: there are big differences in how each member of the pair sees self and other � The questioner doesn’t really distinguish between self and other � The contestant devalues self relative to average and increases the rating of the questioner relative to average � Presumably because the contestant only got 4 out of 10 answers right on average and also because they acknowledged the difficulty of the general knowledge questions produced by the questioner Mean ratings of self and others’ general knowledge by questioners and contestants Ratings of Ratings by Self Other Questioner 53. 5 50. 6 Contestant 41. 3 66. 8 Questioner 54. 1 52. 5 Contestant 47. 0 50. 3 Experimental Condition Control Condition

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Actor-Observer Effect � What makes these results so cool? › ROLE ASSIGNMENT WAS RANDOM (and the participants knew it was) › So presumably, if the roles were reversed, the contestant would have made up 10 difficult questions and the former questioner would have got about 4 of them right � There is an asymmetry between the roles in terms of opportunity to express “smart” behavior › The questioner gets to call the shots and the contestant has to play along › The role of questioner implies an advantage over the contestant � Questioners apparently recognized this › They elevate neither their own status nor lower the contestants’ status › But contestants appear to be unaware of, or to under-correct for, the advantage of the questioner

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, The Actor-Observer Effect � In a 2 nd experiment › Confederates re-enacted some of the questioner-contestant performances from study 1 › Real participants watched these interactions, believing they were authentic › Participants then rated both the questioner and the contestant on general knowledge ability, relative to other Stanford students (on the same rating scale used in experiment 1) � Results › Participants, acting as observers, apparently saw the quiz game through the eyes of the contestant �The average rating of the questioners was 82. 08 �The average rating of the contestants was 48. 92 › Thus, these results mirrored the ratings given in experiment 1, by the contestants themselves

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the AOE Of course, there are competing explanations of the AOE � Like the FAE, one explanation is perceptual � › Essentially argues that actors and observers literally have “different points of view” �Actors cannot see themselves acting �From an actor’s perspective what is most salient and available are the situational influences on their behavior (the objects, the people, the role requirements, and the social setting) �From an observer’s point of view, the actor’s behavior is more perceptually salient than the situation or context › These different “vantage points” for actors and observers lead to different attributional tendencies �Situational attributions for actors �Dispositional attributions for observers

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the AOE � Taylor and Fiske (1975) attempted to test the perceptual salience hypothesis › › 2 male confederates were seated opposite one another, and conversed for 5 minutes A participant sat behind confederate A, so that they could only see confederate B A participant sat behind confederate B, so that they could only see confederate A A participant sat at the table between confederates A and B and could see them both A O C Blah O Blah B C O

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the AOE � After watching A and B interact for 5 minutes all observers rated each confederate on the dimensions of: › › Friendliness Talkativeness Nervousness The extent to which each confederates behavior was caused by dispositional qualities and by situational factors › How much each confederate set the conversation’s tone › Determined the kind of information exchanged in the conversation › Caused the other’s behavior � Results › The observers behind A watching B viewed B as more causal than A › The observers behind B watching A viewed A as more causal than B › Observers between A and B viewed A and B as about equally influential � Thus different vantage points do matter

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the AOE � � Other individualistic explanations of AOE have been suggested Jones and Nisbett (1972) › Originally suggested that actors and observers may possess different information about events and this is what leads to the different attributions � In this view, actors have access to their own feelings, desires and motivations, as well as to their own cross-situational behavioral history › Which observers are unaware of � This theory of informational differences between actors and observers has been supported by research › Idson and Mischel (2001) found that observers were more likely to make situational inferences and fewer trait attributions about an actor’s behavior if that person is familiar and important to them › Presumably, then, the longer we know someone, the more knowledge we are likely to have about their behavior across different situations

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the AOE � Another individualistic (although more social and interactive) explanation is based on the linguistic practices of actors and observers › Different linguistic categories convey different information about an event � Semin and Fielder (1988) suggest there are 4 linguistic categories referring to interpersonal relations › Descriptive action verbs �Ex. Sally is talking to Bob › Interpretive action verbs �Ex. Sally is helping Bob › State verbs �Ex. Sally likes Bob › Adjectives �Ex. Sally is an extroverted person

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Explanations of the AOE � Adjectives convey more information about a person than do verbs › And therefore lead to more dispositional inferences � Ex. It’s hard to imagine making a dispositional correspondent inference based on the statement “Sally is talking to Bob” � Ex. But it’s hard not to make a dispositional correspondent inference with the information “Sally is an extroverted person” � Because this presumes a disposition in itself � Semin and Fiedler (1989) › Found that actors tended to use the more concrete linguistic forms (descriptive and interpretative verbs) � i. e. “Sally is talking to Bob, ” and “Sally is helping Bob” › Observers tended to use the abstract forms (state verbs and adjectives) � i. e. “Sally likes Bob, ” and “Sally is an extroverted person” � In contrast to purely cognitive models of attribution, this work emphasizes how language itself can shape attributions

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases � Both the actor-observer effect and the fundamental attribution error are two of the most widely investigated attributional biases › Actors and observers differ, sometimes drastically, in the inferences they draw from and the attributions they make about presumably the same event � But, the evidence we have discussed here cannot support a strong form of either the AOE or the FAE › It appears that attributers do not make either a dispositional or a situational attribution � Rather, a weak form of the AOE and the FAE is more consistent with research as a whole › Attributers use both dispositional and situational factors in constructing causal sense of events surrounding them › But, they tend to rely on one relatively more than the other depending on their perspective of events

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases � While there is evidence that changing people’s point of view alters their attributional accounts of events in that view, this does not imply that there are hardwired, innate cognitive attributional mechanisms › Developmental and cross-cultural research suggests that people learn the attributional accounts favored by their social environment �Ex. European and North American’s tend towards dispositional attributions and people from more collectivist societies tend towards situational attributions › This learning is likely to be so efficient that particular attributional accounts become automatic and unconscious

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases Theories of attribution tend to view the attributer as a uninvolved bystander observing events around them � But, as we all know, this is far removed from the heat of normal human interaction � › People are involved, passionately or not, in the events around them › People, and their attributions, affect and are affected by others and by events � People often make attributions that reflect selfserving biases › Designed consciously or unconsciously to enhance their self-esteem in their own eyes and in the eyes of others

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Attributions for Success and Failure � It is an all too common phenomenon that people accept credit for success and deny responsibility for failure › Students do it after passing for failing a course › Athletes do it after winning or losing an event › Even academics do it after having a manuscript accepted or rejected for publication Although the strength of the effect varies across cultures, the attributional asymmetry following success or failure has been noted in cultures around the globe � Again, both cognitive and motivational explanations have been formulated to account for the attributional difference �

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Attributions for Success and Failure � Example of cognitive explanation › Weary (1981) suggested that focus of attention towards self or away from self and informational availability may be 2 strong cognitive mechanisms involved in this phenomenon � However, most researchers advocate a motivational explanation related to an almost self-evident, commonsense explanation › People accept credit for success and deflect responsibility for failure because doing so makes them feel good and look good › Basically, it serves a self-enhancement motive � Ex. Miller (1976) › Found that the attributional difference is greater when the task participants succeed or fail at is important to them

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Attributions for Success and Failure � Attributing egocentrically not only bolsters self-esteem, but also influences the impressions others have of the attributer › Evidence for the impressions of others is clearer than bolstering one’s own selfesteem � Ex. Schlenker and Leary (1982) › Found that audiences were generally most favorably impressed by actors who make “accurate” attributional claims for their success � i. e. actors who were modest about their superior performance were liked more than actors who boasted about their performance › Also, audiences disliked actors who predicted that they would not do well, even when that prediction turned out to be accurate � What is clear here, is that different attributional patterns following success or failure create different impressions on an audience › Some kinds of attributions do seem to make the actor look good in the eyes of others and others seem to make the actor look less favorable › Whether they also make the actor feel good is another issue

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Attributions for Success and Failure � Central to any self-enhancement explanation of attributional biases are these predictions: › Self-esteem will increase following a self-serving attribution � An internal attribution following success or an external attribution following failure › Self-esteem will decrease following a self-deprecating attribution � An external attribution following success or an internal attribution following failure � Research does support this, Maracek and Metee (1972): › People with chronically high self-esteem make more self-serving attributions › People with chronically low self-esteem make more self-deprecating attributions This is an important finding with clinical implications for the history and treatment of depression � But, this finding is not quite the same thing as evidence that changes in self-esteem follow particular attributions � › Which is the core of any self-enhancement explanation

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Attributions for Success and Failure � The absence of studies documenting attribution effects on self-esteem is curious, and perhaps due to 2 factors: › First, many researchers appear to accept such effects as obvious and hence not needing empirical verification or falsification › Second, it is methodologically difficult to design an unconfounded experiment to test the hypothesis

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Attributions for Success and Failure � A pure, experimental investigation would require the experimenter to: › � The problem is that participants make their own attributions › � It can only be investigated by allowing participants to make their own attributions But, allowing this automatically introduces a confound between participants’ attributional direction and their prior self-esteem › › � They cannot be assigned to an internal or external attribution condition in the same way as they can to a success or failure condition So direction of attribution cannot be experimentally controlled › � Assign participants randomly to either an internal or an external attribution condition following either success or failure and to observe consequent effects on self-esteem Because we know that people with chronic high self-esteem accept credit for success and deflect blame for failure and people with chronically low self-esteem tend to do the opposite And who knows if these attributional styles cause or reflect differences in chronic selfesteem Thus there is no direct test of the central hypothesis of a self-enhancement explanation

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Depression Implicit in the self-enhancement account of attributional biases is the notion that it is functional, and biologically adaptive to make these biased attributions because they help to create and maintain a positive self-esteem � Weiner’s attributional theory of motivation and emotion � › Argues that the kinds of attributions people make for success and failure elicit different emotional consequences › And that these attributions are characterized by 3 underlying dimensions � Locus: whether we attribute success and failure internally or externally � Stability: whether the cause is perceived as something fixed and stable (like personality or ability) or something changing and unstable (like motivation and effort) � Control: whether we feel we have any control over the cause Locus Stability Control Ability Internal Stable Uncontrollable Effort Internal Unstable Controllable Luck External Unstable Uncontrollable Task difficulty External Unstable Uncontrollable

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Depression � Consistent with the self-enhancement bias › People who attribute their achievements to internal, stable and controllable factors are more likely to feel good about themselves �Ex. After making an A on an English essay exam, a student attributes success to personal ability and effort (I’m good at writing English essays and I studied hard) › In contrast, attributing negative outcomes to internal, stable and uncontrollable factors is associated with negative emotions such as hopelessness and helplessness �Ex. After failing an English essay exam, a student attributes failure to personal lack of ability (I’m never going to be good at writing English essays because I’m just a dumb student) � This attributional pattern for negative events and outcomes has been referred to as a “depressive attributional style” › This style has been strongly linked with clinical depression

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Self-Serving Biases, Depression The learned helplessness model of depression views this attributional style as directly causing depression � Others have argued this attributional tendency is merely a symptom of depression � › Reflecting the affective state of the depressed person � Whether a cause or a symptom › Attributional retraining programs, in which people are taught how to make more self-enhancing attributions, are being widely accepted as an important clinical intervention in the treatment of depression

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Do People Attribute Spontaneously? � Some psychologists have suggested that attribution theory exaggerates the extent to which people seek causal explanations for everyday occurrences and events: › That the degree of attributional activity suggested by attribution research may simply be an artifact of the reactive methodologies used in such studies Keep in mind that most attribution studies require, and instruct, participants to indicate their agreement or disagreement with attributional statements provided by the researchers � So, do people spontaneously engage in causal thinking and, if so, under what conditions do they make causal attributions? � › 2 studies address these questions directly

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Do People Attribute Spontaneously? � Lau and Russell (1980): › Examined newspaper reports of 33 sporting events �The 6 baseball games in the 1977 World Series, and a number of college and professional football games › Found that more causal attributions were made after an unexpected outcome than an expected outcome � Taylor (1982): › Found that 95% of a sample of cancer victims spontaneously made attributions about the cause of their cancer › Also that 70% of close family members of cancer victims made spontaneous attributions about the cause of their loved one’s cancer

Social Cognition & Attribution: Attributional Biases, Do People Attribute Spontaneously? � These two studies suggest that people do in fact spontaneously make causal attributions about events around them › At least when those events are either unexpected or negative � Weiner (1985) similarly concludes that people do indeed engage in spontaneous causal thinking › But mostly for unexpected events and especially when confronted with failure � This conclusion is consistent with that of others who have argued that people actively look for causal explanations for the unexpected or different › And that in such situations the complexity of attributions increases � No doubt many events in social life are common, routine, everyday, and give no need for any sort of attributional analysis › For such events, people probably function mindlessly or essentially run on automatic � However, people do make causal attributions under some conditions › And even when operating mindlessly people probably could generate causal attributions for the events passing them by if they were required to

Social Cognition & Attribution: Criticisms of Classic Attribution Theories Thus far in this chapter, attributing causes to behavior and events has been presented primarily as an intraindividual cognitive phenomenon � In traditional attribution models individuals are construed as information processors: � › Who attend to and select information from the environment › Process the information › And then arrive at a causal analysis of the behavior or event in question � This is too simple › As we all know, social life is an intricate complex mass of individuals, couples, groups, sects, ethnicities, nations, etc. all interacting and negotiating an everchanging social reality which is reproduced, represented, and reconstructed � None of us interacts with any one other person as if that person were an abstracted, fixed and given individual › We all are social, contextualized, and cannot interact with or even perceive others as if we, or they, were anything else � According to your textbook: › Attribution theory persists in theorizing the asocial, decontextualized fiction called the “individual”

Social Cognition & Attribution: Criticisms of Classic Attribution Theories Hewstone has argued that the bulk of attributional research has been articulated at the intrapersonal and the interpersonal levels � Kelley’s covariation model is a good example of the intrapersonal level � › An individual perceives an event – usually behavior enacted by another individual › Engages in a mental calculus estimating the consistency, consensus and distinctiveness of that event › Then arrives at a conclusion regarding the cause of the event � The attributer turns only inward in this attributional search › Without reference to interpersonal relations, dominant social representations, the language of causation, and their relative group memberships and identifications › Everything, apart from the event that triggered the attributional search, takes place internally within the mind of the individual

Social Cognition & Attribution: Criticisms of Classic Attribution Theories � The actor-observer effect and the fundamental attribution error are examples of interpersonal attribution research › Even here, the individuals in the interaction come to the interaction strictly as individuals: �The individuals have no history, no power or status differentials, no social context �They are interchangeable, asocial, decontextualized, often disembodied individuals

Social Cognition & Attribution: Criticisms of Classic Attribution Theories These models thus far have had little to say about the social, interactive, and cultural context within which causal attributions are made � Attribution theory has therefore been criticized for being predominantly an individualistic theory � › Requiring a greater social perspective � Several social psychologists have attempted to develop a more social account of attributions

Social Identity Theory and Attributions The extraordinary events of September 11, 2001 – the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington – will undoubtedly be remembered as one of the most politically salient and defining events at the beginning of the 21 st century � These attacks and their graphic portrayal on television (as they occurred in real time) stunned the world �

Social Identity Theory and Attributions The research on spontaneous attributions would suggest that such a negative and unexpected event is likely to generate considerable attributional activity � Indeed, as the enormity and significance of the attacks began to sink in, people tried to make sense of this event by looking for reasons as to why it occurred � › Why would a group of individuals plan and execute such a brazen act of mass murder and suicide by flying planes into tall buildings?

Social Identity Theory and Attributions � Here is how Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of Britain, attempted to make sense of this event in a speech he delivered the day following September 11, 2001: › “The world knows the full evil and capability of international terrorism which menaces the whole of the democratic world. The terrorists responsible have no sense of humanity, of mercy, or of justice. To commit acts of this nature requires a fanaticism and wickedness that is beyond our normal comprehension. ”

Social Identity Theory and Attributions � Over time, of course, we have been provided with a range of explanatory accounts, by a variety of expert sources including other world leaders, politicians, the media, and social analysts › These explanations included accounts such as that of Tony Blair that attributed the cause(s) of September 11 primarily to the religious fanaticism and extremism of “evil” terrorists › Accounts that attributed the cause(s) to geopolitical factors and the current state of international relations � Importantly, people’s attributions for this significant event were not arrived at simply through a solitary cognitive process of information processing: › People’s social, cultural and political identifications significantly shaped their causal analysis and response to the events of September 11

Social Identity Theory and Attributions �A social identity, or intergroup, approach to attributions examines: › How group memberships, social identifications, and intergroup relations affect the sorts of attributions people make � Although we will discuss this work in more detail later in the chapters on stereotyping and prejudice › Here we will cover what Pettigrew (1979) has coined the “ultimate attribution error”

Social Identity Theory and Attributions: The “Ultimate Attribution Error” � Pettigrew combined the fundamental attribution error and Allport’s classical work on intergroup relations: › Formulated an analysis of how prejudice shapes intergroup “misattributions” � Pettigrew (1979) noted how people typically make attributions that: › Favor and protect the group to which they belong (ingroup) › Derogate groups to which they do not belong (outgroup) � The title of the universal attribution error was meant partly as a joke about the rather grand title Ross gave to the FAE › It’s very unlikely that anything in the social sciences deserves the label “fundamental” › Thus, Pettigrew names this ingroup serving and outgroup derogating attributional pattern the “ultimate attribution error”

Social Identity Theory and Attributions: The “Ultimate Attribution Error” � When a person is confronted with an obviously positive behavior committed by a member of a disliked outgroup › That person will have trouble reconciling this with their negative stereotype of the group › And is unlikely to make a dispositional attribution � This positive outgroup behavior is likely to be explained away or dismissed as either being: › Due to external situational pressures OR › Due to the exceptional and thus unrepresentative nature of the outgroup member In contrast, negative behavior by an outgroup member will be attributed to stereotypic dispositions and traits that are associated with the outgroup � This pattern of attributions is completely reversed for ingroup behavior � › Positive ingroup behavior is attributed to dispositional traits › Negative ingroup behavior is attributed to external situational factors

Social Identity Theory and Attributions: The “Ultimate Attribution Error” Indeed studies from around the world have demonstrated what may be a universal, certainly a pervasive, self-serving and ethnocentric pattern in the way we see and explain the events around us � These studies will be discussed in detail in chapter 7 � But we will discuss one interesting study regarding the real world of intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland �

Social Identity Theory and Attributions: The “Ultimate Attribution Error” � Hunter, Stringer, and Watson (1991): simple study demonstrating the social psychological processes underlying the markedly different perceptions of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland › Gathered newsreel footage of Catholic and Protestant violence in Northern Ireland � One scene showed a Protestant attack on a Catholic funeral � The other scene showed two soldiers in a car being attacked by a group of Catholics › Both scenes had been rated as being comparable in their degree of violent content by a sample of Spanish and German foreign exchange students › Then the two clips were shown to Catholic and Protestant students at the University of Ulster (located in Northern Ireland) � The clips were shown without sound to control for any possible effects of media bias › Students were then asked to “explain in their own words what they thought was happening in the videos, and why they thought those involved had behaved as they had” › Students’ reasons for the behavior of the people shown in the video were coded as either an internal or an external attribution

Social Identity Theory and Attributions: The “Ultimate Attribution Error” � Catholic students: › Causes of violent acts committed by Catholics were viewed as being somewhere in the situation (21 vs. 5) › Causes of violent acts committed by Protestants were viewed as being caused by dispositional factors (19 vs. 5) � Protestant students: › Causes of violent acts committed by Protestants viewed as situational (15 vs. 6) › Causes of violent acts committed by Catholics viewed as dispositional (15 vs. 6) � Yet the two groups were watching the same acts of the same people which had been judged to be equal in violence Pattern of internal and external attributions Catholic violence Catholic students Protestant violence Protestant students Catholic students Protestant students Attribution Internal 5 15 19 6 External 21 6 5 15

Social Identity Theory and Attributions: The “Ultimate Attribution Error” � The behavior of participants in the Hunter et al. experiment isn’t unusual › Studies of this type demonstrate that social perception, especially in situations involving partisanship, is rarely, if ever, neutral and dispassionate › Also, the possibility of ever being able to find a single “true” account of social “reality” is highly questionable � These studies also suggest that differential attributions of this kind for ingroup and outgroup violence are probably linked to the maintenance and perpetuation of intergroup conflict › External attributions for violence committed by ingroup members by both groups may serve to justify violence committed by one’s own group and to view it as legitimate � Further, internal attributions for the other group’s violence may perpetuate hostilities and perhaps even lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy › Members of the outgroup come to act in ways the ingroup expects

Social Identity Theory and Attributions: Group Differences in Explanations for Social Issues A considerable body of research has indicated that social groups prefer different explanations for a range of social issues and problems (ex. Poverty and unemployment) � Explanations for these social issues are linked to political identifications and voting behavior � Ex. In Britain � › Conservatives rate individualistic explanations for poverty and unemployment as more important than Labor voters › Labor voters rate societal-structural factors as more important � Explanations are therefore not purely cognitive phenomena › But, are collectively shared by those with similar political and social identities

Social Representations and Attributions How do social representations affect attribution processes and outcomes? � If we accept that explanations for everyday events and experiences are social phenomena, which are negotiated and communicated during social interaction � › Then, we require an approach that emphasizes the contents of social knowledge › Enter social representations theory

Social Representations and Attributions � Like attribution theory, social representations theory also emphasizes the fundamental human need to understand explain events in everyday life › Difference: �Attribution theory seeks to identify the internal cognitive processes involved in making causal explanations �Social representations theory seeks to locate these causal attributions not in individual minds, but in the cultural meaning systems embodied by social representations � So, both theories emphasize the importance of explanation in social life › But, the two theories are articulated at different levels of analysis � Unlike traditional attribution theory, social representations theory emphasizes the social and collective nature of explanations

Social Representations and Attributions � Moscovici and Hewstone have proposed that social representations should be viewed as the foundations on which attributions are built › “A theory of social causality is a theory of our imputations and attributions, associated with a representation… any causal explanation must be viewed within the context of social representations and is determined thereby. ” � Meaning that, when we attribute causality, our attribution stems from an overall social representation › And thus, any attribution we make has to be viewed in the context of the social representation it came from

Social Representations and Attributions � In a similar vein, Lalljee and Abelson (1983) suggest a “knowledge structure” approach to attribution › Well-learned consensual structures, like highly organized event schemas or scripts, do not usually evoke causal explanations because people expect the sequence of events that occur › People’s prior expectations, beliefs knowledge or schemas will determine what parts of social information we need an attribution for �Information that is consistent with a person’s schema or representation won’t require an in-depth search for causality, because that information is expected and therefore automatically processed �In contrast, information that is inconsistent with expectations or existing knowledge will require a more detailed search to an explanation � Ex. The Walmart greeter scenario › The greeter is nice, polite, and helpful = expected and processed automatically › The greeter is mean and insulting = need to know why the greeter acted this way, thus attributional processes are needed

Social Representations and Attributions “… social representations impose a kind of automatic explanation. Causes are singled out and proposed prior to a detailed search for and analysis of information. Without much active thinking, people’s explanations are determined by their social representations” � The social function of such automatic explanations is that they are learned and thus socially communicated through language � It is suggested that the use of cultural hypotheses to explain behavior and events can be regarded as a kind of “socialized processing” � › Culturally agreed upon explanations eventually become common-sense explanations › Each society has its own culturally and socially sanctioned explanation or range of explanations for phenomena such as illness, poverty, failure, success, and violence � Point being, people don’t always need to engage in an active cognitive search for explanations for all forms of behavior and events › Instead, people can use their socialized processing for social representations

Social Representations and Attributions: Social Origins of the FAE The study of perceived causality in attribution theory is primarily concerned with what passes as everyday social explanation � There are 2 kinds of attributions central to attribution theory: dispositional (personal) and situational (contextual) � These 2 types of explanation correspond to what has been referred to as “individual” and “social” principles � Earlier we discussed one of the most consistent findings in attribution research: the FAE � › We also discussed that this bias has primarily been explained by cognitive and perceptual factors (like the dominance of the actor in the perceptual field) › But, we also talked about how others have suggested that this bias may be due to our individualistic culture

Social Representations and Attributions: Social Origins of the FAE The importance of individualism specific to liberal democratic societies and, most particularly, in American social, cultural, and political life, has been emphasized by political philosophers � Ex. Lukes (1973) pointed out how political, economic, religious, ethical, epistemological, and methodological domains have been filled with individualist principles � › Liberal individualism’s central principles emphasize the importance of the individual over and above society, and view the individual as the center of all action and processes � This representation of the person may seem pretty self-evident and not particularly controversial, But, the anthropologist Geertz emphasizes its uniqueness: › “The western conceptions of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures. ” � Meaning that the emphasis on individualism in western culture is odd given that the majority of societies around the globe don’t think this way

Social Representations and Attributions: Social Origins of the FAE � If, indeed, attributions and explanations are grounded in social knowledge › Then, cultural variations in the representation of the person should yield cross-cultural differences in the prevalence of person attributions � The overcomplicated point the authors of this textbook are trying to make: › The focus on individualism in western society, which is part of our social representations, is not the general view of the rest of the world › Emphasis on individualism leads to more personal attributions and less situational attributions › So, if attributions do stem from social knowledge, or social representations, cultures that place emphasis on individualism should make different attributions from cultures than do not › Thus, there should be differences in prevalence of personal attributions between cultures � Supporting research…

Social Representations and Attributions: Culture and Attributions � Before any research was specifically designed to examine cultural influences on attributions: › Developmental research had found a significant tendency for dispositional attributions to increase with age in western cultures �Young western children predominantly make references to contextual factors to explain social behavior �Western adults are more likely to stress dispositional characteristics of the actor › Anthropologists had also found that: �Non-western adults place less emphasis on the dispositional characteristics of the agent and more emphasis on the contextual or situational factors, compared to western adults

Social Representations and Attributions: Culture and Attributions � At first, social psychologists didn’t attempt to explain these differences in a social way › Rather, they tried to explain them in terms of individual cognition and experience � Ex. Early explanation of why young children don’t make dispositional attributions › Young children have a limited cognitive capacity to make dispositional attributions because it requires the cognitive competence to generalize behavioral regularities over time › It was argued that children did not acquire the cognitive capacity to do this until they were older � Similarly, it was argued that non-western adults are less likely to make dispositional attributions because the cognitive capacity to do so is more likely to be associated with the experience of living in complex modernized societies

Social Representations and Attributions: Culture and Attributions � Joan Miller was among the first social psychologists to point out that these explanations disregard the possibility that developmental and cultural differences may: › “result from divergent cultural conceptions of the person acquired over development in the two cultures rather than from cognitive or objective experiential differences between attributors” � Cultural differences › Western notions of the person are essentially individualistic, emphasizing the centrality and autonomy of the individual actor in all action › Non-western notions of the person tend to be holistic, stressing the interdependence between the individual and his/her surroundings � Developmental/age differences › Reflect the enculturation process – the gradual process by which children adopt the dominant conception of the person within their culture

Social Representations and Attributions: Culture and Attributions � � Miller’s 1984 research does support this theory Cross-cultural study comparing the attributions made for prosocial and deviant behaviors › American vs. Indian Hindu › Sample: 8, 11, and 15 year olds, and a group of adults (mean age = 40. 5 years) � Results: › At older ages, Americans made significantly more references to dispositions (M = 40%) than did Hindus (M < 20%) �Most of the dispositions referred to personality characteristics of the actor › There were no significant differences that distinguished the responses of 8 -11 year old American children from the responses of Hindu children (difference was an average of 2%)

Social Representations and Attributions: Culture and Attributions Cultural and developmental patterns of dispositional attribution Proportion of references to dispositions 0. 4 0. 35 0. 3 0. 25 Americans 0. 2 Indian Hindus 0. 15 0. 1 0. 05 0 8 11 15 Adult

Social Representations and Attributions: Culture and Attributions � Within each culture developmental trends indicated a significant linear age increase in reference to: › General dispositions among Americans › Context among the Hindus, emphasis on social roles and patterns of interpersonal relationships � These attributional patterns reflect Indian cultural conceptions › Emphasis on locating a person, object, or event in relation to someone or something else � Ex. Explanations given by an American and a Hindu participant regarding a story about an attorney who, after a motorcycle accident, left his injured passenger in a hospital without consulting with the doctor while he went on to work › American: “The driver is obviously irresponsible (disposition). The driver is aggressive in pursuing career success (disposition). › Hindu: “It was the driver’s duty to be in court for the client whom he’s representing (context). The passenger might not have looked as serious as he was (context/aspects of another person).

Social Representations and Attributions: Culture and Attributions More recent cross-cultural studies have generally confirmed Miller’s cultural hypothesis � It appears that the tendency to overrate personal/dispositional factors of the agent in western adults cannot be completely explained by cognitive and experiential interpretations � The attribution “bias” may not simply be a cognitive property or universal law of psychological functioning � › It may be culture-specific � Though the agent of action tends to dominate the perceptual field for Americans › The “person” does not seem to enjoy the same degree of perceptual dominance among non-western people

Social Representations and Attributions: Lay Explanations for Social Issues � It’s clear that attributions or lay explanations for behavior and events are not only the outcome of internal cognitive processes › Rather, they are social phenomena that are based on widely held and shared beliefs in the form of social and collective representations � Hewstone (1989) suggested the concept of an “attributing society” – our tendency to seek explanations within our predominant cultural framework

Social Representations and Attributions: Lay Explanations for Social Issues � Our explanations for social phenomena are shaped not only by culture but also by scientific and expert knowledge › The diffusion and popularization of scientific concepts throughout society is occurring at a rapid rate through the mass media › Increasingly, expert knowledge contributes to the stock of common sense which people draw upon to understand social reality › Thus, people can be regarded as “amateur” scientists, “amateur” economists, “amateur” psychologists, etc. , as they draw upon this information to explain a range of phenomena �Such as the causes of cancer, economic depression, or problems in personal relationships › Some of this knowledge becomes an integral part of mass culture and, ultimately, what will come to be regarded as “common sense”

Social Representations and Attributions: Lay Explanations for Social Issues The attributions that people make for societal events such as social issues provide us with rich insight into a society’s prevailing explanations or meaning systems � Research on causal attributions for social issues has included everyday explanations for poverty, unemployment, riots, and health and illness � Research has found that people in western industrialized societies are more likely to attribute poverty to individualist-dispositional causes, such as lack of effort and laziness, than situational-societal causes � › People primarily hold the poor responsible for their dilemma › In contrast, unemployment is predominantly attributed to social and structural causes such as economic recession and government policies