Assessing the Military Benefits of NEC Using a

Assessing the Military Benefits of NEC Using a Generic Kill. Chain Approach David Nevell Qineti. Q Malvern 21 ISMOR September 2004

Context Providing a quantified example of the benefits that Network Enabled Capability (NEC) will bring to Network Enabled Fires (NEF) by: • Analysing a specific NEF kill chain • Conducting a more general analysis using multiple generic NEF kill chains A secondary aim is to develop an approach that could be used more generally to address benefits that NEC may bring to military missions. For the purposes of this work Network Enabled Fires is defined as: "The exploitation of network enabled capability to flexibly utilise ISR, C 2 and effectors from land, sea and air to synchronise fires in time, space and purpose".

Approach Understand NEC & NEF Concepts Benefits Analysis (single Kill Chain) • Qualitative benefits Develop NEF Architectures • Initial • Transitional • Mature System Performance & Military Effectiveness Dynamic Analysis (single & multiple KCs) • Quantitative analysis Identify Metrics Develop Dynamic & Benefits Models

Requirements of Single Kill Chain The kill chain was created to ensure that it satisfied the following requirements: • • • Tactical participation by multiple components Effect against time sensitive target Involvement of UK only assets High degree of mission complexity High degree of communications complexity

Elements of Single Kill Chain Harrier GR 7/9 Satellite AWACS CVS JFAC HQ Phoenix GCS MLRS Phoenix BCP IDM MLRS DFDC Enemy FARP Div HQ SAM Launchers Formation Recce RHQ Formation Recce

Need for a Multiple Kill Chain model • Output from single Kill Chain model was restricted to: – overall process times – slack times – critical paths • The multiple Kill Chain model provides a richer environment in which; – a wider range of dynamic metrics can be analysed (e. g. concurrent Kill Chains allow aspects of co-ordination, synchronisation and competition) – resources can be limited to more realistically reflect the context of a wider battlespace (variable battlespace activity) – longer simulations allow a representative steady state to be reached which is not dependent on specific starting conditions – more complex event-based rules can be used to better model aspects of subjective decision making

Modelling Issues • Lack of credible or verifiable data for medium/far term – Develop generic approach that is not dependent on precise data – Make comparative rather than absolute evaluations – Present results in terms of trade-offs (assuming x --> implies y) – Use consistent and generic assumptions across epochs • Difficulty in measuring costs and benefits – Need to find measurable outputs that best capture the key metrics (timeliness, utilisation, flexibility, synchronisation) – Metrics will be based in the “modelling world” • Difficulty in representing decision making processes – Need to use simple rules and be consistent

Generic Breakdown of Functions Networked Fires Functions Inform Gain Exploit Collection Assets Command Analyse Secure Data Exploit Disseminate Data Operate Disseminate Maintain

Generic NEF Kill-Chain Generic NEF (Last updated 08/08/03) Gain Analyse © copyright Qineti. Q Ltd 2003 Confidence Exploit Disseminate Maintain Qineti. Q in GII COMMAND Battlespace Management Apply Effects Secure Data Disseminate Data Collate Data Create Information Create intelligence products Disseminate intelligence products Access relevant information SA Analyse and develop options Co-ordinate Resources to achieve desired effects Choose COA (1) Task attack asset Preparation of attack asset Analyse and develop options Co-ordinate Resources to achieve desired effects Choose COA (2) Task attack asset Preparation of attack asset Deconfliction of Battlespace Decide appropriate ISTAR asset Detailed planning Disseminate planning & deconfliction information Transistion to target Request deconfliction Deconfliction of Battlespace Task ISTAR asset Deconfliction of Battlespace Transit to target Detailed planning Disseminate planning & deconfliction information Transistion to target Secure Data Disseminate Data Collate Data Create Information Create intelligence products Disseminate intelligence products Confirm decision to engage target Disseminate engagement information Secure BDA Data Disseminate BDA Data Engage target to achieve desired effects Collate BDA Data Confirm decision to engage target Engage target to achieve desired effects Disseminate engagement information Secure BDA Data Disseminate BDA Data Collate BDA Data Manoeuvre

Elements of the Generic Kill-Chain ISTAR Execution and Exploitation Access relevant information Analysis and choice of COA Analyse and develop options Co-ordinate Resources to achieve desired effects Choose COA (1) Task attack asset Secure Data Disseminate Data Collate Data Create Information Create intelligence products Disseminate intelligence products Preparation of attack asset Attack Transistion to target Decide appropriate ISTAR asset ISTAR Planning Request deconfliction Deconfliction of Battlespace Task ISTAR asset Transit to target Engage target to achieve desired effects Choose COA (2) Disseminate engagement information BDA Deconfliction of Battlespace Secure BDA Data Detailed planning Disseminate BDA Data Disseminate planning & deconfliction information Collate BDA Data Planning and deconfliction • The kill-chain is constructed from generic elements • The elements can be used to construct other kill-chains

Generic Kill Chain - factors (1) Driven by changes to NEC across epochs • ISR assets and effectors – types, resource levels • Targets – types, generation rates • Suitability of ISR assets and effectors against targets. A function of: – resource capability – target behaviour (e. g. self defence) – terrain – depth – mobility – proximity of sensitive targets – existing ISR information

Generic Kill Chain - factors (2) • Process times – minima – maxima – distribution type • Background battlespace activity • C 2 structure – number of components – connectivity • Quality of SA – access to correct information during simulation

Multiple kill chain model - detail MISSIONS Other battlespace activity Component 2 ISR ASSETS Component 3 ISR ASSETS Component 1 2 CELL 3 CELL INTERACT Component 2 2 CELL 3 CELL Component 3 2 CELL 3 CELL Component 1 COMMAND & CONTROL ISR ASSETS COMMAND & CONTROL Component 1 EFFECTOR S Component 2 EFFECTOR S Component 3 EFFECTOR S

Multiple Kill Chain model - metrics • Distributions of process and overall Kill Chain times (TIME) • Synchronisation between engaging related and primary targets (CO-ORDINATION) • Degree of choice available when choosing assets (FLEXIBILITY) • Utilisation/loading of resources (OPTIMALITY) – ISR assets, effectors – Cells • Suitability of assets used against targets (ISR and effector) (MISSION SUCCESS)

Presentation of Results Diagrammatic only Time Percentage 30. 00 Improvement (%) 20. 00 Co-ordination Time between engaging targets Optimality Utilisation 10. 00 Mission Success Number of first choices of assets Flexibility Choice of asset type

Summary • Single kill chain provided necessary context for addressing problem and eliciting baseline information • Extension to multiple kill chain model was necessitated by need to address more complex issues (e. g. concurrency) • Lack of detailed information about future epochs led to adoption of generic kill chain approach • Generic kill chain made up of re-usable sub-chains which are functionally (not organisationally) based • Analyses comparative, not absolute • Results presented in terms of high level metrics and their tradeoffs

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