Approaches to EU regional integration Regional Integration Module

Approaches to EU regional integration Regional Integration Module of Political Science Lecture 2

Schmitter-Malamud 2010 • All theories of European integration can be placed on a two dimensional property space formed by two variables : • ONTOLOGY • EPISTEMOLOGY

ONTOLOGY • Refers to the difference between theories that assume a process that reproduces the existing characteristics of the member states and the interstate system of which they are a part, and theories that assume a process that transforms the nature of sovereign nation states and their relations with each other

EPISTEMOLOGY • Refers to the fact that, in gathering evidence to monitor these processes some theories focus primarly on dramatic political events (ex: treaties) while other theories focus on prosaic socio-economic-cultural exchanges

GREAT EVENTS R E P R O D U C T I V E T R A N F O R M A T I V E GRADUAL PROCESSES Regulationism Realism Intergoverm’sm Fusion thesis Liberal Intergoverm’sm INSTITUTIONALISM Policy network analysis Historical Rational l choice MULTI-LEVEL (polycentric) GOVERNANCE Socio logical Neo-neo-functionalism CONSTITUTIONALIZATION Incremental federalism Federalism Schmitter, Malamud (2010) Neo-functionalism Functionalism

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (A. Moravsick) Shares the premise of realism that states are the actors in processes of regional integration. Proposes a two-stage theory to explain regional integration expecially the big decisions (grand bargains) treaties (The choice for Europe, 1998). 1° stage- a liberal (pluralistic) theory of the formation of state’s preferences 2° stage- an intergovernmentalist theory of states’ bargaining

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (A. Moravsick) Stage 1 – State’s preferences formation: demand of integration A liberal (pluralistic) theory of state’s preference formation National preferences arise in the domestic politics of nation states , from the competition among national interest groups for political influence on the government. : national preferences are the consequences of state-society interactions. Departure from traditional realism : states’ preferences, that guide states’rational behaviour in negotiations, are not fixed but depend on dynamic political processes in the domestic polity. The most important preferences are socio-economic Ex: CAP, Single Market and Single European Act

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (A. Moravsick) Stage 2 - Interstate bargaining Rational actors in a particular bargaining environment: 1) The situation is not coercitive: states enter volountary in the negotiation and the decision rule is unanimity. 2) The situation is information- rich : there is a widespread knowledge of the technicalities of the EU policymaking and states have a lot information on other state’s preferences. 3) The transactions costs are low because the time-frame of negotiations is long and because there is a wide possibility for issue-linkages, trade-offs and subbargains (multi-issue nature of EU cooperation)

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM Stage 2 - Interstate bargaining What explains the outcomes of the bargainings? Asymmetrical interdependence is the main factor. Some states have more at stake than others and are more willing to reach an agreement and more prepared to make concessions. 3 facors are likely to influence the outcomes: 1. The value of alternative policy alternatives , relative to the status quo, which underlies credible threats to veto (generates pressures to agree on the recalcitrant state) 2. The value of alternative coalitions which underlies credible threat to exclude (even more powerful pressure on recalcitrant states ) 3. The opportunities for issue linkage or side-payments which underlie pakage deals Those who desire more the benefits of cooperation will concede more to get them. The limits are in domestic policy: concessions : may create domestic loosers and this limits the states’ willingness to concede. Role of supranational organization (Commission or Court of Justice very limited)

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (A. Moravsick) Outocomes : don’t trascend the nation state; the nation state is not fundamentally transformed. Regional integration may re-inforce the nation state (A. Milward, The European rescue of the nation state)

LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM Critiques 1. Focuses only on “history making decisions” , neglecting ordinary, day-today, policy decisions 2. Overlooks the role of supra-national actors (European Commission, European Court of Justice)

GREAT EVENTS R E P R O D U C T I V E T R A N F O R M A T I V E GRADUAL PROCESSES Regulationism Realism Intergoverm’sm Fusion thesis Liberal Intergoverm’sm INSTITUTIONALISM Policy network analysis Historical Rational l choice MULTI-LEVEL (polycentric) GOVERNANCE Socio logical Neo-neo-functionalism CONSTITUTIONALIZATION Incremental federalism Federalism Schmitter, Malamud (2010) Neo-functionalism Functionalism

NEOFUNCTIONALISM Born in the 50 s in an “exceptional political context”(Rosamond) inauguration of the European Communities Monnet’s Strategy of integration in limited but yet crucial functional sectors (CSC 1950) mirrored in some key assumptions of NF functionalism and incrementalism rather than federalism and comprehensive planning (Haas 1958) Part of the behavioural revolution in social sciences : testable ipothesis. Departure from early functionalist approaches in IR (Mitrany) because it focus not only on functional pressure but also on the purposeful actors pursuing their own self-interest. Influenced by the pluralist paradigm in American political science (Dahl, Schattscneider, Bentley, Truman, Polsby, Downs, Lipset) on the role of interest groups

NEOFUNCTIONALISM Early theorizing: E. Haas, The uniting of Europe (1958) L. Lindberg, The political dynamics of European economic integration (1963) E. Has, Beyond the nation-state (1964)

Regionalism-Regional integration (def. ) • Haas(1961) “process of how and why nation states volountary mingle, merge and mix with their neibourghs so as to loose the factual attributes of sovereignity while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts among themselves • + (Schmitter 2004) “by creating common and permanent institutions capable of making decisions binding on all members” • TRANSFORMATION OF STATES

Neo-functionalism Fundamental logic of NF explanation (Rosamond 2000): Two or more states agree to work for integration in an economic sector A and to do so appoint some supra-national burocratic agency. While integration in A produce some of the expected benefits, the full advantages of integration can’t be achived until economic sectors closely linked with A are also drawn in the integrative process. This mechanism is called spill over (functional spill over): integration in one economic sector create functional pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that sector and for greater authoritative capacity at the European level. The main drive of integration (in terms of pressures for both broadening and deepening regional integration ) resides in the functional interdependence between economic sectors. Ex: coal and steel (ECSC) single market-environment Single-market -transports But: single market- social policy?

NEOFUNCTIONALISM – POLITICAL SPILL OVER Along with functional pressure, integration is also driven by the actions of deliberate integrationseeking agents. Namely : -Interest groups ( trans-national interest groups) -Supra-national burocracies (High Authority, Commission)

POLITICAL SPILL OVER: INTEREST GROUPS Since economic integration generates an increase in transactions between actors in the integrated region the pressure of interest groups tends to shift from the national to the regional level and new transnational interest groups are formed and pressure for further integration. This regards in particular producers’ interests: COPA (1958) UNICE (1958) But: ETUC only in the 70 s ; transnational groups are organizationally weak Multi-level rather than shifted pressure politics

POLITICAL SPILL OVER: THE ROLE OF SUPRANATIONAL BUROCRACIES They become the first sponsor or further regional integration. They develop strategies to promote deeper integration in a larger range of economic sectors and for an increased institutionalization of authority at the regional level. They do so emphasizing the advantages of further functional integration and sponsoring the emergence of transnational pressure groups. The logic is one of beurocratic politics (Downs 1964) : beurocracy’s main interests are the expansion of their competences and power and their budgets ; the main resources they have are technical skills, information and strategic capabilities (to forge coalitions of actors)

POLITICAL SPILL OVER: THE ROLE OF SUPRANATIONAL BUROCRACIES 2 Leon Lindberg has specified the prerequisites of a supranational authority to perform an integrative role. Regional institutions are indespensable. They must have competences that go beyond those typical of the Secretariats of international organizations, including the capacity to initiate social and economic processes. Their tasks should be inherently expansive : they are not effective if they not generate tensions that could be solved only with further action and they must have the ability to attract new actors in their politics.

Political spill over –Impacts on the domestic level Given the benefits of integration, interest groups pressure on national governments for further integration. Technocrats at the state level (high civil servants , economists in Ministries and the Central Bank etc. ) are aware of the linkages and increasing transactions emerging at the regional level. They also pressure on governments for further integration.

Epistemic communities and spill over (Haas) “Epistemic communities are associations of professional experts in a particular field who, because of the knowledge they have, have an unusual influence on politicians and bureaucrats, and are, therefore, able to penetrate government departments and make their ideas part of policy. . . They only operate in fields of policy where science matters. In the field of human rights, forget it. . . In environmental politics, it matters a great deal” Mediators of spill over

SPILL OVER –Def. Central mechanism is therefore functional spill over: Lindberg (1963) best known definition of SO “A situation in which a given action related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth”

SPILL OVERSpill over intrinsically expansive logic governing processes of regional integration. Prerequisite for spill-over to emerge is: - That the m. s. economies are already reasonably interdependent prior to the initiation of the integration process (may not be the case outside Europe). - Haas specifies that to set in motion this process the sectors initially integrated must have some characteristics: some sectors have more spill over potential than others (low politics with a direct impact on people lives) (ex: Coal and Steel in Europe 1950 vs European Community for Defence which failed in 1954 )

Spill over and integration The interpretation of regional integration of neo-functionalists seems to describe (and predict) a linear progressive phenomenon : once started dynamics will be set in place to continue the original impetus. The development of European integration between 1950 and the mid-Sixties seemed to confirm this interpretation

Critiques to early neofunctionalism It’s a n=1 , ad hoc , theory explaining only the case of European integration not a general theory of regional integration. It’s deterministic, the idea of spill-over postulates a sort of automatic process, an in-built mechanism , leading from integration to further integration. It has been empirically disconfirmed by the evolution of European integration after 1965: the “crisis of the empty chairs” and the backlash of the nation state.

Revision of functionalism : neo-neo functionalism and the contribution of P. Schmitter (1969 - 2010) P. Schmitter has worked to integrate the idea of spill over in a framework focusing on a plurality of possible actors strategies and spelling out the conditions in which these strategies would be employed. Main effort to produce a general theory of integration building on the European experience

Neo-neo-functionalism • What makes the difference is what neoand neo-neo functionalism tries to specify. • Its answer to whether “spill-over” into new tasks or level of authority will occur is: it depends! Not that it has to happen or that it will automatically happen

• Any comprehensive theory of integration should potentially be a theory of disintegration. • It should not only explain why countries decide to coordinate their efforts across a wider range of tasks and delegate more authority to common institutions, but also why they do not do so or why, having done so, they decide to defect from such arrangements. • (Schmitter 2005)

Crises and “critical junctures” Integration process are not conceived anymore as linear. It depends on how crises are perceived and on the strategies adopted by actors to solve them.

Spill over? Not necessairly so… • If …as a result of the consequences of trying to reach these initial objectives, the performance of the regional organization is inadequate, actors may be forced to revise their strategies and to consider alternative integrative obligations, i. e. , they may re-evaluate the level and/or scope of their commitment to regional institutions and they may even come adopt a new set of common objectives, e. g. change from economic to political integration. “Transcendence” has been accomplished in the exotic lexicon of this theory. • This particular “success syndrome” is only one of several possible outcomes … and not a very probable one at that. They might just as well have chosen to “spillback”… and withdraw from their original objective, downgrading their commitment tomutual cooperation.

Neo-neo-functionalism: alternative actors’ strategies Strategy Definition Increase both the scope and level of an actor Spillover committment Spill-around Increasing only the scope while holding the level of authority constant Buildup Agree to increase the decisional autonomy of joint institutions but deny them entrance into new issue areas Retrench Increase the level of decision but reduce the scope (debate on subsidiarity) Muddle-about Let the regional beurocrats debate: suggest and expostulate on a variety of issues but decrease their capacity to allocate values (soft law) Spill back Retreat on level and scope of authority (perhaps reverting to the status quo prior to integration) Encapsulate Respond to the crisis by marginal modifications

Neo-neo-functionalism • Nevertheless, these neo-versions postulate an underlying sequence (admittedly of indeterminate length) whereby organizational roles, efforts at collective action, and actor conceptions of interest shift from the national to the supranational level. • This does not happen “automatically, ” as in the original model, but requires a considerable amount of political action and that is usually associated with a crisis in the integration process. Its previous functioning has failed to meet expectations, generated a distribution of benefits that is not voluntarily acceptable and/or produced negative externalities that can no longer be ignored. • Regardless of their initial intentions (and what they have placed in the documentary record), the national actors have to reassess the level and scope of their regional institutions. • They can, of course, decide to withdraw from joint obligations (“spillback”) or they could try to survive without changing institutions (“muddleabout”), but the macro-hypothesis of neo- and neo-neofunctionalist theory is that, under certain conditions, they will prefer to resolve these crises by expanding their mutual obligations (“spill-over”), rather than contracting or just reasserting them.

GREAT EVENTS R E P R O D U C T I V E T R A N F O R M A T I V E GRADUAL PROCESSES Regulationism Realism Intergoverm’sm Fusion thesis Liberal Intergoverm’sm INSTITUTIONALISM Policy network analysis Historical Rational l choice MULTI-LEVEL (polycentric) GOVERNANCE Socio logical Neo-neo-functionalism CONSTITUTIONALIZATION Incremental federalism Federalism Schmitter, Malamud (2010) Neo-functionalism Functionalism

Regulationism, Fusion theory, Policy network Focus on policy-making EU as “regulatory state” (Majone) Institutional fusion or networks of actors in policy making No fundamental changes in the nature of nations states

Institutionalism A group of approaches; presently the mainstream literature on the EU is institutionalistm. They are mid-range theories rather than grand theories, focusing on the political process and its outcomes rather than on “the nature of the beast”(Risse) (trasformation of the state or not) : which justifies placing them in the middle of the diagram.

Institutionalism A number of versions of institutionalism that share a common premise “institutions matter” But differ in the definition of institutions and their role. Various typologies of institutionalism. Most commonly referred to is P. Hall’s, which distinguishes 3 types: -rational choice institutionalism -historical institutionalism -sociological institutionalism

rational choice institutionalism Conceives institutions (formal rules and operating practices) as systems of constraints and opportunities for the strategies of rational actors. Es. M. Pollack on supranational institutions Tsebelis on veto points F. Scharpf (and the MP school) Actor centered institutionalism

Historical institutionalism “history matters” Central concepts are “path dependence” and “increasing returns” Explains inertia (of institutions or policies) better than change

What is “Path dependence”? I eat my peas with honey. I’ve done it all my life. It makes ’em taste quite funny, but it keeps them on the knife. – an old Bostonian jump roping rhyme. (Page , 2006) “Path dependence” counters the idea of functional adaptation of an institution or a policy

Path dependence-def. M. LEVI “Path dependence has to mean…that once a country or a region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choices points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal to the initial choice” (1997). Preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movements in the same direction. - this lead to the notion of increasing returns

increasing returns -def. P. Pierson (2000) “In an increasing returns process the probability of certain steps along the same path increase with each move along that path. This is because the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time. To put it in a different way the costs of exit –of switching to some previously plausible alternative-rise. Increasing returns processes can also be described as selfreinforcing or positive feedback processes”

Path dependence in political institutions and policy The status quo bias of political institutions Institutional arrangement are generally hard to change. They are often designed to be difficult to overturn (ex: unanimity rules in the EU; supermajorities to alter Constitutions)

SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM Institutions are intended not only as rules (formal or informal) but also as values, “habits of the heart”, cognitive frames. Normative dimension of institutional impact Actors act not only following a logic of consequences (Powell, Di Maggio) [rational] but also following a logic of “appropriateness”. Processes of institutional socialization and learning.

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE It’s not a theory. Rather is a description of the EU polity. Elaborated on the experience of EU cohesion policy post-1988. Describes the interactions in policy making (both in the policy formulation and the policy implementation phases) of actors situated at supranational-regional levels of government.

EU integration calls for pluralism of approaches • . • Peterson – Bomberg (1999) Type of decision “Best” Theory History making Policy setting Liberal intergovern mentalism Institutional ism Policy shaping Policy network