Alliance in International Relations Prof Jaechun Kim Alliance

Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Alliance in IR v Importance of Alliance in International Relations § v Important element of statecraft Alliance politics has been a common practice in IR § Weak states enter into alliance agreements, when they need protection against strong states. § Strong states form alliances to counter other strong states (to maintain proper balance of power).

Alliance in IR § Therefore, alliance has been a very important subject of research in IR

Defining Alliance v Coalition – “a set of members acting in concert at x time regarding 1 to n issues” (Fedder 1968: 80); Alliances are formed in peace time and coalitions are often found during times of war or crises (Snyder 1990: 106). e. g. , Coalition of the Gulf War in 1993, Coalition of the Willing in 2003 v Alignment – occurs when states bring their policies into close cooperation with other states in order to achieve mutual security (or foreign policy) goals. § Formal alliances strengthen existing alignments or create new ones. § Alliances are subsets of the broader phenomena known as alignments (Snyder 1990: 105).

Defining Alliance v Entente – more flexible association between states (Kann 1976: 611) No firm commitments exist between partners § Simple recognition of the fact that cooperation between them will make sense… cf. Triple Entente before WWI § v Coalition < Alliance < Alignment cf. Entente v Some do use them interchangeably

Theory of Alliance (Formation) v REALIST v Balance THEORY OF ALLIANCE of Power Theory (K. Waltz 1976) States balance against power – “power” is the most important variable § States tend to balance against stronger states § This is to ensure that no one states will dominate the intl system maintenance of balance of power §

Theory of Alliance (Formation) § Two types of balancing • • Internal balancing External balancing – alliance! § Internal balancing is more reliable… ; Alliance is the product of compromise between states § Why not balancing against the US? (Although K. Waltz claimed that the US would be eventually balanced by one or more states… )

Theory of Alliance (Formation) § Bipolar Stability vs. Danger of Multipolarity (K. Waltz) • Alliance pattern is unstable under the multipolarity • Buck-passing and Chain-ganging

v Balance 1987) of Threat Theory (S. Walt § Refinement of Waltzian BOP Theory § Walt adopts Waltzian neorealist framework and agrees that Waltz’s theory is sound, but not sufficient… § States tend to balance against threats rather than against power… power

§ Level of external threats is a function of four factors • • Distribution of capabilities Geographic proximity Offensive capabilities Perceived aggression intentions (S. Walt 1987: 22) perception is the key (constructivism? ) When states don’t feel threatened, they do bandwagon with the strongest state rather than balance against it…! e. g. , Bandwagoning with the US in the post Cold War era § Nonetheless, balancing is far more common than bandwagoning… §

v R. Scheweller (1994) – Balance of Interests § Balancing and bandwagoning are not opposite strategies; states choose them for different reasons! § Balancing is for self-preservation, while bandwagoning is for self-extension (balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses, while bandwagoning is driven by the opportunity for gains (interests)) interests

§ States bandwagon with the stronger side because (or when) it represents the “wave of the future. ” § The presence of a significant external threat is not necessary for states to bandwagon; alliance choices are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger! § The most important determination of alliance decisions is the compatibility of political goals (in IR), not imbalances of power or threat.

v Status-quo countries vs. revisionist countries § Satisfied powers will join the status-quo coalition(alliance), even when it is the stronger side § Dissatisfied powers, motivated by opportunities more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state!

v Two types of bandwagoning § Jackal bandwagoning – ascent of powerful revisionist states or coalition attracts opportunistic revisionist states… § Piling-on bandwagoning – status-quo countries bandwagon with the strongest status -quo state or coalition v Bottom Line – “interests (i. e. , gains)” is an important element of alliance behavior

v Glenn Snyder (1984) – Alliance Security Dilemma § Security dilemma functions within alliances § 2 risks of alliance security dilemma • Risk of abandonment – danger that an ally does not come in help • Risk of entrapment – danger of being dragged into a conflict that alliance partner gets involved in (though that conflict is not in the interests of your country)

§ § Dilemma ! § if a state tries to reduce a risk of abandonment by increasing its alliance commitments, it ends up increasing a risk of entrapment § if a state tries to reduce a risk of entrapment by decreasing its commitments, it ends up increasing a risk of abandonment Alliance security dilemma is more severe in a multipolar than in a bipolar system. Why? (because there a number of plausible realignment options!)

v J. Morrow (1993) – Autonomy-security trade-off model Minor states get security benefits from their major alliance partners at the cost of sacrificing autonomy § Major alliance partners get autonomy benefits at the cost of providing security § Autonomy Security Source: Morrow (1991: 914)

Alliance Transformation in the post-Cold War Era v Realism – if common threats cease to exist, so will the alliance! § Predicted that the Cold War alliances would fall apart § Nonetheless, most of the US Cold War alliances survived the collapse of the Cold War order

v Liberal institutionalists – alliance is an institution! § Alliance takes on a life of its own, adapts to a new environment, and adopts new missions! § e. g. , NATO developed a host of institutional assets that are not just specific to the Soviet threats but general enough to tackle many post-CW security problems!

v Constructivists – identities and values are as much important as threat perceptions! § NATO allies grew to acquire similar values and sense of wefeeling that became the source of durability for alliance partnership. v Case Study: Why do the US Cold War alliances endure in Asia? ; How can we explain the longevity of NATO?