Alessandra Tanesini May 2018 Epistemic Norms A broad

Alessandra Tanesini May 2018

§ Epistemic Norms: A broad conception § The game of asking for and sharing information as an optional practice THE PLAN § Asking and Requesting § Telling and Promising § Telling: The Second Personal Dimension § Gratitude as a motive to cooperate

§ Epistemic Norms as standards of epistemic evaluation § Norms as rules and normative EPISTEMIC NORMS sensibilities governing epistemic practices § Norms in the second sense are epistemic because they govern practices that have an epistemic aim. § The norms themselves may not be concerned directly with epistemic goods but may be instrumental in their promotion.

THE GAME OF ASKING FOR AND GIVING/SH ARING INFORMATI ON § Asking for and giving information is an epistemic practice § Telling which is a way of transferring knowledge or warranted belief is half of this practice. § Figuring out the shape of this practice helps us to understand some aspects of the workings of epistemic communities

§ These are speech acts designed to ASKING FOR INFORMATI ON elicit a telling in response. § They are requests when one is already entitled to ask § They are entreaties combined with requests otherwise § Entreaties serve to gain the entitlement to make requests (Lance & Kukla, 2013; Kukla, 2014). § Some noteworthy features: § Ordinarily we cannot demand that others give us information § When faced with strangers we request permission to make requests § Requests can be legitimately turned down

§ Giving information is often done GIVING/SH ARING INFORMATI ON using the speech act of telling. § A noteworthy feature: § Sharing of information through telling is not compulsory, there is no norm demanding that we do it (in ordinary cases, more on this below)

GIVING/SH ARING INFORMATI ON PARTECIPA TION IS OPTIONAL § Participation in the practice is ordinarily optional (although there are special contexts in which it is not). § There is no obligation to be a truth Samaritan and assist those in epistemic need. § It is not a matter of balancing out a prima facie duty to be epistemically altruistic with other considerations. § This odd since by sharing a piece of information we do not lose it ourselves (non-rivalrous good)

GIVING/SH ARING INFORMATI ON PARTECIPA TION IS OPTIONAL § Solicited testimony: this is the granting of a request § Unsolicited testimony: § a gift when it answers a need § But it can be a nuisance § Solicited and unsolicited helpful testimony generate reactive attitudes of gratitude to the benefactors in their recipients. § Gratitude is an apt response to a favour such as the granting of a request.

§ Gratitude is experienced because GRATITUDE AND GRATEFUL NESS there is no obligation to grant a request (or so it seems, to be epistemically helpful) § Gratitude is a reactive attitude of approval or admiration of a person (for what they did) § Gratitude is only apt for the addressee of the telling § The person in the earshot of the assertion may be grateful for having heard but not really grateful to the teller. § Gratitude fosters goodwill (but also at times indebtedness) and a motive to reciprocate.

THE CONTINGE NCY OF THE VOLUNTARI NESS OF ASKING FOR AND GIVING FOR § We could have had another practice § One in which people can demand information and are obliged to supply it on demand with the following provisos: § Demand can be overridden § Conditional on genuine need § We have the more demanding practice in some professional contexts § Courtroom (subpoena and oath to tell the whole truth)

§ Telling as Invitation to Trust (Hinchman) or as giving an assurance (Moran) § To tell is to entitle the hearer to believe what one is telling them merely in virtue of their recognition that is one's intention. TELLING AS PROMISING § The model is promising because § It generates new entitlements for the promissee and new obligations for the promissor. § These normative statuses are second personal because they are instituted by second-personal relations of making oneself responsible which entitles others to hold one responsible. § If promissee shows that they do not an empirical expectation that promissor delivers, promissor is entitled to feel slighted or insulted § There is a tendency to forget that § A promise need not be accepted

§ Telling as promising that belief in p is TELLING AND GIVING ONE’S WORD safe (because one has the correct epistemic standing in relation to it) § The teller (A) becomes accountable for the safety of believing in p, the addressee (B) becomes entitled to normatively expect that it is. § If it turns out that belief in p is not safe, B legitimately resents A § If B does not take herself to be entitled to belief in p then A is entitled to feel slighted. § Anscombe: it is an insult not to be believed.

§ Contra Hinchman and Moran mere AUTHORIT Y, ACCOUNTA BILITY AND ACCEPTAN CE recognition on the part of the audience that one is trying to make oneself accountable for the safety of believing that p does not secure the entitlement to be trusted that is required if the audience is to be entitled to believe p. § The telling like a promise must also be accepted § So normative statuses of obligation and entitlement are not instituted via mere recognition that one intends to make oneself responsible for the safety of believing that p.

§ However, promises must be accepted to generate AUTHORIT Y, ACCOUNTA BILITY AND ACCEPTAN CE entitlements and obligations and so do tellings. § If so telling as promising requires an independent reason to trust, one that is not generated by the mere recognition of the intention to promise. § No acceptance cases § There are no obligations or entitlements § Partial acceptance cases (Normative expectation without empirical ones) § Cry wolf § B holds A responsible for the safety of believing that p, but does not expect that believing that p is safe and thus has no reason to believe that p is safe. § B holds A responsible for the safety of believing that p but does not take A to be entitled to believe that p.

§ Under the assumption that the promise (that AUTHORIT Y, ACCOUNTA BILITY AND ACCEPTAN CE believing that p is safe) is at least partially accepted. § A (teller) is accountable to B (addressee) for the safety of believing that p (A’s R 1) § B is entitled to censure A if believing that p is not safe (B’s E 1) § A’s undertaking R 1 institutes B’s E 1 (A by making herself accountable institutes B’s entitlement to hold her accountable) § B’s E 1 institutes A’s R 1 (B’s entitlement to censure A institutes A’s responsibility) § B legitimately resents A if belief in p is not safe § A’s R 1 is not a reason for B to believe that p

§ Partial acceptance § A tells B that p but B does not take TELLING WITHOUT TRUST herself to have a reason to believe that p because § Doubts A’s competency § Doubts A’s sincerity § Telling if solicited rules out these possibilities because solicitation creates an obligation to full acceptance. § B should not ask A to share information if B has these doubts § By asking, B grants A the authority of telling (entitlement to be trusted)

§ Under the assumption that the promise (that AUTHORIT Y, ACCOUNTA BILITY AND ACCEPTAN CE believing that p is safe) is wholly accepted. § A is entitled to censure B if B does not acknowledge A’s competence and sincerity with regard to the safety of believing that p (A’s E 1 the entitlement to be trust) § B is accountable to A for acknowledging A’s competence and sincerity with regard to the safety of believing that p (B’s R 1) § B’s acceptance of A’s telling institutes A’s E 1. § A’s E 1 institutes B’s R 1 (because A is entitled to be taken to be sincere and competent by those who accept his telling, B is responsible for taking A to be entitled to normatively expect this). § A’s E 1 gives B a reason to believe that B

AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTA BILITY, RESENTME NT AND INSULT §A is rightly slighted and resentful if B contravenes R 1 §These relations are second -personal §Bystanders to telling are not entitled to resent speakers; speakers are not entitled to feel slighted if not believed by bystanders

§ Asking and telling as two halves ASKING AND TELLING (RECAP) of one practice § Asking is a request for a favour § Asking grants authority to answer. § Telling is to accede to request and to offer an authoritative answer § The speaker is entitled to be treated as trustworthy § Telling is be accountable to questioner for safety of what one tells

§ This practice is structured by ASKING AND TELLING (RECAP) normative expectations which are instituted by second-personal relations § It is characterised by reactive attitudes of participants § Gratitude (if a request is acceded to by means of telling) § Disappointment (if not) § Resentment (if a telling turns out to violate normative expectations) § Insult (if the response to a telling violates normative expectations) § Spectators attitudes include: disappointment, regret, gratefulness for

§ The practice of asking and WHY GRATITUD E? telling is optional because recruitment of the gratitude motive may makes it epistemically more effective. § Ensuring cooperation in one-off encounters with strangers § Gratitude as better incentive than § Sanctions § Resentment § Being the recipient of others’ gratitude is gratifying

§ The motive of gratitude is an TAKE HOME engine of some epistemic practices § Testimony is to be understood as a component of the larger practice of asking for and sharing information where gratitude plays a significant role § The normative expectations which shape this epistemic practice are instituted second -personally.

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