Airport Security Airport Security Outline w Major consideration

Airport Security

Airport Security Outline w Major consideration in Terminal planning and design w Who? What? w History – Why? w How? w Airport Security Program w “Failure of Imagination”

Airport Security w How much delay due to security?

Terminal Design Objectives w Walking distances w Aesthetic design w Services w Security w Cost effectiveness

Flight Interface w Arriving passenger areas w Security w Departure lounges w Corridors w Departure Gates All are important for different reasons, mostly to be more efficient, make more money… But Security is only to protect life/property!

Introduction w Safety vs. Security l l Safety-freedom from unintentional danger, etc. Security-freedom from intentional acts of violence, danger, risk of injury, loss, etc. w Who is/are the problem? l l l Terrorists w Hijackers w Suicide bombers Criminals – “Inside Threat”/Outside job Disruptive Passengers – intentional and not

Introduction w What is the problem? l l Individual attacks to… Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) w Nuclear n Full nuclear detonation to “dirty” bomb w Biological w Chemical w Conventional weapons – large explosives n n Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) Mass attacks with military weapons w Unconventional weapons – large A/C flown into targets…

Introduction w Why airports? l l Vital to a stable economy Important to community operation High density of people – targets Very visible, high profile facilities

History of Airport Security w FAA/TSA regs are written in blood l Crash/incident New regulations w First hijacking - 1930 Lima, Peru l Revolutionaries dropping leaflets w 1930 s to ‘ 55 - Several hijackings l l Eastern Europeans seeking asylum 1 st Fatal ‘ 47 – Romanians killed a crew w 1955 First Major Criminal Act l l Jack Graham blew up A/C, 33 dead Killed his mother for insurance money

Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d) w 1960 First Suicide Bomber l l Again, for a heavy life insurance payout Political/public demand for baggage inspection w Flying down to Cuba- 1959 to ‘ 80 s l l l First hijackings to escape Cuba, then… Hijacking to Cuba for money or politics Political/public demand for Pax screening and hijacker profiling* w 1972 – Southern Airways Flight 49 l l DC-9 diverted LEX, hot refueled, next - Havana December- LEX Pax/carryon screening begins

Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d) w 1972 -Part 107 Fed Aviation Regulations l l l Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage All airports must: w Identify their Air Operations Area (AOA) w ID those areas with little/no protection against unauthorized access due to poor infrastructure w Create their Airport Security Plan to upgrade their facilities to comply with current and future regulations with a timetable and budget estimate Successfully reduced security incidents

Airport Security Hist. (Cont’d) w 1980 s International Incidents USA l l l 1985 TWA in Lebanon – Pax murdered 1988 Pan Am Lockerbie Scotland-all dead Threats to US personnel - gaining access through foreign security w New US Regulations applied to foreign facilities n n Screen all pax, carry-on and baggage Reconcile pax/bags or “no go” w 1990 s - FAA sponsored more research l l New Equipment to detect bombs/weapons Upgrade facilities/procedures…then…

History of Airport Security w September 11, 2001 l l Airport Security world changed “Failure of Imagination” –routine security w ALL A/C ordered to “Land immediately” l @0945 over 4500 A/C IFR + 1000 s VFR w LEX tasked to create plan for 30 -50 A/C w 1215 nothing but Mil A/C - unprecedented n l All regs RE: airport sec’ty/air ops TSA responsibility Airports begin improvised security checklist w LEX begins flight ops 1250 September 13 w Ky. ANG airmen/soldiers stand guard

History of Airport Security w 9/11/2001

History of Airport Security w Aviation & Transportation Security Act l Transportation Security Admin (TSA) created w Develop/enforce new guidelines w Title 49 CFR – Transportation n n l All regs RE: airport sec’ty/air ops TSA responsibility Part 107 cancelled… 2003 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) w TSA/USCG/Customs/INS combined

Airport Security Program w TSA is responsible for Airport Security l Main source for planning/design guidelines w Air Operations Area (AOA) w Secure Area w Sterile area w Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) w Exclusive Area w Risk Management/Assessment

Airport Security Program w Security Identification Display Area(SIDA)

Pier/Finger Terminal

Security @Commercial Airports w Passenger Screening w Baggage Screening w Employee Identification w Perimeter Security

Passenger Screening w Major changes/overhaul since 9/11 w Since 2003 managed/operated by TSA l l l Prior by Airlines under FAA regulation Significant impacts on planning/design Continuously reviewed and evolving w Facilities/Equipment include: l l l Automatic process: magnetometer, explosive trace detection, body scanning, biometrics, etc Manual search procedures/areas Each airport is unique

Passenger Screening w Typical Passenger Screening Layout

Baggage Screening w Since 2003, every bag screened l l “ 100% EDS rule”, Explosive Detection System w Like a CT scan Magnetometer Greatly complicates baggage handling w Usual solution – Automation (LEX) w 1 st in Lobbies, then moved behind counters Search areas “blast resistant”

Baggage Screening w Initial Standalone Screening in lobbies-exposed w Inline Screening

Employee Identification w All personnel in the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA): l l l Must have criminal background check/OK Trained in facilities and security issues Prominently display SIDA badge at all times w SIDA Facilities/Equipment needs: l l l Secure defined perimeter Automatic electronic controls w Electronically controlled gates, card readers CCTV, card reader monitoring, personnel

Perimeter Security w Airport Security Plan must have a defined perimeter l l Perimeter fencing w Title 49 Part 1542 Aviation Security--Airports Controlled access gates w Kept to a minimum Security lighting PSO patrols w NOT routine

Vulnerability Assessment w Important for planning and design l l ID where security enhancements are needed Intro security issues early in design w Wide range of threats/vulnerabilities l l l Threat-anything that may cause harm Vulnerability-anything the bad guys can take advantage of to carry out a threat Cannot completely eliminate Play out scenarios Implement protective measures/procedures

Vulnerability Assessment w Flow diagram

Special Design Issues w TSA controls most Security Design… l l TSA used to post links on website for design Mark Day – Must have need to know & get OK w Public Facilities l l Limit concealment points, entry control points Harden emergency systems

Special Design Issues w Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation

Special Design Issues w Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation

Special Design Issues w Blast Resistant Design/Mitigation l l Glazing and screens Structure – harden columns, blast walls, etc. w Mimimize “progressive collapse” Blast Analysis Plan (BAP) VERY specialized contractors/suppliers

Special Design Issues w Security Facilities l Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, TSA areas, road barriers, vehicle inspection areas, etc w Joint Military Facilities l Coordinating force protection with TSA w Avoid “Security Theater” l Countermeasures to provide the “feeling” of security…but do little or nothing to achieve it w Sometimes perception is beneficial but… w Actual benefits very debatable

Special Construction Issues w All personnel get criminal background checks before access approval w Security during construction l Workers can’t go sightseeing! Areas off-limits! w Security of classified equipment l l l Fencing, gates, controls, CCTV, etc. TSA screening areas Only cleared workers handle the installation

Special Security Issues w Presidential/US VIP visit l l l Secure Ramp/buildings/ Detailed access to your info Shut down airspace/terminal/roads/comm w Foreign VIP visit l l Queen of England Emir of UAE and family w Con Air l Federal/International prisoner exchange

Security at GA Airports w TSA has not required the same level of security effort at GA airports…but… w Encourage GA airports to develop their own security initiatives l l Like Commercial Airports Awareness programs Reporting methods Develop security plans similar to commercial

Future Security w Changing/Increasing security Norm l l Keep up with TSA/FAA regulation changes Airport/perimeter security technology changes w Cannot completely eliminate threats l Continuous vulnerability assessment w Watch the news l l Criminals/terrorists are copycats AND innovators Scare du jour (disease, terrorism) w Europe warning - five A/C bombings for Xmas w Failure of Imagination

Airport Security w Questions?

Airport Security w References, Links • • • http: //www. bluegrassairport. com/ http: //www. faa. gov/ http: //www. boeing. com/boeing/ http: //www. aaae. org/ R. Horonjeff, F. Mc. Kelvey. Planning & Design of Airports. Mc. Graw-Hill, New York, 2010 TSA. Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction. 2006 R. Souleyrette. CE 633 Lectures John Cassel, majordadjohn@msn. com Mark Day, MDay@bluegrassairport. com * - http: //www. kentucky. com/2014/12/16/3596907/tsa-chief-travelers-fromsome. html? sp=/99/101/