Agile Appsec CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building

Agile Appsec CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Why we Suck at Building Secure Software… CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

and what we can do about it… CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Or… CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

How Agile Development is a major Cause of today’s Insecure Software… CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

and how Agile Development can be the Cure too CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

About the Author ◦ Jim Bird ◦ A software guy that cares about security ◦ Experience in software development, Ops, general management, project management (PMP, CSM, PMI-ACP, SCPM) ◦ Worked with financial services organizations in more than 30 countries ◦ Consulted to IBM, Italian Banking Association, Deutsche Borse, Korea Exchanges, Australian Stock Exchange, … ◦ Currently co-founder and CTO of a major US-based institutional trading service ◦ Helps out at SANS and OWASP ◦ “Building Real Software” blog ◦ Find me on Linked. In Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Warning � Lots of information to follow � No pictures of puppies, kittens, babies or Star Trek characters � Stuff you can take away and use later Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Problem � As an industry we suck at building secure software � Most developers don’t understand software security (take the test and see how you do) https: //www. aspectsecurity. com/news/pressrelease-aspect-security-launches-free-tool-to-measuregaps-in-developers-application-security-knowledge/ � and we don’t include security in development ◦ Microsoft study 2012: Only 37% of developers follow secure development practices ◦ Ponemon Institute study 2012: 79% of developers followed no or only ad hoc secure development process Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Agile AKA “the A Word” � Many security experts think that Agile is the problem ◦ Agile Development = Security Fail, Adrian Lane, RSA Conference 2011 http: //vimeo. com/15505840 ◦ Agile development is seen in some big shops as being undisciplined and unmanaged ◦ 2010 Study: Agile teams did not take meaningful steps to integrate security into development even when security was a mandated requirement http: //www. igi-global. com/article/agile-softwaredevelopment/46153 � Agile development makes it easier to build more software faster. More software = more vulnerabilities Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

We Suck at Building Secure Software � Major security vulnerabilities are found in common desktop software each month: Windows, Java, Adobe, all of the browsers, Quicktime, … � Information. Week 2013 Strategic Security Survey ◦ 46% of breaches last year were due to software exploits (OS, mobile or other application) � New technologies like HTML 5 and node. JS introduce new capabilities and new security risks http: //www. darkreading. com/applications/beware-ofhtml 5 -development-risks/240156891 https: //www. owasp. org/images/3/31/Node. js_Security_Ol d_vulnerabilities_in_new_bottles_-_Sven_Vetsch. pdf Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

We Suck at Building Secure Web Apps � 2013 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report: ◦ 1/3 of all breaches are caused by attacks on Web apps ◦ Probability of being hit by a Web app exploit: 75% � Cenzic Report 2013 ◦ 99% of apps tested had at least 1 serious vulnerability � White. Hat Security Report 2013 � Veracode State of Software Security April 2013 ◦ Average Web app has 56 serious vulnerabilities ◦ 25% of organizations had at least 1 security breach caused by an application vulnerability ◦ Only 13% of Web apps passed OWASP Top 10 (the most common vulnerabilities) ◦ These are apps that people bothered to test… Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

We Suck at Building Secure Mobile Apps � via. Forensics Mobile App Security Study 2011 �Only 17% of apps passed basic tests � 10% of apps stored passwords in plain text �In 2/3 of apps, private or sensitive data was recoverable (private communications, personal data, acct numbers) � Veracode State of Software Security Report 2013 � Ponemon Survey 2012 � 64% of Android apps have crypto problems � 42% of i. OS apps have information leakage problems � 31% of i. OS apps have SQL injection bugs � 65% of mobile apps aren’t tested at all Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

We Suck at Building Secure Industrial Control Systems � Hacking Industrial Systems Turns out to be Easy, MIT Technology Review, Aug 2013 http: //www. technologyreview. com/news/517731/ha cking-industrial-systems-turns-out-to-be-easy/ � Backdoor in computer controls opens critical infrastructure to hackers, Oct 2012 http: //arstechnica. com/security/2012/10/backdoorin-computer-controls-opens-critical-infrastructureto-hackers/ � Researchers expose flaws in popular industrial control systems, Info. World, Jan 2012 http: //www. infoworld. com/d/security/researchersexpose-flaws-in-popular-industrial-control-systems -184629 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Cars, TVs, Toilets, Airplanes… � Smart toilet security flaw could result in nasty surprise, Fox News Aug 2013 http: //www. foxnews. com/tech/2013/08/05/smart-toiletsecurity-flaw/ � The same security risks are in today’s cars, smart homes, TVs, … ◦ http: //arstechnica. com/security/2013/07/disabling-acars-brakes-and-speed-by-hacking-its-computers-anew-how-to/ � Hacking airplanes in flight? I did that a year ago…, April 2013 http: //www. foxnews. com/tech/2013/04/12/hacking-inflight-airplane-did-that-year-ago-hacker-says/ Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Root Causes � Lack of Knowledge and Skills – Developers Don’t Understand Security � Fundamental Asymmetry – the Bad Guys always Win � Quality – Bad Software is Easy to Hack Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Developers don’t Understand Security � Not firewalls, DMZs and patching � Not just security features: authentication, access control, auditing � Thinking through workflows and exceptions like a bad guy (abuse cases not use cases) � Understanding security risks and weaknesses in your language and platform stack � Technical details that must be understood and executed perfectly: ◦ crypto, session management, language/platformspecific vulnerabilities and attacks and exploits, secure configuration, context-sensitive data encoding, race conditions (TOC/TOU), … Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Developers don’t Understand Security � Education and Knowledge Gap ◦ Almost no universities teach software security ◦ Most developers don’t get enough – or any – on the job security training (Ponemon Study, 2012) ◦ Leading books/blogs/conferences on software development and design do not touch on security ◦ Agile 2013 conference example: � 1800 people, 200+ sessions � 1 session on application security (attended by 30 people) �Agile 2013 Eventifier was hacked Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Security don’t Understand Development � Most security people are network infosec (CISSP), or auditing/compliance/risk � They can’t help developers with appsec � Critical worldwide shortage of appsec expertise: Breakers and especially Builders http: //www. appsecireland. org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/7 -Ways-to-Scale-Web-Security -Jeremiah-Grossman. pdf ◦ 17 million developers worldwide ◦ BSIMM says 2% of developers need to be security black belts = 340, 000 need advanced appsec training Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Attacker’s Advantage, and the Defender’s Dilemma � Software Security is an Asymmetric Problem Michael Howard, 8 Simple Rules for Developing More Secure Software http: //msdn. microsoft. com/enus/magazine/cc 163518. aspx � Developers must make sure that design and code are perfect � Attackers get in through mistakes and bugs that nobody understands or realizes are important (eg. C/C++ bounds violation) � 1 Bug is all that the bad guys need Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Attacker’s Advantage, and the Defender’s Dilemma � Ensuring that there are no critical security problems in software is very hard � With enough money, time and talent (e. g. , nation-state backed) targeted attackers can get into any system � But we are making it too easy for the lazy bad guys (opportunistic hackers) � Too many security bugs are too easy to find and exploit… even bugs that are easy to fix and prevent Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Attacker’s Advantage, and the Defender’s Dilemma The most common attacks stay the same year over year (XSS, CSRF, Directory Traversal. . /, SQL Injection) � SQL injection � ◦ The most dangerous security vulnerability for the past 5+ years http: //cwe. mitre. org/top 25/index. html ◦ Easy to fix – use prepared statements and bind variables ◦ NOSQL databases have injection vulnerabilities too http: //blog. fortify. com/blog/2011/04/27/ � Bad guys use SQLi to steal data like email addresses and passwords – which programmers don’t store safely ◦ http: //www. mnn. com/green-tech/computers/stories/450000 passwords-stolen-in-yahoo-data-breach ◦ http: //www. zdnet. com/over-21000 -plain-text-passwordsstolen-from-billabong-7000000842/ Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Security <> Quality, but… �Security = C-I-A ◦ Confidentiality ◦ Integrity ◦ Availability �All of these are also important factors to Software Quality �“Software security relates entirely and completely to quality. “ Dr. Gary Mc. Graw �A poor quality system cannot be secure �Security vulnerabilities are bugs that need to be eradicated like all the other bugs Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Agile: the Security Problems CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � Agile is about building software quickly ◦ Move fast and iterate, respond to feedback ◦ Emphasis on Velocity: how much Business Value is delivered every 1 or 2 weeks ◦ Short time boxes keep getting shorter (1 -month, 2 -weeks, 1 -week, …) ◦ Deliver software to customer before it is finished ◦ Taken to extreme by teams following Continuous Deployment pushing changes 10 -100+ times per day (Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, …) Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

When is “Fast” too Fast? Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � “Move fast and break things. The idea is that if you never break anything, you’re probably not moving fast enough. ” Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook ◦ http: //www. straight. com/life/carol-todd-asks-facebook-fixsecurity-failures-putting-kids-risk ◦ http: //www. zdnet. com/facebook-admits-failure-in-bug-report 7000019657/ ◦ http: //www. thetechherald. com/articles/More-security-failure-as. Phishing-attacks-return-to-Facebook/6017/ ◦ http: //grahamcluley. com/2013/06/facebook-owns-privacybreach-tells-world-late-friday-night/ ◦ http: //www. dailymail. co. uk/news/article-2396628/Mark. Zuckerbergs-Facebook-page-hacked-Khalil-Shreateh-exposesite-vulnerability. html ◦ http: //thehackernews. com/2013/09/vulnerability-allowed-hacker -to-delete. html ◦ …. Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � Emergent Design ◦ 50% of security problems are caused in design (Gary Mc. Graw, Cigital) ◦ De-emphasis on architecture definition in Agile (BDUF is B-A-D) ◦ Only design and build what you need (Simple Design, YAGNI, Minimum Marketable Feature) ◦ Refactor and react to feedback – design on the fly ◦ The Code is the Design - so how do you see design mistakes and oversights? You wait to get feedback from the customer… or from hackers…. Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � The Product Owner is King/Queen ◦ Defines requirements, decides what gets done when ◦ Under pressure (and pressures team) to deliver Business Value, Time-to-Market ◦ The Product Owner has too much Responsibility: �Doesn’t always understand what they are supposed to do, or have the time to do it properly �Doesn’t understand security beyond mandated compliance requirements in regulated environments �Doesn’t always understand the risks and threats facing the organization �Doesn’t understand software development Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � Security is a Chicken, not a Pig ◦ Only Pigs have a voice – Product Owner, the Team ◦ Pigs decide how software is going to be developed ◦ Security is on the outside looking in – a Chicken, a witness, a nag who can be ignored or pushed off to later ◦ Without explicit security gates/approvals, Security has no control over how work gets done or over priorities or outcomes Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � Whole Team and Collective Code Ownership � Everybody shares all the work and all the code � The Team decides how work will be done – will they decide to include secure development practices? � Security work requires special knowledge and a Hacker’s/Breaker’s mindset � Remember the Defender’s Dilemma – even small mistakes have serious consequences � You need your best (technically strongest) people working on security – not everybody will “get it” or will be careful enough Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � XP has reinforced the value of testing, but… ◦ TDD, automated unit testing (JUnit) and functional acceptance testing (FIT, FITNesse) – “the feature passes the automated tests, so it must work” ◦ Security is a system testing problem, not a unit testing problem ◦ Many teams don’t have testers, or testers who do anything more than follow acceptance checklists – so who will do security testing? “Why Facebook doesn’t have or need testers” http: //www. zdnet. com/blog/facebook/why-facebook-doesnthave-or-need-testers/7191 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � Sprints � Work and Time Boxes needs to be done in little pieces and time-boxed (smaller = better) � Where do you fit security reviews and testing in Scrum or iterationless Kanban or Continuous Deployment? � E. g. Penetration Testing doesn’t fit nicely into a short Sprint – need time to understand the app, explore, hack, assess risk and understand findings, fix and test again… Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � Work � As is defined through Stories a <type of user> I want <something> so that <reason> � Most security requirements are nonfunctional (like maintainability, supportability) http: //www. infoq. com/articles/managing-securityrequirements-in-agile-projects � Security risks and activities cut across many stories (constraints on design and implementation) � Cannot always be tested (same as other NFRs) � Security is never “Done” Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

The Security Problems in Agile � Traceability and Assurance ◦ Waterfall has natural gates (requirements, design, code, test, deploy) and hand-off documents for security experts to review and assess risk ◦ But Agile: “working software over comprehensive documentation” ◦ Story cards, white boarding, … “barely sufficient” and discarded when work is done ◦ Code and automated tests are the documentation � How do you prove traceability in Agile? How do you know (and show) that you’ve done a responsible job? Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Agile: the Security Solution CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Adding Security to Agile � Security Stories and Abuse Cases ◦ Make security activities/risks part of the backlog ◦ SAFECode Security Stories – common non-functional stories and SDLC tasks for security http: //www. safecode. org/publications/SAFECode_Agile_ Dev_Security 0712. pdf ◦ OWASP Evil User Stories: “As a hacker, I can send bad data in URLs, so I can access data and functions for which I’m not authorized” https: //www. owasp. org/index. php/Agile_Software_Devel opment: _Don%27 t_Forget_EVIL_User_Stories ◦ Cigital Abuse/Misuse Cases – think like a bad guy http: //cigital. com/papers/download/bsi 2 -misuse. pdf Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Adding Security to Agile � Abuser Stories ◦ Judy Neher, Agile 2013 ◦ As part of working on / elaborating a story, take some time to explore negative cases ◦ Don’t just think about what the user can do and wants to do ◦ Think about what the user can’t do and doesn’t want to do ◦ Write up negative cases/scenarios and include them in scenarios or add them to the backlog Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Adding Security to Agile � Security Sprint / Security Push ◦ Test and fix security problems in high-risk areas (as much as you can in a time box) ◦ Train the team, then have them look for and fix security vulnerabilities ◦ Evaluate a static analysis tool, run it for the first time and triage the results ◦ Pen test and then fix what you can before you go live � Band aid: won’t solve your security problems � Like a “Hardening Sprint” - difficult to build a business case for – what value is the customer getting? Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Try following Microsoft: SDL Agile ◦ Available for free but expensive to follow http: //msdn. microsoft. com/enus/library/windows/desktop/ee 790621. aspx ◦ Integrate security activities and controls �Start of project – understand security and privacy requirements, training, assign security lead �Each Sprint – using safe libraries, static analysis in CI, threat/risk modeling on new features �Bucket – code reviews, design reviews, incident response planning (do one of these activities each Sprint) Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Upfront, Iteration 0 stuff ◦ Understand major risks and threats ◦ Understand requirements for security and privacy, compliance – don’t depend only on Product Owner ◦ Include security in coding guidelines and tools/technology selection ◦ If you’re playing Pigs and Chickens, security must be a Pig – make someone the Security Lead ◦ Include time for security tasks in planning, retrospectives/reviews and “Definition of Done” Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Training ◦ White. Hat study: teams with training have 40% fewer vulnerabilities, resolve them 59% faster ◦ Train all developers and testers in basics �SAFECode free training https: //training. safecode. org/courses �Coursera free MOOCs in Crypto https: //www. coursera. org/instructor/~85 �OWASP Cheat Sheet series https: //www. owasp. org/index. php/Cheat_Sheets ◦ Security Lead needs extra training: Denim Group, SANS, Cigital ◦ Don’t forget to train the Product Owner! Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Design and Architecture ◦ Understand the security capabilities of your framework (. NET, Rails, Play, Spring, Django, Yii, i. OS, Android, …) �Authentication and Identity Management �Access Control (deny by default) �Auditing (including log injection protection) �Session Management (including CSRF protection) �Data access layer (SQL injection) ◦ Keep frameworks patched and up to date and monitor for vulnerabilities (serious Rails vulnerabilities in 2013, …) Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Design and Architecture ◦ Use a security library to fill in security gaps: �OWASP ESAPI (for enterprise apps, especially Java) �Apache Shiro (Java general security toolkit) �JASYPT (Java encryption) �Microsoft’s Anti-Cross Site Scripting library (. NET) �Iron. Box Anti. SQLi (. NET) �OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer (XSS protection) ◦ If you really know enough to write your own crypto, why are you here reading this slide? Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Attack Surface ◦ How bad guys get in: forms, fields, parms, cookies, files, URLs, APIs, run-time args, configs, sockets, databases… and the code behind this ◦ As you add features, attack surface increases: �Just changing the same code again, adding another field or form…? �Adding a new API, or a mobile interface, or hooking up to a new service? �Introducing a new piece of confidential/secret data? �Changing the stack or plumbing (web server, security library, back-end data store…)? ◦ What additional testing/reviews should be done? Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Follow the Data ◦ Identify critical data �Private/confidential data (PII, credit card, medical, anything to do with children, financial, …), tokens/passwords/session ids and other credentials, secrets, config, … ◦ Follow this data through the system �What is the source (is the source authenticated, can you tell if the data is being replayed)? �Where is it validated and sanitized? �Where is it stored (does it have to be stored)? �Should it be encrypted or masked? �Where is it displayed and used, are the users authorized? �Who can change it, is this access audited? �Do I need to protect it with a checksum/digital signature? Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Focus on High-Risk Code ◦ Security plumbing, network-facing APIs, file handling, command control (root) functions, data validation, error handling, database access layer, auto-update, … ◦ If any High-Risk code is changed: review and testing must be done ◦ Team Ground Rule, or automatically through checkin monitoring (Etsy, Zane Lackey) http: //www. slideshare. net/zanelackey/effectiveapproaches-to-web-application-security Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Be Careful with High-Risk Code ◦ Code in pairs (always at least one senior developer) ◦ Use OWASP Secure Coding Checklist https: //www. owasp. org/index. php/OWASP_Secure_Codi ng_Practices_-_Quick_Reference_Guide � Expert Security Code Review Bring in an outside expert/consultant Help them to understand the code and design Time-box their review Make sure you understand what they found, why it is a problem, and how to fix it ◦ Maybe get them to review your fixes too ◦ ◦ Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Write Code that “doesn’t boink” ◦ Correctness and usability isn’t enough ◦ Clean code isn’t enough – although it helps (security and quality problems are correlated with complexity) ◦ Use safe functions and APIs (understand your language and platform and use them properly) ◦ Pay attention to data validation (client-side isn’t enough, strong white-list vs weak black-list) ◦ Error handling and exception handling (check return codes, fail closed, watch for information leakage) ◦ Manage threads and memory carefully ◦ Log and trace – but don’t log confidential/private data Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Static Analysis Checkers (Source/Binary) ◦ Start with picky Compiler options and flags, and IDE ◦ Continuous Integration: Fail build on serious bugs ◦ Java �Free: Findbugs and PMD (or Sonar. Qube) – superficial but common security bugs �Expensive: Coverity, Fortify, Klocwork, Appscan, Checkmarx – deeper, interprocedural data flow and control flow analysis ◦. NET �Microsoft Fx. Cop, CAT. NET, MS Source Code Analyzer for SQL Injection, Bin. Scope ◦ PHP: RIPS ◦ Ruby: Brakeman ◦ Binary analysis (if you don’t have source): Veracode Saa. S Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In �Unit testing is not enough �Also need end-to-end system testing ◦ High unit test coverage for high-risk code to ensure correctness – especially security features ◦ Need negative tests for error handling and for input checking – tedious to do, maybe try fuzzing instead ◦ Fuzzing files is easy (dumb), fuzzing APIs is hard (smart) Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In �Manual ◦ ◦ ◦ exploratory testing Do some basic hacking on your own Test boundaries, negative cases Try injecting attack strings into fields Try to break things, be creative How to Break Software [and How to Break Software Security], James Whittaker http: //www. amazon. com/How-Break-Software-Practical -Testing/dp/0201796198 http: //jpkc. sziit. edu. cn/software/www/st/courses/res/q iyeziyuan/eng/how_to_break_software. pdf Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In �Application Pen Testing �Hire an expert to hack into your app ◦ Before go live ◦ Periodic Regression Sweep (1 -2 x per year, or when you make a major change) ◦ Give pen tester whatever information and access they need ◦ Learn from what they find – treat serious bugs as Sev 1 or 2 �But… Expensive and doesn’t Scale Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Dynamic Can” Web App Scanning – “Pen Tester in a ◦ Arachni, Acunetix, Appscan, Webinspect, … http: //sectoolmarket. com/ ◦ OWASP ZAP (Attack Proxy) https: //www. owasp. org/index. php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_P roxy_Project ◦ Hassle to setup, train, review and triage ◦ Most developers don’t like using these tools, but QA usually doesn’t have the technical skills ◦ Consider Cloud-based service like White. Hat ◦ Or Contrast Security (Java real-time bug tracing) Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Gauntlt “Be Mean to Your Code” http: //gauntlt. org/ ◦ Scriptable attacks against a system using different security tools – built on Cucumber ◦ Include in Continuous Integration or Continuous Delivery pipeline ◦ Limited number of tests available today � Mozilla Minion ◦ Plug-in platform for automated testing web apps https: //blog. mozilla. org/security/2013/07/30/introducingminion/ Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Remediation ◦ White. Hat study: only 61% of security bugs are fixed, and it takes 193 days to fix them ◦ Remember the Attacker’s Advantage – we’re leaving holes open for a long time ◦ Treat security vulnerabilities like other bugs �Add them to the backlog �Fix critical bugs �Fix bugs you understand ◦ Use Agile to your Advantage: Agile teams can get fixes into production much faster than Waterfall Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Secure Operations ◦ Your responsibility doesn’t end with releasing code ◦ Secure the run-time – CIS and vendor lockdowns, Nessus scanning, check SSL config (ssllabs) ◦ WAF or IDS (mod_security, Snort) ◦ Always be patching ◦ Detective change control – OSSEC ◦ Infrastructure as Code (Puppet, Chef) so you know everything is setup consistently ◦ Make sure somebody is actually reading the logs Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Secure Devops – Learn from Etsy and Netflix ◦ Understand what normal looks like, identify anomalies/attacks, and respond ◦ Fast, repeatable deployment capability so you can fix problems immediately http: //www. client 9. com/2013/05/24/faster-securesoftware-development-with-continuous-deployment/ ◦ Automated health checks, self-tests, run-time asserts ◦ Net. Flix Simian Army – Security Monkey, Conformity Monkey, Doctor Monkey, and Chaos Monkey/Gorilla http: //techblog. netflix. com/2011/07/netflix-simianarmy. html Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Build Security In � Prepare to be Attacked ◦ Leverage what you have for handling Sev 1 incidents ◦ Escalate to outside security experts and legal ◦ Contain and recover, capture data forensics and legal purposes if you can ◦ Root Cause Analysis once you are stabilized ◦ SANS training on security incident management ◦ ISO 30111 standard for vulnerability handling and remediation (including root cause analysis) ◦ ISO 21947 vulnerability disclosure - how to deal with your friendly neighbourhood security researcher Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Rinse and Repeat CAMUG 2013 Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Rinse and Repeat ◦ Agile Development can be the Cure for Insecure Software �Replace big, Waterfall gates with continuous, iterative checks �Always do something, always be improving �Smaller changes = less to review, less to test, less risk �Do what works for your team �Automate everything that you can Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Rinse and Repeat ◦ Include Security Upfront �Understand important security and privacy compliance requirements and risks �Budget tools and time �Training and OWASP Cheat Sheets on basics �Make somebody on the team responsible for Security (the team’s Conscience) Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Rinse and Repeat ◦ Secure Design (the first 50%) �Understand use security capabilities of your language(s) and framework(s) �Plug any holes with a security library �Think about Trust when you cross Layers �Think about security when you choose Open Source / Commercial Software Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Rinse and Repeat ◦ Build Security into Sprints �Defensive coding – code that is more robust and more secure �Michael Howard “all input data is evil until proven otherwise” (the other 50%) �Understand critical data and attack surface – when you change it, evaluate risks �Security Stories/Abuser Stories �Think about Ops and the run-time Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Rinse and Repeat ◦ Build Security on top of Quality �Think – and test – like a bad guy �Do some kind of security testing (static analysis, dynamic scanning, pen test) �Fix the bugs that you find – like any other bug �Make sure that you can deploy bug fixes quickly and safely – Continuous Delivery pipeline, regression testing �Include Security in Retrospectives (learn and prevent) Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software

Be Part of the Solution ◦ Join OWASP https: //www. owasp. org/index. php/Membership ◦ Setup an OWASP Chapter ◦ Contribute to an OWASP project ◦ Go to a security conference or at least attend security sessions at other conferences (Uber. Conf and Java. One have security tracks) ◦ Read more about appsec and security ◦ Talk to security people, make friends ◦ Get appsec training, mentor others ◦ Write good software Agile Appsec 2013 Building Real Software