Afghanistan Longer term strategies vs Short term priorities

Afghanistan : Longer term strategies vs Short term priorities University of Kent in Brussels - European Geopolitical Forum October 12, 2011 Emmanuel Dupuy, Political Advisor (POLAD) of french Task Force Lafayette (Febuary-July 2011)

Comprehensive Approach : a tentative of Definition • In the ambit of complex crisis requiring a better coordination of civil and military actors, both in an international and local environment, the concept of « comprehensive approach » as merged at the level of international organisations (Nato, EU, UN) as well as states ; • It concerns restauration of security, installation of a good governance and stabilization , and thus throughout a inter-agency, interministerial or inter-organization approach ; • Concept appeared in the end of 2000 : « Global Approach » , « comprehensive approach » « multidimensional approach » or « integrated approach» ; • Comprehensive approach (insights vision – each Valley in Afghanistan is different ) vs Centralised approach (bureaucratic vision – defined in NATO HQ’s) ? At the end : Comprehensive Approach is just about finding a better interraction (harmonization, cooperation) between various actors, wich in a globalized world, are obliged to work toogether, regardless of there own individual agenda

Counter Insurgency (COIN) & Comprehensive Approach : two faces of a Global Strategy • The 4 rules of COIN (cf : in reference to french strategic thinkers, based on their colonial war experience in Algeria and Indochina (Ltc David Galula, Colonel Roger Trinquier, General Hoggard, Bernard Falle) are particularly appliable to the Afghan context : 1. "The First Law: The Support of the Population Is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent ; 2. "The Second Law : Support Is Gained Through an Active Minority" ; 3. "The Third Law : Support from the Population Is Contingent" (…) "The counterinsurgent needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win” ; 4. "The Fourth Law : Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means Are Essential"

Comprehensive Approach in acts “Comprensive Approach” principles (Live amongs the population/Concentration of Might/Fight, Reconstruct and Stabilize/Win Hearts and Minds…) finds its roots in reference to the prophetic essay Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, written by french colonel David Galula in 1964 : • " Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or expel the main body of armed insurgents. • " Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages and towns where the population lives. • " Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas. • " Destroy the local insurgent political organizations. • " Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. • " Test these authorities. . Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to active leaders. Organize self-defense units. • " Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. • " Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. "

Organigramme du Pole Cliquez pour modifier le style du titre Stabilite CONFIDENTIAL//REL USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO GOUVERNANCE DEVELOPPEMENT Haut-Représentant Civil en Kapisa et Surobi Conseiller Politique du COM TFLF Adjoint Chargé de liaison avec le RC-E Chargé de mission Justice Chargé de mission Administration publique (à Kaboul) Conseiller technique du Gouverneur de Province (à pourvoir) Chef de Projets Kapisa & Surobi (à Kaboul) Chargé de mission Energie, Santé & Education Chargé de mission Développement rural (irrigation) Chargé de mission Valorisation des ressources (filières agricoles) 6 TF LA FAYETTE 6 NIJRAB, LE 22/03/2011 CONFIDENTIAL//REL USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

CONFIDENTIAL//REL USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO PROJECTS Cliquez pour modifier le style du titre Province de KAPISA Electrification ligne M-e-R / NIJRAB 5, 9 M€ Justice: mise en relation des systèmes de justice formels et informels (en cours d’étude) Projet filière pomegrenades en vallée de Tagab (en cours d’étude) Education : Centre de formation des maîtres à Nijrab M-e-R Gouv : District Delivery Program (DDP) Tagab (financement français - 1, 5 M€) NIJRAB TAGAB Santé : Hôpital de Tagab (en lien avec les CIMIC) Electrification vallée de Tagab (en cours d’étude) Projets hydro-agricoles en vallée de Tagab (en cours d’étude) Gouv : District Delivery Program (DDP) Surobi (financement US) Santé : Hôpital de Surobi Zone d’effort Santé Gouvernance & justice Education Hydro-agriculture TF LA FAYETTE 7 District de SUROBI Energie Filières horticole 7 NIJRAB, LE 22/03/2011 CONFIDENTIAL//REL USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

French POLE DE STABILITE (Stabobs) : a concrete exemple of global approach • • • Gouvernance Justice Hydro-agriculture Valorisation des ressources (pomegrenades) Energie / Electricité Santé Education Etudes / Conseil CIMIC (MAE-Mindef) FCO MAIL Ø French Investment in Afghanistan : 100 M euros Ø 16, 5 M in Kapisa and in Surobi

From Reconciliation to Transition Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP) • A « Global » Incentive Towards Transition : Kapisa, Model Province for Reconciliation (designated as so by High Peace Council) : v Now : Key Terrain Districts : Surobi in Second Package (0 to 6 months)/ Performance Based Governor’s Fund (PBGF) in Kapisa (Third Package Transition - 6 to 12 months) ; v Tomorow : « Afghan Led » operations (Security with ANSF/Development with Governor and Sub-governors and Line Ministers Representatives) ; v After tomorow : From Post-2014 « Out-Strategies » to 2025 Transformation philosophy. (towards a « Diplomatic Surge » ) • A « Bottom up » Process : v Positive and Immediate impacts on Local Security Agenda : Ø Recconciliation will be won in the valleys as well as at the level of the High Peace Council ; Ø Implement Local and Community Security (throughout ANSF and ALP) in order to allow the return of Intermediary INS , « upset brothers » back into their community. v Development and Stabilization : Ø Winning « Hearts and Minds » of the population : CIMIC, PRT, STABOBS (Pole de Stabilité) actions as generators of employment ; Ø Promoting Positive action of the Coalition Forces.

Global Challenges • At a National Level : After the death of Ben Laden and assasination of Professor Rabbani, what Strategy ? What Narrative for R 2 processus ? v What will be the Hidden Agenda of Pakistan (mostly ISI) after Ben Laden’s death ? v At what level of discussions are we willing to go with Taleb Leadership (including the top leaders amongst which Mollah Omar, Haqqani, Hekmatyar) ? v How can the Goverment overcome the recent accusations of the « Counter-productivity » of the Program (as presented in some local medias) ? v Consider the differences of approach and sincerity of engagment towards CF and GIROA between HIG, Taleb and Haqqani system. • At a Provincial Level : Reintegration is a « Mile Stone » for Governance and thus Transition, taking in account : v Difficult Coordination between Provincial Administration and GIRo. A ; v Diversion of financing (reintegration of false INS / new grievances : land grabbing) ; v Political use of the Processus in order to implement local politicians (possibly corrupted) v Long Time Deadline Procedures (approximately 10 potential INS group leaders, candidates for APRP have been waiting for more than a months); v Local divergences (lack of will in Tagab and Alasay Districts at the level of sub-provincial Governance)

From Transition (towards 2014) to Transformation (horizon 2025)… • Transition : an afghan matter (agenda of president Karzai) ? under Pakistan monitoring ? Nato’s business ? or on a true bilateral agenda (JANIB) ? • Announcement by President Karzaï, (21 march and 25 june) of the processus of transfert of authority (security & institutions) is now totally blocked by the on going insecurity in Kabul city Two main objectifs « non negociable » for France (cf : visite PR in Surobi, 12 july - « Il faut savoir finir une guerre » ) : • v District of Surobi in tranche 2 (december) completing the 13/14 districts ok Kabul province ; v Province de Kapisa in tranche 3 (but on a global dimension : 7 districts toogether).

Geological break/ Geostrategic Rupture declined to the Afghan case • An Afghanistan « fragmented » and « shaped » by it’s geography and by geopolitics : The pifall of Afghanistan are also opportunities for its future…. 1. endogene factors (altitude, latitude, longitude) 2. exogene actors (close but no so « friendly » neighbours, faraway partners)

Obama’s and Bush war ? Have we the same ennemies ? • The « nomination » in Bonn of the least reliable candidate but the most compatible with the views of Washington : Hamid Karzai , former executive of californian oil company, UNOCAL (2001) : actuality of the TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) gazoduc • GIROA and power brokers composed of former war lords (Fahim, Khalili, Bismullah Khan, Dostom, Abdullah, Mojaddedi, Sayaf, Yunus Qanani) ; • A Constitution « born in pain » , shaped in the sole interest of USA (2004) : even thought it was a afghano-french co-production ; • The Governance agenda : general elections (presidential in 2004/2009 ; Legislatives in 2005/2010) considered by the International Community (even thought their implicit validation by UNAMA) as not convincing and incompatible with the Rule of Law criteria ; • A military and financial « Surge » : « Obama’s war » have become hours. .

« Afghan paradox » : A military victory ? A political failure ? A hidden strategic agenda ? Can we speak of a military victory ? • Almost destroyed in 2004 (except some small areas of taleb resistance in the south - Helmand, Kandahar) the Insurrection reappears in a global scheme in 2006 -2007 – and thus tighly linked with regional and local political instability and illegitimacy ; • Sacrality of the COIN concept : Counter-Insurgency & Counter terrorism ; • « Win hearts and minds » ? Is it that the only purpose of ISAF presence ? (tactical, operational and strategic long range planification of NATO in confrontation of possible and prospective confrontation with China ?

« Afghan paradox » : A military victory ? A political failure ? A hidden strategic agenda ? A political failure ? • An artificially re-elected (to elect again ? ) President ? • A inefficient GIROA, notably corrupted et playing « double jeu » ? • An International Community voiceless ? • An unexisting unique Europe’s voice in the Afpak agenda ? • Validation of the principle of Interference (Iran, India, Russia, Pakistan) ? • Negation of our Moral and Ethics (Reconciliation at strategic level) ? • The « empty-chair policy » (Pakistan’s ISI « grand strategy » to prevent the former tadjik Northern Alliance military and political chiefs to rearm and eventually defeat again the Talebans in the scenario of post-2014 civil war ? • Our incapacity to anticipate futher than by the end of 2014 (from transition to transformation) ?

« Afghan paradox » : A military victory ? A political failure ? A hidden strategic agenda ? • The Strategic partnership agreement between NATO and Afghanistan submitted to the « traditional » Loya Jirga : expression of a domestic and parlamentary fatigue focused on President’s Karzai legitimacy ? • The role of regional actors in the scenarios of post-conflict management and reconstruction : the rise of a « Af. Cent Agenda » based on a transregional solidarity (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, SCO, under the leadership of Uzbekistan) ? • Merge of Interculturality and Religion as a factor of mutual comprehension (Organisation of the Islamic Conference, OIC, under the presidency of Kazakhstan) ? • China in the line of sight ! (strategic interest for military expansion throughout Asia, incapacity to prevent proliferation of arms race)….

The risks and opportunities of the Privatization of Defence and Security ? • « Civil Surge » vs « Military Surge » in the perspective of the « out / thin out » IFAS strategy in the scope of 2014 ; • Private Miltary & Security Companies (SMP) still massively present and quite active but reluctant to stay on a long range period : « libyan eldorado » ? • Training, mentoring, formation and partnership with ANSF : The objective is to have, by the end of 2014, 460 000 security forces (ANA, ANP, NDS, ALP, ANCOP) ; • DDR (Disarmement, Demobilization, Reintegration) perspectives linked to APRP (Afghan Peace & Reconciliation Program) ; • A « normalised » Afghanistan on a military level (Pf. P of NATO) and a « stabilised » Afghanistan on diplomatic and strategic criterias (from « Af. Pak » bureaucratic follow up to « Af. Cent » awareness) ?

Shona ba Shona today Hopes and Changes tomorow ? • Malgré tout, existe dans ce pays une vocation à la modernité et à l’installation de l’Etat de droit (ce fut vrai dans les années 20, 60 -70 et pourquoi pas demain) ? • L’expression de la « rue afghane » est une réalité : manifestation (contre la main tendue aux talebs suite au discours du président Karzai) du 5 mai dernier à l’appel de l’ancien chef du NDS, Amrullah Saleh ; • L’émergence « balbutiante » de partis politiques est une avancée démocratique qui fera des émules (à l’instar de la Coalition nationale « Taghir wa Omide » sous la houlette d’Abdullah, Waly Massoud, Younous Qanani, Houmayoun Assefy) ou encore la coalition en gestation liant l’ancien Vice-président Zia Massoud et Dostom ; • Des candidats sérieux à la succession de Karzai : Dr. Ashraf Ghani (Patron du JANIB, en charge de la transition), Ali Ahmad Jalili, ancien ministre de l’Intérieur, professeur à la NDU… • L’ONU souhaite prendre le relais de l’ISAF : si l’on en croit la « feuille de route » du prochain Hautreprésentant de l’ONU (Lakdhar Brahimi) et ses 35 propositions renforçant les fondamentaux du multilatéralisme (Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution) ; • Des ANSF (ANP, ANA, NDS et ALP) bien entrainés, suffisamment armés et nombreuses (350 000 pax) offrent le meilleur message possible en faveur de la transition, du Partenariat et in fine de l’afghanisation…

QUESTIONS ?