Afghanistan from Regional Stability to ISAF Sources The

Afghanistan from “Regional Stability” to ISAF Sources: The National Security Archive S. Coll, Ghost Wars nato. int 1

Outline n The Phase of Regional stability n Afghanistan-Background n The Soviet invasion n The Carter Doctrine n The Reagan Doctrine n 9/11 and the Creation of ISAF 2

US policy: the phase of regional stability n n n Bases of US policy since the early 1950’s: A. by itself is of little importance, but the area around it (Persian Gulf and sea lines and ports Indian Ocean) was deemed critical A. within regional policy of strong and friendly ties with Iran and Pakistan: policy essentially based on balance of power main aim: to prevent “excessive” Soviet influence After 1953, Soviet policy in A. viewed as defensive National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 1954: Soviet attention to A. is part of a general effort to counter recent Western (particularly US) gains in the Middle East-South Asia area 3

…regional stability, 1960’s-1970’s n n USSR-A. relations grow stronger, USSR is one of largest sources of foreign aid Do. S 1962: US fostering of active hostility toward USSR [can] only serve to weaken A’s ability to survive Do. S 1976: A is a militarily and politically neutral nation, effectively dependent on the SU, still US is not nor should it become committed to or responsible for the ‘protection’ of A in any respect Balance of power is in favor of US: no significant threat is in view 4

Phase of regional stability ends Situation drastically changes in 1979: n Iranian revolution n USSR deploys 100, 000 troops to A n Red Army within striking distance of Pakistan and Iran n Soviet policy is suddenly described as the gravest threat to world peace since WWII n 5

Afghanistan-Background n n n Early 1970’s: growing discontent over monarchy (Zahir Shah) World Bank estimate: A’s per capita GNP $70, it ranks 73 rd in list of 83 underdeveloped countries US Emb. Kabul, 1971: there has been increased leftist activity which can be attributed to increased disillusionment and frustration with the existing social/economic conditions and the apparent inability or unwillingness of the leadership to tackle boldly the nation’s problems 6

…Background n n 1973: while Zahir is vacationing in Rome, his cousin Mohammad Daud takes power and declares end of monarchy Rival groups: 1 -People’s Democratic Party of A. (PDPA), Marxist oriented and divided in two factions 2 -Islamic elements, some had studied in Egypt where came into contact with the Muslim Brotherhood n n Form the Islamic Society Party (Jamiat-i Islami) Fought by Daud, they flee to mountains or Pakistan 7

Daud’s action-US position Saur (April) revolution, 1978 n n Daud purges leftists from govt; bans political opposition (1975); strengthens ties with Iran and US US welcomes D’s policy; Do. S (1977): Daud has made significant contributions to the improvement of regional stability—thereby helping to fulfill another principal US objective PDPA (also with Soviet pressures) overcomes differences, infiltrates the army April 1978 Daud is overthrown by the military in cooperation with PDPA: it’s the Saur revolution 8

US reaction n n US Emb. detects no Soviet hand in Saur coup, tends to hold Daud responsible for neglecting religious leaders and intellectuals However, Carter Administration finds itself in dilemma. Memo to Cyrus Vance, Apr. 30: We need to take into account the mix of nationalism and communism in the new leadership and seek to avoid driving the regime into a closer embrace with the SU than it might wish 9

…US reaction n But a hard-line approach is also envisaged in same memo: Anti-regime elements in A will be watching us carefully to see if we acquiesce in or accept the communist takeover…Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others of our friends in the area will see the situation clearly as a Soviet coup. On the domestic front, many Americans will see this as an extension of Soviet power… 10

…US reaction n n US thus compromises, maintaining correct relations with A. Govt while keeping channels open to the opposition US double policy does not last long: Dec 1978: A-USSR treaty of friendship-more Soviet aid and advisers reach Kabul Dissatisfaction with PDPA mounts in A Amb. Dubs kidnapped by anti-govt Shiites; clumsy police action; independent US investigation refused by A. govt. 11

Towards covert support Brzezinski: n USSR has territorial designs in A and possibly the whole South Asian region n If DRA consolidates power, USSR may turn A into launching pad for aggression in the region n pushes NSC decision to be more sympathetic to those Afghans who are determined to preserve their country’s independence 12

Covert aid to Islamic dissidents n n n Which groups should be helped? US Emb. charged to ask Pakistani military officials to recommend rebel organization that would make best use of US aid CIA-radical leaders meetings (Hekmatyar) Documents seized by Iranian “students” in US Emb. Teheran Carter’s Directive, July ’ 79 (nearly 6 months before the invasion): CIA authorized to spend $500, 000 on propaganda and psychological operations, to provide radio equipments, medical supplies and cash to the Afghan rebels Saudi Arabia “matching program” 13

Brzezinski interview “Le Nouvel Observateur”, Jan 15 -21 1998 n n It was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that… this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention… We did not push the Soviets to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would 14

…Zbig’s interview, 1998 n Q: You don’t regret anything today? A: That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border I wrote to President Carter: we now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed, for almost 10 years Moscow had to carry on a war insupportable by the govt, a war that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire 15

…Zbig’s interview, 1998 Q: And neither do you regret having supported the Islamic intégrism, having given arms and advice to future terrorists? n A: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslem or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war? n 16

…Zbig’s interview, 1998 Q: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated: Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today n A: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid. There isn’t a global Islam n 17

The invasion, Dec. 24 -25, 1979 n n n USSR tries to moderate A govt and bring moderate PDPA faction to power, seeks participation of other elements in govt US Emb. Kabul informed of Soviet steps, that bring no results Oct: Soviet ascertain that A govt lost control of 23 out of 28 provinces Nov: Soviet forces moved to border; Warsaw Pact forces placed on advanced state of readiness Dec 24: the invasion begins 18

The invasion: political meaning n n For USSR: it symbolized the limits of Soviet influence in A. USSR unable to stabilize DRA govt through political means, attempts to do so with military force (US did the same in Vietnam) For USA: invasion coincides with 1)decline of US influence in Iran and several Third World countries where “pro-Soviet” govts have seized power; 2)eve of election year 19

US perceptions n n n Regional stability already made vulnerable by Iranian revolution; Balance of power shifts in favor of USSR’s action puts Pakistan and Iran itself at the Red Army’s mercy; becomes the gravest threat to world peace since World War II Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): The key motivation that propelled Moscow’s move was to bring its long-standing strategic goals closer within reach. Control of A would be a major step toward overland access to the Indian Ocean and 20 to domination of the Asian sub-continent

The Carter Doctrine State of the Union, Jan 23, 1980: n Premise: Aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease… n Doctrine: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the US and will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force 21 n

…Carter n n n However, Carter is not prepared to go to war and looks for alternatives in order to 1)slow down a potential Soviet drive; 2)make Moscow pay a high price for intervention International economic sanctions; boycott of the Moscow Olympic games; military access agreements with Asian countries; more covert aid to Mujahedin Not all US officials believe that USSR is engaged in expansionist drive. They ask to provide Moscow with way out by quiet diplomacy 22

…Carter n n n Cold war logic and electoral debate US: the view prevails that quiet diplomacy won’t work, even moderates distrust the Soviet willingness to negotiate in good faith and support covert aid to the rebels Carter opts for a two-track approach: supporting moderate levels of covert aid and seeking a forum for a negotiated settlement 23

Ronald Reagan n RR victory in 1980 elections: end of the negotiation track, beginning of hard line based on A rebels and other anti-communist insurgencies around the world To RR rebels (like Contras) are Freedom fighters, the moral equivalent of our founding fathers Reagan Doctrine (State of Union, 1985): Support for freedom fighters is self defense 24

…RR n n n Few believe that A rebels may defeat Red Army Objective is to tie Soviets down in A until cost of occupation become unsustainable The key is Pakistan, led since 1977 by General Zia P receives 6 -year economic and military aid package that elevates P to top recipients of US aid Congress accepts Zia as allied and pushes for more covert aid to Mujahedin 25

Aid to Mujahedin approved by US Congress and delivered by CIA n Total amount: about $3 b n n Considerable contributions by Saudi Arabia Annual military assistance: $700 m (more than what Pakistan was receiving) Swiss and British anti-aircraft missiles; Stinger missiles (never before had CIA provided US made weaponry as part of covert insurgency support operation) Use of Public Diplomacy 26

Soviet withdrawal n n n USSR: costs of the war by late 1986: signs of a loosing, unpopular war: low moral, criticism, drug and alcohol abuse… billions of rubles spent in crumbling economic situation unrest in Islamic population of Soviet Asian republics M. Gorbachev: a new approach to the Third World April 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U. N. -brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring USSR to 27 withdraw

…Soviet withdrawal n n The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989 A warming of relations moved US and USSR to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict Trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the USSR which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants 28