2012 Security Breach at Y12 National Security Complex

2012 Security Breach at Y-12 National Security Complex Don Alston Strategic Consulting, LLC

Overview • • • The Breach Y-12 Security Response Contributors to Failure Initial Recovery Actions Personal Observations

The Breach Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility • Pre-dawn trespass • Cut through multiple fences • Achieved objective • Defaced HEUMF • Paint, blood, hammering

Y-12 Security Response • Perimeter alarms activated • Surveillance cameras inoperative – Unauthorized camera failed to see trespassers • Slow dispatch • Inept initial response • Guards inside HEUMF silenced alarm; no visual – Assumed maintenance • Ultimately: robust security response

Contributors to Failure • Inadequate operational testing • High false and nuisance alarm rates • Critical features inoperative – Not Priority maintenance • Compensatory measures • Growing maintenance backlog • Reduced funding for security Culture of Permissiveness

Contributors to Failure (cont. ) • Split accountability and responsibility Plant management contractor: Security systems vs. Security contractor: Security personnel • Federal oversight … early indicators

Initial Recovery Actions • Fortified HEUMF • Reduced false alarm rate • Security personnel and system management into single contract • Security system maintenance priority

Personal Observations Secretary of Energy Task: Examine DOE security constructs Central Observation: “… a pervasive culture of tolerating the intolerable and accepting the unacceptable. ” Defective Culture In Need of Change

Personal Observations Set Conditions for Successful Security Culture: – – – Responsibility for success shared by all Clear lines of authority/accountability Performance testing: operational effectiveness Incentivize information flow and self-criticism Circulate assignments between HQ and field Walk the talk Culture: Preparing to Pass It On

Trespassers - Federal convictions - Sentenced: 3, 5 years

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