2004 Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Conference 1 3 February

2004 Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Conference 1 - 3 February 2004 MG Skip Philips U. S. Army Reserve The Army Reserve

• A Complementary Force vs. a Supplementary Force – no longer a force in reserve • Inactive Duty to Active Duty to Inactive Duty • Mission Capable not mobilization capable • Reduced structure with same end strength—fully manned units with modernized equipment – TTHS Account to account for non-ready soldiers • Practiced, Institutionalized, Leader Development and Growth through PME and Developmental Assignments – PME outside the unit while in a training status The Army Reserve

Then Now Oct 2002 to Present Operation Iraqi Freedom + 79, 123 troops MOB BOOTS ON GROUND ALERT Finite Period Of Mobilization Continuous Mobilization (Institutional) SUSTAIN RESET/ RETRAIN The Army Reserve DEMOB

• Reduce strategic lift requirements • Reduce logistics footprint in area of operations with the commonality in equipment platforms • Reduce inventories through management of like type equipment requirements • Reduce costs through reduced inventories and force structure • Reduce O&S costs and training time • Reduction in requisitioning, shipping and receiving errors The Army Reserve

• Optimize force structure through the Army RESET process (personnel & equipment) • Maintain readiness posture • Single Theater CS/CSS (Theater Support Command) • Forward presence The Army Reserve

• Change logistics doctrine • Optimize Logistics • Change Business Processes • Reduce Requirements • Improve/upgrade/rightsize Infrastructure • Field Improved Logistics Equipment (enablers) • Exploit Science and Technology • Intermediate Staging (Support) Base • Split-Based & Reach Operations • Leverage Contractor/Host Nation Support • National Maintenance Program • Velocity Management • Dollar Cost Banding • Single Stock Fund • Recapitalization • Enhance Strategic Response • Meet Deployment Timeline • Depots • Containment Projection Platforms • Diagnostic and Prognostics • Precision Munitions • Fuel Efficient Systems • Common Chassis Logistic Enablers are the Key to Success • Common Unit Design • Reach Operations • Intermediate Staging (Support) Base • Distribution Based Logistics • Standardized Strategic/Mission • Combat Configured Loads • Cultural Change • Update Planning Factor and Allocation Rules • Identify and Validate ASOS • Palletized Load System • Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles • Tactical Fire Fighting Truck • M 915 A 3 Line Haul Tractors • All Terrain Lifter Army System • HMMWVs • M 878 Yard Tractor • Rough Terrain Cargo Handler The Army Reserve

• New Procurement Ø Projected in Procurement-1 R submission (require a minimum of $400 M per year) Ø Funded through Other Procurement, Army appropriation • The Redistribution or Cascading of Equipment from the Active Component Ø The Army Reserve has 42% of the Army’s combat service support structure Ø As such, little combat service support equipment is cascaded from the Active Component to the Army Reserve Ø Likewise, little or no funding accompanies the equipment that is cascaded to restore it to the appropriate standards • Recapitalization of Old (Legacy) Equipment Ø The rebuild and selected upgrade of currently fielded systems to a zero mile/zero time system Ø Limited benefit from Army Recap program for the Army Reserve • Congressional Adds Ø Funding earmarked for specific equipment • National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) Ø Started in 1981, NGREA is congressional directed program providing funds to the Reserve Components to improve readiness. Ø Enables economical stewardship of resources by providing the flexibility to acquire new equipment and rebuild/overhaul/refurbish existing systems. The Army Reserve

ARMY RESERVE PROCUREMENT $641 $Millions $550 D O W N A R D $567 $424 $278 $282 $279. 5 *$300 $281 $126 $149 $191 $133 $90 $205 $167 $114 $84 $91 $75 $8 $177 $186 $142 $147 $20 $30 $14 $243 $158 $115 $125 $103 $64 $45 $5 $3. 5 $10 $12 Army Reserve POM Target $400 Million Annually * ESTIMATED P-1 R PROJECTION The Army Reserve T R E N D

*ALL SOURCES = P 1 -R, NGREA, CONG ADDS The Army Reserve

FMTV EXAMPLE HISTORICALLY, FUNDING TENDS TO SLIP TO THE RIGHT The Army Reserve

§ Green = Fleet Average Age equals ½ EUL or Less. § Yellow = Fleet Average Age > than ½ EUL and < EUL § Orange = Fleet Average exceeds EUL + 10 years § Red BOTTOMLINE: Equipment exceeds *Economical Usage Life (EUL) = Fleet Average Age exceeds EUL + 10 - 20 yrs DATA SOURCE: LOGSA, MAY 03 The Army Reserve

üHigh Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (99) ü 10 K/4 K Forklifts (122) HMMWV ü 5000 Gal Fuel Tankers (65) üM 787 Yard Tractors (12) üM 915 Line Haul Tractors (111) Yard Tractor üHEMTT Cargo Truck & Fuel Tankers (13/6) ü 5 -Ton Dump Trucks (17) ü 5 -Ton Cargo Trucks (102) M 915 Tractor ü 22. 5 Ton Semi-Trailers (140) HEMTT Cargo The Army Reserve

• Unit Readiness Reporting only reports approximately 9% of total equipment. • Operational Readiness rates for non-reportable equipment is a challenge for the Army Reserve because of the age of the nonreportable TWV fleet. . . limited visibility. • Additional maintenance and rebuild funds are needed to support aging Army Reserve tactical wheeled vehicles and the increase in OPTEMPO due to OIF requirements. The Army Reserve

• Lack of adequate funding stream to purchase or upgrade TWV fleet • Reduced or decremented system quantities and delayed fieldings impacts the ability to meet Transformation goals • Aging equipment is expensive and labor-intensive to maintain and sustainment funding must be increased • Substitute or in-lieu-of items perpetuate incompatibility and interoperability issues. These incompatibility issues create impediments to supporting the digitized force and OIF requirements • Limited benefit from Army Recap program for the Army Reserve BOTTOMLINE: • Shortage of new equipment procurement (P-1 R) makes funding provided through NGREA, Congressional Add and support of Depot Maintenance Programs vital to the readiness of the Army Reserve TWV fleet The Army Reserve

“First is the Soldier. Our Soldiers are paramount. They will remain the centerpiece of our thinking, our systems, and our combat formations. We must always remember, ‘Humans are more important than hardware’. We must always remember that Soldiers ARE the Army. ” - Peter J. Schoomaker, CSA Person of the Year represents 2. 6 million men and women of the Armed Forces AUSA 2003 Washington, DC The Army Reserve