1896 1920 Doublespending 1987 2006 1896 1920 Doublespending
1896 1920 比特币的原理及运作机制 Double-spending攻击 第一步 第二步 1987 2006
1896 1920 比特币的原理及运作机制 Double-spending攻击 第三步 第四步 1987 2006
1896 1920 1987 Enhancing Bitcoin Security and Performance with Strong Consistency via Collective Signing 通过集体签名强化一致性 提升比特币安全性和性能 2006
1896 Bitcoin and its limitation Byz. Coin Performance Evaluation Conclusions 1920 1987 2006
1896 Bitcoin and its limitation Byz. Coin Performance Evaluation Conclusions 1920 1987 2006
1896 1920 1987 Byz. Coin Strawman design: PBFTCoin Opening the consensus group From MACs to Collective Signing Decoupling Transaction Verification from Leader Election 2006
1896 1920 1987 2006
1896 1920 1987 Byz. Coin Strawman design: PBFTCoin Opening the consensus group From MACs to Collective Signing Decoupling Transaction Verification from Leader Election 2006
1896 1920 Opening the consensus group 固定大小的窗口 最近活跃的矿 防御Sybil攻击 1987 2006
1896 1920 1987 Byz. Coin Strawman design: PBFTCoin Opening the consensus group From MACs to Collective Signing Decoupling Transaction Verification from Leader Election 2006
1896 1920 1987 2006
1896 1920 1987 2006 From MACs Signing Collective Signing 通信复杂度:O(n)→O(logn) 组播协议 通信树 验证复杂度:O(n)→O(1) Cosi集体签名协议 通信树 Schnorr 多重签名 Schnorr多重签名+通信树=集体签名
1896 1920 1987 Byz. Coin Strawman design: PBFTCoin Opening the consensus group From MACs to Collective Signing Decoupling Transaction Verification from Leader Election 2006
1896 1920 1987 Decoupling Transaction Verification from Leader Election 微块/事务块 存储和提交事务 几秒钟创建 键块 用于选择领导者 2006
1896 Bitcoin and its limitation Byz. Coin Performance Evaluation Conclusions 1920 1987 2006
1896 Performance Evaluation 在 36台机器上模拟 1008个节点 200 ms往返延迟 35 Mbps 链路带宽 1920 1987 2006
1896 Performance Evaluation 协商延迟 1920 1987 2006
1896 Performance Evaluation 交易吞吐量 1920 1987 2006
1896 Bitcoin and its limitation Byz. Coin Performance Evaluation Conclusions 1920 1987 2006
1896 Conclusions Byz. Coin-可扩展的BFT共识算法 PBFT:强大一致性 集体签名:高扩展性 Bitcoin-NG:低事务延迟 1920 1987 2006
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