15 849 Hot Topics in Networking Four Next

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15 -849: Hot Topics in Networking Four Next Generation Architectures Srinivasan Seshan 1

15 -849: Hot Topics in Networking Four Next Generation Architectures Srinivasan Seshan 1

Key Questions • How do these proposals differ in addressing similar problems? • Routing

Key Questions • How do these proposals differ in addressing similar problems? • Routing • Addressing • Service interface • Security • Economics/Policy • Mobility • Naming 2

Key Questions • What are the key hurdles for each project? • Scalability •

Key Questions • What are the key hurdles for each project? • Scalability • Difficult scenarios/usage models • Inherent complexity • Handling real‐world incentives/economics • Evolution from current network 3

Key Questions • Do you believe in basic motivations of each project? • Do

Key Questions • Do you believe in basic motivations of each project? • Do we really need a new Internet arch? • If so, how do we deploy this? • What about IPv 6? 4

NSF Programs • Stagnation • 100 x 100 Clean Slate Design • Planet. Lab

NSF Programs • Stagnation • 100 x 100 Clean Slate Design • Planet. Lab • Overcoming the Internet Impasse through Virtualization GENI • FIND FIA (aka FIND phase 2) • Phase 1 – 50 “small” projects • Phase 2 – 4 large “integrative” projects • • Named Data Networking Mobility. First NEBULA e. Xpressive Internet Architecture 5

Named Data Networking • In the beginning. . . – First applications strictly focused

Named Data Networking • In the beginning. . . – First applications strictly focused on host-to-host interprocess communication: • Remote login, file transfer, . . . – Internet was built around this host-to-host model. – Architecture is well-suited for communication between pairs of stationary hosts. • . . . while today – Vast majority of Internet usage is data retrieval and service access. – Users care about the content and are oblivious to location. They are often oblivious as to delivery time: • Fetching headlines from CNN, videos from You. Tube, TV from Tivo • Accessing a bank account at www. bank. com. 6

To the beginning. . . • What if you could re-architect the way “bulk”

To the beginning. . . • What if you could re-architect the way “bulk” data transfer applications worked • HTTP • FTP • Email • etc. • . . . knowing what we know now? 7

Google… Biggest content source Third largest ISP Level(3) Global Crossing Google 8 source: ‘ATLAS’

Google… Biggest content source Third largest ISP Level(3) Global Crossing Google 8 source: ‘ATLAS’ Internet Observatory 2009 Annual Report’, C. Labovitz et. al.

1995 ‐ 2007: Textbook Internet 2009: Rise of the Hyper Giants 9 source: ‘ATLAS’

1995 ‐ 2007: Textbook Internet 2009: Rise of the Hyper Giants 9 source: ‘ATLAS’ Internet Observatory 2009 Annual Report’, C. Labovitz et. al.

What does the network look like… ISP 10

What does the network look like… ISP 10

What should the network look like… ISP 11

What should the network look like… ISP 11

Communication vs. Distribution 12

Communication vs. Distribution 12

CCN Model a Dat • • Packets say ‘what’ not ‘who’ (no src or

CCN Model a Dat • • Packets say ‘what’ not ‘who’ (no src or dst) communication is to local peer(s) upstream performance is measurable memory makes loops impossible 13

Context Awareness? • Like IP, CCN imposes no semantics on names. • ‘Meaning’ comes

Context Awareness? • Like IP, CCN imposes no semantics on names. • ‘Meaning’ comes from application, institution and global conventions: /parc. com/people/van/presentations/CCN /parc. com/people/van/calendar/free. Time. For. Meeti ng /this. Room/projector /this. Meeting/documents /near. By/available/parking /this. House/demand. Reduction/2 KW 14

CCN Names/Security /nytimes. com/web/front. Page/v 20100415/s 0/0 x 3 fdc 96 a 4. .

CCN Names/Security /nytimes. com/web/front. Page/v 20100415/s 0/0 x 3 fdc 96 a 4. . . signature key � � � � �� 0 x 1 b 048347 nytimes. com/web/george/desktop public key � �� � Signed by nytimes. com/web/george Signed by nytimes. com/web Signed by nytimes. com • Per-packet signatures using public key • Packet also contain link to public key 15

Names Route Interests • FIB lookups are longest match (like IP prefix lookups) which

Names Route Interests • FIB lookups are longest match (like IP prefix lookups) which helps guarantee log(n) state scaling for globally accessible data. • Although CCN names are longer than IP identifiers, their explicit structure allows lookups as efficient as IP’s. • Since nothing can loop, state can be approximate (e. g. , bloom filters). 16

CCN node model 17

CCN node model 17

CCN node model get /parc. com/videos/Widget. A. mpg/ v 3/s 2 P /parc. com/videos/Widget.

CCN node model get /parc. com/videos/Widget. A. mpg/ v 3/s 2 P /parc. com/videos/Widget. A. mpg/v 3/s 2 0 18

Flow/Congestion Control • One Interest pkt one data packet • All xfers are done

Flow/Congestion Control • One Interest pkt one data packet • All xfers are done hop-by-hop – so no need for congestion control • Sequence numbers are part of the name space 19

What about connections/Vo. IP? • Key challenge - rendezvous • Need to support requesting

What about connections/Vo. IP? • Key challenge - rendezvous • Need to support requesting ability to request content that has not yet been published • E. g. , route request to potential publishers, and have them create the desired content in response 20

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Trust in NDN 22

Trust in NDN 22

Mobility. First • Fundamental change in design goals and assumptions • • ~10 B+

Mobility. First • Fundamental change in design goals and assumptions • • ~10 B+ mobile/wireless end‐points as “first‐class” Internet devices Mobility as the norm for end‐points and access networks Wireless access – varying link BW/quality, multiple radios, disconnections Stronger security/trust requirements due to: • • open radio medium need for dynamic trust association for mobile devices/users increased privacy concerns (e. g. location tracking) greater potential for network failure • Mobile applications involve location/content/context and energy constraints • Technology has also changed a lot in the ~40 yrs since IP was designed • Moore’s law improvements in computing and storage (~5‐ 6 orders‐of‐ magnitude gain in cost performance since 1970) • Edge/core disparity, fast fiber but continuing shortage of radio spectrum 23

Mobility. First • Clean‐slate protocol design that directly addresses the problems of mobility at

Mobility. First • Clean‐slate protocol design that directly addresses the problems of mobility at scale, while also strengthening the trust model • • End‐point and network mobility at scale Intrinsic properties of wireless medium More stringent security/trust requirements Special needs of emerging mobile applications • Fixed internet access is treated as a special case of the more general design • Although the “sweet spot” of our protocol is wireless/mobile, we believe that our design provides important benefits to fixed network applications • • Security/trust Robustness Fault tolerance Context/content 24

Goals 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Host + network mobility No global root

Goals 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Host + network mobility No global root of trust Intentional data receipt Byzantine robustness Content addressability Evolvable network 25

Additional Design Principles 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Visibility and choice Usability

Additional Design Principles 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Visibility and choice Usability Manageability Simplicity Regulability Commercializability Technology‐awareness 26

Mobility. First Architecture 27

Mobility. First Architecture 27

Protocol Stack 28

Protocol Stack 28

Name-Address Separation 29

Name-Address Separation 29

Name Resolution 30

Name Resolution 30

Storage Aware Routing 31

Storage Aware Routing 31

Security 1. Public keys global identifiers for hosts & networks; forms basis for: •

Security 1. Public keys global identifiers for hosts & networks; forms basis for: • • Ensuring accountability of traffic Ubiquitous access‐control infrastructure Robust routing protocols Preventing address hijacking 2. Support deployment of policies that constrain the traffic that a network or node receives • In the limit, a “default‐disconnected” posture 3. No single globally trusted root for naming or addressing • Opens naming to innovation to combat naming‐related abuses • Removes obstacles to adoption of secure routing protocols 4. Systematically consider Trusted Computing Base of designs • Promote TCB reduction technologies (e. g. , Byzantine fault tolerance) 32

NEBULA • NEBULA is an architecture for the cloud‐based future Internet • More secure

NEBULA • NEBULA is an architecture for the cloud‐based future Internet • More secure and reliable • Deployable and evolvable • Truly clean slate • Availability: At risk of network outages • Security: • Poor endpoint authentication • HIPAA policy restrictions not expressible with existing routing protocols • Consistency: • Communications end‐‐‐point focused, not data focused • Cloud systems have embraced weak consistency (CAP Theorem) 33

Architecture 34

Architecture 34

Network Security • The “big I” Internet Is federated: • Policies must be enforced

Network Security • The “big I” Internet Is federated: • Policies must be enforced across realms (e. g. , DDo. S) • NEBULA addresses problems at right places: • Extensibility+Policy: new control plane • Policy Enforcement: new data plane • Availability: high‐performance, redundant‐path core with high‐availability core routers 35

NDP 36

NDP 36

NEBULA Virtual and Extensible Network Techniques (NVENT) 37

NEBULA Virtual and Extensible Network Techniques (NVENT) 37

NEBULA Core (NCore) 38

NEBULA Core (NCore) 38

XIA Vision We envision a future Internet that: • Is trustworthy • Security broadly

XIA Vision We envision a future Internet that: • Is trustworthy • Security broadly defined is the biggest challenge • Supports long‐term evolution of usage models • Including host‐host, content retrieval, services, … • Supports long term technology evolution • Not just for link technologies, but also for storage and computing capabilities in the network and end‐points • Allows all actors to operate effectively • Despite differences in roles, goals and incentives 39

Today’s Internet Src: Client IP Dest: Server IP TCP Client IP Server IP •

Today’s Internet Src: Client IP Dest: Server IP TCP Client IP Server IP • Client retrieves document from a specific web server • But client mostly cares about correctness of content, timeliness • Specific server, file name, etc. are not of interest • Transfer is between wrong principals • What if the server fails? • Optimizing transfer using local caches is hard • Need to use application‐specific overlay or transparent proxy – bad! 40

e. Xpressive Internet Architecture Src: Client ID Dest: Content ID PDA Content • Client

e. Xpressive Internet Architecture Src: Client ID Dest: Content ID PDA Content • Client expresses communication intent for content explicitly • Network uses content identifier to retrieve content from appropriate location • How does client know the content is correct? • Intrinsic security! Verify content using self‐certifying id: hash(content) = content id • How does source know it is talking to the right client? • Intrinsic security! Self‐certifying host identifiers 41

A Bit More Detail … Dest: Service ID Content Name? Dest: Client ID Content

A Bit More Detail … Dest: Service ID Content Name? Dest: Client ID Content ID Dest: Content ID Flexible Trust Management Diverse Communicating Entities Anywhere Intrinsic Security Hash( ) = CID? 42 XIA Transformational Ideas

P 1: Evolvable Set of Principals • Identifying the intended communicating entities reduces complexity

P 1: Evolvable Set of Principals • Identifying the intended communicating entities reduces complexity and overhead • No need to force all communication at a lower level (hosts), as in today’s Internet • Allows the network to evolve Content a 581 fe 9. . . Services d 9389 fa … Host 024 e 881 … Future Entities 39 c 0348 … 43

P 2: Security as Intrinsic as Possible • Security properties are a direct result

P 2: Security as Intrinsic as Possible • Security properties are a direct result of the design of the system • Do not rely on correctness of external configurations, actions, data bases • Malicious actions can be easily identified Content a 581 fe 9. . . Services d 9389 fa … Host 024 e 881 … Future Entities 39 c 0348 … 44

P 3: Narrow Waist for Trust Management • Ensure that the inputs to the

P 3: Narrow Waist for Trust Management • Ensure that the inputs to the intrinsically secure system match the trust assumptions and intensions of the user • Certificate authorities, reputation, personal, … • Narrow waist allows leveraging diverse mechanisms for trust management Declaration of Independence Trust Management 043 e 49 af 3890 dd 327134389 a 90 cd 2199 45

P 4: Narrow Waist for All Principals • Extends today’s host‐based narrow waist to

P 4: Narrow Waist for All Principals • Extends today’s host‐based narrow waist to all principals: hosts, services, content, … • Defines the API between the principals and the network protocol mechanisms XIA adds evolvability at the waist: IP: Evolvability of: Applications Link technologies Applications Evolving set of principals Link technologies 46

P 5: All other Network Functions are Explicit Services • DNS, firewalls, … •

P 5: All other Network Functions are Explicit Services • DNS, firewalls, … • Causes problems in IP • Covers all functions not part of the narrow waist • XIA provides a principal type for services • Keeps the architecture simple and easy to reason about 47

XIA: e. Xpressive Internet Architecture • Each communication operation expresses the intent of the

XIA: e. Xpressive Internet Architecture • Each communication operation expresses the intent of the operation • Also: explicit trust management, APIs among actors • XIA is a single inter‐network in which all principals are connected • Not a collection of architectures implemented through, e. g. , virtualization, overlays • Not based on a “preferred” principal (host, content), that has to support all communication 48

Users Applications Services Host Support Content Support Services Support e. Xpressive Internet Protocol Intrinsic

Users Applications Services Host Support Content Support Services Support e. Xpressive Internet Protocol Intrinsic Security … Trustworthy Network Operation Network‐Network User‐Network XIA Components and Interactions 49

What Applications Does XIA Support • Since XIA supports host‐based communication, today’s applications continue

What Applications Does XIA Support • Since XIA supports host‐based communication, today’s applications continue to work • Will benefit from the intrinsic security properties • New applications can express the right principal • Can also specify other principals (host based) as fallbacks • Content‐centric applications • Explicit reliance on network services • Mobile users • As yet unknown usage models 50