1 FOOD DEFENSE TRAINING FOOD PROTECTION TASK FORCE

1 FOOD DEFENSE TRAINING FOOD PROTECTION TASK FORCE & RAPID RESPONSE TEAM MEETING Brandon Sauceda, MPH RRT Program Manager Georgia Department of Agriculture Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness CARVER+Shock Exercise

2 Food Security: access to sufficient quantity / quality of nutritious food Food Safety: protection from unintentional contamination • Agents likely to occur in food supply Overview Food Defense: protection from intentional contamination • Biological, chemical, physical, radiological agents

3 Accidents Disgruntled Employee Terrorism Economically Motivated Adulteration Mother Nature Overview

4 Overview - “Figure 2: Confirmed malicious contaminations of food around the world. ” Frederickson, N. R. (2014). Chapter 36: Food Security: Biosecurity. In Encyclopedia of Agriculture and Food Systems (Vol. 3 pp. 311 -323)

5 Economically Motivated Adulteration • aka “Food Fraud” • Definition: “surreptitious addition of non-authentic substances, unwarranted substitution of ingredients, or mislabeling of food products to gain inequitable financial advantage” —Frederickson, N. R. (2014). Chapter 36: Food Security: Biosecurity. In Encyclopedia of Agriculture and Food Systems (Vol. 3 pp. 311 -323) • As opposed to other intentional contamination events (terrorism), EMA is not intended to be discovered • As a result, EMA can maintain longevity • Fish / Seafood is most often adulterated for economic gain Overview

6 Incidents of Intentional Contamination • 1981, Spain • Cooking oil adulterated with industrial rapeseed triggered toxic oil syndrome • 20, 000 illnesses • 800 deaths http: //www. thegrocer. co. uk/fmcg/rapeseed-oil-at-tipping-point-as-it-woos-olive-oil-fans/351716. article Overview Incidents

7 Incidents of Intentional Contamination • 1984, Oregon USA • Salmonella typhimurium introduced into 10 salad bars by Rajneeshee cult • Aiming to influence a local election • 751 illnesses https: //people. uwec. edu/piercech/bio/Rajneeshee%20 Cult. htm Overview Incidents

8 Incidents of Intentional Contamination • 2008 -2009, China • Melamine illegally added to milk products to falsify protein content • 300, 000 illnesses • 6 deaths http: //www. investigativescience. com/CON-290408 p 1. html Overview Incidents

9 Incidents of Intentional Contamination • October, 2012, New Jersey USA • Cheaper ketchup repackaged into bottles for more expensive ketchup • None made it to market http: //abcnewsradioonline. com/business-news/hundreds-of-fake-heinz-ketchup-bottles-discovered-in-new-jer. html Overview Incidents

10 Incidents of Intentional Contamination • October 2013, Japan • Malathion added to frozen foods by disgruntled production line employee • ≤ 2, 800 illnesses • Major Recall http: //www. medicaldaily. com/over-1000 -sick-after-eating-contaminated-food-japans-largest-seafoodproducer-266606 Overview Incidents

11 • Designed to improve global food protection and prevent foodborne illness • Ratified 2011, rule-making process underway • Updated previous policy (1938) to reflect more high-tech and complex food industry Overview Incidents Policy Response

12 • Proposed Rules: • Focused mitigation strategies to protect food against intentional adulteration (IA) • Foreign supplier verification • Preventative controls for • Human food • Animal feed • Standards for produce safety • Accreditation of 3 rd party auditors • Sanitary transportation of human and animal food Overview Incidents Policy Response

13 Food Defense Plan Builder • Food defense plan – written document recording practices implemented to control and/or minimize the risk of intentional contamination • Available through FDA • Incorporates: • Broad mitigation strategies • Vulnerability assessment • Focused mitigation strategies • Emergency contact network • Action plans Overview Incidents Policy Response

14 Food Defense Preparedness System Based on Presidential Policy Directive 8 1. Prevent 2. Protect Comprehensive food defense strategy incorporates all 5 frameworks 3. Mitigate 4. Respond 5. Recover Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness

15 Food Defense Preparedness System • Prevention Adversary does not attempt to adulterate food • How do we eliminate the opportunity to adulterate? • How do we remove the motivation to adulterate? Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness

16 Food Defense Preparedness System • Protection Block the adversary’s attempt • What needs securing? • How do we vigilantly look for anomalies? Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness

17 Food Defense Preparedness System • Mitigation Minimize the adverse health and economic effects • What can we do to lessen the impact? Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness

18 Food Defense Preparedness System • Response Stop the spread of adverse effects, provide care to those affected • What response actions are needed? • How do we inform / instruct the public? Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness

19 Food Defense Preparedness System • Recovery Return to normal commerce, better prepared • How do we return to normal? • How do we gather lessons learned and adapt? Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness

20 CARVER+Shock • Risk Assessment tool – vulnerability assessment: • Criticality – degree of public health or economic consequence • Accessibility – ability of adversary to access / egress point of contamination • Recuperability – delay required to bring system back into recovery • Vulnerability – potential for successful attack – ability to introduce enough of agent to survive control steps and cause harm to consumer. • Effect – direct loss from attack, measured in lost production in food system • Recognizability – ease of target identification • Shock – combined health, economic, and psychological impacts of attack Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness CARVER+Shock

21 CARVER+Shock Threat Vulnerability • • Gaps in defense RISK Adversary’s resources and capacities Consequence • Human & economic impact of attack • Facility vs. Supply Chain Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness CARVER+Shock

22 CARVER+Shock Exercise • Study the flow-map of the Frozen Pizza Plant • Consider the following: environment, location, timing, equipment, barriers, worker observation, etc. • For each station (#1 -#15) score for Vulnerability and for Accessibility • There is no wrong answer, use your professional judgment Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness CARVER+Shock Exercise

23 Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness CARVER+Shock Exercise

24 References • Slides adapted from the National Center for Food Protection and Defense’s “Food Defense Training” slides from the Food Defense Conference (September 17, 2014) and Jon Woody / USDA’s “Vulnerability Assessment” slides (same date / location). Overview Incidents Policy Response Preparedness CARVER+Shock Exercise