1 Class 7 Fiction 2 Class 7 Fiction

1 Class 7: Fiction

2 Class 7: Fiction Colin Radford: “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina? ” Thesis: Our being moved by fictional characters appears to be ultimately irrational. Background: The Paradox of Fiction: (1) We believe that the objects of our emotions exist. (2) We know that fictional objects don’t exist. (3) We sometimes have extreme emotional reactions to fiction.

3 Class 7: Fiction The Problem • “What is it to be moved by something’s happening to someone? ” (67) - Seeing someone’s torment moves us. - The thought of someone’s torment moves us. - Thought implies belief: “When we say that the thought of his plight moves us to tears to grieves us, it is thinking of or contemplating suffering which we believe to be actual or likely that does it. ” (68)

4 Class 7: Fiction The Problem (cont’d) • If an actor friend mimics pains and agony, and you know he is only acting, you are unlikely to be moved. • But if your friend is re-enacting the death agonies of another friend, you might be horrified. • Historical novels, plays, etc. , seem unproblematic because “these works depict and forcibly remind us of the real plight and of the real sufferings of real people, and it is for these persons that we feel. ” (69) • We cannot grieve for Mercutio, but we can be moved by his death.

5 Class 7: Fiction The Problem (cont’d) • “What is worrying is that we are moved by the death of Mercutio and we weep while knowing that no one has really died, that no young man has been cut off in the flower of his youth. ” (71)

6 Class 7: Fiction First Solution We forget that we are only watching a film or a play. Surely if we thought someone was actually being killed, we would rush the stage, or run from theater. We would be “geniunely appalled. ” But we don’t do any of these things. • We are not unaware that we are only watching a play involving fictional characters.

7 Class 7: Fiction Second Solution We “suspend disbelief” to maintain the illusion. We don’t continually remind ourselves that we’re watching a play or movie. And we are never unaware that we are watching a play or movie.

8 Class 7: Fiction Third Solution There’s nothing special about fiction – a lot of people aren’t moved by it. Of course, a lot of people are moved by fiction.

9 Class 7: Fiction Fourth Solution Works of fiction aren’t unlike modal reactions. • We are often moved by imagining things that could (or could have) happened. • “So a man can be moved not only by what has happened to someone, by actual suffering and death, but by their prospect and the greater the probability of the awful thing’s happening, the more likely we are to sympathise. ” (73) The analogy doesn’t fit: Here are being moved by the pain or suffering that might happen to a real person. This still fails to explain how we can be moved by the suffering of a fictional person.

10 Class 7: Fiction Fifth Solution We are moved by thinking about a real person in that situation. But we are not moved by someone else’s plight – we are moved by what happens to the fictional character – we weep for her. • But the problem remains: how can we do so when we know she isn’t real?

11 Class 7: Fiction Sixth Solution There is no problem. Being moved by fiction is an entirely different kind of being moved. • “There is being moved (Sense 1) in real life and “being moved” (Sense 2) by what happens to fictional characters. But since there are these two sorts and senses, it does not follow from the necessity of belief in the reality of the agony or whatever it is, for being moved (S. 1), that belief in its reality is, or ought to be necessary for “being moved” (S. 2). ” (75) There seems to be something to this, but our responses just aren’t that different.

12 Class 7: Fiction Some Differences • However strong our emotional reactions to fictions, they don’t seem to have the same duration as our emotional reactions to real events. • We seem to have a divided state of mind with regard to our desires: - We don’t want the hero to die. - We do want the hero to die. • We get a certain pleasure even from our negative emotional responses to fictions.

13 Class 6: Interpreting Art Conclusion “I am left with the conclusion that our being moved in certain ways by works of art, though very “natural” to us and in that way only too intelligible, involves us in inconsistency and so incoherence. ” (78)

14 Class 7: Fiction Questions & Problems (1) Re: Solution 1: Don’t we get “caught up” in films and plays, to the point where the real world dissolves away, and we have to be “jolted” back into the real world? (2) Do our emotional reactions differ between watching/reading a fiction and watching/reading something “based on a true story”?

15 Class 7: Fiction Kendall Walton: “Fearing Fictions” Thesis: We aren’t afraid when we watch a horror movie – we pretend to be afraid by entering a fictional game world combining aspects of the fictional movie world with aspects of the real world.

16 Class 7: Fiction The Paradox of Fiction (1) We believe that the objects of our emotions exist. (2) We know that fictional objects don’t exist. (3) We sometimes have extreme emotional reactions to fiction. • Many proposed explanations focus on (1). - Half-Belief - Gut-Belief - Momentary Belief - Suspension of Disbelief • Walton, instead, focuses on (3): we don’t experience real emotions in response to fictions.

17 Class 7: Fiction The Barrier of Fiction • There is a barrier against physical interactions with a fictional world. • The barrier is psychologically transparent. - we detest - we pity - we worry - we envy - we fear • We become emotionally-involved: caught up.

18 Class 7: Fiction Charles & the Green Slime • Physical interaction is only possible with what actually exists, but this doesn’t prevent Charles from fearing the slime. Is Charles Afraid of the Slime? • If Charles took the film to be a news flash, he might naturally be afraid. - But Charles knows the slime isn’t real, and there is no danger. • What makes us think Charles is afraid? - Charles says he’s afraid. - Charles’ state seems similar to a state of fear.

19 Class 7: Fiction “Quasi-Fear” • Charles’ state is different from an ordinary case of fear. - Charles is fully aware the slime isn’t real. - Fear must be accompanied by the belief that one is in danger. - Charles’ experience is intense but is it “fear”? • Does Charles believe the slime is real? - Charles calls it fear, but this isn’t reason enough. - If he was afraid, we would expect him to flee, to call the police, etc. - Does Charles believe on some level that the slime is real?

20 Class 7: Fiction (1) The Half-Belief Hypothesis • “Half-belief” – to be not quite sure it is true, and not quite sure it is untrue. - But Charles shows no inclination to act on any fear. - He knows the slime isn’t real: he isn’t uncertain. - Charles’ symptoms aren’t those of mere suspicion. - Charles has physical, extreme manifestations of fear.

21 Class 7: Fiction (2) The Gut-Belief Hypothesis • (As opposed to “intellectual” belief) – like someone with a “gut” belief that flying is dangerous. - But Charles has no inclination to leave theatre or call the police. - Charles only has the automatic involuntary symptoms of fear. - One has reasons for fleeing, but one doesn’t have reasons for involuntary responses.

22 Class 7: Fiction (3) The Momentary Belief Hypothesis • At moments, Charles “loses track of reality” – he momentarily thinks the slime is real, and he fears it. - These moments are too short for Charles to act on (or even be consciously aware of) them. - But Charles’ response isn’t momentary – his symptoms may last through the entire movie. - How does this “fear” compare to equivalent emotions of “pity” or “envy”? - Most likely, one’s sense of reality is uninterrupted during the film.

23 Class 7: Fiction So what is this fear? • The fiction might cause real fears of things in the world (e. g. Jaws). • If Charles has a heart condition, he may be afraid of the film itself (a fear of depiction of the slime, but not the slime itself).

24 Class 7: Fictional Propositions • Fictional propositions are such that x is true (in the world of y). • “It is fictional that a terrible, green slime is on the loose, ” or “It is true (in the world of the movie) that a terrible, green slime is on the loose. ” • Groups of fictional truths constitute a “fictional world. ” • We see the same sort of fictional propositions at work with regard to games of make-believe.

25 Class 7: Fictional Propositions (cont’d) • All fictional truths are man-made, and fall under one of two categories. (1) Truths simply imagined to be true: “imaginary truths” (2) “Make-believe truths”

26 Class 7: Fiction Make-Believe Truths • Where participants agree to certain ‘principles’ of makebelieve (e. g. mud pies) • These propositions may be truths regardless of anyone’s imaginings. • The principles need not be explicit or deliberately adopted. • The game and principles of make-believe may be entirely private. • Representational works of art generate make-believe truths: these truths are understood because the principles of make-believe are understood to be in force (though these principles, themselves, are rarely explicit).

27 Class 7: Fiction Make-Believe • Father-and-son game of “Monster”: - Child screams and runs away (involuntary, perhaps). - The child knows it is a game. - The child is not really afraid. - The child, like the monster, belongs to the fictional game of make-believe. - It is like a theatrical event, and the child is an actor, playing himself. • Charles is in a similar position: - It is make-believe that Charles is afraid. - Charles is like an actor, impersonating himself.

28 Class 7: Fiction Make-Believe (cont’d) • Facts about Charles generate make-believe truths about him: - By what he thinks and feels, not just by how he acts: Charles’ quasi-fear makes it make-believedly true that he is afraid. - Charles’ quasi-fears result from the make-believe truth that the slime is bearing down on him. - His belief that make-believedly the slime endangers him makes the slime the object of his fear. - “[T]he fact that Charles is quasi-afraid as a result of realizing that make-believedly the slime threatens him generates the truth that make-believedly he is afraid of the slime. ” (14).

29 Class 7: Fiction Make-Believe (cont’d) • The on-stage actor generates make-believe truths solely through is actions (not because of his inner state). • With the game of “Monster, ” the child seems to bring in aspects of both actor and audience. • In a case where the child is undemonstrative, he may still experience quasi-fear, though he does not show any outward symptoms. - Charles is like the undemonstrative child: his behavioral reaction (if any) is not for an audience. It is not his actions that generate the make-believe truth that he is afraid.

30 Class 7: Fiction Make-Believedly, Charles Fears the Slime • It is at least imaginary (and thus fictional) that Charles is afraid. • Charles’ “fear” isn’t deliberate, but automatically triggered by his quasi-fear sensations. • “Charles’s tendency to imagine himself afraid of the slime when he finds himself in the relevant mental state constitutes persuasive grounds for attributing to him acceptance of a principle whereby his experience makes it make-believe that he is afraid. ” (16).

31 Class 7: Fiction Make-Believedly, Charles Fears the Slime (cont’d) • Charles’ game of make-believe is private, while the game of make-believe played in the movie is public, and there are two corresponding fictional worlds. • Charles supplements the film in the same way the illustration supplements the book. • Charles’ fictional world is larger than that of the movie: it includes Charles and the make-believe truths generated by his interaction with the film. • The film serves essentially as a prop to Charles’ game of make-believe.

32 Class 7: Fiction Making Sense of Fictional Propositions • At times, Charles might be heard to exclaim, “Watch out! Here comes the slime!” • Charles’ make-believe world includes both himself and the slime. • In exclaiming, “Here comes the slime, ” Charles is not making an assertion of what make-believedly is the case: He is pretending to (seriously) assert that the slime is headed this way. • Charles is playing along with the fiction (public) of the movie, and incorporating it into his own (private) game of make-believe.

33 Class 7: Fiction Making Sense of Fictional Propositions (cont’d) • “In saying “Yikes!” and “Watch out!” he is pretending to express amazement or terror and pretending to issue a (serious) warning; make-believedly he is doing these things. ” (20) • Why do we so often say, “Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe, ” rather than, “In the novel, Sherlock Homes smokes a pipe”? - An utterance of ‘p’ isn’t an ellipsis for ‘Make-believedly p’; rather, the speaker is make-believedly asserting ‘p’. - That said, a critic might say, “In the novel, Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe, ” but this is because he is not making-believe in the way that the average reader might.

34 Class 7: Fiction Making Sense of Fictional Propositions (cont’d) • Audiences are actually in distinctive psychological states, but these are not pity, worry, or fear; they arise from the awareness of certain make-believe truths. • As make-believe truths are generated by the spectator, Charles is no mere ‘external observer’ of the fictional world of the film. • It is true of Charles’ feelings that make-believedly they are feelings of fear. • We feel ourselves to be a part of the fictional worlds. Walton rejects the notion of ‘suspension of disbelief’: - “Suspension of Disbelief” seems to assume we not completely disbelieve. - Make-believedly, we believe the green slime is coming.

35 Class 7: Fiction Advantages of Walton’s Theory (1) Explains the importance of fiction: - Our experience of representational works serves to clarify our feelings and provides an outlet for pent-up emotions (through catharsis), etc. - We usually include ourselves in our own daydreams; children are usually characters in their own games of make-believe. - One comes to discover his actual feelings by thinking of oneself as belonging to a fictional world. (Counterfactually) - We can gain similar advantages from films, novels, etc. , only if we imagine ourselves as participants.

36 Class 7: Fiction Advantages of Walton’s Theory (cont’d) (2) Explains (apparently) conflicting desires: - When we watch a horror film, we: † sympathize with the characters, hoping they will escape; and † really want a good bloodbath. - “My theory provides a neat explanation. It is merely make -believe that the spectator sympathizes with the heroine and wants her to escape. And he (really) wants it to be make-believe that she suffers a cruel end. He does not have conflicting desires. Nor, for that matter, is it makebelieve that he does. ” (25)

37 Class 7: Fiction Advantages of Walton’s Theory (cont’d) (3) Explains our ability to enjoy repeated viewings: - The viewer knows that make-believedly x, but makebelievedly does not know x. - It is make-believe uncertainty (not any actual uncertainty) that is responsible for the excitement and suspense. - The point of listening to, reading or watching a story is not merely to learn the outcome, but to play a game of make-believe!

38 Class 7: Fiction Questions & Problems (1) Is Walton’s theory of make-believe intuitive? Does it sound like what we do when we watch movies or read books? (2) Are we actually excited when we watch an action movie, or are we merely make-believedly excited? How would Walton account for this?

39 Class 7: Fiction